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ABSTRACT 
Parallel Trade in Pharmaceutical Products within the EEA: From First to Final Marketing 
- Balancing the Need to Protect and Promote Public Health and Safety with the 
EC Treaty Objective of Establishing a Common Market 
by Carl Johan Bjamram 
This thesis provides a thorough clarification of the rules governing parallel trade in 
pharmaceutical products within the EEA; from first to final marketing. More 
specifically, the thesis provides an analysis of the application o f EC competition 
law (Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty), the free movement of goods provisions 
(Articles 28-30 EC Treaty), Community measures, and Member State laws to 
parallel import-restrictive measures. 
The EC Treaty and Commimity measures must, in conjunction with Member State 
laws, facilitate the establishment of an internal market without compromising public 
health and safety. For example, the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty to 
parallel import-restrictive measures must take into consideration the need to 
promote public health and safety by acknowledging the pharmaceutical industry's 
reliance on future investments in 'research and development' (R&D). Similarly, the 
application of Articles 28-30 EC Treaty to repackaging o f pharmaceutical products 
must take into consideration the need to protect public health and safety. The 
importance of balancing the pro-integration objective with the public health and 
safety objective is particularly evident in relation to the application o f the EC Treaty 
to Member State laws governing the pharmaceutical market-specific and potentially 
parallel import-restrictive requirement of marketing authorisations. 
Parallel trade is, nevertheless, a statistically safe practice, and considered essential 
to market integration by encouraging intra-brand competition and widening 
customer choice. Parallel trade is also believed to generate savings to national 
health authorities, and ultimately patients and taxpayers. The thesis therefore 
concludes with a set of recommendations aimed at strengthening the protection and 
promotion of public health and safety without having an unduly negative impact on 
the establishment of an internal market. 
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A NOTE ON FOOTNOTES 
Every source is given a fu l l reference the first time it appears in a chapter, with the 
exception o f a small number of documents and Acts. These exceptions are referred 
to using a system of chapter X , page X, and footnote X in all subsequent chapters. 
The fu-st (and full) reference in a chapter is the principal footnote to which all 
subsequent references in the chapter refer to using a system of footnote (n.) X above. 
Ibid is used i f the immediate above footnote refers to the same source or the same 
footnote. The case number is given i f the main text does not clearly refer to the 
source. For example, i f the principle footnote refers to Case 104/75 Officier van 
Justitie V . de Peijper, all subsequent footnotes w i l l refer to n. X above, para. X i f 
the main text clearly indicates the case concerned, or to Case 104/75, n. X above, 
para. X i f not clear from the main text. Subsequent Commission Decisions are 
referred to using a short form of the 'name' of the decision (e.g. Adalat, n. X above). 
Similarly, i f the principal footnote refers to a literary work, for example P. Rey and 
J. Venit, 'Parallel trade and pharmaceuticals: A policy in search o f itself,' (2004) 29 
E.L.Rev. 153, all subsequent footnotes w i l l refer to Rey and Venit, n. X above, X, 
with the last X denoting the particular page number. The same principle applies to 
Community measures, national legislation and agency guidelines, where either the 
title of the document, name of the author, or an easily identifiable number wi l l be 
used in all subsequent footnotes. Cross-references to other parts of the thesis are 
given in the form of chapter 1(2) above, referring to section 2 of chapter 1, or, i f 
more specific; chapter X, pp. X-X above. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Parallel trade is the act o f purchasing goods in a lower priced market and reselling 
in a higher priced market without authorisation from the manufacturer and owner of 
the intellectual property rights. Having identified a price differential in legitimate 
intellectual property protected products, parallel traders purchase the goods in the 
lower priced market in the hope of selling the goods in the higher priced market.' 
Parallel traders thus compete with the manufacturer's authorised products on the 
higher-priced market. 
Although organised trade outside the manufacturer's distribution channels occurs 
within most products groups, parallel traders have found pharmaceutical products a 
particularly attractive niche market (see chapter 1). This may seem strange 
considering the potential profitability of parallel trade in a wide range of less 
regulated product groups, such as electronic products and clothing. However, 
parallel traders' particular interest in pharmaceutical products is easily explained. 
First, pharmaceutical prices are regulated by national authorities leading to a large 
disparity in prices between different national markets (see chapter I). Secondly, 
pharmaceutical products are a non-substitutable necessity for the well-being of any 
society, guaranteeing a constant and inherent demand. 
Parallel trade is not legally or practically possible in most parts of the world. Strict 
marketing regulations are applied to most pharmaceutical products. Without access 
to the manufacturer's test-results and product-specific information it is very 
difficult to obtain marketing authorisation from national authorities. Further, even i f 
marketing authorisation is obtained, importation would be made economically 
unviable, i f not impossible, due to the fact that most pharmaceutical products 
' See T. Hays, Parallel importation under European Union law, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004); 
and W. Rothnie, Parallel imports, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993). 
benefit from patent protection for the chemical composition of the product and a 
trademark affixed on the packaging. National laws allow intellectual property 
owners to exercise their rights so as to prevent importation or exportation of the 
intellectual property protected products. There are, however, exceptions. A limited 
number of States and 'trade zones' restricts the manufacturer's right to exercise 
intellectual property rights so as to create barriers to trade.^ 
The most prominent and economically significant o f these countries and entities is 
the European Union (EU) and its 25 Member States. The objective of the EC Treaty 
is to establish a common market through the free movement o f goods, workers and 
capital and the application of competition rules.'' 
For this purpose, parallel import-restrictive market strategies, adopted by 
manufacturers, have traditionally been considered as an obstacle to market 
integration by the European Commission (the Commission)'* (see chapter 2). Article 
81 EC Treaty prohibits all agreements, concerted practices and decisions by 
undertakings that may affect trade between Member States and prevent, restrict or 
distort competition within the common market. Article 82 EC Treaty prohibits any 
abuse by a dominant undertaking likely to affect trade between Member States. The 
Commission, the Court of First Instance (CFI), and the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) have found a wide variety of parallel import-restrictive agreements and 
" For example, the European Union, Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Africa have all 
introduced varying forms of exhaustion of trademark rights mechanisms. In late April 2004 a bill 
was introduced to allow re-importation from Canada and other countries into the US: see J. 
Arfwedson, 'Parallel trade in pharmaceuticals,' Quickstudy, The Institute for Policy Innovation (27 
July 2004), p. 2. 
' The fi-ee movement of goods provisions comprise Articles 28 to 30 E C Treaty. Article 28 E C 
Treaty: 'Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be 
prohibited between Member States.' Article 30 E C Treaty: 'Theprovisions o/[Article 2S]...shall not 
preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds 
of...the protection of health and life of humans...;or the protection of industrial and commercial 
property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.' The relevant competition 
rules comprise Articles 81 and 82 E C Treaty. 
" The Commission is the competition authority for the European Community. 
abuses to be prohibited by Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty, from refusals to supply,^ 
and applying a system of dual-pricing in order to l imit parallel importation,^ to the 
imposition o f restrictions through distribution agreements (see chapter 2)? 
Further, the requirement in Directive 2001/83/EC, that no pharmaceutical product 
may be placed on the market without benefiting from a marketing authorisation, 
presents a problem for parallel importers of pharmaceutical products (see chapter 
3). Without access to the manufacturer's product dossier it is almost impossible to 
obtain marketing authorisation. However, in de Peijper^ the ECJ ruled that national 
measures having this effect hinder intra-Community trade contrary to Article 28 EC 
Treaty. '° The Court also ruled that it is imnecessary for the protection of public 
health and safety to request, from the parallel trader, information which the 
competent authority in the importing Member State already has in its possession 
following the original marketing authorisation application. The effect o f this ruling 
was the establishment of a 'first marketing principle' for marketing authorisation 
applications, commonly referred to as the 'simplified procedure.'" As explained in 
chapter 4, the reference marketing authorisation holder exhausts the right to prevent 
futtire applicants from relying on the information already in the possession of the 
national authority when the product obtains a first marketing authorisation. A 
'parallel import licence' (PIL) w i l l be granted by a competent national authority i f 
the parallel imported product and the reference product already benefiting from a 
marketing authorisation share a 'coinmon origin' and are 'essentially identical.' 
' Case 27/76 United Brands Co. v. Commission [1978] E . C . R . 1-207; and Joined Cases 6-7/73 
Commercial Solvents v. Commission [1974] E .C .R. 223. 
' See e.g. Commission Decision 2001/791/EC GlaxofVellcome [2001] O.J. L302/1. 
' See e.g. Commission Decision 87/409/EEC Sandoz [1987] O.J. L222/28; Commission Decision 
80/I283/EEC Johnson & Johnson [1980] O.J. L377/16; and Commission Decision 87/406/EEC 
Tipp-Ex[m7] O.J. L222/1. 
' Article 6 of Council Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products 
for human use [2001] O.J. L311/67. 
' Case 104/75 Qfficier van Justitie v. de Peijper [1976] E . C . R . 613. See chapter 3(3.1) below. 
It should be noted that different rules apply to 'personal imports:' see Case 215/87 Schumacher v. 
Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Ost [1989] E .C .R. 617; and chapter 3, p. 102, n. 91 below. 
" Case 104/75, n. 9 above. 
Nevertheless, patent and trademark holders are in effect capable o f segmenting the 
common market along national borders, owing to the territorial nature of 
intellectual property rights.'^ Manufactiirers' may therefore exercise their 
intellectual property rights vested in the pharmaceutical product so as to restrict 
parallel trade. This has resulted in the ECJ distinguishing between the 'existence' 
and the 'exercise' o f an intellectual property right (see chapter 5). The former is 
protected by Article 295 EC Treaty'^ whilst the latter is subject to the severity of the 
free movement of goods and the competition rules. This tension between national 
and Commimity law whereby the existence o f national intellectual property rights is 
recognised but the exploitation thereof is subject to Community law, is known as 
the 'exhaustion of rights' doctrine (see chapter 5). This doctrine allows for 
'Community exhaustion' o f intellectual property rights once the protected product 
is placed anywhere in the European Economic Area (EEA) for the first time.''* The 
inclusion o f a derogation (commonly referred to as the 'specific mechanism') from 
the 'exhaustion o f rights' doctrine in the 2003 Act of Accession'^ o f the ten new 
Member States (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) w i l l , however, restrict parallel trade from the 
new Member States for a dynamic transition period (see chapter 5). Its inclusion 
was largely a result of the low pharmaceutical prices in the new Member States, 
which are mostly 'central and eastern European' (CEE) countries with struggling 
economies. 
Some hmited measures have been adopted by the Community, such as Council Directive 89/104 
E E C to approximate the laws of the Member States concerning trademarks [1989] O.J. L40/1, 
providing for the granting of trademarks valid throughout the Community. 
Article 295 E C Treaty: "This Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States 
governing the system of property ownership.' This Article should be read in conjunction with Article 
30 E C Treaty. 
See Case 15/74 Centra/arm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc. [1974] E . C . R . 1174. The E E A is a free trade 
area established by the Agreement on the European Economic Area [1994] O.J. L344/3. It consists 
of Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and the 25 E C Member States. 
Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the 
Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the 
Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic and 
the Adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded [2003] O.J. L236/33. The 
'specific mechanism' is contained in Chapter 2 (Company Law) of Annex IV to the Act. 
In consequence, manufacturers are largely unable to exercise their intellectual 
property rights to prevent parallel trade within the EE A. However, national 
marketing regulations concerning marketing authorisations, commercial practices, 
and customer preferences have also imdermined parallel importers' ability to ful ly 
exploit these opportunities (see chapter 6). By way of illustration, goods purchased 
in bulk originally packaged for sales to hospitals may require repackaging to 
accommodate smaller quantity consumer sa les ,and packaging bearing instructions 
or warnings in one language may need to be translated for sale in another Member 
State. To prevent the European pharmaceutical market f rom being partitioned along 
national borders the ECJ has repeatedly ruled that trademark proprietors are 
precluded fi-om 'exercising' their intellectual property rights to prevent repackaging 
of pharmaceutical products i f the parallel importer fulf i ls a set o f conditions (see 
chapter 6) These conditions effectively afford the parallel trader a licence for the 
imauthorised use o f the relevant trademark. 
However, it is not only the trademark proprietor's rights that must be taken into 
consideration when repackaging pharmaceutical products (see chapter 7). Title V of 
Directive 2001/83/EC'^ regulates the labelling and package leaflets of 
pharmaceutical products. In addition. Article 40 of the above Directive requires 
parallel importers to hold a 'manufacturer's (assemble) licence' before commencing 
any repackaging.'* The intellectual property aspect is secondary, and separate from 
these regulations. As this area of law is sparsely commented upon, chapter 7 
analyses the conformity o f these regulations with the EC Treaty. 
Against this background, this thesis provides a thorough clarification of the rules 
governing parallel trade in pharmaceutical products within the EEA; from first to 
final marketing. Focus is on the need to balance the common market objective with 
the need to protect and promote public health and safety when interpreting the EC 
" In the U K for example, medicines usually come in multiples of seven, whereas in other continental 
Member States medicines are usually packaged in multiples of five or ten. Discussed in chapter 6(1) 
below. 
" N. 8 above. 
ibid.. An. 40. 
Treaty. This balancing act is of utmost importance due to the specific characteristics 
of the pharmaceutical industry, which largely set it aside from other consumer 
product groups. 
First, the Community-wide diversity in pricing regulations and reimbursement 
policies has led to a vast disparity in pricing levels for pharmaceutical products 
between Member States (see chapter I). This has prompted debate on the effect of 
parallel frade on the need to promote future 'research and development' (R&D) of 
new pharmaceutical products.'^ The pharmaceutical industry relies heavily upon 
investments in R & D . The profit made during patent protection w i l l fund the R & D 
of new products. Parallel traders, however, are simply importing the exporting 
Member States' pricing policy (see chapter 2). The argument is therefore that the 
profits o f parallel traders correlate to the decrease in fimds made available for R & D 
by the patent proprietor.^*^ 
Secondly, the pharmaceutical industry is characterised by strict regulations, the 
majority concerning quality control. This has lead to concerns, mostly voiced by 
manufacturers and patient interest groups, that parallel trade may adversely affect 
the protection of public health and safety (see chapter J). It is argued that parallel 
trade, as a result of the relaxation of regulatory control following the establishment 
of the 'simplified procedure' (see chapter 4) and the 'exhaustion of rights' doctrine 
(see chapter 5), may open a gateway to the common market for poor or even 
counterfeit pharmaceutical products.^' In particular, it is argued that repackaging of 
pharmaceutical products may affect the therapeutic qualities of parallel imported 
" See for example H. Bale Jr., 'The conflict between parallel trade and product access and 
innovation: The case of pharmaceuticals,' (1998) 1 J . I . E . L . 637; and P. Rey and J. Venit, 'Parallel 
trade and pharmaceuticals: A policy in search of itself,' (2004) 29 E.L.Rev. 153. 
See for example P. Kanavos, J. Costa-Font, S. Merkur and M. Gemmill, 'The economic impact of 
pharmaceutical parallel trade in European Union Member States: A stakeholder analysis,' Special 
Research Paper, London School of Economics (January 2004); and P. West and J. Mahon, 'Benefits 
to payer and patients from parallel trade,' Report, York Health Economics Consortium (May 2003), 
(<http://www.york.ac.uk/inst/yhec/downloads/ParallelTrade _ExecSumm.pdf^). 
'^ See e.g. A. Clark, 'Parallel imports: A new job for customs?,' (1999) 21 E.I.P.R.; and S. Shallar, 
'Spaghetti junction,' European Pharmaceutical Executive, 1 March 2005, p. 12. 
products (see chapter 6), either due to interference with the actual products or to 
poor packaging providing an inadequate protection (see chapter 7)}^ 
This thesis applies a doctrinal research methodology. Focus is on primary sources 
such as the EC Treaty, Community Regulations and Directives, ECJ and national 
case-lav^f interpreting the EC Treaty, and national legislation. The U K w i l l be used 
as a reference Member State. Secondary sources include peer-reviewed journal 
articles and other literary works. Guidance notes and other material from competent 
national authorities and the European Medicines Agency (EMEA)^^ are frequently 
used in order to research the practical implementation o f EC measures and national 
legislation. Chapters 3, 4 and 7 in particular include much EMEA and UK 
Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA)^"* material. 
There are three main reasons for not including empirical research in the thesis. First, 
parallel trade in pharmaceutical products is a very sensitive and contentious 
business sector. Parallel traders and manufactixrers have for nearly three decades 
been involved in an enduring argument over the legitimacy and public benefit of 
parallel trade. As a result of the two groups' opposing interests, their willingness to 
participate in such research would be limited. This was made evident to me by the 
board of directors of the Association of Swedish Parallel Importers in September 
2005.^^ Secondly, for the same reason, the objectivity of any primary evidence and 
information received from the respective interest groups would be questionable. 
Finally, the diverse interest in the trade, f rom all parties involved in and affected by 
it, ensures that any disputes are likely to result in legal proceedings. Similarly, 
" See chapter 7(4) below, and F. Humer, 'A tainted trade - parallel trade medicines are a clear 
symptom of the failure of Europe's pharmaceutical policy,' European Pharmaceutical Executive, 1 
November 2005, p. 44. 
-•' The acronym E M E A originates from the agency's predecessor the 'European Agency for the 
Evaluation of Medicinal products.' In keeping with the traditionally confusing policy of agency 
names in the Community, the acronym does not actually match the full name of the (current or 
former) agency in any European language. 
^ On January 1" 2006 the U K Medicine's Control Agency (MCA) and the U K Medical Devices 
Agency (MDA) merged to form the new MHRA. 
I was invited by the chairman of the 'Foreningen for Parallelldistributorer av Lakemedel' (FPL) , 
Goran Heintz, in September 2005 to discuss my research, and given an opportunity ask questions. 
other interested parties, such as the Commission and individual Member States, wi l l 
have an incentive to either promote or prevent the trade. The Commission believes 
parallel trade w i l l help to achieve the EC Treaty objective of establishing a common 
market,^* whilst the majority o f Member States are actively promoting the trade as 
it is believed to generate savings for national health budgets.^^ Thus, any conduct 
not in accordance with national and Community regulations and measures w i l l most 
likely be brought to the public's attention. The thesis therefore applies a doctrinal 
research methodology focusing on primary sources. This has the added benefit of 
allowing for an objective study of the reasoning applied by the Community courts 
when balancing the common market objective with the need to promote and protect 
public health and safety in light of the information available to the Court at the time 
of giving its judgment or ruling. This w i l l allow for an analytical (as opposed to a 
mere result-driven) approach that can be applied to other areas of the law. 
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part 1 concerns the European pharmaceutical 
market (chapter 1), competition law (chapter 2), marketing authorisations and PILs 
(chapters 3 and 4), with special reference to the U K regulatory fi-amework. Part 2 
concerns intellectual property - 'exhaustion of rights' and the 'specific mechanism' 
(chapter 5); repackaging (chapter 6); and labelling and package leaflet regulations 
(chapter 7). Part 3 (chapter 8) concludes, with a set of recommendations. 
The terminology applied in this thesis needs to be briefly explained. First, the term 
'pharmaceutical products,' used throughout the thesis, is interchangeable with 
'medicinal products' or 'medicines.' Secondly, the terms 'common market,' 'single 
market,' and 'internal market' are sometimes used interchangeably by EU 
institutions and commentators. Even though a single market is sometimes 
differentiated as a more advanced form of common market, the thesis tends to use 
the term 'common market' for the purpose of clarity and consistency. As the 
common market extends to the markets of the EEA Member States, the term 
See chapters 2 and 5 below. 
See chapter 1(3) below. 
'common market' refers to the 25 EC Member States and the EEA Member 
States.'^ * Finally, all decisions of national courts, of the ECJ, o f the CFI, and of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Court^^ are referred to as judgments. 
However, national courts are empowered under Article 234 EC Treaty (and national 
courts against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law are 
obliged) to refer questions of interpretation or validity of Community law to the 
ECJ, when necessary before the national court can deliver a judgment. Such 
preliminary references result in a ruling by the ECJ. 
The law is stated as of 28'^ of September 2006. 
Seen. 14 above. 
The EFTA Court has jurisdicrion with regard to EFTA Member States which are parties to the 
EEA Agreement, currently Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. 
PARTI 
REGULATING THE EUROPEAN PHARMACEUTICAL 
MARKET: PRICING, DISTRIBUTION AND MARKETE^JG 
CHAPTER 
THE EUROPEAN PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET 
Over the last hundred years the pharmaceutical industry has changed our lives and 
the way we think about diseases and medicine. A century ago the contraction of 
tuberculosis or meningitis would most likely result in death. The development and 
progress of the pharmaceutical industry means that today there is a drug to treat 
most diseases, and a vaccine to prevent most diseases altogether. Everyone agrees 
that this is a remarkable achievement which is to the benefit of all mankind. 
Controversy has arisen because most pharmaceutical companies are privately 
owned profit-making institutions, and profiting f rom sickness and misery can be 
difficult to reconcile with human morals. Apart from the particular nature of 
pharmaceutical products the industry itself is operating under special circumstances 
and conditions, both in relation to national and Community measures, but also in 
temis of the development and marketing of pharmaceutical products. A clear 
understanding o f the intricacies o f the pharmaceutical industry and the European 
pharmaceutical market is necessary in order to gain a clear understanding of the 
conditions under which parallel trade in pharmaceutical products operates. 
1. The intricacies of the pharmaceutical industry 
The pharmaceutical industry relies heavily upon investments in 'research and 
development' (R&D). A new pharmaceutical product starts ' l i f e ' as a newly-
discovered molecule in a research lab. The R & D may have been carried out in the 
pharmaceutical company's own facilities or be the result o f collaboration with a 
university, or (as is increasingly the norm) by an R & D contractor.' At this stage of 
See S. El Feki, 'Prescription for change - a survey o f pharmaceuticals,' The Economist, 18 June 
2005, p. 1,6. 
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the development the new molecule is patented. After further pre-clinical 
development the clinical trials start. This is soon followed by a marketing 
authorisation application and approval. The process of developing a pharmaceutical 
product is costly and long; it can take as much as 12 years from first discovery to 
first marketing" and cost upwards of S802 million.^ At this stage most of the patent 
period wi l l have expired, only leaving approximately 8 years of patent protection 
after first marketing. However, this is only for the molecules that survive the 
different stages of development and reach the final stage of markering approval, 
estimated to be only about 1 out of 10 000 molecules.'^ The implications of this 
costly process is that 'Big Pharma,' a dozen or so multinafional pharmaceutical 
companies, roughly accounts for half of the world's $550 billion pharmaceutical 
sales market.^ 
The next stage in a pharmaceutical product's life-cycle - the marketing stage - is 
laden with controversy. First, a key issue for the manufacturer is whether the 
product w i l l be classified as a 'prescription-only-medicine' (POM) or as an 'over-
the-counter' (OTC) medicine.'' OTC medicines have traditionally been used for 
" See The Association o f the British Phamiaceutical Industry (ABPl ) , 'The development o f 
medicines,' (October 2005) (<http://www.abpi.org.iik/pubHcations/briefings/Dev_IVIedicines.pdf>), 
p. 1. 
' See J. DiMasi , R. Hansen and H . Grabowski, 'The price o f innovation: New estimates o f drug 
development costs,' (2003) 22 Journal of Health Economics 151, 182. According to The Swedish 
Association of the Pharmaceutical Industry (LIF) , 'Pharmaceutical market and healthcare,' Fakta 
(2005), (<http://www.Iifse/Statistik/stat.asp>), p. 38, the estimated cost has increased from $231m 
in 1991, to $802m in 2001. However, Steven Paul, head of science and technology at Eiii L i l ly , 
estimates that the cost o f bringing a new product to the market has now risen to more than $1.5 
bilhon: See El Feki, n. I above, 6. 
* ABPI , n. 2 above, 2; and El Feki, ibid., 6. To this should be added that about 20% o f new drugs 
w i l l fail because o f safety concerns; see C. Hodges, European regulation of consumer safety, 
(Oxford: OUP, 2000), p. 281. 
" See LIF, n. 3 above, 36-37 for the world market figure and the twelve top pharmaceutical 
companies' ( 'B ig Pharma') world sales figures 2004 (Bil l ion USD): Pfizer (50,7); GlaxoSmithKIine 
(32,8); Sanofi-Aventis (27,5); Johnson & Johnson (24,7); Merck & Co (23,9); Novartis (22,8); 
AstraZeneca (21,6); Roche (17,7); Bristol-Myers Squibb (15,6); Wyeth (14,2); Abbott (14,2); El l i 
L i l l y (12,7). 
* In the UK three classifications are used: POM (requires a prescription f rom a specified health 
professional), 'behind-the-counter' (must be sold by, or under tlie supei-vision of, a registered 
phannacist); and 'off-the-shelf (available from any sales outlet). The OTC market includes the last 
two of the abovementioned categories. See The British Medical Association ( B M A ) , 'Over-the-
counter medication,' Board o f Science (May 2005), (<http://www.bma.org.uk/ap.nsf/Content/ 
OTCmedication>), p. 2. 
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minor ailments, as the documented safety of such products makes them suitable for 
self-diagnosis and self-care. There is a general recognition that when a new product 
is granted a marketing authorisation it w i l l be classified as a POM in order to 
supervise the safety of the product. However, there is a general trend to switch the 
POM classification to OTC after a few years, when the safety of the drug is 
documented and established. ^ Pharmaceutical companies welcome the 
(de)classification to OTC, especially when the product patent is about to expire, as 
it is a good way to manage the product life-cycle; perhaps ending with a sale of the 
brand name altogether. National health services and patients also encourage the 
(de)classification to OTC as such products are often cheaper and save doctors from 
having to write prescriptions.^ 
Secondly, Pharmaceutical companies have to balance the immorality of profiting 
from illness and suffering with share-holders' demands for larger returns on 
investment. Pharmaceutical companies are accused of rushing the development 
stage in order to market the products earlier, thus allowing for a longer period of 
marketing before the patent period expires.^ Worse even, the industry is often 
accused of 'inventing' diseases in order to widen the market for a particular 
pharmaceutical product. '° Recent events, such as the Vioxx scandal have not helped 
to better the reputation of the industry." This highlights the difficulties faced by the 
industry in relation to advertising and marketing. 
' B M A , n. 6 above, 6. 
' E L F e k i , n. 1 above, 10. 
' See Appendix 3 o f Hodges, n. 4 above, for statistics on drug-related incidents and injuries. 
'° One example is Pfizer's advertising campaign aimed at marketing Viagra for female sexual 
dysfunction: El Feki, n. 1 above, 5. 
" Vioxx, a pharmaceutical product marketed by Merck, has recently been subject to a number o f 
Court cases concerning the safety of the product; see below. The industry's reputation was also 
tarnished when 39 pharmaceutical companies sued the South Afr ican government over changes to its 
patent law to allow for the supply of affordable HIV medicines. See S. El Feki, 'Why drugmakers 
should do more for developing countries,' The Economist, 2 October 2004, p. 63; and A. van der 
Merwe, 'Use o f pharmaceutical patents without authorisation: Some thoughts f rom South Africa, ' 
(2004) l.P.Q 198. 
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Only America and New Zealand allow direct-to-consumer marketing,'" a practice 
which helps patients become aware of medical conditions they did not know they 
had, but may also lead to more self-diagnosis and medication; a practice which may 
not be in patients best interest in the long run.'^ It may also run counter to its 
purpose. Vioxx, a COX-2 inhibitant, was fiercely advertised by Merck. The effect 
was that the drug, which was o f immense benefit to a small number of patients, is 
now withdrawn from the market due to over usage by patients not in need of its 
therapeutic effects as a result of over-marketing by Merck.''' Sales promotion aimed 
at doctors and health authorities is similarly intensive. However, this practice is 
much a characteristic of the US market as the European market is much more 
regulated and state controlled, which wi l l be further discussed below. Nevertheless, 
this explains the strategy employed by 'Big Pharma' of focusing on a small number 
of products. As R & D is a risky business, with few molecules reaching the market, 
and having only 8 or so years of patent protection left, pharmaceutical companies 
intend to maximise revenues before the patent expires. Meanwhile competitors, 
realising the value of the product market, introduce so called 'me-too' products 
(copies or substitutes of the competitor's product).'^ It is questionable whether 'me-
too' products actually fill a purpose as the efforts applied by the company could 
better serve humanity by finding a much-needed cure for another disease, although 
subsequent research may actually result in a much improved version of the original 
product. Perhaps this cumulatively explains why pharmaceutical companies spend 
around three times more on marketing, advertising, and administration as on 
R&D. '^ This is especially so as in addition to 'me-too' products, R & D companies 
face competition from generics manufacturers post patent expiration. 
' -E1 Feki,n. 1 above, 11. 
See B. Mintzes, M . Barer, R. Kravitz, A. Kazanjian and K. Bassett, 'Influence o f direct to 
consumer pharmaceutical advertising and patients' requests on prescribing decisions: two site cross 
sectional survey,' (2002) 324 B.M.J. 278. 
'"The Court recently ruled in favour o f Merck by rejecting a claim that short-term use o f Vioxx 
caused the 2001 death o f a Florida man. Vioxx was withdrawn from the market in 2006. See Merck 
press release o f 17 February, 2006:<http://www.vioxx.com/rofecoxib/vioxx/consumer/press_release 
_02172006.jsp>. 
El Feki,n. I above, 5. 
See D. Light and J. Lexchin, 'Foreign free riders and the high price o f US medicines,' (2005) 331 
B.M.J. 958, 959. 
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R & D companies invest a fraction of their revenues back into research and 
development o f new molecules. Generics manufacturers, on the other hand, take 
advantage of the availability of the product data. Once the patent expires, generics 
companies are allowed to use this data to produce equivalents o f an original 
product.'^ In some Member State markets, for example Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK, generic products accounts for upwards or almost 20% of 
the market sales value.Generic products are often 20-80% cheaper than original 
patented products and can therefore generate savings for health care providers as 
well as patients.'^ As generic products bring down prices through increased brand 
competition, R & D companies (the patent holders) try to generate as much revenue 
as possible before the patent expires. 
This inevitably highlights the fact that the pharmaceutical industry operates under 
very special conditions. First, the inherent demand for pharmaceutical products is 
not price sensitive. Admittedly, pharmaceutical products can be a luxury few can 
afford in developing countries, but demand is genuine, and quite literally, a matter 
of life or death. As a necessity, and a non-substitutable such, pharmaceutical 
products w i l l always be in demand. Both poor and rich people wi l l always demand 
pharmaceutical products, even though rich people may purchase them more readily. 
Especially since life-expectancy in rich (and to a certain extent developing) 
countries is increasing and chronic diseases are rapidly becoming a growing burden 
on society."" Secondly, profiting from illness and suffering is by some considered 
unethical or at least immoral. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that without 
substantial profits there would be no incentive to carry out further R & D . At least a 
pharmaceutical company provides life-saving products in return for its profits, 
whilst a generics company only produces copies of already invented pharmaceutical 
" Discussed in chapter 3(2.3) below. 
"Denmark 21 .1%; Germany 26.8%; the Netherlands 21 .1%; and the U K 17.2%: The European 
Federation o f Pharmaceutical Industries and Association (EFPIA), 'The pharmaceutical industry in 
figures,' Key data (2005), (<http://www.etpia.org/6_publ/infigures2005.pdf>), p. 12. 
"See The European Generics Medicines Association's website at: <http://wvvw,egagenerics.com/ 
gen-basics.htm> for more information. 
"° Most o f the 7500 products currently under development are aimed at chronic diseases of the rich 
world, according to El Feki, n. 1 above, 8. 
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products and as such does not contribute to the R & D of new pharmaceutical 
products. In other industries, large profits may only mean the sale of even more 
environmentally harmful or unliealthy products. 
2. The European pharmaceutical market 
The European pharmaceutical market accounts for 29.6% of the world market and 
is second in size only to the US market.^' The pharmaceutical industry is the EU's 
5'*^  largest industrial sector"" employing upwards of 588,000 people^^ producing 
more than €154 billion worth of pharmaceutical products annually.^"* This makes 
the European pharmaceutical industry an important employer and economic actor 
contributing to the well-being of the European economy in addition to maintaining 
a healthy society. Further, European pharmaceutical companies invested upwards of 
€21.5 billion in R&D in 2004."^ Investments in R&D has steadily increased since 
1980 reflecting the increase in product development costs, whilst the amount of new 
chemical or biological entities/products originating on European territory has 
steadily decreased from 88 in the period 1990-1994 to only 57 in the period 2000-
2004."'' Only 7 of the 23 new molecular entities/products launched on the world 
market in 2004 originated from European territory, whilst 9 originated from the US 
market."' The unavoidable analysis seems to be that, compared to the US; Europe 
seems to be a less attractive location for R&D investment. The Commission has, by 
setting up the GIO Medicines Group and releasing a Communication on 'a stronger 
European-based pharmaceutical industry for the benefit o f the patient - a call for 
action,' recognised that the pharmaceutical industry is favouring the US over 
Europe as a base for R&D. '^ It is clear that 'without creating the right environment 
-' L I F . n . 3 above, 37. 
Commission Communication on a stronger European-based pharmaceutical industry for the 
benefit o f the patient - a call for action [2003] COM/383/final. , p. 12. 
" As o f 2004: EFPIA, n. 18 above, 9. 
-' 'Asof2003:/Z?;V/.,6. 
" ibid., 20. 
^* ibid. 
LIF, n.3above, 41. 
' ' The High Level Group on Innovation and Provision o f Medicines - The GIO Medicines Group -
was set up in March 2001 to 'explore ways of improving industry competitiveness in Europe while 
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for pharmaceutical innovation we w i l l never regain the competitive advantage 
Europe once enjoyed.'^' However, regaining Europe's crown as the world's leading 
health and research centre w i l l be difficult considering that the pharmaceutical 
industry regards Europe as 'a hostile and turbulent environment for 
pharmaceuticals.The industry's main grievance within the EC is Member States' 
pricing regulations and the trade in pharmaceutical products outside manufacturers' 
distribution channels, maintaining that parallel trade in medicines 'between EU 
countries is a key factor in Europe's declining attractiveness for pharmaceutical 
R&D. '^ ' Member State regulations existing in conjunction with EC measures have 
created a complex and often non-dynamic market, at least from the pharmaceutical 
industry's viewpoint, which is likely to differ from that of economic actors - such 
as parallel importers - actually benefiting from the lack o f harmonisation of 
national pricing regulations. These regulations and measures must be thoroughly 
accounted for and discussed before the rationale for parallel trade can be outlined. 
2.1 Community measures specific to the pharmaceutical market 
Measures adopted by the Community are primarily concerned with the marketing 
stage of pharmaceutical products. The Unit responsible for pharmaceuticals in the 
Commission's Enterprise and Industry Directorate-General is responsible for 
maintaining, simplifying, and updating Community measures concerning the single 
market in pharmaceutical products. The first Community pharmaceutical Directive 
was introduced in 1965, aiming to maintain a high level of protection for public 
encouraging high levels o f health protection.' The Group published the report; GIO Medicines 
Group, 'High Level Group on innovation and provision o f medicines in the European Union -
recommendations for action,' Report, (7 May 2002), (<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/phabiocom/ 
p9.htm>). The Commission adopted its off icial response by way o f the Commission Communication 
(2003), n. 22 above, setting out how each recommendation can be taken forward. 
Gunter Verheugen (Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for Enterprise and 
Industry) at the annual meeting o f the EFPIA in Brussels, 1 June 2005. See Commission press 
release SPEECH/05/311 (1 June 2005), p. 4. 
'"Speech by J-F Dehecq, EFPIA Vice-President, GIO Medicines Group's Conference, Rome (10 
July 2003), (<http://www.efpia.org/5_conf/DehecqG10RJuly2003.pdf>), 
^' See F. Humer ' A tainted trade - parallel trade medicines are a clear symptom of the failure o f 
Europe's pharmaceutical policy, ' European Pharmaceutical Executive, 1 November 2005, p. 44. 
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health.^^ In 1995 the 'European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal products' 
(EMEA) was es tab l i shed ,on ly to be replaced by the new 'European Medicines 
Agency' (EMEA) in November 2005.^'' The new Agency is responsible for the 
'centralised procedure,' the 'mutual recognifion procedure' and the 'simplified 
procedure' (for generic products) for granting marketing authorisations. 
The Community has also introduced a system of pharmacovigilance (the system of 
monitoring the safety of pharmaceutical products post marketing) requiring 
Member States to monitor and collect data on adverse reactions to pharmaceutical 
products and to take action where necessary. This system is linked to the 
Community regulations governing the 'classification of medicinal products,' 
determining whether a pharmaceutical product should be sold as a POM or an OTC 
medicine.Wholesale distribution, packaging and labelling have also been subject 
to Community measures. 
Finally, Directive 2001/83/EC prohibits any advertising of medicinal products for 
which a marketing authorisation has not been g r a n t e d . I n contrast to llie US, 
direct-to-consumer advertising of POM products and products containing narcotic 
Council Directive 65/65/EEC on the approximation o f provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action relating to proprietary medicinal products [1965] O.J. 22/369. 
Council Regulation (EEC) 2309/93 laying down Community procedures for the authorization and 
supervision o f medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Agency 
for the Evaluation o f Medicinal Products [1993] L214/1. 
See Council Regulation (EC) 726/2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation 
and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European 
Medicines Agency [2004] O.J. L I 36/01, Title V and Art. 90. The acronym EMEA remains: see 
introduction, p. 7, n. 23 above. The functions o f the agency are discussed in chapter 3, pp. 89-90 
below. 
" See Regulation 726/2004, ibid.; and Council Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code 
relating to medicinal products for human use [2001] O.J. L3I1/67. See chapter 3(2) below for 
discussion o f these procedures. 
Title IX o f Directive 2001/83, ibid. 
ibid., Title V I ; and B M A , n. 6 above. The GIO Medicines Group recommended that the 
mechanisms and concepts for moving medicines f rom POM to OTC should be reviewed, and that the 
same trademark should be allowed to be used for products moved to OTC status; see Commission 
Communication (2003), n. 22 above, 31. 
Directive 2001/83, ibid.. Title V and V I . See chapter 7 below. 
^' ibid, Title V I I I and Article 87(1). 
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substances is prohibited."*" However, a product may be advertised i f it is designed 
'for use without the intervention of a medical practitioner for diagnostic purposes or 
for the prescription or monitoring of treatment.'"*' Member States may also prohibit 
direct-to-consumer advertising of products subject to State reimbursement. 
Advertising aimed at persons qualified to prescribe or supply such products, e.g. 
doctors, is allowed subject to certain restrictions, including certain requirements 
concerning the training of medical sales representatives. 
However, although these measures may prove important to public health and safety 
and, to a certain extent, the free movement of pharmaceutical products; the 
pharmaceutical market is distinct from other markets in respect of the pricing of 
pharmaceutical products. Member States are allowed to regulate the price and 
reimbursement levels of pharmaceutical products sold within the national market as 
the organisation of national social security schemes is under the exclusive 
competence of Member S ta tes . In effect, this means that Member States are both 
price regulators and, in most Member States, the largest - i f not sole - buyer of 
pharmaceutical products due to a European tradition of maintaining national health 
services. However, notwithstanding the exclusive competence o f Member States, 
the Council has adopted Directive 89/105/EEC''^ in an attempt to increase the 
transparency of measures regulating the pricing of pharmaceutical products and 
their inclusion in national health insurance system lists o f reimbursable products. 
Member States must ensure that national measures on the pricing and 
reimbursement of pharmaceutical products do not create unjustified obstacles to 
trade by ensuring that a decision on the price is communicated within 90 days to the 
Directive 2001/83, n. 35 above, Article 88(1). The GIO Medicines Group recommended that the 
restriction on advertising o f prescription medicines to the general public should continue. This is 
endorsed by Commission Communication (2003), n. 22 above, 36. 
Directive 2001/83, ibid., Art . 88(2). 
ibid.. Art . 88(3). 
" ibid.. Arts. 91-93. 
""See Case 238/82 Dupliar BV\. The Netherlands [1984] E.C.R. 523, para. 16; and Case 110/79 
Una Coonan v. Insurance O ^ t e r [1980] E.C.R. 1445, para. 12. 
"^Council Directive 89/105/EEC relating to the transparency o f measures regulating the prices o f 
medicinal products for human use and their inclusion in the scope of national health insurance 
systems [1989] O.J. L40/8. 
applicant."*^ I f the Member State decides not to include the product on the list of 
reimbursable products the 'decision shall contain a statement o f reasons based on 
objective and verifiable criteria.''*' Member States must also ensure that such 
decisions are capable of judicial review.'*^ These principles are equally applicable to 
decisions to include certain categories in the list of reimbursable products (positive 
list),'*' or excluding certain categories of products from that list (negative list),^'' as 
well as decisions concerning a subsequent price increase.^' Similarly, Member 
States operating a system of direct or indirect price controls on the profitability of 
pharmaceutical companies responsible for placing products on the market must both 
publish information concerning the function of the system in an appropriate 
publication, and communicate it to the Commission.^^ Finally, the GIO Medicines 
Group recommended that Member States should remove price control altogether on 
authorised pharmaceutical products that are neither purchased nor reimbursed by 
national health services.^'' 
The Transparency D i r e c t i v e a n d the GIO recommendation^^ may provide for a 
more transparent and competitive pharmaceutical market. However, the method of 
price control and the structure of the national market remains the exclusive 
competence of Member States, resulting in large variations in pharmaceutical prices 
Directive 89/105, n. 45 above, Art . 2(1). 
ibid., Art . 2(2). The Commission has formally asked Spain in a reasoned opinion to introduce a 
more transparent procedure for the reimbursement of pharmaceutical products. In addition to being 
included in the list o f reimbursable products, Spanish authorities require prior approval o f individual 
prescriptions, in the form of an inspection visa, before reimbursement. According to the Commission 
this procedure is not based on 'objective and verifiable criteria.' See Commission press release 
lP/05/1285 (17 October 2005). 
ibid.. Art . 2(2). Such appeals must be to judicial bodies and not mere independent experts or 
supervisory bodies. See Case C-424/99 Commission v. Austria [2001] E.C.R. 9285, paras. 42-45. 
ibid., Art . 6. The 90 day time l imit is mandatory. However, this does not require the automatic 
entry of the product to the list where the time limit is exceeded: see Case C-245/03 Merck, Sharp & 
Dohme BVv. Belgium [2005] E.C.R. 637, paras. 20 and 34. 
ibid., Art . 7. 
" ibid., An. 3. 
" ibid., Art . 5. 
" See Commission Communication (2003), n. 22 above, 32. 
Directive 89/105, n. 45 above. 
" N . 53 above. 
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and market structures throughout the Community. It is therefore necessary to 
analyse the conditions under which the pharmaceutical markets of a selected 
number of Member States operate. 
2.2 Different markets, policies and prices 
Member States have adopted some form of national health care policy over the last 
30 years or so." Some maintain a public national health service, whilst others allow 
for private health care financed through mandatory health insurance. By illustration, 
total spending on health care as a percentage of GDP varied from 5.7% in the 
Slovak Republic to 10.9% in Germany in 2002.'^ 
As Member States are often the largest and main provider of health care they have 
monopsony^' power in terms of purchasing and pricing of pharmaceutical products. 
This is especially so whenever the State is not only the main provider of health care 
but also the sole supplier of pharmaceutical products due to a long established state-
controlled pharmacy monopoly.^^ However, Member States regulate the price of 
pharmaceutical products not only by market forces but also through national 
regulations. The price regulation methods differ between Member States and often 
overlap, but in general three different approaches can be discerned. 
The method of profit control is only applied by the UK. By way of the 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS)*"' prices for all pharmaceutical 
The system o f price control o f pharmaceutical products is generally endorsed by the ECJ as long 
as it does not discriminate between domestic and imported products: see Case 181/82 Roussel 
Laboratoria BVv. The Netherlands [1983] E.C.R. 3849. See also R. Nazzini, 'Parallel trade in the 
pharmaceutical market: Current trends and future solutions,' (2003) 26 World Competition 53, 59-60. 
" M . Kyle, 'Entry in pharmaceutical markets,' Seminar paper, German Institute for Economic 
Research (4 June 2003), (<http://www.diw.de/deutsch/produkte/veranstaltungen/docs/margaret_ 
kyle.pdf>), p. 4. 
EFPIA, n. 18 above, 24. 
^' A market similar to a monopoly except that a large buyer not seller controls a large proportion o f 
the market and drives the prices down. Sometimes referred to as the buyer's monopoly. 
For example Sweden and its State owned pharmacy (Apoteket). See Case C-438/02 Criminal 
proceedings against Manner [2005] E.C.R. 4551, concerning the State monopoly's conformity with 
the EC Treaty. 
Administered by the Department o f Health. The statutory powers covering pharmaceutical pricing 
are contained in sections 33 to 38 o f the Health Act 1999. See R v. The Secretary of Stale for Health 
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products are set so as to ensure that the return on capital is lower than the authorised 
upper-threshold. In practical terms this means that the government regulates the 
return on capital instead of the price d i r e c t l y . T h e profit control system in 
conjunction with a strong national pharmaceutical industry, thus encouraging 
spending on R&D,**^ has led to the UK having higher pharmaceutical prices in 
comparison with other Member States. 
A method of 'international price comparison' is applied by most Member States. 
The price is set in relation to prices in neighbouring countries, the EU-wide average, 
or by reference to prices in selected countries. Most Member States using this 
method, however, set the price in relation to an average European price, or the 
average of prices in a number o f selected countries. Table 1 below provides a list of 
the reference countries Member States use when calculating the price.*''* 
Table 1. 
Member State Reference countries Basis of calculation 
Ireland Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, U K Average 
Italy A l l EU countries Average 
Portugal France, Italy, Spain Average 
Slovenia Italy, France, Germany 85% o f the average for most 
products; 96% of the average for 
innovative products. 
Czech Republic Greece, Spain, France, Poland Lowest 
Sweden Norway, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Switzerland 
Similar to No. and F, but lower 
than G, N , and S. 
The Netherlands Belgium, France, Germany, and the U K Average 
Greece A l l EU countries Lowest price 
Spain Originating country, and lowest priced 
Member State. 
Average 
France 12 Member States (Ireland, Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal mandatory) 
Average 
ex parte BAEPD & Dowelhurst Ltd v. ABPI [2001] E.W.H.C. 183, where the conformity o f the 
PPRS with the EC Treaty was unsuccessfully challenged by parallel importer Dowelhurst. 
See M . Sedgley, 'Profi t or loss? Fulf i l l ing dual aims in pharmaceutical price regulation in the 
U K , ' {200\)2 Eurohealth 13. 
" Together with the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden, the UK provides tax incentives for R & D 
spending by allowing for deductions o f R & D facilities and machinery. See P. Kanavos, 
'Pharmaceutical pricing, ' Josephinum Lectures seminar paper, Medizinische Universitat Wien (5 
July 2005), (<http://www.meduniwien.ac.at/josephinum-lectures/index.php?menu=download>). 
Data gathered f rom P. Kanavos, 'Pharmaceutical regulation in Europe,' Towards a national 
strategy on drug insurance: Challenges and priorities Conference Paper, IRPP (23 September 2004), 
(<http://www.irpp.org/events/archive/sep02/kanavos.pdf>), p. 14; and S. Seget, 'Pharmaceutical 
pricing strategies: Optimizing returns throughout R & D and marketing,' Reuters Business Insight 
Report, Datamonitor (2005), pp. 103-115. 
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Finally, some Member States apply a mixture of direct price control and/or 
intemational price comparisons. Spain, for example, requires a price to be 
negotiated directly with the national authorities in addition to using international 
price comparisons as a guiding price. The price is supposed to reflect the cost of the 
product and its value to society. As this is notoriously difficult to estimate, greater 
emphasis is placed on intemational price comparisons. A system of direct 
negotiations, however, provides national authorities with an opportunity to reward 
companies that have made a contribution to society or the economy. ""^  France 
applies a similar system. The R & D expenditure and the added-value o f the product 
to society, as well as the above-listed intemational price comparisons, are taken into 
consideration by the negotiating national authorities. Negotiations are often lengthy, 
resulting in a delay of up to 18 months before the product can be launched on the 
French market.^^ Finland applies a similar system whereby a 'reasonable price' is 
set on the basis of the costs and value of the product in conjunction with 
intemational price comparisons. Instead of direct price control through 
negotiations, Austria has implemented a system of price/volume agreements in 
addition to rebates on excessive sales .The only Member State not applying any 
form of price control - thus allowing free pricing - is Germany. However, reference 
prices establish the maximum limit up to which the national authorities wi l l 
reimburse German patients.""^ Pharmaceutical prices are therefore indirectly affected 
by reimbursement levels; so-called reference prices. 
Reference pricing systems operate by grouping together similar products and 
specifying a price. The government wi l l only reimburse the patient up to that price; 
Kanavos, 'Pharmaceutical regulation,' n. 64 above, 13. 
"^^Seget, n. 64 above, 112. In R. Minder and D. Pilling, "Drug companies hit out at French price 
controls,' Financial Times, 10 June 2001, p. 23, Pfizer chairman Hank McKinnel l was quoted saying 
'we introduce our new products later and later on the French market, and i f the government 
continues to put pressure on prices, there wi l l be no more [new products].' 
Kanavos, 'Pharmaceutical regulation,' n. 64 above, 13. 
ibid., 14. Also used, to some extent, in Belgium, Sweden and France. 
The German Association o f Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies ( V F A ) , 'Reference prices: 
Jumbo groups discriminate against innovative pharmaceuticals,' Position paper (4 November 2005), 
(<http://www.vfa.de/en/articles/art_2005-01_001.html>). 
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any excess above the reference price has to be paid by the patient (insured).™ The 
distinction and relationship between pricing pohcies and reference prices can be 
confusing. Simply put, the government regulates the 'retail' price at which 
pharmaceutical products can be sold using the methods described above. However, 
for budgetary purposes, the same government decides which - and at what prices -
pharmaceutical products are to be reimbursed to patients using a 'reference' price. 
In effect, the reference price is the maximum as companies w i l l be unable to realise 
a price above the reference price (reimbursement level). Unless the price is in line 
with the reference (reimbursement) price, the 'retail' price can only be realised i f 
the product is not subject to reimbursement or the patient agrees to pay the excess 
price. 
A vast majority o f Member States have implemented a system of reference 
pricing.^" In Germany a so-called 'positive list' is used, covering all products that 
are reimbursable.^^ In Italy, the reference price is set using a European average 
price. Drugs are divided into three groups. Class A includes pharmaceutical 
products for chronic diseases, which are ful ly reimbursable. Class B includes 
'important' medicines, of which 50% of the price is reimbursable, whilst Class C 
covers products not reimbursable by the state. " Similarly, in the UK, all 
pharmaceutical products not included on a 'limited list' are ful ly reimbursable.'"' 
Reimbursement rates in France are determined by a product's efficacy and value to 
society. Products not included on the 'negative list' are divided into three groups 
with a reimbursement level ranging from 100% (AIDS medicines) to 35% for less 
serious diseases.Finally, Greece uses a novel system whereby products that are 
Kanavos, 'Pharmaceutical pricing,' n. 63 above. 
" Note that reference pricing systems are subject to Directive 89/105, n. 45 above. 
Seget, n. 64 above, 105. 
" ibid., 107. 
'* ibid., 108-110. Spain uses a similar system, whereby all products not covered by the 'negative list' 
are reimbursed to a level o f 60-90% depending on the classification o f the product. 
ibid., 104. These negotiations, headed by the Commission de Transparence, can be very lengthy. 
See Fumiss J, 'Price controls in France: Budgeting for medical benefit?,' (2001) 2 Eiirohealth 9. 
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considered for reimbursement must be available in two of the following countries; 
USA, the U K , Sweden, Switzerland, France and Germany.''^ 
The diversity in pricing regulations and reimbursement policies throughout the 
Community has lead to vast differences in price levels for pharmaceutical products 
between Member States. It is possible that prices throughout the Community w i l l , 
over time, converge due to the use of international price comparisons. The 
Transparency Directive may hasten this process, as the flaws of national 
regulations w i l l be more apparent when transparent. However, the current price 
differences represent historical and cultural differences in Member States health 
care policies. These price differences are illustrated by Table 2.^ ^ 
The price level in Greece for the 180 top-selling pharmaceutical 
products compared with the corresponding prices for the same 












A discemable pattern is that Member States with more intrusive regulations tend to 
have lower prices. In general, these Member States tend to be southern European 
countries, wi th Spain and Greece having the lowest prices in the EC. Northern 
Member States, such as the UK, Germany, and the Scandinavian Member States, 
' Kanavos, 'Pharmaceutical regulation,' n. 64 above, 15. 
' Directive 89/105, n. 45 above. 
' Gathered f rom LIF , n. 3 above, 41 . 
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are historically rich countries with a large domestic pharmaceutical industry and 
therefore tend to have less restrictive regulations and in consequence, higher prices. 
3. Parallel trade in pharmaceutical products 
The large disparity in prices in the Community is the result of national pricing 
regulations and thus cannot be remedied by market forces. In fact, the disparity in 
pricing levels in conjunction with the harmonisation of the European 
pharmaceutical market and the free movement of goods provisions has proved 
sufficient to sustain a successful parallel trade in pharmaceutical products between 
low-price and high-price Member States. 
This trade, largely a result of the abovementioned pricing regulations, refers to the 
act of purchasing goods in lower-priced countries and reselling them in a higher-
priced country without the authorisation of the manufacturer and owner of the 
intellectual property rights. Simply put, it is the trade in products outside the 
manufacturer's distribution channels. However, it does not necessarily include re-
importation as parallel importation can be carried out between any two Member 
States. By way of illustration, Losec manufactured in Sweden may be exported to 
Spain by the manufacturer, only to be parallel imported into the U K by a Dutch 
parallel trader. 
As illustrated by the formula below, parallel trade is based upon the price difference 
between the exporting and importing Member State. 
(PH - PL - T)Q - L > 0 
where PH is the price in the importing Member State and PL the price in the 
exporting Member State. T is the transport cost, Q the quantity traded and L is the 
marketing authorisation fee. A parallel trader wi l l enter the market as long as it 
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expects to cover its fixed costs (L) with a high enough margin (PH - PL) on a 
sufficient quantity o f products (Q). 
The only costs are transportation costs and the marketing authorisation fee, which 
w i l l be discussed in chapters 3 and 4 below. Parallel traders also have had to 
overcome claims that such trade is prohibited due to manufacturers' intellectual 
property rights. Despite these costs and hurdles parallel trade is highly profitable. 
Vast price differences between Member States, sometimes as much as 25-35%, 
allow for a good profit margin and ample opportunity for successful trade. As the 
Mediterranean Member States tend to have lower prices than the northem Member 
States they are often the source of parallel imported pharmaceutical products. The 
Greek and Spanish markets are the main source countries for parallel importers, 
closely followed by France and Italy. ^ ' Hence, northem Member States such as 
Germany , the UK,^^ the Netherlands*"* and the Scandinavian countries*^ are net 
importers o f parallel traded pharmaceutical products. 
" See M . Kyle, 'Strategic responses to parallel trade,' CEP productivity and innovation seminar 
paper, London School o f Economics (19 January 2006), (<http://cep.lse.ac.uk/seminarpapers/19-01-
06 -KYL.pd f^ ) , pp. 10-11. 
Discussed in chapter 5 below. 
^' Exact figures for parallel exports are di f f icul t to compile, however, it is estimated that parallel 
exports accounted for 21.6% of the Greek pharmaceutical market in 2002. Data is not available from 
France, Italy, Spain and Portugal. In 2003 there were only 4 registered parallel import licences in 
Italy, and 2 in Spain. These Member States are clearly net parallel exporters. See P. Kanavos and J. 
Costa-Font, 'Pharmaceutical parallel trade in Europe: Stakeholder and competition effects,' (2005) 
20 Economic Policy 753, 763. 
According to the V F A , 'The pharmaceutical industry in Germany,' Statistics (2005), 
(<http://www.vfa.de-e_statistics_2005.pdC>), p. 50; parallel imports accounted for 5% of the 
German pharmacy sales market in 2004. 
" According to the EFPIA, n. 18 above, 5; parallel imports accounted for 17.1% o f the UK 
pharmacy sales market in 2003. 
According to the Foundation for Pharmaceutical Statistics (SFK), 'Facts and figures,' (2004), 
(<http://www.sfk.nl/algemeen/2004fandf>), p. 32; parallel imports accounted for 14.8% of the 
Netherlands drug costs in 2003. 
According to LIF, n. 3 above, 11; parallel imports accounted for 10.4% of the Swedish pharmacy 
market in 2004. Parallel imports accounted for 6.2% of the Norwegian pharmacy sales market in 
2004 according to the Norwegian Association o f Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (Legemiddel-
industriforeningen), 'Facts and figures' (2005), p. 31; and 8.5% o f the Danish market in 2004 
according to its Danish counterpart Lasgemiddelindustriforeningen (<http://www.talogdata.dk/ 
swl64.asp>). This is likely not only the result o f the prevailing prices in these Member States, but 
also due to the State owned pharmacy monopoly in Sweden (and until recently Denmark and 
Norway) allowing for easy and simultaneous access to the whole o f the market: see C. Bjamram, 
'Parallellimportorema blir forlorama,' Dagens Industri, 1 June 2005, p 4. 
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However, a sufficient price differential need not necessarily be the sole relevant 
criteria for successful commerce. Parallel importers are also benefiting from 
national policies mandating dispensing of parallel imported products. These policies 
are intended to generate savings for national health systems and are mostly applied 
by high-priced Member States. 
Table 3*^ 
Policies mandating the dispensing of parallel imports in 2004 
Policy Denmark Germany Netherlands Norway Sweden L K 
Financial incentive to 
pharmacy 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Penalty to pharmacy i f not 
dispensing cheaper PI 
No Yes No No No No 
Obligation to inform 
patients of cheaper PI 
Yes No No No No No 
Obligation to dispense 
PI i f available 
No No No No Yes No 
Clawback (indirect 
benefit to health 
insurance) 
No No Yes No No Yes 
The above policies explain why Norway and Sweden, Member States with modest 
pharmaceutical prices in comparison with many others, are large purchasers of 
parallel imported pharmaceutical products. Even with low price margins between 
the importing and exporting country parallel traders can make a large profit by 
supplying large quantities due to the abovementioned p o l i c i e s . I n the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and the U K pharmacists have a financial incentive to dispense 
parallel imported products. These markets are therefore prime markets for parallel 
traders. Clawback mechanisms ensure that the discounts (lower prices) pharmacists 
receive from parallel importers are being returned to the health authorities as 
savings. Without such policies it is likely that an even larger share o f the savings 
Adapted from P. Kanavos, D. Gross and D. Taylor, 'Parallel trading in medicines: Europe's 
experience and its implications for commercial drug importation in the United States,' Pub ID: 2005-
07, The AARP Public Policy Institute (July 2005), (<http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/2005_07 
_trade.pdf>), pp. C1-C2; and the author's own research. 
" i n Sweden, where pharmacies are legally obliged to dispense a parallel imported equivalent i f 
available, 3 o f the 12 largest pharmaceutical companies in terms o f sales value are parallel importers. 
Two out o f these parallel importers, Orifarm and Paranova, are also the largest parallel importers in 
Denmark and Norway. See LIF , n. 3 above, 14. 
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would not accrue to the national health system, but remain with the parallel traders. 
However, even though parallel trade may have short-term economic benefits, the 
question is whether the trade is o f benefit to society in the long run. 
3.1 Parallel trade - benefit or menace to society? 
Parallel traders argue that parallel imports generate savings to national health 
authorities, and ultimately patients and taxpayers. Several reports have assessed the 
benefits from parallel imported pharmaceutical products and to whom these benefits 
accrue. A report by York Health Economics Consortium, commissioned by the 
European Association of Euro-Pharmaceutical Companies (EAEPC), estimated that 
the total direct savings from parallel importation of pharmaceutical products in the 
UK, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark amounted to €63 Im in 
2002.** However, this finding must be analysed in the hght of the EAEPC's 
description of itself as 'the professional and representative voice of pharmaceutical 
parallel trade in Europe.'*^ Similarly, an analysis conducted by the University of 
Southern Denmark in 2006, partly funded by the EAEPC (£25,000), estimates that 
the practice o f parallel trade in Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the U K alone 
generated savings of €442m to national health budgets in 2004.^° 
This should be compared to a recent study from the London School of Economics 
and Political Science (LSE), partly funded by pharmaceutical company Johnson & 
Johnson, estimating that parallel imports in 2002 generated savings to the 
Norwegian, German, Swedish, Danish, Dutch and U K national health services of 
just €99.2m.^' The savings accruing to the UK National Health Service alone was 
P. West and J. Mahon, 'Benefits to payer and patients from parallel trade,' Report, York Health 
Economics Consortium (May 2003), (<http://www.york.ac.uk/inst/yhec/downloads/ParallelTrade 
_ExecSumm.pdf>). 
^' EAEPC's website: <http://www.eaepc.org>. 
See A . Jack, 'Parallel trade in drugs 'saves mi l l ions ," Financial Times, 24 June, 2006, 
(<http://www.ft.eom/cms/s/fc877de6-02ce-l ldb-9231-0000779e2340.html>).The survey also notes 
that savings f rom parallel trade have decreased since 2001. 
" P. Kanavos, J. Costa-Font, S. Merkur and M . Gemmill , 'The economic impact o f pharmaceutical 
parallel trade in European Union Member States: A stakeholder analysis,' Special Research Paper, 
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estimated at just €55.9m.^^ By comparison, the U K Department of Heakh estimates 
'that parallel imports save the NHS...approximately £60m per y e a r . ' T h i s 
strengthens the credibility o f the LSE survey, as it should be in the interest of the 
Department of Health to present large savings in order to justify its parallel trade 
mandating policies. £60m is far more conservative than the York Health Economics 
Consortium's estimate of €201.3m for the UK alone.^ "* In conclusion it can be said 
that parallel imports generate savings to national health authorities. The lack of 
objectivity and impartiality of these surveys, however, makes it difficult to reach a 
conclusion on exactly how large or small these savings really are. A more relevant 
question is i f these savings are in proportion to the profit made by parallel importers, 
pharmacists and the costs to society in terms of less funding made available for 
R & D . 
A closer look at the economics of parallel trade is needed, for which the U K market 
w i l l serve as an example. The price difference between the importing and exporting 
Member States is the base o f the business. This has been estimated to range 
between 2 1 % and 26.3%, or €414m and €518m for the 19 most parallel traded 
pharmaceutical products in the UK in 2002. It is difficult to esdmate the revenue 
that accrues to pharmacists, but it is likely that pharmacists retain a certain margin 
over the U K government's clawback which average 10.4% of the sales price.^^ 
This means that after the effect of the clawback is included gross financial benefits 
ranging between €365m and €469m accrue to parallel traders and, to a lesser extent, 
London School o f Economics (January 2004), (<http://www.lse.ac.uk/colIections/LSEHealthAnd 
SociaICare/pdf/Workingpapers/Paper.pdf>). 
Kanavos et al. (LSE Report), n. 91 above , 1 8 1 . This figure includes the clawback mechanism. 
" Hansard, HC, V o l . 434, Column 436W, 6 June 2005; per Jane Kennedy on behalf o f the Secretary 
o f State for Health. 
West and Mahon, n. 88 above, 'Executive Summary.' See also B. Irvine (ed.), P. Kanavos and P. 
Holmes, 'Pharmaceutical parallel trade in the U K , ' Report, The Institute for the Study of Civi l 
Society (2005), (<http://www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/ParallelTradeUK.pdf>), p. 48, for a compilation o f 
all findings. This figure excludes the benefit to pharmacies. 
Kanavos et al. (LSE Report), n. 91 above, 124. The former figure relates to the average o f the 
three lowest EU Public Purchasing Parity Prices (PPP), whereas the latter refers to the lowest PPP 
price in the EU. 
ibid., 123. By comparison, the York Health Economics Consortium estimated the total direct 
savings to pharmacies at € l41m (See Irvine et al. (Civitas), n. 94 above, p. 48). 
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pharmacists. Even though these figures fail to take parallel importers 
transportation and administrative costs into consideration, it is likely that 'most, but 
not all, of the financial benefit accrues to the parallel trader rather than to the health 
care system or the patient.'^^ Logically, this also means that the total loss of direct 
profits to the pharmaceutical industry in the U K amounts to the total price 
difference between the low- and high-priced Member States, ranging between 
€414m and €518m in 2002.^^ 
The pharmaceutical industry clauns that this has serious effects on the 'research-
based industry's ability to fund research for new, innovative and life-saving drugs -
to the overall detriment o f patients and medical p r o g r e s s . ' T h e industry also 
refutes the argument that parallel trade w i l l lead to price convergence in the 
Community. Price convergence can only be achieved by harmonising Member 
States' pricmg regulations, and in any case, w i l l never be achieved through parallel 
trade as long as most of the profit from the trade remains with the importers. As 
parallel traders are simply importing the exporting Member States' pricing policy, 
this form of trade comes at a cost. It reduces the funds available for fijture R & D and 
is therefore 'a key factor in Europe's declining attractiveness for pharmaceutical 
R & D . ' Parallel traders retaliate by claiming that there is no 'quantifiable 
evidence that parallel distribution negatively affects R & D spending. Parallel trade 
simply generates large savings for national health services which can be invested in 
other parts of the health service.' "^ ^ 
" Kanavos et al. (LSE Report), n. 91 above, 124. 
98 
99 
Commission Communication on the single market in pharmaceuticals [1998] COM/588/final, p. 4. 
Kanavos et al. (LSE Report), n. 91 above, 125. This is a very low estimate, and only includes the 
direct loss to profits. The indirect effects, such as a loss of sales due to the increased parallel 
importation o f generic products, would add significantly to this figure. In S. Hall and S. Szymanski, 
'Intellectual property rights and parallel trading in pharmaceuticals,' Full Report o f Research 
Activities and Result, ESRC (10 March 2003) p. 10: Professor Stephen Hall estimates the total loss 
to the UK industry at about £770m, and a gain o f up to £480m for the UK economy f rom parallel 
trade, leading to a net loss o f £290m. 
' ""Humer.n . 31 above, 44. 
ibid. 
R. Freudenberg (President o f the British Association o f European Pharmaceutical Distributors 
(BAEPD)), 'Dispelling the myths,' European Pharmaceutical Executive, 1 January 2006, p. 58. 
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4. Conclusion 
Parallel importation of pharmaceutical products is built upon two market anomalies. 
First, in contrast to most product markets, pharmaceutical prices are regulated by 
national authorities, giving rise to vast price differences between Member States. 
Secondly, Member States tend to prefer parallel imported products over nationally 
sourced products, despite the potential impact parallel trade may have on future 
investments in the R & D of new products. In fact, many Member States have 
adopted policies mandating the dispensing of parallel imported products even 
though recent studies suggest that the (net) savings generated by parallel imports to 
national health authorities, taking into account the overall effect the trade has on the 
national economy, are far lower than first anticipated. This disjunctive approach -
encouraging parallel imports instead o f simply lower (or, i f a low price Member 
State, increase) the pharmaceutical prices directly so as to make parallel trade 
unprofitable - is contributing to the unattractiveness of Europe as a location for 
carrying out R&D, and could eventually result in a decline in the introduction of 
new substances. 
In the absence of Community-wide harmonisation of national pricing and 
reimbursement regulations, parallel trade in pharmaceutical products w i l l remain a 
profitable business. Unable to influence the main prerequisite for successfiil parallel 
trading - the price divergences - manufacturers are considering other ways in which 
parallel trade can be restricted. However, as the next chapter w i l l show, restricting 
parallel trade is difficuU considering the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC 
Treaty to the European pharmaceutical market. 
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CHAPTER 2 
P A R A L L E L TRADE IN PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS AND 
ARTICLES 81 AND 82 E C T R E A T Y 
The objective of competition law is to enhance efficiency and facilitate the creation 
of a single market while protecting consumers and competition.' Article 81 EC 
Treaty prohibits all agreements, concerted practices and decisions by undertakings 
that may affect trade between Member States and prevent, restrict or distort 
competition within the common market." Article 82 EC Treaty prohibits any abuse 
by a dominant undertaking likely to affect trade between Member States.^ As such, 
competition law is a vast subject. This chapter therefore only discusses specific 
issues relevant to the trade in pharmaceutical products, in particular the export and 
import of pharmaceutical products by parallel traders. Focus is on restrictive 
agreements between manufacturers and distributors o f pharmaceutical products and 
abusive behaviour by dominant manufacturers which aims to restrict further trade in 
their products. The Commission has traditionally adopted a very pro-integration 
policy towards parallel import-restrictive measures. The Community courts and 
Advocate General Jacobs, however, have lately taken a critical approach to the 
Commission's very pro-integration application of Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty in 
' Neelie Kroes (Commissioner for competition) was quoted saying that ' f irst , it is competition, and 
not competitors, that is to be protected, secondly, ultimately the aim is to avoid consumers harm,' in 
a speech delivered at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute on 23"" September 2005: see Commission 
press release SPEECH/05/537. See also K.. Ehlermann, 'The contribution o f EC competition policy 
to the single market,' (1992) 29 C.M.L.R. 257; and R. Whish, Competition Law, 4"' ed., (London: 
Butterworths, 2001), pp. 15-21 for further discussion. 
" Article 81 EC Treaty: 'The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: 
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market.' 
^ Article 82 EC Treaty: 'Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common 
market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.' 
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relation to such measures, which wi l l be evident following the discussion of Bayer,^ 
GlaxoWellcoine,^ and Syfait. ^ 
1. Article 81 EC Treaty 
The application of Article 81 EC Treaty can be divided into three steps. First, is 
there a valid agreement or concerted practice between two or more undertakings? 
Secondly, does this agreement or concerted practice distort competition within the 
common market? Thirdly, does it affect trade between Member States? 
The Commission and to a lesser extent the ECJ have traditionally adopted a very 
wide definition of an agreement or concerted practice.^ Agreements can be inferred 
from mere acquiescence and do not necessarily require any formal documents.^ No 
distinction is made in relation to agreements between competitors active at the same 
level of commercialisation (horizontal agreements), and agreements between parties 
at a different level of commercialisation (vertical agreements), such as between a 
manufacturer and a distributor.^ For the purpose of this chapter an undertaking can 
be sufficiently defined as an entity engaging in trade within the market, which wi l l 
certainly include manufacturers, distributors and parallel importers. The 
undertaking does not have to be physically present, but must have commercial 
presence within the market.'*' A distortion or restriction o f trade between Member 
See Commission Decision 96/478/EC Adalat [1996] L201/1; the CFI judgment in Case T-41/96 
Bayer AG v. Commission [2000] E.C.R. 11-3383; and the ECJ judgment in Joined Cases C-2-3/01 P 
Bundesverband der Arzneimiltel-Importeure & Commission v. Bayer AG [2004] E.C.R. 23. 
' See Case T-168/01 GlaxoWellcomepic v. Commission [2006] E.C.R. (unreported: delivered on 27 
September 2006). See also Commission Decision 2001/791/EC GlaxoWellcome [2001] O.J. L302/ I . 
' See Opinion o f Advocate General Jacobs and the ECJ ruling in Case C-53/03 Synetairismos 
Farmakopoion Aitolias {Syfait) & Others v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE [2005] E.C.R. 4609. 
' See Joined Cases 4 1 , 44-45/69 ACF Chemiefarma NV v. Commission [1970] E.C.R. 661, and 
Joined Cases 89, 104, 114 , 116-117, 125-129/85 Ahlstrdm Oy v. Commission (Woodpulp) [1993] 
E.C.R. 1307. 
^ ibid.; and Commission Decision 82/853/EEC National Panasonic [1982] O.J. L354/28. 
' See Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten SARL & Grundig-Verkaufs GmbH v. Commission [1966] 
E.C.R. 299, and Case C-70/93 BMW AG v. Aid Autoleasing D GmbH [1995] E.C.R. 3439, para. 15. 
Article 81 EC Treaty does not, however, apply to agreements between an undertaking and its 
subsidiary: Case 15/74 Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc. [1974] E.C.R. 1174. See also T. Hays, 
'Anti-competitive agreements and extra-market parallel importation,' (2001) 26 E.L.Rev. 468, 469. 
'° Commonly referred to as 'the effects doctrine.' See Case 48/69 ICI Ltd v. Commission (Dyestuffs) 
[1972] E.C.R. 619; and Cases 89, 104/85 etc., n. 7 above. 
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States is evident when, typically, the agreement directly or indirectly restricts 
imports or exports as a result of supply restrictions, distribution restrictions, or price 
fixing as a means to segment the common market." The provisions of Article 81(1) 
EC Treaty may be declared inapplicable under Article 81(3) EC Treaty i f the 
agreement has minor effects and 'contributes to improving the production or 
distribution of goods,' otherwise the agreement w i l l be void and attract a fine of up 
to 10% of the pardcipating undertakings' turnover. However, when the effect of the 
agreement is to restrict intra-Community trade, even a small market-share may 
support the finding of a violation of Article 81 EC Treaty.'" The Block Exemption 
Regulations,'^ providing a safe harbour f rom the prohibition under Article 81(1) EC 
Treaty for certain categories of agreements, are important to technology transfer 
agreements and research and development agreements between manufacturers of 
pharmaceutical products, but less relevant to distribution agreements. Regulation 
2790/99 covers all vertical agreements that fal l , prima facie, within Article 81(1) 
EC Trea ty .However , territorial and customer restrictions are listed as 'hard core 
regulations' in Article 4(1 )(b), rendering any agreements as to where products may 
be exported or imported from, or to whom products may or may not be sold, 
ineligible for an exemption. Refusals to meet demand from a reseller who would 
market the products in a different Member State/market are prohibited by 
Regulation 2659/2000.'^ This Regulation also explicitly prohibits contractual 
obligations aimed at preventing parallel imports. 
" See e.g. Case 56/65 STM v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH [\96(,] E.C.R. 235. However i f the effect 
on competition within the common market is negligible, the agreement may fal l outside Article 
81(1) EC Treaty due to the de minimis doctrine: see Case 5/69 Vdlk v. Vervaecke [1969] E.C.R. 295 
and Commission Notice on agreements o f minor importance which do not appreciably restrict 
competition under Article 81(1) o f the Treaty establishing the European Community [2001] O.J. 
C368/13. 
A market share o f as little as 3.18% was not considered insignificant in Joined Cases 100-103/80 
Musique Diffusion Francaise SA v. Commission [1983] E.C.R. 1825. 
See Commission Regulation (EC) 2659/2000 on the application o f Article 81(3) o f the Treaty to 
categories o f research and development agreements [2000] O.J. L304/7; and Commission Regulation 
(EC) 772/2004 on the application o f Article 81(3) o f the Treaty to categories o f technology transfer 
agreements [2004] O.J. L I23 /11 . 
Commission Regulation (EC) 2790/1999 on the application o f Article 81(3) o f the Treaty to 
categories o f vertical agreements and concerted practices [1999] O.J. L336/2I . 
' ^ N . 13 above, Art 5 ( l ) ( i ) , 
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1.1 Parallel imports and Article 81 EC Treaty 
Measures to restrict parallel trade by manufacturers have traditionally been 
considered an obstacle to market integration by the Commission. Parallel trade, the 
Commission believes, wi l l bring about harmonisation and market integration. The 
first case to discuss the application o f Article 81 EC Treaty to transactions 
involving intellectual property was Consten & Grundig}'^ As intellectual property 
holders, which may include pharmaceutical manufacturers, would be able to 
segment the market along national boundaries i f free to exercise the territorially 
based intellectual property rights, a distinction was made between the 'exercise' and 
the 'existence' o f such rights.'^ The 'existence' of rights granted through national 
legislation was to remain protected by national legislation by way of Articles 295 
and 30 EC Treaty, whilst the exercise of such rights is subject to the application of 
the free movement of goods provisions and the competition law framework of the 
EC Treaty.'^ The practice of using intellectual property rights to enforce agreements 
brings such agreements within Article 81 EC Treaty.'^ However, as a result of this 
principle, manufacturers were no longer able to segment the common market by 
territorially-based exclusive distribution agreements,^° and were forced to find other 
solutions to prevent parallel imports. 
The Commission has found a wide variety of parallel import-restrictive agreements 
to be prohibited by Article 81 EC Treaty, from (tacitly accepted) refusals to 
supply,^' to the imposition of restrictions through distribution agreements,"^ and 
N . 9 above. See Hays, n. 9 above, 469 for a thorough discussion. 
" See chapter 5 below for a further discussion. 
See Case 15/74, n. 9 above; and the 'exhaustion o f rights doctrine' discussed in ibid. 
" Cases 56 and 58/64, n. 9 above. It is worth noting that, even though not relevant to the direct 
argument at issue, an agreement or concertation between several competitors to bring a course o f 
intellectual property infringement litigation against parallel importers so as to prevent exports or 
imports is not likely to infringe Article 81 EC Treaty: see S. Preece, 'Glaxo and others v Dowelhurst 
and Swingward: Litigation and the scope o f Article 81 , ' (2000) 21 E.C.L.R. 330. 
-° Case 161/84 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis [1986] E.C.R. 
353. 
See Commission Decision 87/406/EEC Tipp-Ex [1987] O.J. L222/1; Commission Decision 
92/261/EEC Dunlop [1992] O.J. LI31/3; and Commission Decision 82/628/EEC Ford [1982] O.J, 
L256/20. 
35 
applying a system of dual-pricing in order to l imit parallel importation."^ 
Manufacturers try to prevent parallel importation in various ways, in particular by 
maintaining an effective distribution network,"'' to prevent parallel importers from 
entering the market. However, this chapter wi l l focus on the much narrower issue 
of restricting parallel imports from or to a particular market. Restrictive measures 
affect particular existing parallel importers on particular markets after the trade has 
started to affect the manufacturer's sales. Such measures are not implemented in a 
preventative capacity, but in order to restrict parallel imports after the general 
preventative measures have failed to achieve their objective. 
1.2 Pricing policies 
Pricing restrictions can generally be divided into two main policies. The first, and 
perhaps most obvious, is fixing the resale price of the products. In order to restrict 
parallel imports, manufacturers impose restrictions on the price at which the 
distributor is allowed to resell the products. Such measures, often imposed through 
supply agreements, are prohibited by Article 81 EC Treaty as they distort 
competition by artificially segmenting the common market along low-priced and 
high-priced Member States."^ However, the pharmaceutical market is distinct from 
most other markets as pharmaceutical prices are set by national authorities, 
rendering manufacturers unable to fix or even influence distributors' resale prices in 
a given Member State. 
Commission Decision 92/426/EEC Parker Pen [1992] O.J. L233/27; Commission Decision 
87/409/EEC Sandoz [1987] O.J. L222/28; and Commission Decision 80/1283/EEC Johnson & 
Johnson [1980] O.J. L377/16. 
" GlaxoWellcome, n. 5 above. 
'^ ^ Such as the tactics applied by AEG in relation to its selective distribution network: see 
Commission Decision S2/261/EEC AEG-Telefunken [1982] O.J. L117/15. 
See Commission Decision 77/66/EEC Gerofabriek [1977] O.J. L16/8; Commission Decision 
78/823/EEC Kurt Eisele (Maize Seed I) [1978] O.J. L286/23; and Hays, Parallel importation under 
European Union law, (London: Sweet & Maxwell , 2004) p. 141. Similarly, the imposition o f a 
minimum price in the supply agreement is prohibited by Article 81 EC Treaty as it could potentially 
prevent entry into a large number o f Member State markets: see Commission Decision 82/367/EEC 
Camera Care/Hasselblad [\9S2] O.J. LI61/18. 
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The second pricing policy that can be implemented by manufacturers is a system of 
dual-pricing intended to discourage parallel importers from capitalising on price 
differences between Member States. Instead of restricting the distributor's 
subsequent resale price, the manufacturer directly restricts the price at which it sells 
the products to the distributor: one price for products intended for the domestic 
market and another for products intended for export.^^ The nature o f the 
pharmaceutical industry makes it particularly prone to such measures as the 
distributor's customers are easily identifiable and often few in number, and as such, 
easily monitored. Further, as pharmaceutical prices are largely regulated by 
Member State authorities, a single price can be set for all products regardless of 
destination, but allowing for a rebate for products sold on the domestic market. The 
manufacturer's reimbursement level (rebate) is thus linked to the national 
authority's reimbursement l e v e l . F o r example, the measure at issue in Organot?^ 
was Organon's offer of a 12.5% discount on the contraceptive pills 'Marvelon' and 
'Mercilon' to U K distributors intending to resell the products only within the UK. 
The Commission applied Ardcle 81 EC Treaty, and found that an agreement existed 
between Organon and its distributors which would restrict parallel imports and 
divide the common market along nadonal boundaries. Similarly, a dual pricing 
system was set up by Glaxo Wellcome in S p a i n . T h e pricing mechanism involved 
a different price for pharmaceudcal products subsidised by the Spanish social 
security funds and sold on the Spanish market, and a much higher price for products 
destined for export. The price of the product was thus determined by its geographic 
destination. As in Organon^^ the Commission found the measure to restrict parallel 
See Commission Decision 78/163/EEC The Distillers Company [1978] O.J. L50/16; and 
Commission Decision 82/203/EEC Moet et Chandon [1982] O.J. L94/7. 
See chapter 1(2.2) above on reference prices. 
The Commission made it known that it wanted to issue a Decision withdrawing immunity from 
fines that ensued from Organon's notification (Article 81(3) EC Treaty). In the end this was not 
necessary as Organon voluntarily decided to abandon the pricing regime; see Commission press 
release lP/95/1345; and S. Kon and F. Schaeffer, 'Parallel imports o f pharmaceutical products: A 
new realism, or back to basics,'(1997) 18 E.C.L.R. 123, 127-129. 
GlaxoWellcome, n. 5 above. 
N . 28 above. 
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importation and distort competition within the common market.^' GlaxoWellcome 
did not dispute the Commission's finding of an agreement between GlaxoWellcome 
and the distributors.^" 
GlaxoWellcome and Organon, however, argued that the pricing mechanisms could 
be justified with reference to economic arguments. The price o f Marvelon, the 
contraceptive pi l l subject to Organon's discount, was at the time subject to the U K 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) and could therefore be supplied 
almost without charge to UK patients.^^ The price difference between Marvelon on 
the U K market and Marvelon on the Dutch market was therefore almost completely 
a result of national pricing policies, as Marvelon was not ful ly reimbursable under 
the Dutch social security scheme. The argument is therefore that competition law is 
not the appropriate tool to remedy distortions to the market which are caused not by 
the actions of the undertakings subject to the agreement but by national pricing 
regulations. Further, Dutch patients were not affected by the discount scheme as 
the price and availability of Marvelon remained stable. Similarly, GlaxoWellcome 
maintained that its dual pricing policy did not have an anti-competitive effect as it 
only remedied a distortion of the pharmaceutical market caused by the divergence 
in national pricing regulations.^"* The Commission, however, argued that as the 
disparity in national pricing regulations does not exempt the pharmaceutical sector 
from the free movement of goods provisions,^^ the same argument cannot warrant 
an exemption from the competition provisions. The relevant argument could, 
moreover, be refuted by the fact that the price difference was mainly the result of 
The Commission drew an analogy with Commission Decision 80/789/EEC Distillers [1980] O.J. 
L233/43 concerning a prohibition to supply customers who would not use the goods for their own 
consumption, but to resell the goods in the non-duty-free market. The low-priced Spanish market 
was compared with a duty free market, and the non-duty free market with the export markets. See 
GlaxoWellcome, n. 5 above, recital 81. 
See C. Stothers, 'Who needs intellectual property? Competition law and restrictions on parallel 
trade within the European Economic Area,' (2005) 27 E.I.P.R, 458, 460-462. 
" See chapter 1(2.2) above on the UK pricing system. 
See A . Kliemann, 'Commission Decision prohibits Glaxo Wellcome's Spanish pricing system,' 
(2001) 2 Competition Policy Newsletter 30, 31 ; and Kon and Schaeffer, n. 28 above, 129. 
" See Joined Cases C-267-268/95 Merck & Co. Inc. v. Primecrown Ltd [1996] E.C.R. 6285; and 
chapter 5 below. 
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currency fluctuations.^^ However, regardless of the cause of the price difference, the 
agreement sought to distort competition in the common market by restricting 
parallel imports, and ' in any event, it is not for a private company to safeguard 
governmental policy choices by restricting competition.'" 
GlaxoWellcome decided to appeal the Commission Decision to 'keep the issue [of 
parallel trading] alive.'^^ The CFl's judgment is important and, in relation to the 
pharmaceutical market and Article 81 EC Treaty, can be seen as indicating a change 
in the Court's traditionally pro-integration approach to parallel import-restrictive 
agreements.^^ The Court did not dispute the Commission's finding of an agreement 
between GlaxoWellcome and its distributors.'^'' However, the Court held that the 
Commission did not take adequate account of the specific nature of the 
pharmaceuticals market when considering the dual-pricing scheme to have as its 
objective the restriction of competition. 'As the prices of the medicines concerned 
are to a large extent shielded from the free play o f supply and demand owing to the 
applicable regulations and are set or controlled by the public authorities, it cannot 
be taken for granted at the outset that parallel trade tends to reduce those prices and 
thus to increase the welfare of final consumers.'"" It can therefore not be presumed 
that parallel trade reduces prices, and that the dual-pricing clause deprives final 
consumers of a benefit which would have been present in the absence of the 
potentially parallel import-restrictive agreement."*" However, the Court held that 
GlaxoWellcome had failed to show that the dual-pricing clause did not have as its 
effect the restriction of competition. Even though the dual-pricing clause has the 
Kliemann, n. 34 above, 31; and GlaxoWellcome, n. 5 above, recitals 141-143: the British pound 
appreciated by 30% against the Spanish Peseta between October 1996 and April 1998, and 27% 
between January 1996 and December 1998. 
" GlaxoWellcome, ibid., recital 179. 
Case T-168/01, n. 5 above. See S. Pautke and K. Jones, 'Competition law limitations for the 
distribution of pharmaceuticals - rough guide to the brave new world,' (2005) 26 E . C . L . R . 24, 34. 
^' The judgment was, however, delivered after Cases C-2-3/01 Bayer (n. 4 above) and Advocate 
General Jacobs's Opinion in Syfait (n. 6 above), which is further discussed in section 2.5 below. 
Case T-168/01, n. 5 above, paras. 89-90. 
ibid., para. 147. This can be seen as endorsing Advocate General Jacobs's Opinion in Syfait, n. 6 
above: see pp. 77-79 below for the Advocate General's discussion of the effects of parallel trade on 
the final consumer. 
ibid., paras. 121-122. 
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effect of limiting the freedom of Glaxo Wellcome and its distributor's to choose 
their customers, 'not every agreement which restricts the freedom of action of the 
participating undertakings...necessarily falls within the prohibition in Article 81(1) 
[EC Treaty].''*^ Nevertheless, the Court held that GlaxoWellcome had not 
succeeded in calling into question the Commission's finding that the dual-pricing 
clause had as its effect to deprive national health budgets, and therefore final 
consumers, of a benefit in the form of a reduction in prices which they would have 
derived in the absence of the parallel import-restrictive agreement."*^ 
However, even though the agreement had as its effect the restriction o f competition, 
the Court found that the Commission had failed to adequately consider whether the 
dual-pricing clause might give rise to an economic advantage by contributing to 
innovation so as to be capable of benefiting from an Article 81(3) EC Treaty 
exemption. GlaxoWellcome's argument that parallel trade leads to a loss in 
efficiency by reducing the capacities for financing R & D cannot be disregarded in 
light of GlaxoWellcome's evidence to this effect.''^ 'Such an omission is 
particularly serious where the Commission is required to determine whether the 
conditions for the application Article 81(3) [EC Treaty] are satisfied in a legal and 
economic context, such as that characteristic of the pharmaceutical sector, where 
competition is distorted by the presence of national regulafions.'''^ It cannot be 
assumed that the loss in efficiency only stems from the variations in exchange rates, 
as, even though currency fluctuations may have an impact on price differentials 
between two Member States, parallel trade is linked to the coexistence of different 
national pricing regulations. Further, the Commission had erred in not considering 
that the dual-pricing clause could lead to a gain in efficiency. In particular, the 
Case T-168/01, n. 5 above, para. 170-171. The Court referred to inter alia Case C-309/99 Woulers 
and Others v. Nederlandse Orden van Advocaten [2002] E .C .R. 1577. 
Case T-168/01, para. 189-190. The Court, however, acknowledged that the savings derived 
from parallel trade are minimal (para. 190). See also chapter 1(3.1) above. 
"•^ ibid., paras. 258 and 264. This is particularly so considering that the contents of GlaxoWellcome's 
arguments and supporting evidence is 'corroborated on a number of significant aspects by 
documents originating with the Commission' (at para 263), as, for example, Commission 
Communication on the single market in pharmaceuticals [1998] COM/588/final. 
ibid., para. 276. 
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measure would not only lead to an increase in revenues for Glaxo Wellcome, but has 
the secondary effect of increasing the funds available for future R & D . Parallel 
importers, on the other hand, do not engage in competition among themselves, but 
only reduce prices to an extent necessary to attract customers. In consequence, most 
of the price differentials remain with the parallel importers instead o f being re-
invested into innovation.''^ The Commission could therefore not lawfully conclude 
that the dual-pricing clause did not contribute to the promotion o f technical progress 
for the purpose of the first condition for the application o f Article 81(3) EC 
Treaty."** Accordingly, as the Commission did not further clarify and consider the 
other conditions which must be satisfied in order to be eligible for an exemption 
under Article 81(3) EC Treaty, the Decision was annulled. Due to the retro-active 
effect of the annulment, the Commission must reconsider GlaxoWellcome's request 
for an exemption. 
By considering the specific nature o f the pharmaceutical market, the judgment can 
be seen as endorsing Advocate General Jacobs's Opinion in Syfait,^^ which wi l l be 
discussed in section 2.5 below. The Commission must acknowledge that certain 
practices that facilitate price discrimination by preventing parallel imports, such as 
dual-pricing mechanisms, may lead to a gain in efficiency, providing an added 
benefit to consumers and strengthen the competitiveness of the European 
pharmaceutical industry.^" The pharmaceutical industry is characterised by high 
investments, which are largely sunk costs, while the variable costs are fairly low. 
As a result, it is commercially sensible to market the products wherever the variable 
costs can be recovered, even though the sunk costs cannot be recovered i f all 
products are sold at the lowest price.^' The Court can be interpreted as giving its 
approval of Ramsey pricing by ordering the Commission to take this aspect into 
Case T-168/01, n. 5 above, para. 300. See also chapter 1(3.1) above. 
ibid., para. 308. 
N. 6 above. See also section 2.5 below. 
" See D. Glynn, 'Article 82 and price discrimination in patented pharmaceuticals: The economics,' 
(2005) 26 E . C . L . R . 135, for a very convincing discussion of the benefits of price discrimination and 
measures that facilitate such price discrimination within the common market. 
" Case T-168/01, n. 5 above, para. 271. See also Advocate General Jacobs's Opinion in Syfait, n. 6 
above, para. 89. 
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consideration, which contradicts earlier findings by the Commission and the ECJ.^" 
The inability to recover the overhead sunk costs in the low price Member States 
may result in manufacturers delaying the launch of new pharmaceutical products in 
these Member States. In fact, parallel trade may seriously affect the incentive to 
carry out further R & D i f the overhead sunk costs cannot be recovered. The 
conclusion must therefore be that competition law shifts the funds available for 
R & D to parallel importers no-value adding business. Whether manufacturers in fact 
choose to make the funds available for R & D is irrelevant. Manufacturers have the 
option, i f needs be, to mvest the funds into R & D , whilst an increase in parallel 
importers' profits wi l l have no, even potential, impact on R & D . The agreement may 
therefore remedy a loss in efficiency, as well as providing a gain in efficiency by 
allowing for an increase in funds made available by the pharmaceutical company 
for future inventions (R&D). It is therefore hoped that the Commission w i l l 
consider the agreement eligible for an Article 81(3) exemption. 
Coincidentally, the European Association of Euro-Pharmaceutical Companies 
(EAEPC), the European-wide parallel importers association, has filed a complaint 
with the Commission alleging that Pfizer's recently implemented dual-pricing 
system in Spain - similar to GlaxoWellcome's - is incompatible with Article 81 EC 
Treaty." The outcome of the Commission's re-examination of GlaxoWellcome's 
request for an exemption, or, i f appealed, the ECJ's judgment, is eagerly waited for 
" See V. Korah, 'The interface between intellectual property rights and competition in developed 
countries,' (2005) 2:4 Script-ed 463, 472, discussed in the context of Advocate General Jacobs's 
Opinion in Syfait (n. 6 above), where the Advocate General invoked the same argument. See F. 
Ramsey, 'A contribution to the theory of taxation,' (1929) 37 Economic Journal 41, 47-61: provided 
that if no price is below variable costs, no-one is worse off, and the sunk overhead costs will be 
recovered from the markets willing to pay a high price. 
" E A E P C , 'Pfizer breaking E U competition rules,' (October 2005), (<http://www.eaepc.org/news 
_and_press/current_articles.php?n=3&id=274>), Pfizer's dual-pricing system entails a 'regulated' 
price for products intended for the Spanish market, and a higher 'Pfizer price' for products intended 
for other markets. Distributors will have to sign a detailed contract creating an information system 
whereby the distributors will have to inform Pfizer of their sales data, allowing Pfizer to determine 
which of the two prices should apply. There is therefore a distinct possibility that the Commission 
will conclude that there is a valid agreement between Pfizer and the distributors. Alternatively, the 
E A E P C claims that the dual pricing system can be considered an abuse by a dominant undertaking, 
and thus not compatible with Article 82 E C Treaty: see p. 66 below. 
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by commentators.^'' It must be remembered, however, that the CFI did not dispute 
the Commission's finding of a valid agreement between GlaxoWellcome and its 
distributors. The 'concept of an agreement,' which wi l l be further discussed in 
section 1.4 below, has been the subject of much case-law by the ECJ, cuhninating 
in the Bayer'^ judgment. 
1.3 Export and resale bans 
The demand for pharmaceutical products is not price sensitive due to the lack of 
substitutes and special nature of such products. Despite a lack of commercial 
viability, manufacturers f u l f i l their ethical duties by continuing to supply 
pharmaceutical products in low-priced Member States in order to satisfy inherent 
domestic demand. Manufacturers hope that those products w i l l saturate the local 
demand and not be re-exported to higher-priced Member States. The most obvious 
way of preventing parallel imports from low-priced Member States is to impose an 
export or resale ban in the sales contract, and make the further commercial 
relationship and the delivery of products contingent upon the distributor's 
agreement not to export or resell the products to higher-priced markets. In order to 
guarantee the parallel importer's adherence with the ban, working as a deterrent, the 
manufacturer may penalise any breach o f the agreement with a refusal to supply. 
Resale bans can potentially segment the common market along national boundaries 
and distort competition by preventing the flow of goods from low-priced to high-
priced Member States. Agreements between manufacturers and distributors that 
prevent the distributor from reselling the products, by for example requiring that the 
supplies be used only for the distributor's own requirements, are not compatible 
with Article 81 EC T r e a t y . E v e n resale bans that are not directly aimed at 
The E A E P C said in a comment to the judgment: 'we are confident that a full analysis of the 
economic impact of parallel trade will confirm pharma manufacturers are in the wrong,' in S. 
Boseley, ' G S K claims victory in battle over drug prices,' The Guardian, 28 September 2006, p. 15. 
" Cases C-2-3/01,n.4above. 
" See Commission Decision 90/38/EEC Bayer (Bayo-n-ox) [1990] O.J. L21/71. This case was 
complicated by the fact that Bayer was using a selective distribution system; but as the resale ban 
43 
preventing parallel imports per se, but nevertheless have an indirect effect on intra-
Community trade, may violate Article 81 EC Treaty. A resale ban on opened forms 
of original packages carrying the manufacturer's trademark was held to be in 
violation o f Article 81 EC Treaty by the Commission." Bayer, the manufacturer, 
claimed that the prohibition was not aimed at preventing parallel imports, but was a 
pure health and safety measure.^* The Commission nevertheless held the measure to 
amount to an export ban, as the prohibition did not take into account that certain 
types of packaging, i f opened, do not affect the safety o f the product, and even 
though several Member States prohibit trade in opened forms of packaging the 
resale ban effectively prevents trade to the remaining Member States. 
A less restrictive measure to prevent parallel imports is to include an export ban in 
the supply contract. The effects of an export ban are similar to that of a complete 
resale ban. It segments the common market along national borders and prevents 
parallel imports; even though, hypothetically, a distributor may potentially still 
resell the products to another distributor based within the same Member State who 
in turn exports the products to a higher-priced Member State.^° For example, 
Sandoz, a pharmaceutical manufacturer, sought to prevent products marketed in 
Italy from being parallel exported to other higher-priced Member States by simply 
including the term 'export prohibited' on the distributors' invoices. This is clearly 
the most obvious way to restrict exports. There is also no doubt that the insertion of 
such a condition distorts competition and trade between Member States. In fact, 
even an export ban to non-EE A countries may be seen as distorting competition 
prevented intra-system sales it was nevertheless in violation of Article 81 E C Treaty. See Hays, 
'Parallel importation,' n. 25 above, 83-84. 
" Commission Decision 90/645/EEC Bayer Dental [1990] O.J. L35I/46. 
ibid., recital 8. Further, as prices for dental products were at the time freely determined throughout 
the Community, prices were almost the same in all Member States. Hence, Bayer argued that the 
prohibition was not aimed at preventing parallel imports. 
" ibid., recitals 11 and 16. See chapters 6 and 7 below on repackaging. 
Similarly, sending the products out of the common market and enforcing an import ban in the 
supply contract in order to keep the products out of the common market would have the same effect 
on trade between Member States. The manufacturer may, however, be able to assert his patent rights 
in order to prevent such importation. See chapter 5(4) on 'international exhaustion.' 
44 
within the common market i f the effects of the export ban and the manufacturer's 
behaviour are such that in reality the export ban prevents parallel imports.^' 
A n export ban, however, does not amount to an infringement of Article 81 EC 
Treaty in the absence of an agreement between the manufacturer and distributors. 
As the insertion of an export ban on the invoices can be seen as a unilateral action, 
the Commission had to adopt a very wide interpretation o f an 'agreement.' 
Although the Commission recognised that no formal agreement between Sandoz 
and the distributors existed, it maintained that the inclusion of the contested 
condition on the invoices was part of the normal commercial relationship between 
Sandoz and its customers. 'Consequently, the invoice cannot be seen as the 
expression of a merely unilateral act...the fact that the invoices have been 
constantly and systematically used leads to the conclusion that Sandoz P f s clients 
implicitly agreed with it and accepted it. '^" When Sandoz subsequently challenged 
the decision before the ECJ the Court upheld the Commission Decision by ruling 
that the distributors' failure to object to the contested condition amounted to a tacit 
acceptance of the condition.''^ The Court held that this practice had been repeated to 
the extent that it had become an established part of Sandoz's business relations, and 
as such, together with the Italian distributors' tacit acceptance of the terms by the 
distributors, amounted to an agreement to restrict exports between Sandoz and its 
distributors.^'' As Broberg and Jacobsen rightly observe, 'the idea that the 
distributors tacitly accept the anti-competitive clause irrespective o f the fact that the 
clause is clearly contrary to their interests, and irrespective of the fact that several of 
Johnson & Johnson, n 22 above, recital 28: after amending the wording of the agreement, only 
exports to non-EEA countries were prohibited. However, the supplier's behaviour gave evidence to 
the fact that exports to E E A Member States were in practise still prohibited. 
" Sandoz, n. 22 above, recital 26. 
" Case C-277/87 Sandoz SpA v. Commission [1990] E . C . R . 45, para. 1 (only a summary has been 
published). 
'''' An agreement was held to exist even though the customers were not informed of the condition 
until the invoice arrived. C f Johnson & Johnson, n. 22 above, where a similar condition was 
included in the price list. Further, the Court held that an agreement existed even though Sandoz had 
taken no any action against customers in order to ensure compliance with the condition. See also 
Case 86/82 Hasselblad v. Commission [1984] E .C .R. 883; and M. Broberg and P. Jakobsen, 'The 
concept of agreement in Article 81 E C : On the manufacturers' right to prevent parallel trade within 
the European Community,' (2002) 23 E . C . L . R . 127, 130. 
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the distributors did re-export the products is...an unusually broad interpretation of 
the concept of agreement.'^^ Nevertheless, the insertion of the export ban on the 
invoices was a fundamental error by Sandoz, enabling the Commission and the ECJ 
to discern Sandoz's underlying intention to restrict parallel imports. This leads to 
the question whether a unilateral decision to restrict parallel imports, in the absence 
of any written or otherwise communicated requirements, w i l l violate Article 81 EC 
Treaty. 
1.4 Refusals to supply and the 'concept of agreement' 
Resale bans and export bans are often contained in the manufacturer's supply 
contract or otherwise communicated to the distributor by the manufacturer. The 
Commission w i l l readily show that this amounts to an agreement to restrict parallel 
imports between the manufacturer and the distributor. To circumvent this finding, 
manufacturers may simply refuse to supply selected distributors altogether, or at 
least implement some sort of supply quota, in order to restrict parallel imports 
without violating Article 81 EC Treaty. The manufacturer may trace parallel 
imported products back through the distribution chain in order to identify which 
distributors are supplying parallel importers, or, alternatively, w i l l be able to 
identify such distributors by the unusually large amount of products ordered.^^ Like 
a resale or export ban, refusing to supply a distributor clearly distorts competition 
and w i l l segment the common market along national boundaries as it prevents trade 
between Member States. However, unlike resale and export bans, often expressly 
included in the supply or sales contract, a refusal to supply is arguably a unilateral 
decision by the manufacturer. In the absence of a valid agreement such measures 
Broberg and Jakobsen, n. 64 above, 131. 
^ See inter alia, Johnson & Johnson, n. 22 above. Another practice is to supply the same drug for 
the same price in the importing Member State. The manufacturer will do this for six or seven weeks 
and then suddenly cut off supply. During this time the manufacturer will be able to ascertain the 
demand for products in the importing Member State, and the inherent domestic demand in the 
exporting Member State, subsequently limiting supplies on the exporting market accordingly. See 
Morals R, 'Pssst...Wanna buy some Augmentin?,' Forbes, 12 April 2004, (<http://www.forbes.com/ 
forbes/2004/0412/086/html>). 
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w i l l be compatible with Article 81 EC Treaty. This spurred the Commission to 
focus on the definition of an agreement, widening the concept when convenient. 
The Commission's and the ECJ's wide interpretation o f an agreement in Sandoz^^ 
has been applied to a wide range of practices aimed at preventing parallel imports, 
including a car manufacturer's refusal to supply right-hand driven cars to German 
distributors in an attempt to prevent re-importation into the UK.^* The ECJ held that 
although the act of refusing to supply the distributor did not itself constitute an 
agreement between the manufacturer and the distributor, the manufacturer's 
practice could be seen as part of the original selective distribution agreement signed 
and agreed long before the manufacturer's refusal to supply.^^ According to the 
ECJ, technological developments leave room for certain matters to be decided by 
the manufacturer at any point during the duration of the agreement.^" Thus, refusing 
to supply the distributor could not be seen as a unilateral decision by the 
manufacturer. 
The Commission's and the Community courts' willingness to infer an agreement 
between a manufacturer and its distributors, albeit an agreement of benefit only to 
the manufacturer, resulted in manufacturers being unable to refuse to supply 
distributors. As w i l l be discussed below, the Commission's approach was 
unsatisfactory as it blurred the distinction between Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty, 
with the former being used as a substitute for the latter whenever the manufacturer 
was non-dominant. To manufacturers' widespread relief this was recognised by the 
CFI and the ECJ in the landmark case of Bayer J ^ 
Bayer, a large multinational pharmaceutical company, manufactures and markets 
'adalat,' for the treatment of coronary heart disease. Due to national regulations the 
price for 'adalat' was almost 40% lower in Spain and France than in the UK. 
" N. 22 and 63 above. 
" See Joined Cases 25-26/84 Ford Inc. v. Commission [1985] E.C.R. 2725. 
ibid., paras. 30-33. 
'° ibid, para. 20. 
" N. 4 above. 
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Bayer's distributors engaged in parallel exporting 'adalat' f rom Spain and France to 
the U K . As, by law, distributors must keep a reserve stock of pharmaceutical 
products, they began to order huge amounts of 'adalat' so as to be able to satisfy the 
needs of local pharmacies as well as those in the UK. This lead to a significant loss 
of revenue for Bayer's British subsidiary, as a result of a huge increase in 'adalat' 
dispensed by Bayer's French and Spanish subsidiaries.^^ Bayer, concerned by this 
loss, implemented a supply quota system in order to restrict the flow of 'adalat' 
from Spain and France onto the U K market. The quota was calculated on basis of 
the distributors' orders in the previous year, allowing a 10% annual increase to 
cover the general rise in consumpfion. The distributors tried to circumvent Bayer's 
quota system by convincing their local subsidiaries to increase their orders and send 
the excess supply to the distributors for later parallel export to the UK. Bayer 
discovered this widespread practice and refused the orders in excess of the decided 
quota. 
The Commission, considering that there was an agreement between the distributors 
and Bayer capable of restricting trade between Member States, issued a Decision 
ordering Bayer to inform the distributors that exports are allowed within the 
common market.'^ In addition Bayer was fined 3 million ECUs.^ "* The Commission 
tried to extend the principle in Sandoz^^ and in the ECJ's judgment in Ford^^ to a 
situation like that in Bayer'^ where there was no explicit export ban or selective 
distribution agreement. Thus, the Commission effectively argued that the EC Treaty 
imposes a general prohibition on parallel import-restrictive measures. 
Bayer appealed the decision to the CFI. The subsequent judgment would have a far-
reaching impact on manufacturer's ability to prevent parallel imports. The CFI 
referred to established case-law and held that it is sufficient that undertakings have 
Cases C-2-3/01, n. 5 above, para. 5. According to Bayer, its British subsidiary saw a fall in 
turnover of D E M 230 million as a direct result of the parallel imports from Spain and Portugal. This 
represented a loss of revenue for the mother company of D E M 100 million. 
" Adalat, n. 5 above. 
ibid., recital 3. 
" N. 22 above. 
N. 68 above 
N. 4 above. 
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expressed a joint intention to conduct themselves in a specific way for there to be an 
agreement.^^ However, it is also clear from that case-law that the Commission 
cannot hold that apparently unilateral conduct on the part o f a manufacturer, 
adopted in the context o f the contractual relations which he maintains with his 
dealers, in reality forms the basis of an agreement between undertakings... i f it does 
not establish the existence of an acquiescence by the other partners, express or 
implied, in the attitude adopted by the manufacturer.'^' The CFI held that the 
evidence put forward by the Commission was not enough to prove that there was 
tacit acquiescence on behalf of the distributors. The fact that the distributors 
actively tried to circumvent the system set up by Bayer negates the Commission's 
finding of an agreement. The facts of the case can also be distinguished from the 
judgment in Sandoz.^^ In Sandoz^^ the manufacturer had clearly included the phrase 
'export prohibited' on the invoices, which set the tone o f the underlying intention. 
Bayer, on the other hand, did not make its intentions clear to the distributors. 
Secondly, the distributors in Sandoz^^ complied with the clause de facto and without 
discussion, thereby giving their tacit acquiescence.^'' The second case relied on by 
the Commission, Tipp-Ex^^ concerned an exclusive distribution agreement between 
Tipp-Ex and its distributor D M I . In order to achieve its object o f preventing parallel 
imports, Tipp-Ex implemented a monitoring system to give D M I an incentive to 
increase its prices to the parallel importers. Unlike the distributors in Bayer,^^ D M I 
gave its acquiescence by following Tipp-Ex's demands so as to increase the resale 
prices eventually culminating in a refusal to supply altogether.^^ The Court held that 
this amounted to an agreement between Tipp-Ex and D M I . Similarly, in Johnson & 
Johnson, a monitoring system set up in order to trace exported goods back to the 
distributor coupled with an express warning to reduce supplies to the distributor 
Case T-41/96, n. 4 above, para. 67; referring to Cases 41, 44-45/69, n. 7 above. 






See Case T-41/96, n. 4 above, para. 163. 
Case C-279/87 Tipp-Ex GmbH v. Commision [1981] E . C . R . 1-261. See K. Lasok, 'Article 85 
definition of an agreement,' [1990] 11 E . C . L . R . R59. 
'^N. 4 above. 
Case C-279/87, n. 84 above. 
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amounted to an export ban.^^ Therefore, as the distributors in Bayer failed to give 
their tacit acquiescence by trying to circumvent the resale ban, Bayer's conduct did 
not amount to an agreement but merely a unilateral act.^ * The CFI therefore held 
that the Commission had failed to prove the existence of an agreement between 
Bayer and the distributors.^'' On appeal, the ECJ upheld the CFI judgment, noting 
that the mere finding of a continuous business relationship between the 
manufacturer and its distributors is not sufficient for a finding that an agreement to 
restrict parallel exports exists.'^ 
The Bayer^^ judgment has severely restricted the Commission's practice o f using 
Article 81 EC Treaty as a tool to penalise 'parallel import-restrictive' conduct by 
manufacturers. Unilateral conduct cannot and should not come within the scope of 
Article 81 EC Treaty. It is likely that the Commission widened the concept of an 
agreement under Article 81 EC Treaty as a direct result of not being able to classify 
Bayer as a dominant undertaking.'^ The almost religious belief that restricting 
parallel imports is per se prohibited by Community competition law had obliterated 
the concept of an agreement under Article 81 EC Treaty. The ECJ observed that i f 
an agreement could be inferred from the facts of Bayer it 'would have the effect of 
confusing the scope of that provision [Art. 81] with that of Article 82 EC Treaty.''"^ 
The result, until Bayer^^ was that a manufacturer could not refuse to supply a 
distributor. I f the manufacturer were in a dominant position the 'abuse' could be 
^' Johnson & Johnson, n. 22 above, recital 15-17; and Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Johnson & Johnson 
Inc. [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 287. See M. Noor, 'The Bayer Case: New hope for manufacturers,' (2002) 
23 E.I .P.R. 158, 159. This follows US policy (under the Sherman Antitrust Act 15 U.S. §§), where 
an agreement does not necessarily require contractual arrangements, but may be inferred from the 
actions of the manufacturer, if the manufacturer's actions go beyond mere announcement of his 
policy, and he employs others means to enforce his policy, this may amount to an agreement. See 
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29; and H. Lidgaard, 'Unilateral refusal to supply: An 
agreement in disguise?,' (1997) 17 E . C . L . R . 352, 358. 
Case T-41/96, n. 4 above, para. 182. 
ibid., para. 183. 
'° Cases C-2-3/01, n. 4 above, para. 141. See C. Brown, 'Bayer v Commission: The ECJ agrees,' 
(2004)25 E . C . L . R . 386. 
" ibid. 
M. Jephcott, 'Commentary on Case T-41/96 Bayer A G v. Commission,' (2001) 22 E . C . L . R . 469, 
476. 
" Case C-2-3/01, n. 4 above, para. 101. 
" ibid. 
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caught by Article 82 EC Treaty, i f not; the Commission would infer an agreement 
to restrict parallel imports from the continuous business relationship between the 
manufacturer and the distributors so as to come within Article 81 EC Treaty. This 
would lead to the illogicality of a refusal to supply being more heavily penalised 
under Article 81 EC Treaty than under Article 82 EC Treaty, since Article 82 EC 
Treaty only prohibits a dominant undertaking from 'abusing' its position, which 
does not necessarily encompass all forms of a refusal to supply.^^ 
The Bayer^^ judgment provided non-dominant manufacturers with a glimpse o f 
hope.^^ The Court made it clear that the concept o f an agreement is restricted to at 
least a 'concurrence of wills , ' albeit the form in 'which it is manifested being 
unimportant so long as it constitutes the faithful expression of the parties' 
intention.'^* However, manufacturers should be aware that the judgment must be 
applied with care. 
First, it should be remembered that the ECJ did not rely on Forcf^ and AEG v. 
Commission'^'^ since those cases concerned selective distribution agreements .For 
example, the issue in Ford^^^ was not to establish that there was an agreement, but 
rather whether the export ban was part of the original agreement. Manufacturers 
should therefore be aware that the principle in Bayer^^^ may not apply to a 
relationship between a manufacturer and a selective distributor. 
Secondly, the manufacturer must not make its intentions, as to the refusal to supply, 
known to the distributor or indeed to any other party. This was the 'mistake' Sandoz 
N. 4 above: Cases C-2-3/01, para. 139; and Case T-41/96, para. 180. See Case 27/76 United 
Brands Co. v. Commission [1978] E.C.R. 1-207, paras. 182-191. See also section 2.4 below. 
Cases C-2-3/01, n. 4 above. 
See A. Dawes, 'Neither head nor tail: The confused application of E C competition law to the 
pharmaceutical sector,' (2006) 27 E . C . L . R . 269, 276. 
Case T-41/96, n. 4 above, para. 69. 
" N. 68 above. 
'""Case \Qim AEG-Telefunken AG V. Commission [1983] E .C .R. 3151. 
N. 4 above: Cases C-2-3/01, paras. 143-144; and Case T-41/96, paras. 170-171. 
N. 68 above. 
Cases C-2-3/01, n. 4 above. 
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made when printing 'export prohibited' on the invoices."^"^ Similarly, manufacturers 
w i l l have to ensure that no documents or memos in their possession set out their 
covert intentions.'"^ Further, Bayer was in a position to argue that the sales quota 
was justified as the distributors had to order enormous amounts of products to 
satisfy national legislation requiring distributors to keep a fu l l range o f products. 
A legally or commercially viable explanation for the refusal to supply could be 
enough to negate anti-competitive behaviour. 
Thirdly, manufacturers must refrain from monitoring and tracing parallel exported 
goods back through the distribution chain, as this can be seen as a means to enforce 
the 'export ban' f rom which an agreement can be inferred f rom i f the distributors 
adhere to the manufacturer's policy.'"^ Manufacturers may trace parallel exported 
goods back to the original distributors and warn, penalise, or refuse to supply them. 
However, not only may this lead to the inference of an agreement i f the distributor 
adheres to the manufacturer's threats, but the manufacturer's covert intention o f 
restricting parallel imports may be discemable f rom the manufacturer's selective 
approach by refusing to supply only certain distributors. It is important to remember 
that Bayer's quota system universally applied to all distributors. 
'"•^ Sandoz, n. 22 above. Similarly, Johnson & Johnson made the mistake of including the condition: 
'Export prohibited except by prior arrangement' under the 'terms of trading;' see Johnson <& 
Johnson, n. 22 above, recital 13. 
In this respect Ford, n. 68 above, can be distinguished from Cases C-2-3/01 Bayer, n. 4 above, by 
the 'smoking memo' setting out Ford's intentions to prevent parallel exports. See Jephcott, n. 92 
above, 476. 
For example, Bayer claimed that one Spanish distributor suddenly ordered a quantity representing 
nearly half of the total yearly consumption in Spain: see Case T-41/96, n. 4 above, para. 32; and 
Adalat, n. 4 above, recital 114. As national legislation requires distributors to keep a full range of 
products in reserve quantities, the distributors had to order huge quantities so as to satisfy the 
domestic market as well as the parallel exporters. Bayer's quota system did therefore only amount to 
an export ban when coupled with the national legislation. As a consequence, parallel exporters and 
distributors supplying such are likely to try to have this legislation amended or removed. 
For example in Re. Pfizer Hellas SA and Glaxo SA, Advisor}' Opinions of the Competition 
Committee Nos 81 and 82, Greece, Cases A1-732, A1-733 (August 1989), Pfizer and Glaxo 
successfully managed to justify a refusal to supply a potential parallel importer. Greek law required 
manufacturers to maintain a three month reserve stock of pharmaceutical products in the country. As 
the manufacturers' laboratories were operating at full capacity, the Hellenic Competition 
Commission excused Pfizer and Glaxo for refusing to supply the potential parallel exporter with the 
large amount of products ordered, as this would have placed the two undertakings in breach of Greek 
national law. See Hays, 'Parallel importation,' n. 25 above, 83. 
Johnson & Johnson, n. 22 above, recitals 15-17. 
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Finally, Bayer'^^ was distinguished from Sandoz^^^ on the fact that the distributors 
in Bayer ' ' sought to circumvent Bayer's quota system. This means that, ironically, 
a manufacturer may benefit f rom a dishonest relationship with its distributors. I f the 
distributor 'agrees' to the unilateral policy the Commission may regard this as an 
agreement. Distributors may also take ful l advantage of this 'loophole' and 
will ingly accept any conditions, even though this may be to their detriment in the 
short run, so as to argue that there is a valid agreement with the manufacturer. 
Manufacturers are therefore well advised not to discuss the policy with distributors, 
and not to attempt to justify its implementation even though this may have a 
negative impact on their commercial relationship with the distributors."^ 
Although the Commission suffered a great setback in terms of its ability to apply 
Article 81 EC Treaty by the ECJ's judgment in Bayer,^^^ the effects of Bayer^^'^ 
may turn out to be far more extensive for the Commission than first anticipated. The 
Commission's misapplication of Article 81 EC Treaty may have spurred the Court 
to consider the peculiarities of the pharmaceutical trade in the context of parallel 
imports and competition law. The CFI in Bayer held that the Commission cannot 
'rely in support of its argument upon its conviction, which is, moreover, devoid of 
all foundation, that parallel imports wi l l in the long term bring about the 
harmonisation of the price of medicinal products.'"^ This reasoning is further 
supported by Advocate General Jacobs's Opinion to the first case before the ECJ 
concerning a unilateral refusal to supply distributors in order to restrict parallel 
imports under Article 82 EC Treaty."^ This case is important at a time when the 
Commission is facing significant difficulty in applying Article 81 EC Treaty, 
following GlaxoWellcome^^'' and Bayer.^^^ By narrowing market definitions the 
Cases C-2-3/01, n. 4 above. 
'"'N.63 above. 
"' N. 4 above. 
"- S. Pautke and K. Jones, 'Competition law limitations for the distribution of pharmaceuticals 
rough guide to the brave new world,' (2005) 26 E . C . L . R . 24, 34. 
' " N . 4 above. 
''Ubid. 
Case T-41/96, n. 4 above, para. 181. 
"*Case C-53/03, n. 6 above. 
'"Case T-168/0 l , n . 5 above. 
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Commission set out to prevent such restrictive practices using Article 82 instead of 
Article 81 EC Treaty."' 
2. Article 82 EC Treaty 
The costly and difficult task of proving a dominant position on behalf of the 
manufacturer is a possible explanation to why the Commission has traditionally 
focused on Article 81 EC Treaty in relation to parallel import-restrictive 
measures.'^'' The Bayer and GlaxoWellcome^^' judgments, however, may leave 
the Commission with httle choice but to consider the application of Article 82 EC 
Treaty to such measures by pharmaceutical manufacturers in a dominant position. 
This can be a daunting exercise as the Commission must not only show that the 
undertaking holds a dominant position on the market, but also that the measure 
amounts to an abuse of this position. This involves a three stage approach. First, 
the relevant market must be defined; secondly, it must be assessed whether the 
undertaking holds a dominant position on this market. Finally, as dominance is not 
in itself an abuse, consideration of what behaviour is likely to be abusive must be 
undertaken. 
2.1 Article 82 EC Treaty and parallel trade 
The eagerly awaited ruling by the ECJ in Syfait^^^ did not provide the guidance 
hoped for in relation to the application of Article 82 EC Treaty to parallel import-
restrictive measures in the field of pharmaceutical products. The ECJ was asked to 
provide guidance on whether the refusal to meet ful ly the orders of its distributors 
'"'N. 4 above. 
Following Case C-2-3/01, ibid., the Commission spokeswoman Amelia Torres said that the 
Commission has received numerous requests for clearance of supply quota systems and is 
considering them under 'the antitrust rules.' Cleariy, the Commission turned the focus to Article 82 
E C Treaty following this judgment. See Morals, n. 66 above, p. 4. 
J. Nazerali, S. Hocking and U. Ranasinghe, 'Parallel imports of pharmaceuticals - a prescription 
for success or a free market overdose?,' [1998] 19 E . C . L . R . 332, 338. 
Cases C-2-3/01, n. 4 above. 
'-- Case T-168/0l,n. 5 above. 
' " N . 6 above. 
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constitutes a per se abuse of Article 82 EC Treaty when done with the intention of 
restricting parallel exports. Advocate General Jacobs delivered a much debated 
Opinion where it is argued that such measures can be objectively justified 'given 
the combined circumstances of the European pharmaceutical sector at the current 
stage of its development.''^'* However, the ECJ never considered these arguments 
as the reference was held to be inadmissible.'^^ Similarly, the Commission's 
Decision in AstraZeneca^'^ provides little guidance on the application of Article 82 
EC Treaty to parallel import-restrictive measures. The decision concerns an abuse 
by a dominant position as a result of withdrawing a marketing authorisation so as to 
prevent the further marketing of generic and parallel imported products, as well as 
giving misleading information to the authorities delaying the access of generic 
products to the market. The Commission Decision is therefore limited to its facts, 
and primarily concerns a preventative (exclusionary) rather than restrictive 
measure. 
This unfortunately left the issues of substance as a matter of EC law concerning the 
application of Article 82 EC Treaty to parallel import-restrictive practices by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers unresolved. Secondly, the issue of market definition 
and dominance was not part of the reference to the ECJ in Syfait}~^ A definition 
and discussion of the factors that must be present in order for Article 82 EC Treaty 
to be applicable is therefore necessary. Finally, a thorough analysis of conduct that 
might be objectively justified will be carried out with reference to Advocate 
General Jacobs's Opinion in Syfait.^^^ 
Advocate General Jacobs, n. 6 above, para. 105. 
Case 53/03, n. 6 above, para. 37. 
Commission Decision COMP/A.37.507/F3-AstraZeneca of 15 July 2005 (not yet reported, but a 
non-confidential version is available on DG Competition's website: <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/ 
competition/index_en.html>). See also Commission press release IP/05/737, and N. Fagerlund and 
S. Rasmussen, 'AstraZeneca: The first abuse case in the pharmaceutical sector,' (2005) 3 
Competition News Letter 54, 54-56. The decision has been appealed: Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v. 
Commission [2005] O.J. C271/47. See also pp. 70-72 below. 
N. 6 above. 
'''ibid. 
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2.2 Defining the relevant market 
The relevant market for the purpose of Article 82 EC Treaty can be defined as a 
geographically delimited product market. The product market comprises 'all those 
products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by 
the consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their 
intended use.''^ ^ The key is interchangeability; involving demand-side and supply-
side subst i tut ion.An undertaking or a group of undertakings cannot be in a 
dominant position if its customers can switch to available substitutes in the event of 
a change in the sales conditions or p r i c e . T h e most widely used test to measure 
demand-side substitution is the so called "Small but Significant Non-transitory 
Increase in Price" (SSNIP) test. This test measures whether a hypothetical small but 
permanent price increase (5-10%) in the product considered would incur a loss of 
sales of such magnitude that the price increase would be unprofitable for the 
manufacturer.'^" Interchangeability may also be a factor on the supply-side. The 
undertaking (or its competitors) may be able to adapt its production/supply to the 
manufacture of a product sold by its competitors. I f so, the additional substitutable 
goods will be included in the relevant product market.'" 
Before applying these tests to pharmaceutical products it must be recognised that 
the pharmaceutical sector is a very distinct market with four specific attributes. 
First, pharmaceutical products are neither trend nor price sensitive as there is an 
inherent demand for such products. Secondly, pharmaceutical products are rarely 
substitutable as they are intrinsically linked to a particular treatment. Thirdly, 
virtually all pharmaceutical products are patent protected, or/and must be linked to a 
marketing authorisation in order to be placed on the market. Finally, prices are 
Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of the Community 
competition law [1997] O.J. C372/5, recital 2. 
™ See Case 85/76 Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission [1979] E . C . R . 641; and Case 
322/81 Michelin NVw. Commission [1983] E . C . R . 3461. 
Case 27/76, n. 95 above. See Whish, n. 1 above, 26-30 for discussion. 
Commission Notice, n. 129 above, recital 17. 
See Case 6/72 Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. Inc. v. Commission [1973] 
E . C . R . 215; and Case 322/81, n. 130 above. 
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regulated by national authorities by way of reimbursement levels. For example, the 
SSNIP test does not take into account state intervention in the pharmaceutical 
sector, making it difficult to apply the test to pharmaceutical products as end 
consumers are not sensitive to price increases as a result of state regulated 
reimbursement levels.'^^ The SSNIP test may also be irrelevant to the 
pharmaceutical industry as manufacturers caimot increase prices due to national 
pricing regulations. Besides, only in limited cases, as for example when there are a 
number of similar products for the treatment of a particular illness, will demand-
side substitutability be relevant and practically possible.''^ ^ Similarly, supply-side 
substitutability may not be relevant to the pharmaceutical sector as it will require 
significant investments in production capability (including 'research and 
development' (R&D)) or intangible assets (intellectual property) in order to switch 
to production of another pharmaceutical product. 
There are very few cases on market definition involving the pharmaceutical market 
outside the field of merger control. Unfortunately, the issue of dominance was not 
part of the reference to the ECJ in Syfait,^'^^ as the Hellenic Competition 
Commission assumed that GlaxoSmithKline was holding a dominant position in at 
least one of its products; Lamictal. However, a handful of Article 81 EC Treaty 
decisions'"*' and one Article 82 EC Treaty decision'^* have discussed market 
definition, and as in the merger control cases, the Commission used the 
'Anatomical Therapeutic Classification' system (ATC) as the basis for defining the 
'^ ^ For a discussion on pricing and reimbursement levels see chapter 1(2.2) above. Further, this 
attribute of the pharmaceutical sector makes product substitution very difficult as demand should be 
assessed with reference to pharmacists and doctors and not end consumers. See Commission 
Decision 97/469/EC Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz [1997] O.J. L201/1, recital 21. See also GlaxoWellcome, n. 
5 above, recital 185, in relation to Article 81 E C Treaty. By comparison, see the 'customer 
preference test' in chapter 6(4.1) below. 
'•'^  The intensity of competition in the pharmaceutical industry means that a patented product 
sometimes competes with rival patented products; often referred to as 'fast followers.' See E F P I A , 
'Article 82 E C : Can it be applied to control sales by pharmaceutical manufacturers to wholesalers'?,' 
(November 2004), (<http://www.efpia.org/6_publ/Article82ECNov04.pdf>), p. 26. 
N. 6 above. 
See in particular GlaxoWellcome, n. 5 above, and Adalat, n. 4 above. 
'^^ AstraZeneca, n. 126 above. See also Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd v. Director General of 
Fair Trading [2001 ] Comp. A.R. 1, concerning a dominant position on the U K market. 
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relevant market.'^^ In pharmaceutical cases the third ATC level is used, which 
determines the therapeutic and pharmacological subgroups of pharmaceutical 
products - i.e. their intended use and characteristics. However, in specific cases the 
product market definition may be narrower or wider than the ATC 3 level, as 
ultimately, the definition depends on the indication for which the pharmaceutical 
products are prescribed.The ATC 3 level may also be further subdivided 
between (i) over-the-counter products and prescription only products, and (ii) 
products subject to state reimbursement, and those not reimbursed.''" 
The geographical market in all Commission Decisions using the ATC classification 
has hitherto been defined as national.'"*^ The relevant geographic market therefore 
comprises the exporting as well as all importing national markets. However, even 
though ATC classification is the right method for defining the relevant market in 
merger control and Article 81 EC Treaty cases, it does not necessarily mean that 
this is the right approach in parallel import cases. 
Parallel traders choose their products not on basis of their therapeutic qualities but 
on the margin of price difference between the product on the exporting market and 
the importing market. Therefore, in addition to the 'ATC classification approach,' 
the so-called 'arbitrage approach' to the definition of the relevant market must be 
Recognised by the World Health Organisation (WHO), (<http://www.who.int/classifications/ 
atcddd/en/>). Occasionally, and lately, the Commission has also relied on the A T C system drawn up 
by the European Pharmaceutical Marketing Research Association (EphMRA). See Ciba-Geigy, n. 
134 above, and GlaxoWellcome, n. 5 above, recital 110. See also J-P. Gunther, 'Misuse of patent and 
drug regulatory approval systems in the pharmaceutical industry: An analysis of US and E U 
converging approaches,' (2005) 26 E . C . L . R . 669, 680. 
In AstraZeneca, n. 126 above, recitals 371 and 504, the Commission used the A T C 4 level, 
defining the relevant market as prescription-only proton pump inhibitors as all such products were 
used for the same treatment. See Fagerlund and Rasmussen, n. 126 above, 56. 
See e.g. Ciba-Geigy, n. 134 above. See also Commission Notice, n. 129 above, para. 16; and 
Gunther, n. 139 above, 680. See also chapter 1(1 and 2.2.) above 
See e.g. Adalat, n. 4 above; GlaxoWellcome, n. 5 above; and AstraZeneca, n. 126 above. See 
Commission Decision TVM.2922-Pfizer/Pharmacia [2003] O.J. CI 10/24 in relation to mergers. See 
also M. Kerckhove, 'Parallel trade in pharmaceutical products following the E C J ' s Bayer judgment: 
Can a case be made under Article 82 of the E C Treaty?,' (2005) The European Antitrust Review 83, 
84. 
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discussed.''*^ The (economics) term 'arbitrage' refers to 'the simultaneous buying 
and selling of assets in different markets or in derivative forms, taking advantage of 
the differing prices.'''*^ The basis of this approach to the definition of the relevant 
market is the fact that the parallel importer is in the business of arbitrage and not of 
manufacturing and providing pharmaceutical products for the downstream market 
of treating bad health. Secondly, the parallel importer and the manufacturer are not 
competitors since doctors are often unaware whether the product is 'original' or 
parallel imported; the doctor's only interest is that the product possess certain 
therapeutic attributes.''*^ Thirdly, a parallel trader can easily end parallel 
importation of a certain product, and commence parallel importation of a different 
product with a higher price margin. Very small investments, or none, in tangible 
and intangible assets will be necessary. Strictly speaking, parallel importers choose 
their products on basis of the price difference, and thus the scope for successful 
short-term trade between the exporting and the importing Member State.'"'^  Parallel 
traders' demand-side substitutability is therefore based on existing price 
differences, and not limited to the relevant ATC level.''*^ When a price difference 
disappears between two Member States, parallel importers will substitute the loss in 
profits by finding a new product or a new export market."*^ Whether the new 
'"^  This term was first used by Frederic Jenny, Judge at the French Cour de Cassation, in F. Jenny, 
'Pharmaceuticals competition and free movement of goods,' E U competition law and policy 
conference report, Hellenic Competition Commission (19 April 2002), p. 77. See also E A E P C , 
'Understanding competition in the distribution of pharmaceutical products in Europe,' (September 
2005), (<http://www.eaepc.org/admin/files/eaepc_article_82_study_september_2005.pdf>), pp. 30-
31, where, unsurprisingly, this theory is refuted by the E A E P C . 
See The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, lO"" ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 
67. 
E F P l A . n . 135 above, 32. 
'''ibid., 23. 
Jenny, n. 143 above, 82. In Case T-168/01, n. 5 above, the C F I said: 'it is not manifestly 
incorrect to accept that all the medicines... which are capable of being sold at a profit owing to the 
price differential between [the exporting Member State] and the Member State of destination 
constitute a product market:' (at para. 159). This could serve as good obiter dicta in support of this 
argument. 
Luc Gyselen, (at the time) Head of the Unit responsible for pharmaceuticals in D G Competition 
stated, at the IBC's 12*^  annual ' E U Pharmaceutical Law conference' (May 13 2004), that the 
conclusion reached after receiving the answers from a questionnaire sent out to parallel importers in 
connection with a quota system implemented by a manufacturer, was that, although the search costs 
for new products was more expensive than usual as a result of the quota system, the parallel 
importers could get 'round this by diversifying.' Substitutes were thus available. See E F P I A , n. 135 
above, 33. 
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product belongs to the same ATC class as the previously traded product is of no 
relevance to the parallel importer. In other words, the relevant product market 
comprises all pharmaceutical products for which a similar profit can be generated, 
taking account of both volume and price margin, i f parallel imported within the 
EEA.'"^ By illustration, i f a pharmaceutical product, for example an antibiotic, is 
50% more expensive in Member State A than in Member State B, the relevant 
market is not all antibiotics coming within the same ATC class, but all 
pharmaceutical products with at least a 50% price difference between the two 
Member States and the same volume market on the two markets. 
Analysing the relevant geographical market for parallel imported pharmaceutical 
products under the 'arbitrage' approach is a novel task. First, the geographical 
market can only be comprised of Member States in which the product in question 
benefits from a marketing authorisation. Without a marketing authorisation the 
parallel importer will not be able to apply for a parallel import licence; thus 
rendering parallel importation impossible and unlawful.'^° Focus should therefore 
be on Member State markets where the manufacturer is active, and not necessarily 
where the parallel importer is, as of yet, active.'^' Similarly, regulatory and legal 
obstacles restrict the geographic scope of the market to EEA Member State markets. 
It can be argued that the relevant market should only comprise the exporting market 
(where the abusive behaviour is conducted) and Member State markets with a 
higher price - that is to say where a profit from arbitrage can be made.'^ " However, 
as discussed in relation to the relevant product market, parallel importers can 
readily switch from one product to another, and similarly, source the products from 
another Member State. Parallel importation does not require overt investments, and 
the regulatory barriers faced when entering a new Member State market are 
negligible. As the number of combinations of different products that can be 
Kerchove, n. 142 above, 84. 
See chapters 3 and 4 below for a further discussion on marketing authorisations and parallel 
import licences. 
However, Jenny, n. 143 above, 83, is focusing on the markets where the parallel importer is 
currently active. 
However, c f ibid. 
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imported and exported to/from different Member States with a profit is, in theory, 
almost endless, the relevant geographic market should be defined as comprising all 
Member States where the product is benefiting from a marketing authorisation.'^^ 
2.3 Dominance 
To be in a dominant position the undertaking must be able to prevent competition 
and have the ability to behave independently within the above defined 'relevant 
market.' The EC Treaty does not provide a definition of a 'dominant position' but 
the ECJ and the Commission have provided vast guidelines. The ECJ has defined a 
dominant position as relating 'to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an 
undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on 
the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers.''^ '* In 
other words, a dominant undertaking is able to increase prices to an uncompetitive 
level without losing sales to its competitors so as to make the price rise profitable. 
There is no single factor which is conclusively indicative of a dominant position. 
Instead the Commission and the ECJ have identified a number of separate factors 
which are cumulatively indicative of a dominant position.'^^ These include the size 
of the undertaking's market share, the product substitutability, barriers to entry and 
buyer power. 
The size of the undertaking's market share becomes relevant i f the relevant market 
is limited to products within the same ATC group marketed on the national market. 
Prices may also fluctuate throughout the Community as a result of patent expirations, changes to 
national pharmaceutical pricing policies or currency rates, changing the market conditions over time. 
See Case T-30/89 Hilti AG v. Commission [1991] E .C .R. 11-1439, where the relevant geographical 
market was defined as the entire Community by the C F l , due to large price differences between 
Member States and low transportation costs making parallel importation likely. 
See Case 85/76, n. 130 above, para. 38. 
However, as the case-law on parallel trade in pharmaceutical products and Article 82 E C Treaty 
is limited to AstraZeneca, n. 126 above, and Case C-53/03, n. 6 above; most cases concerning 
dominance within the pharmaceutical sector have been decided under Council Regulation (EC) 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [the E C Merger Control 
Regulation] [2004] O.J. L204/01. 
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Evidence of a large market share, over 50%, can be indicative of a dominant 
position, but the significance of a large market share varies depending on the 
market structure and is not conclusive i f viewed independently of other factors.'^^ 
The market share is likely to depend on whether the product is a 'first mover,' i.e. 
still patent protected and recently commercialised, or an off-patent product subject 
to competition from a number of generic substitutes.'^' The novelty required for 
patent protection is indicative of a large market share, indeed as large as 50% or 
more. As such, the size of the market share is often proportionate to the amount of 
available substitute products. Off-patent products often face competition from 
generic substitutes, which may be indicative of a non-dominant position.'^^ The 
barriers to entry into the market are also lower for off-patent products, as the 
product data is available and patent protection is not longer a barrier to entry. 
Nevertheless, this analysis may be more applicable to merger cases than to cases 
concerning parallel imports and Article 82 EC Treaty, as the important question in 
such a situation is whether the undertaking is able to maintain the uncompetitive 
price even in the absence of the alleged anti-competitive abuse.'^ ^ The specific 
market structure of the pharmaceutical market suggests that pharmaceutical 
manufacturers do not possess such market power. First, entry to the market is 
strictly controlled by way of marketing authorisations, and pharmaceutical 
companies can be said to be bound by an ethical duty to continue marketing their 
products due to the special nature of pharmaceutical products.'^° Secondly, 
pharmaceutical companies have little or no room for manoeuvre as prices are 
regulated by national authorities.'^' Manufacturers may thus not possess the power 
In Case C-62/86 AKZO BV\. Commission [1991] E . C . R . 3359, the Court held that a market share 
of 50% or more is indicative of a dominant position in the absence of exceptional circumstances. 
In AstraZeneca, n. 126 above, recital 548, the Commission noticed that a 'first mover' can often 
maintain higher prices than later entrants. This is a result of having a large market share, and thus 
more power to maintain higher prices. See Fagerlund and Rasmussen, n. 126 above, 56. 
Currently over 50% of the value of the E U market consists of off-patented products, making 
dominance difficult to establish: see J. Attridge, 'A single European market for pharmaceuticals: 
Could less regulation and more negotiation be the answer?,' (2003) European Business Journal 122, 
132. 
Kerckhove, n. 142 above, 84. 
See Glynn, n. 50 above, 137. See also chapter 5, pp. 148-150 below. 
G. Robert and S. Ridley, 'Parallel trade in the pharmaceutical sector: Scourge or benefit,' (2006) 
27 E . C . L . R . 91,94. 
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to increase prices. In any event, it can be argued that parallel import-restrictive 
behaviour does not have an impact on pharmaceutical prices, because 'most, but not 
all, of the financial benefit accrues to the parallel trader rather than to the health 
care system or the patient.''^^ 
Thirdly, the number of pharmaceutical buyers on the national market is often very 
limited. Indeed, in some Member States the national health authority is the sole 
buyer of pharmaceutical products.'^ ^ This may place pharmaceutical buyers in a 
monopsonistic position due to their market power and solitude, although this power 
may be undermined by the inherent demand in pharmaceutical products.'^ As 
purchasing health authorities' main aim is to provide the best health service from 
their available budgets, certain product groups, at the detriment of others, may be 
favoured at certain times, undermining the manufacturer's dominant position.'^^ 
Thus, national health authorities' demand is subject to budgetary constraints, 
affecting subsequent supply to end-consumers. Glynn therefore rightly observes 
that 'the correct way of understanding the situation is likely to be that both the 
supplier and the customer have dominant positions - a monopsonist facing a 
monopolist.''^^ 
Proving dominance on the 'arbitrage approach' market may be equally difficult. In 
theory, the same reasoning applies to this market, but not only to products within 
the ATC 3 group, but to all products and product groups within the 'arbitrage 
approach' market. It is almost inconceivable that a manufacturer would hold a 
See Commission Communication (1998), n. 45 above, 43. See also chapter 1(3.1) above. 
An example is Sweden, where pharmaceutical sales are limited to Apoteket A B (a state 
monopoly): See chapter 1, p. 26, n. 85 above. 
See EFPIA, n. 135 above, 44. However, this argument was rejected by the U K Competition 
Appeal Tribunal in Genzyme Ltd. v. The Office of Fair Trading [2004] C .A .T . 4, on the particular 
facts of the case. Genzyme asserted that the buyer power of NHS and the Department of Health's 
price fixing powers prevented any alleged abuse. The Tribunal held that, even though the NHS is the 
only purchaser of the drug in question, the fact that there were no substitutable goods on the market 
meant that the NHS bargaining power is weak in comparison to Genzyme's monopolistic position (at 
para. 250). It should, however, be remembered that this case did not concern parallel imports, and 
was decided on its facts. See also chapter 1, p. 20, n. 59, re: monopsony power. 
Glynn, n. 50 above, 135. This is another reason why the 'relevant market' should not be limited 
to a particular A T C group. 
"Sm, 137. 
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dominant position within a market comprising all products that can be parallel 
imported with the same arbitrage profit between two Member States. This analysis 
is strengthened by the parallel importers' own submission that parallel trade is not 
necessarily curtailed by refusals to supply or dual-pricing policies.'^^ 
Finally, a number of undertakings can be seen as collectively (or jointly) holding a 
dominant position on the market.'^ ^ Collective dominance requires tacit co-
ordination between suppliers in an oligopoly that 'would make each member of the 
dominant oligopoly...consider it possible, economically rational, and hence 
preferable, to adopt on a lasting basis a common policy on the market...without 
having to enter into an agreement or resort to a concerted practice.. .and without any 
actual or potential competitors, let alone customers or consumers, being able to 
react effectively.'"^^ In order to present themselves as a collective entity the 
undertakings must have strong economical and structural links.'^'^ However, in 
comparison with other sectors, it may prove difficult to show collective dominance 
in the pharmaceutical sector. The number of suppliers of any given substitutable 
pharmaceutical product is limited; in many cases (especially during the patent 
protection period) there is only one supplier of the product. Thus, there may be a 
very limited economical rationale for engaging in tacit collusion in relation to 
parallel import-restrictive practices, such as refusal to supply and dual-pricing 
policies.''' Of course, i f the market is defined using the 'arbitrage' approach, it 
could be possible for suppliers to adopt identical dual-pricing policies for all of their 
products on all EEA markets. Nevertheless, the difficulty of finding evidence of 
See E F P I A , n. 135 above, 33; and Kerchove, n. 142 above, 84. However, cf. E A E P C , n. 143 
above, 46-53. 
See Case T-342/99 Airtours pic v. Commission [2002] E .C .R. 11-2585; and the C F l ' s rejection of 
the Commission's finding of collective dominance in Joined Cases T-68, 77-78/89 etc. Societa 
Italiana Vetro v. Commission [1992] E.C.R. 11-1403. 
Case T-342/99, ibid., para. 62. See also S. Baxter and F. Dethmers, 'Collective dominance under 
E C merger control - after Airtours and the introduction of unilateral effects: Is there still a future for 
collective dominance,' (2006) 27 E . C . L . R . 148, 149-150. 
See Joined Cases C-395-396/96 P Compagnie Maritime Beige Transports SA v. Commission 
[2000] E . C . R . 1365. 
However, see ibi, 
to selective price cutting and the granting of loyalty rebates. 
d.; and Commission Decision 93/82/EEC Cewal [1993] O.J. L34/20, in relation 
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economical and structural links between the undertakings'^" so as to show that the 
undertakings collectively hold a dominant position is further aggravated by the fact 
that pharmaceutical buyers may be in a monopsonistic position.''^ In conclusion, 
the Commission is more likely to apply Article 81 EC Treaty, as collective 
dominance would be more difficult to prove than concerted behaviour or an 
agreement. 
The above mentioned characteristics of the narrowly defined ATC classification 
market, and the much wider 'arbitrage approach' market - which is arguably the 
correct market definition - show the difficulties of proving a dominant position. 
This is likely to explain why the Commission has historically focused on Article 81 
EC Treaty when addressing parallel import-restrictive practices. However, 
assessing an undertaking's dominant position is only the first hurdle the 
Commission must overcome, as the issue of proving abuse may be an equally 
insurmountable task. 
2.4 Abuse 
Article 82 EC Treaty does not prohibit undertakings from holding a dominant 
position; only the abuse of such a position. To this end, the ECJ has recognised that 
a dominant undertaking's commercial activity is restricted by its 'special 
responsibility' brought about by its dominant position, and thus must fiilfil certain 
duties in addition to those of a non-dominant undertaking.'^'* In general, abusive 
behaviour can be divided into two types; exploitative abuses affecting consumers of 
the dominant undertaking, and exclusionary abuses detrimental to the competitors 
of the dominant undertaking. Parallel import-restrictive measures generally fall 
In Decision No. 05-D-72 of the French Competition Council the referring parties, engaging in 
parallel trade, contended that the defendant pharmaceutical companies had colluded to restrict their 
deliveries to other Member States so as to prevent parallel exports. The Competition Council held 
that 'a simple parallelism of behaviour was not enough to establish the existence of an agreement in 
the absence of serious, precise and concordant indicators evidencing it.' See A. Glatz and Y . 
Utzschneider, 'France: Anti-competitive agreements - pharmaceuticals,' (2006) 27 E . C . L . R . N58. 
See Case T-342/99, n. 168 above, para. 62, on buyer power. 
See Case 322/81, n. 130 above, para. 57. 
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under the latter category. This section will discuss the range of abuses aimed at 
restricting parallel importation, including pricing policies, regulatory abuses, and 
refusals to supply that may be considered abusive. This will be followed by an 
analysis of the possibility of an objective justification for such behaviour, as 
proposed by Advocate General Jacobs in Syfait}''^ 
2.4.\ Pricing policies 
Article 82(c) EC Treaty explicitly prohibits dominant undertakings from 'applying 
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage.' Dual pricing schemes, charging one 
price for products intended for the domestic market and another price for products 
intended for the export market, may fall within this prohibition. As discussed above 
in relation to Article 81 EC Treaty, such measures are clearly intended to restrict 
parallel exports by discouraging trade between low-price and high-price Member 
States."^ This means that, hypothetically, the Commission could have instigated 
infringement proceedings under Article 82 EC instead of Article 81 EC Treaty 
against GlaxoWellcome and Organon in response to the undertakings' respective 
dual pricing policies, had the Commission been able to establish dominance."' 
Indeed, the EAEPC has recently filed a complaint with the Commission alleging 
that Pfizer is in breach of Article 82 EC Treaty by implementing a rebate system in 
Spain, effectively amounting to a dual-pricing regime."^ 
There is limited guidance from the Commission and the ECJ on discriminatory 
pricing in relation to parallel exports and Article 82 EC Treaty. Rebates and similar 
practices that have the effect of restricting exports are prohibited by Article 82 EC 
' " N . 6 above. 
See section 1.2 above: in particular GlaxoWellcome and Case T-168/01, n. 5 above; and Organon, 
n. 28 above. 
ibid. 
™ See E A E P C , 'Pfizer,' n. 53 above: E A E P C also claims that this behaviour is prohibited by Article 
81 E C Treaty. 
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Treaty,'^^ as are measures discriminating between customers active within the same 
Member State, or indeed different Member States.'*° Similarly, charging excessive 
prices in an effort to impede parallel exports and imports has been held to violate 
Article 82 EC Treaty.'^' Article 82(c) EC Treaty may arguably not apply to 
geographical discriminatory pricing i f the customers are not acting within the same 
182 
geographical market in the absence of a specific prohibition on parallel exports. 
However, the pricing scheme applied by Pfizer does discriminate between 
customers on the same geographical market as the price is determined according to 
the destination of the product.'*^ Nevertheless, unlike in United Brands,the 
pricing scheme set up by Pfizer is not intended to maintain the price differences 
between Member States as prices are set by national authorities (and thus it is not in 
the manufacturers' power to do so); but to restrict parallel exports.'*^ However, i f 
the undertaking can point to an objective justification for its conduct, and it is 
proportionate, the conduct may potentially be exempt from the Article 82 EC Treaty 
prohibition.'^'' This is supported by the CFI's judgment in GlaxoWellcome, where 
the Court considered dual-pricing agreements to be potentially eligible for 
exemption under Article 81(3) EC Treaty due to the specific nature of the 
pharmaceutical market.'*'' The objective justifications given by Advocate General 
See Case T-65/89 BPB Industries pic & British Gypsum v. Commission [1993] E . C . R . 11-389; and 
Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar pic. v. Commission [1999] E .C .R. 11-2969, where the C F I upheld the 
Commission's Decision that Irish Sugar's 'border rebates,' which were implemented in order to 
restrict importation of sugar from Northern Ireland, constituted an abuse of a dominant position 
under Article 82 E C Treaty. See H-G. Kamann and E . Bergmann, 'The granting of rebates by market 
dominant undertakings under Article 82 of the E C Treaty,' (2005) 26 E . C . L . R . 83, 88. 
See Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission [1994] E . C . R . 11-755; and Case 
27/76, n. 95 above. However, there is no per se prohibition of price discrimination. See Whish, n. 1 
above, 659. 
See Commission Decision 84/379 British Leyland [1984] O.J. L207/11, recital 29; and Case 
226/84 British Leyland Pic. v. Commission [1986] E .C .R. 3263. 
'^ ^ Case 27/76, n. 95 above. The geographic price discrimination was intensified by the 
export/import prohibition. See D. Gerardin and N. Petit, 'Price discrimination under E C competition 
law: The need for a case-by-case approach,' G C L C Working Paper 07/05, The Global Competition 
Law Centre Brugge, G C L C Working Paper (7 May 2005), p. 44. 
See n. 53 above. 
'*'N.95 above. 
'^ ^ N. 53 above. 
"* In the absence of an equivalent to Article 81 (3) E C Treaty, the Court has developed a doctrine of 
objective justification: see e.g. ibid. For a discussion: see P. Craig and G. de Burca, EU law: Text, 
cases, and materials, 2"'' ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 975-976. 
Case T-168/01, n. 5 above. See pp. 39-42 above for further discussion. 
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Jacobs in his Opinion in Syfait^^^ are, in theory, equably applicable to dual-pricing 
regimes and refusals to supply. This reasoning will be further discussed in section 
2.5 below. 
2.4.2 Refusals to supply 
A more direct way of restricting parallel imports is to refuse to supply parallel 
importers on the exporting market. Syfait^^^ concerned pharmaceutical products 
manufactured and sold by GlaxoSmithKline on the Greek market. The facts of the 
case were as follows. As a consequence of discovering that a large amount of the 
products on the Greek market were parallel exported, GlaxoSmithKline stopped 
meeting orders from distributors and started supplying pharmacies and hospitals 
directly. Subsequently, as a response to an interim decision by the Hellenic 
Competition Commission, GlaxoSmithKline reinstated supplies to the distributors 
but limited supplies to the amount necessary to satisfy national demand. 
GlaxoSmithKline admitted that the practice was implemented in order to restrict 
parallel imports, but argued that its unilateral action could be objectively justified 
with reference to the specific circumstances of the pharmaceutical market. Although 
Advocate General Jacobs delivered an Opinion'^" which has since been the source 
of much debate, the referral provides little guidance as the ECJ failed to answer the 
questions due to the inadmissibility of the Hellenic Competition Commission 
reference. This section will discuss the actual (alleged) abuse, focusing on the 
question whether a refusal to supply in order to restrict parallel exports is a per se 
abuse, whilst the objective justification argument, as proposed by Advocate General 
Jacobs, will be discussed separately in the next section. 
In general, an undertaking is fi-ee to decide which third parties it wants to deal with, 
and conversely, which parties it does not want to deal with.'^' From this outset, the 
N. 6 above. 
ibid. 
"° ibid. 
Case 210/81 Demo-Studio Schmidt v. Commission [1983] E . C . J . 3045. 
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CFI was correct to state that 'even an undertaking in a dominant position may, in 
certain cases, refuse to sell or change its supply or delivery policy without falling 
under the prohibition laid down in Article [82].''^^ However, the notion that 
dominant undertakings are in general free to decide over commercial decisions 
when pursuing a profit maximising strategy, is subject to certain restrictions.'^^ In 
United Brands the ECJ made it clear that an undertaking 'cannot stop supplying a 
long-standing customer who abides by regular commercial practice, i f the orders 
placed by that customer are in no way out of the ordinary.''^'* The Comt added that 
such refusal must have the possible consequence of eliminating a trading party from 
the relevant market,"^ although this does not prevent a dominant undertaking from 
prioritising long-standing customers over occasional customers in times of scarcity 
of supply.'^^ A refusal to supply would therefore only be an abuse of a dominant 
position where the customer has suffered a competitive disadvantage, or is placed at 
the risk of elimination.'^' In terms of existing competitors, a dominant undertaking 
is not allowed to abuse its dominant position by limiting the output of 
competitors.'^* In this context, however, it should be remembered that the aim of 
competition law is to protect competition and consumers, not necessarily 
competitors.'^^ An undertaking is therefore not under an obligation to subsidise 
competition to itself by supplying an existing competitor. I f the refusal to supply is 
proportionate to the harm suffered by the competitor, and the dominant undertaking 
has given reasonable notice to the customer, a refusal to supply will not be 
considered abusive. 
Case T-41/96, n. 4 above, para. 180. 
See Case 27/76, n. 95 above, para. 189. For a good discussion on refusals to supply, see R. 
Subiotto and R. O'Donoghue, 'Defining the scope of the duty of dominant firms to deal with 
existing customers under Article 82 E C , ' (2003) 24 E . C . L . R . 683. 
ibid., paia. 182. 
"';6i^f.,para. 183. 
Case 77/77 BP BV v. Commission [1978] E . C . R . 1513, para. 32. It may also be objectively 
justifiable for a dominant undertaking to terminate supplies i f it is a direct response to internal 
reorganisation: para. 28. See Subiotto and O'Donoghue, n. 193 above, 685. 
Case 77/77, ibid., para. 32 
Joined Cases 6-7/73 Commercial Solvents v. Commission [1974] E . C . R . 223. 
" ' N . 1 above. See also Subiotto and O'Donoghue, n. 193 above, 684. 
See Commission Decision 87/500/EEC BBI/Boosey & Hawkes [1987] O.J. L286/36. Boosey & 
Hawkes stopped supplying a customer who had changed its main activity to that of the promotion of 
a rival brand. The Commission held that in principle there is no obligation on a dominant 
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The situation is slightly different in respect of refusing to supply a new customer. A 
dominant undertaking, as mentioned above, is under no obligation to enter into 
contract with a third party against its will . As such, a potential customer cannot 
demand to be supplied by the dominant undertaking. In Commercial Solvents,'^^ 
one of the earliest cases on refusals to supply, the ECJ laid down the basis for what 
has come to be known as the 'essential-facilities' doctrine. Commercial Solvents'^^ 
concerned a refusal to supply an existing customer with an indispensable raw 
material, effectively eliminating all competition on the downstream market. This 
doctrine is equally applicable to existing and new customers, effectively 
establishing a system whereby access to essential facilities can be achieved by 
invoking competition law. The facility must have 'no real or potential substitutes' in 
order to be classified as an 'essential facility,' thus precluding competitors from 
demanding access to the facility on grounds of suitability or mere economic 
convenience.^ '^ ^ Secondly, the relevant market for the purpose of the applicafion of 
the doctrine is not the market for the 'essential facility,' but the downstream market 
for which the facility is indispensable. For example, in Sea Containers Ltd/Stena 
Sealink^'^ the requesfing party did not intend to set itself up as a port facilities 
provider, but wished to provide ferry services on the downstream market for which 
the port facilities were seen as an 'essential facility.' 
Applying these findings to the parallel trade sector shows the complexities of the 
doctrine. By way of illustration, AstraZeneca^^^ concerned the marketing 
authorisations pharmaceutical manufacturers must possess in order to market their 
undertaking to subsidise competition to itself. In Fillrona/Tabacalera the Commission held that 
vertical integration without an anticompetitive purpose is not in itself an abuse. Increasing 
production of its own requirements, so as to achieve economies of scale is not an abuse of a 
dominant position even though a refusal to supply existing customers may be an unavoidable 
consequence: see Commission 'Nineteenth Report on Competition Policy,' (1989), point 61; and 
E F P I A , n. 135 above, 54. 
N. 198 above. 
ibid 
Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH v. Mediaprint GmbH [1998] E . C . R . 7791. See Whish, n. 1 
above, 611-613, for discussion. 
-^ '^  See Commission Decision 94 /I9 /EC Sea Containers Lld/Stena Sealink [1994] O.J. LI5 /8 . 
N. 126 above. See chapter 4, p. 130 below for further discussion. 
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products within the EC.'°^ Parallel importers must also apply for a marketing 
authorisation, but can benefit fi-om a simphfied procedure whereby a parallel import 
licence (PIL) is granted on the back of the manufacturer's marketing 
authorisation.^"^ The Commission held that AstraZeneca's withdrawal of its 
marketing authorisation for Losec, upon obtaining a marketing authorisation for a 
new variation of the product, constituted an abuse of a dominant position because it 
was intended to prevent or delay entry of generic and parallel imported products to 
the concerned Member State markets.^*'* First, it may be argued that the 
Commission's reasoning in AstraZeneca''^^ shares similarities with the case-law on 
'essential facilities.'^"' AstraZeneca abused its position not by refusing to supply 
the actual products, but by (in effect) refusing to supply the national authorities with 
information needed in order to grant PILs. This was a refusal to licence rather than 
supply."" However, the essential facilities doctrine can only apply i f such refusal to 
See chapter 3 below for further discussion of marketing authorisations. 
See chapter 4 below. 
See AstraZeneca, n. 126 above, recitals 860-862; and Press release IP/05737, n. 126 above. 
Further, apart from this the second infringement, the Commission alleged that AstraZeneca had 
misused the patent system by giving false information so as to obtain an extra period of patent 
protection; (recital 773-776). It is conceivable that the Commission was inspired by the US antitrust 
authority's focus on alleged attempts at preventing or delaying generic entry. See M. Kerckhove, 
'The application of Article 82 E C Treaty to the pharmaceutical sector - some recent E C guidance,' 
(2006) 77ie European Antitrust Review 5, 6. See also Commission Decision 93/554/EEC Zera-
Agrachemikalien [1993] O.J. L272/28 (abusing national marketing requirements so as to prevent 
parallel importation of agro-chemicals was considered a violation of Article 81 E C Treaty: note; was 
decided on the particular facts of the case). 
ibid. 
See Case C-7/97, n. 203 above; and in particular Cases C-241-242/91 P RTE & ITP (Magill) v. 
Commission [1995] E . C . R . 1-743. The marketing authorisation, which is a prerequisite for the 
granting of a PIL, can be compared with the data information at issue in Magill. See S. Lawrance 
and P. Treacy, 'The Commission's AstraZeneca decision: Delaying generic entry is an abuse of a 
dominant position,' (2005) 1 J.I.P.L.P. 7, 8. 
' A distinction can be made between this case and Case 226/84 (Leyland), n. 181 above, where the 
E C J upheld the Commission's definition of the market as that of issuance of certificates needed for 
importation into the U K ; (para. 4-5). The difference between such certificates and marketing 
authorisations for pharmaceutical products is that secondary certificates are issued (and charged for) 
by the car manufacturer, whilst a secondary marketing authorisation, a P I L , is granted by the 
national Medicines Control Agency. Thus, in the Commission's view, AstraZeneca abused its 
position by indirectly preventing access to the national market of its products by withdrawing the 
marketing authorisation, whilst the certificates at issue in Leyland were seen as a product in itself 
Such certificates could possibly be seen as an 'essential facility' for the downstream market of 
markering Leyland cars. However, as the relevant market in AstraZeneca was defined as proton 
pump inhibitors (i.e. the actual products) the 'essentia! facilities' doctrine did not apply as there is 
not a downstream market: see Fagerlund and Rasmussen, n. 126 above, 56. 
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supply w i l l result in the elimination of all competition on the downstream market,^'^ 
which is not necessarily the case in relation to refusal to supply parallel importers. 
First, a parallel imported product is arguably not a new product, and parallel 
importation may not amount to an ancillary market but is only a form of trade in the 
same product. Secondly, a valid marketing authorisation may not be indispensable 
to carrying on business so as to be classified as an 'essential facility, ' as, depending 
on the definition of the relevant market, there are actual and potential substitutes.^'^ 
I f the relevant market is defined using the 'arbitrage approach' (i.e. parallel 
imported products) there w i l l be many substitutes in the form of products with 
similar price differentials, and i f the relevant market is defined using the 'ATC 
classification approach' the potential substitutes w i l l be newly developed products 
(replacing the withdrawn product on the particular market) for which a marketing 
authorisation and subsequently a PIL can be applied for. It can therefore be argued 
that the Commission introduced a new form of abuse of a dominant position with its 
decision inAstraZeneca?^'^ 
After considering the facts of AstraZeneca^^^ and the reasoning in the preceding 
paragraph, it seems clear that SyfaiP'^^ is not an 'essential facilities' case. 
GlaxoSmithKline was not keeping the products for internal use, and was not 
refusing to supply wholesalers who supplied the Greek market. '^Thus, a refusal to 
supply did not eliminate all competition on the Greek market. Further, there are 
many substitutes to be traded by the parallel importer i f the market is defined using 
-'- Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH v. NDS Health GmbH [2004] E . C . R . 5039. 
Lawrance and Treacy, n. 210 above, 9. 
See ibid., 8. Due to recent case-law and changes to the Community's pharmaceutical framework, 
it may well be the first and the last time the Commission will face similar facts. See AstraZeneca, n. 
126 above, recital 847; and chapter 4(3) below. Nevertheless, AstraZeneca's appeal is eagerly 
awaited by commentators. 
' " N . 126 above. 
^'*N. 6 above. 
However, the fact that the refusal affects existing as well as new trading partners (distributors) 
would not preclude the application of the 'essential facilities' doctrine. See Case 6-7/73, n. 198 
above. 
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the 'arbitrage approach.'^'^ Secondly, as elaborated upon in relation to 
AstraZeneca,'^'^ it is debatable whether parallel trade is a downstream market. Even 
i f the market is as narrowly defined as one particular product manufactured and 
supplied by GlaxoSmithKline, the parallel trade in this product would not be an 
ancillary or downstream market, as both parties are acting in the same market - the 
supply of product X.^^° Thus, parallel trade does not give rise to an ancillary 
product market, and does not give rise to added value, regardless o f the market 
definition.'^'' 
I f the 'essential facilities' doctrine does not apply, the second question is whether a 
refusal to supply in order to restrict parallel imports is a per se abuse. Advocate 
General Jacobs is o f the view that a 'dominant pharmaceutical undertaking w i l l not 
necessarily abuse its dominant position by reason of its refusal to supply in ful l the 
orders placed with it by pharmaceutical wholesalers even when its intention is 
thereby to limit parallel trade.'^^^ This analysis follows a rather detailed survey of 
the case-law on refusals to supply,''^ focusing on United BrandsJ^^ Commercial 
Solvents^^^ and the most important 'essential facility' cases.""^ These cases, 
however, did not refer to a foreclosure o f national markets. The ECJ has held 
Case C-7/97, n. 203 above. See also Case 1873/98 Difar v. MSD Spain (see EFPIA, n. 135 above, 
68) where the Spanish Competition Service held that the refusal could not be an abuse since Difar 
could purchase products from other distributors. 
' " N . 126 above. 
E A E P C ' s argument that the importing market will qualify as a 'downstream geographic market' 
for the purpose of the 'essential facility' doctrine is misleading. That would mean that the 'essential 
facility' doctrine would apply as long as the products are traded between two Member States. The 
downstream market must be a different product market; not merely a different geographical market: 
see E A E P C , n. 143 above, 55. 
Temple Lang states that there must be 'scope for substantial non-price competition on the 
[downstream] market, that is, it is not merely simple resale or distribution of products or services, 
and a refusal to contract would prejudice consumers,' in T. Lang, 'International antitrust law & 
policy,' in Hawk (ed.) (2003) Fordham Corp. L Inst, p. 270. Referred to in C. Koenig and C . 
Engelmann, 'Parallel trade restrictions in the pharmaceuticals sector on the test stand of Article 82 
E C - Commentary on the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in the case Syfait/GlaxoSmithKline,' 
(2005) 26 E . C . L . R . 338, 339. 
Advocate General Jacobs, n. 6 above, para. 53 
ibid., paras. 54-69. 
" ' N . 9 5 above. 
' " N . 198 above. 
Case C-7/97, n. 203 above; Case 311/84 Telemarketing (CBEM) v. CLT & IPB [1985] E . C . R . 
3261; Case 238/87 Volvo AB v. Erik Veng Ltd [1988] E .C .R. 6211; Cases C-241-242/91, n. 210 
above; and Case 418/01, n. 212 above. 
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measures by a dominating undertaking, intended to prevent imports and exports, to 
be incompatible with Article 82 EC Treaty. In British Leyland~'^ and United 
Brands^^^ the ECJ focused on the intention to foreclose national markets, and in 
AAMS^^^ the Court held as abusive measures that v^ere aimed at restricting imports 
of c igaret tes .However , British Leyland,^^^ AAMS,'^' and even AstraZeneca,'^^ 
concerned measures directly aimed at preventing/restricting parallel imports, whilst 
GlaxoSmithKline did not actively prevent or restrict parallel imports, but merely 
stopped facilitating such trade by refusing to supply. Further, the measure at issue in 
United Brands^^^ threatened to force the distributor out of business altogether. It 
should also be remembered that in the same case the ECJ stated that a dominant 
undertaking 'cannot stop supplying a long-standing customer who abides by regular 
commercial practice, i f the orders placed by that customer are in no way out of the 
ordinary.' •^'^  It is unclear exactly what type of reaction would have been considered 
proportionate, but the Court's reasoning can be interpreted as implying that a 
refusal to supply, or as in Syfait only supplying a 'reasonable amount,'"^"^ may be a 
proportionate response i f the orders placed are out of the ordinary.^'^^ It is also clear 
that a dominant undertaking 'must be conceded the right to take such reasonable 
steps as it deems appropriate to protect its said interests,'^^^ although such 
behaviour cannot be deemed justified i f its actual purpose is to strengthen and abuse 
the undertaking's dominant position. Advocate General Jacobs therefore correctly 
admits that an 'intention to limit parallel trade should be one of the circumstances 
which w i l l ordinarily render abusive a refusal to supply on the part of a dominant 
- " N . 181 above. 
-^ ^ N. 95 above. 
Case T-139/98 AAMS v. Commission [2001] E . C . R . 3413. 
The Commission found that A A M S had unilaterally refused to authorise increases in imports of 
cigarettes, and had engaged in various activities aimed at increasing sales of domestic cigarettes and 
to limiting sales of foreign cigarettes. See E U F (ed.), 'Court upholds fine on Italian cigarette 
distribution monopoly,' (2001) 90 E .U .F 10. 
N. 181 above. 
N. 230 above. 
' " N . 126 above. 
N. 95 above. 
ibid., para. 182. 
Satisfying domestic demand and the public service obligation. See Advocate General Jacobs, n. 6 
above, para. 17. 
Craig and de Burca, n. 186 above, 960. 
Case 27/76, n. 95 above, para. 189. 
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undertaking.'^^^ Thus, a refusal to supply with the intention of restricting parallel 
imports is not in all cases abusive. Even though an intention to prevent parallel 
imports is present, 'the partitioning o f the market is not the primary intent, but 
rather an inevitable consequence, given the characteristics o f the market, of the 
attempt by [GlaxoSmithKline] to protect what it sees as its legitimate commercial 
interest, by refusing to meet in fu l l the orders which it receives.'^ '**' I f such conduct 
were a per se abuse all customers could declare an intention to export in the sole 
interest of receiving all additional quantities requested. This would arguably be 
detrimental to legal certainty, and could potentially be exploited by parallel 
importers to the detriment of public health and safety i f the national market does not 
receive adequate supplies.^"" 
A refusal to supply with the intention of restricting parallel imports is therefore not 
necessarily a per se abuse. I f the measure is under the circumstances proportionate, 
given that the orders placed by the parallel importer are out of the ordinary, a 
refusal to supply may not be abusive and thus not incompatible with Article 82 EC 
Treaty in line with United Brands?^'^ However, as Advocate General Jacobs 
observes, ' in any event....it is clear that the Community case-law provides 
dominant undertakings with the possibility of demonstrating an objective 
justification for their conduct, even i f it is prima facie an abuse.'^ '*'' 
2.5 Objective justification 
Indeed, most abuses intended to restrict parallel imports may not be objectively 
justified. The Commission believes that parallel trade is essential to the EC Treaty 
objective o f market integration. This may hold true for parallel trade in general, but 
the European pharmaceutical market operates under very particular conditions on a 
market which is already distorted and thus not affected by anti-competitive 
' Advocate General Jacobs, n. 6 above, para. 70. 
240 ibid., para. 71. 
Subiotto and O'Donoghue, n. 193 above, 692. 
^^-N.95 above, para. 182. 
Advocate General Jacobs, n. 6 above, para. 72. 
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measures. Further, the same arguments may not only make the abuse objectively 
justified, but deem the conduct under the circumstances proportionate to the effects 
on competition so as to make it n o n - a b u s i v e . T o this end. Advocate General 
Jacobs identifies three factors which cumulatively justify refusals to supply in order 
to restrict parallel imports; (i) the regulation of price and distribution in the 
European pharmaceutical sector, (ii) the economics of the innovative 
pharmaceutical industry, and (i i i ) the consequences o f parallel trade for consumers 
and purchasers in the Member State of importation. 
The pharmaceutical market is subject to extensive price regulation giving rise to 
substantial price differences throughout the Community. Prices are set by national 
authorities and are not the result of market forces or commercial strategy on behalf 
of the manufacturer.''*^ As a result, manufacturers are not attempting to maintain 
price differentials of their own making when refusing to supply parallel importers, 
but are merely trying to avoid the economic consequences which would follow i f 
the low prices prevailing in the exporting Member State were to be 'generalised 
across the Community.'"''^ Member States and Community measures also impose 
stringent public service obligations on manufacturers and wholesalers which require 
wholesalers to maintain an adequate supply to meet domestic demand.^'*' As a 
result. Advocate General Jacobs believes that manufacturers may have difficulty 
maintaining a sufficient stock of products in the domestic market i f required to 
supply parallel importers with excessive supplies of products aimed for exports.^ '*^ 
The situation is further aggravated by the fact that manufacturers can be said to 
have an ethical and moral, albeit not legal, obligation to maintain supply in each 
Member State, and are thus restricted from mitigating loses incurred on the 
importing market by withdrawing from low-price Member States acting as 
Case 27/76, n. 95 above, para. 182. 
""^  See chapter 1(2.2) above on the European pharmaceutical market. 
Advocate General Jacobs, n. 6 above, para. 84. 
See, in particular, Article 81 of Council Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to 
medicinal products for human use [2001] O.J. L311/67. 
Advocate General Jacobs, n. 6 above, para. 87. Note: this is refuted by Koenig and Engelmann, n. 
221 above, 342, claiming that there is no verifiable evidence that parallel trade is prevenfing 
manufacturers and wholesalers from fulfilling their supply obligations. 
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exporting markets .Hypothet ical ly, i f it were not for this moral obligation and the 
public service obligations, low-priced Member States would not be supplied at all 
as the entire stock would be exported by parallel traders. 
Advocate General Jacobs continued by considering the economics of the innovative 
pharmaceutical industry. Advocate General Jacobs gave his approval of Ramsey 
pricing by considering the pharmaceutical industry to be characterised by large 
investments in R & D , which are largely sunk costs, while the variable costs are 
fairly low.^^*' As discussed in section 1.2 above regarding GlaxoWellcome, where 
the CFI can be interpreted as tacitly approving of Advocate General Jacobs's 
Opinion," ' parallel trade may seriously affect future R & D i f manufacturers are not 
able to recover the sunk costs. Even though the variable costs can be recovered in 
low-price Member States, the sunk costs can only be recovered by marketing the 
remaining products in high-price Member States. By, in effect, importing the 
exporting Member State's pricing policy; parallel trade may have a detrimental 
effect on future R & D . This is linked to Advocate General Jacobs's discussion on 
the consequences of parallel trade for consumers and purchasers in the Member 
State of importation. 
Parallel trade in pharmaceutical products does not contribute to price competition 
beneficial to the end consumer.^^^ Prices are regulated by national authorities, and 
consumers do not pay for the ful l amount o f the products. Nor do taxpayers benefit 
from parallel trade, as pharmacists receive payment for parallel traded products at 
the same rate as products supplied by the original manufacturer.^^^ As a result, the 
profit from the trade largely remains with the parallel trader and the pharmacists. 
Given that Member States act as both price regulators and purchasers of 
pharmaceutical products, ' i t cannot be assumed that the sole concern of the 
See Advocate General Jacobs, n. 6 above, para. 86. See also n. 160 above for further discussion. 
See n. 52 above; and pp. 41-42 above, for further discussion. 
Case T-168/01, n. 5 above, para. 271; and ibid. 
Advocate General Jacobs, n. 6 above, para. 97. 
'^^ ibid., para 98. See also Commission Communication (1998), n. 45 above, para. 4. 
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purchaser in a high-price Member State is to obtain lower prices.'"^'* As Advocate 
General Jacobs observes; i f Member States' main concern is to lower the funds 
spent on pharmaceutical products, they could have lowered the prices directly 
instead of promoting parallel trade.^^^ 
The arguments in favour of an objective justification, as proposed by Advocate 
General Jacobs, have been thoroughly analysed and scrutinised by several 
commentators."^^ It is argued that Advocate General Jacobs's analysis is erroneous 
as parallel trade actually results in considerable direct and indirect savings for 
health authorities."^^ According to the EAEPC, there is no evidence to show that 
parallel trade affects future R & D , nor that it has a negative impact on the supply 
structure.^^* However, Advocate General Jacobs's conclusion is to be endorsed 
irrespective of these claims and arguments. Competition law serves to protect 
competition and consumers, not certain competitors.'^^^ Although national health 
authorities may generate savings f rom parallel trade, there is no conclusive 
evidence o f end-consumers benefiting from parallel trade. I f the aim was to 
generate savings to the national health authorities there is nothing to prevent a 
Member State from amending its pricing regulations.^^" On the contrary, it is clear 
that end-consumers suffer no harm from a refusal to supply parallel importers; 
According to Advocate General Jacobs, n. 6 above, para. 99. 
"'^ ibid.: the Hellenic Competition Commission came to the same conclusion: (para. 13). 
Koenig and Engelmann, n. 221 above; Korah, n. 52 above; D. McCann, 'Syfait v 
GlaxoSmithKIine: Article 82 and parallel trade of pharmaceutical,' (2005) 26 E . C . L . R . 373; and 
Stothers, n. 32 above, 458. 
"" See e.g. Koenig and Engelmann, ibid., 345-347. A reference is made to P. West and J. Mahon, 
'Benefits to payer and patients from parallel trade,' Report, York Health Economics Consortium 
(May 2003), (<http://www.york.ac.uk/inst/yhec/downloads/ParallelTrade_ExecSumm .pdf>), which 
reached the conclusion that parallel trade could result in substantial savings to national health 
authorities. The study's objectivity must be questioned as it was commissioned by the E A E P C . See 
Chapter 1(3.1) above for further discussion. 
E A E P C , n. 143 above, 65. Conversely, see also P. Rey and J. Venit, 'Parallel trade and 
pharmaceuticals: A policy in search of itself,' (2004) 29 E.L.Rev. 153, 177: 'parallel trade does not 
appear to be a good way to "harmonise" Member States' health policies, since it tends to generate a 
unilateral alignment on the lowest level of R&D incentives.' See chapter 1(3.1) above for an 
extended discussion on the benefits of parallel trade. 
See n. 1 above; and DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the 
Treaty to exclusionary abuses - public consultation, DG Competition (December 2005), 
(<http://ec.europa.eu /comm/competition/antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf>), para. 54: 'this means 
that it is competition, and not competitors as such, that is to be protected.' 
Advocate General Jacobs, n. 6 above, para. 99. 
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indeed, parallel trade may actually be harmful to consumers' well-being as it may 
restrict the funds available for future R&D. Therefore, the essential question in 
Syfait^^^ seems to be whether the parallel importer or the manufacturer should be 
allowed to keep the profits resulting from the price difference between the 
importing and exporting Member State, rather than one to protect consumers.'^^ 
Using Article 82 EC Treaty to protect certain competitors is a misapplication of 
competition law.^" 
Advocate General Jacobs's Opinion must, however, be analysed against the 
background of the specific facts of the case. Refusing to supply distributors 
altogether, by for example supplying pharmacists and hospitals directly, may affect 
distributors not engaging in parallel trade and have a negative impact on the supply 
structure in the market.^^ In this regard, it should be noted that where the refusal to 
supply is aimed at punishing a customer for its export activities, it cannot be 
objectively justified.^^^ Similarly, where the refusal to supply is associated with 
other abusive conduct, i t w i l l not be subject to objective justification; and w i l l , 
accordingly, be classified as an abuse under Article 82 EC Treaty."^*" It is therefore 
advisable to apply Advocate General Jacobs's Opinion with care in order to 
preserve legal certainty. 
The refusal to supply must not be perceived as an attempt to harm competitors so as 
to affect competition in the pharmaceutical market, but rather as a proportionate 
step to protect commercial interests. Implementing supply quotas instead of a total 
refusal to supply w i l l strengthen this assumption due to its less harmful effects on 
N. 6 above. 
Subiotto and O'Donoghue, n. 193 above, 690. 
See n. 249 above. C f Cases 6-7/73, n. 198 above, where the Court signalled its intent to protect 
the competitor before the consumer. 
Allegedly, Pfizer is considering a system of direct sales in Germany which would eliminate the 
need for distributors' altogether. The E A E P C has filed a complaint with the Commission: see 
E A E P C , 'Pfizer,' n. 53 above. 
See Johnson & Johnson, n. 22 above, and Tipp-EX, n. 21 above, in relation to Article 81 E C 
Treaty. 
See, e.g., Case T-30/89, n. 153 above, where a refusal to supply was coupled with intent to tie the 
sales of Hilti nail guns with Hilti nails. 
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the domestic supply system. Advocate General Jacobs's Opinion must also be 
limited to the pharmaceutical industry. The suggestion that Advocate General 
Jacobs's reasoning could have wider implications for other industry sectors (such as 
the auto trade) that are subject to considerate price differences between Member 
States due to national tax rates, fails to consider the extent to which the 
pharmaceutical market is regulated.Further , focusing on the consumer benefit 
aspect (i.e. the industry's reliance on investments in R&D) w i l l just ify the special 
treatment of the pharmaceutical industry and uphold legal certainty. As stated 
above, competition law protects competition and consumers, and not certain 
competitors. Instead of arguing that the characterisdcs of the pharmaceutical 
industry are capable of being objectively justified. Advocate General Jacobs's 
reasoning can be drawn upon to show that the special nature of the pharmaceutical 
market precludes a finding of consumer harm, thus negating a finding of abuse in 
the first place. Instead o f characterising certain abusive behaviour as objectively 
justified, it is 'more accurate to say that certain types o f conduct on the part of a 
dominant undertaking do not fall within the category of abuse at all , ' according to 
Advocate General Jacobs. This approach is also proposed by the Commission in 
a recent DG Competition Discussion paper on the application of Article 82 EC 
Treaty to exclusionary abuses.^ ^^ The Commission proposes the introduction of an 
Article 81(3) EC Treaty-type mechanism to Article 82 EC Treaty. There are two 
types o f objective justification relevant to parallel import-restrictive measures. The 
proposed 'meeting competition defence' could be relevant to refusals to supply and 
dual-pricing policies by pharmaceutical companies in order to 'minimise the short 
run losses resulting directly from competitors actions,' even though this justification 
is only proposed to apply to behaviour which otherwise would constitute a pricing 
abuse.^™ In relation to (strict) refusals to supply, the Commission proposes that 
dominant undertakings should be allowed to exclude others for a period of time in 
This comparison is made in Koenig and Engelmann, n. 221 above, p. 342. See e.g. Case T-62/98 
Volkswagen AG v. Commission [2000] E . C . R . 11-2707. 
Advocate General Jacobs, n. 6 above, para. 72. 
DG Competition, n. 259 above. 
" ° i W . , p a r a . 81. 
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order to recoup an adequate return on their investments.^^' I f this justification would 
apply not only to 'refusal to start supplying an input,' but also to 'termination of an 
existing supply relationship,'^^^ it could justify conduct similar to that at issue in 
Syfait-^^ 
In conclusion it can be said that Advocate General Jacobs's Opinion, contrary to 
previous case-law^ '^* and Commission Decisions,^^^ shows a willingness to 
consider the specific characteristics of the pharmaceutical market. It was 
unfortunate that the ECJ failed to consider these arguments due to the 
inadmissibility of the Hellenic Competition Commission's reference.^^^ However, 
despite the absence of clear guidance from the ECJ, the Hellenic Competition 
Commission decided to follow the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs and ruled 
in September 2006 that GlaxoSmithKline did not infringe Greek competition laws 
or Article 82 EC Treaty by its refusal to meet ful ly the orders sent to it by 
pharmaceutical distributors.^^^ Similarly, as discussed in section 1.2 above, the CFI 
tacitly endorsed Advocate General Jacobs's Opinion by taking the specific nature of 
the pharmaceutical market into consideration in Glaxo WellcomeAdvocate 
General Jacobs's Opinion should therefore not be underestimated as a valuable 
guideline and food for thought for the Commission and the Community courts in 
relation to future decisions and referrals. The Commission and the ECJ must 
recognise that pharmaceutical markets are of a national and not of a Community 
DG Competition, n. 259 above, para. 235. 
-'^ ibid, paras. 207 and 225. 
N. 6 above. 
See e.g. Cases C-267-268/95, n. 37 above. 
For example, GlaxoWellcome, n. 5 above. 
Case C-53/03, n. 6 above, para. 37. 
See Hellenic Competition Commission Decision 318/V/2006 (unreported: delivered on 5 
September 2006); and Hellenic Competition Commission press release (5 September 2006) 
(<http://www.epant.gr/Photos/20060905_pressrelease_glaxo.pdf>). See also C. Seib, 'GSK hails 
judgment as blow to parallel trading,' The Times, 6 September 2006, p. 52. Incidentally, see Case T-
153/06 EAEPC v. Commission [2006] O.J. CI 78/38 (pending before the C F I ) seeking the annulment 
of Commission Decision D/201953 (10 April 2006), rejecting three complaints of the E A E P C 
against GlaxoSmithKline for the reason that the Hellenic Competition Commission is already 
dealing with the case (which resulted in Decision 318/V/2006 above). 
Case T-168/01, n. 5 above. See also section 1.2 above. 
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dimension as a first step to prompt a Community-wide harmonisation of national 
279 regulations. 
3. Conclusion 
The Bayer^^^ and GlaxoWellcome^^^ judgments were welcomed by pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, having long suffered from the pro-integration policy adopted by the 
Commission and the ECJ to the benefit of parallel importers. This wi l l be even 
more evident following the discussion of parallel trade and the free movement of 
goods provisions in chapter 5. 
First, and foremost, Bayer'^^ signalled a change in the Court's approach to parallel 
import-restrictive measures. Mere unilateral decisions are not prohibited by Article 
81 EC Treaty, and its application cannot be justified by the Treaty objective of 
market integration, as restricting parallel imports is not a per se violation of Article 
81 EC Treaty. Manufacturers must, however, apply the Court's findings with care. 
Unilateral decisions to restrict parallel imports may still be prohibited by Article 81 
EC Treaty i f the manufacturer has entered into a selective distribution agreement 
with the distributor. The manufacturer should also refrain f rom making its 
intentions clear to the distributor and avoid any attempts at monitoring and tracing 
parallel exported goods back through the distribution chain as this may be 
interpreted as a means to enforce the export/resale ban. Ironically, manufacturers 
may benefit f rom a dishonest relationship with distributors as any attempt by a 
distributor to circumvent the ban may be seen as evidence of the unilateral nature of 
the decision, to the detriment of the distributor. 
Further, certain dual-pricing agreements may be capable o f benefiting from an 
Article 81(3) EC Treaty exemption despite having a parallel import-restrictive 
See C. Vicien, 'Why parallel imports of pharmaceutical products should be forbidden,' (1996) 17 
E . C . L . R . 219, 224. 
Cases C-2-3/01,n.4above. 
Case T-168/0l,n. 5 above. 
'''-Cases C-2-3/01,n.4above. 
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effect. Such agreements may remedy a loss in efficiency, as well as providing a 
gain in efficiency by allowing for an increase in funds made available by the 
pharmaceutical company for future R & D . The Commission may therefore find i t 
increasingly difficult to apply Article 81 EC Treaty to parallel import-restrictive 
agreements following GlaxoWellcome.'^^ Coincidentally, the EAEPC has filed a 
complaint with the Commission alleging that Pfizer's dual-pricing system in Spain 
is incompatible with Articles 81 and/or 82 EC Treaty.^ '^^  The outcome of the 
Commission's re-examination o f Glaxo Wellcome's request for an exemption, or, i f 
appealed, the ECJ's judgment, is therefore eagerly waited for by commentators. 
It is likely that the CFI was influenced by Advocate General Jacobs's Opinion in 
Syfait^^^ when giving judgment in GlaxoWellcome?^^ Advocate General Jacobs 
argued that the special characteristics of the European pharmaceutical market 
provide an objective justification from Article 82 EC Treaty for parallel import-
restrictive measures. The Opinion should be endorsed and national and Community 
courts should follow the example set to them by the Hellenic Competition 
Commission"^' and the CFI in GlaxoWellcome,'^^ and follow Advocate General 
Jacobs's Opinion as its substance was not rejected by the ECJ. Unfortunately, 
however, the issue of dominance was not considered by the Advocate General or 
the ECJ in Syfait?^^ Nevertheless, it is likely that the Commission w i l l have 
difficulties in proving a dominant position on behalf of the manufacturer in relation 
to parallel import-restrictive measures, as the relevant market must be defined using 
the 'arbitrage approach' method giving rise to a very wide market definition. This 
w i l l be further complicated considering the market posifion o f pharmaceutical 
manufacturers versus nafional health authorities; a monopolist facing a 
290 
monopsonist. 
Case C-168/01,n. 5 above. 
See n. 53 above. 
N. 6 above. 
Case C-168/01,n. 5above. 
See (Greek) Decision 318/V/2006, n. 277 above. 
Case C-168/0l ,n. 5 above. 
N. 6 above. 
"'° See section 2.3 above. 
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This is a great setback for parallel traders, as acquiring products for onward sale is 
merely the first in a series o f hurdles parallel traders must overcome in order to 
carry out successful cross-border trade. The following chapter wi l l discuss the 
pharmaceutical market-specific and potentially parallel import-restrictive 
requirement of marketing authorisations. 
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C H A P T E R 3 
MARKETING AUTHORISATIONS 
AND P A R A L L E L IMPORT L I C E N C E S 
A pharmaceutical product may not be placed on the Community market without a 
marketing authorisation.' This requirement is another hurdle for traders and 
manufacturers of pharmaceutical products. However, it is part of the 'research and 
development' (R&D) process, and enables authorities to maintain and record a 
steady f low of quality drugs being put on the market. 
To protect public health and safety and avoid disasters such as the Thalidomide 
tragedy, pharmaceutical products must be tested and controlled before they can be 
marketed to the public. Marketing authorisation applications must therefore contain 
extensive information concerning the particulars of the product as well as test 
results. As parallel importers do not have access to this information it essentially 
prevents traders f rom obtaining marketing authorisation, even though the products 
imported are already benefiting from the manufacturer's marketing authorisation 
and, consequently, have already been tested and quality assured. 
This chapter wi l l clarify the national and Community measures governing the need 
to obtain a marketing authorisation. It is important to have a clear understanding of 
how Community and national measures regulates the marketing stage and safety of 
' Article 6(1) of Council Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal 
products for human use [2001] O.J. L311/67. 
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the pharmaceutical industry as this regulatory firamework forms the basis o f the 
below discussed simplified procedure for parallel imported products. 
1. National authorisations 
National Medicines Control Agencies grant national marketing authorisations. 
There are no major differences between regulations adopted by Member States 
since most of the laws and regulations have been harmonised by Community 
measures. The U K legal framework w i l l therefore serve as a good example. 
The marketing of pharmaceutical products in the UK, exercised by the granting of 
marketing authorisations and licences, is largely governed by EC measures and the 
Medicines Act 1968." The Medicines Act collated most previous legislation and 
aimed to introduce provisions for the control of medicines. It established a licensing 
system affecting the manufacture, sale, supply and importation o f medicinal 
products into the UK. The Medicines Act matched or even exceeded the 
requirements of Directive 65/65/EEC.^ In 1995 the U K medicines legislation was 
brought into line with EC measures concerning marketing authorisafions by 'The 
Marketing Authorisations Regulations 1994.'"^ Other aspects of medicine control, 
such as wholesale dealer's licences and manufacturer's licences, and promotion of 
pharmaceutical products, are regulated by the Medicines Act 1968 and its 
secondary legislation, amended so as to conform to Community measures.^ The 
'Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency' (MHRA) is responsible 
-The Medicines Act 1968, c. 67. 
^ Council Directive 65/65/EEC on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action relating to proprietary medicinal products [1965] O.J. 22/369. This is quite 
remarkable since, of course, the U K was not yet a Member State in 1968. 
" The Medicines for Human Use (Marketing Authorisation Etc.) Regulations 1994, implementing 
Council Regulation ( E E C ) 2309/93 laying down Community procedures for the authorization and 
supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Agency 
for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products [1993] L214/1. See also The Medicines for Human Use 
and Medicinal Devices (Fees and Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2001, implementing 
Directive 2001/83, n. 1 above. 
' ibid.; and note 2 above. See also chapter 1(2.1) above on advertising of pharmaceutical products. 
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for enforcing the Medicines Act 1968, and therefore for granting licences relating to 
marketing and wholesale distribution of pharmaceuticals. 
A marketing authorisation application requires a vast amount of information 
regarding the product characteristics: inter alia, the qualitative and quantitative 
composition, clinical particulars, pharmacological properties, pharmaceutical 
particulars and administrative data. Furthermore, results of clinical trials, and the 
manufacturing procedure must be extensively described by the applicant and 
approved by the MHRA. The early stages of development of a new pharmaceutical 
product are o f no interest to the MHRA when assessing applications for marketing 
authorisations. It is when the applicant commences clinical trials that the safety and 
efficacy of the pharmaceutical products can be shown. The results of the clinical 
trials wi l l eventually become part of the marketing authorisation application. 
National marketing authorisation procedures have since 1998 been limited to the 
initial phase o f the 'mutual recognition' procedure, i.e. the work undertaken by the 
reference Member State.^ National marketing authorisations can also be used for 
pharmaceutical products which are only to be authorised in one Member State, and 
for products with a 'well-established' use under the 'abridged procedure' laid down 
by Article 10 of Directive 2001/83/EC.' A national marketing authorisation is 
granted for a period of 5 years after which it must be renewed. 
' Commission, 'Notice to Applicants - The Rules governing Medicinal Products in the European 
Community,' (Volume 2A: Chapter 1) ENTEI/F2/BL D(2002) Rev 2, p. 4. The 'mutual recognition' 
procedure allows for a bundle of national marketing authorisations. The assessment by the reference 
Member State (the first Member State to grant the marketing authorisation) has to be mutually 
recognised by other Member State Medicines Control Agencies. See Section 2.2 below 
N. 1 above. The abridged procedure is intended for generic pharmaceutical products. See section 
2.3 below. 
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2. The Community framework 
The Community has been involved in the pharmaceutical market since the early 
1960s.^ Directive 65/65/EEC' was the first Community measure concerning the 
marketing stage of pharmaceutical products. Following the thalidomide disaster, 
and its gruesome effects that shocked society, the Community and lawmakers were 
determined to ensure a high level of public security and safety in the pharmaceutical 
context. The first step was to ensure that no pharmaceutical product is placed on the 
European market without a marketing authorisation. Directive 65/65/EEC,'*^ 
subsequently amended and replaced by Directive 2001/83/EC," defined a 
'medicinal product' and subcategories o f 'medicinal products.''" This term is, for 
the purpose of the thesis, interchangeable with the term 'pharmaceutical product.' 
Nevertheless, the harmonised definition of a 'medicinal product' following 
Directive 65/65/EEC'^ does not in practice ease the workload for Member State 
Medicines Control Agencies.''* The definition is useful to determine whether a 
product is required to have a marketing authorisation. However, once it is 
established that the product is in fact a medicinal product, the definition has lost its 
use. Medicinal products have many shapes, functions, effects, and contain a range 
of different chemicals and natural compounds. The harmonised definition of 
'medicinal products' as products placed on the market under a 'special name,' 
presented for 'treating or preventing disease in human beings,''^ does not remove 
the need to examine each marketing authorisation application in detail. Naturally, 
the definition of chemical compounds, and what can and cannot be included within 
a 'medicinal product' limits the definition o f a medicinal product. However, once a 
^ See Commission 'Pharmaceuticals in the European Union' (Brussels: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 2 0 0 0 ) , for a general introduction. 
' N . 3 above. 
'° ibid. 
" N. 1 above. 
ibid., An. 1. 
'^N. 3 above. 
See Case 2 2 7 / 8 2 Criminal proceedings against Bennekom [ 1 9 8 3 ] E . C . R . 3 8 8 3 , for further 
discussion of the definition of'medicinal products.' 
'^Directive 2 0 0 1 / 8 3 , n. 1 above, Art. 1. 
88 
product has been classified, a thorough examination of its content and safety must 
be made before a marketing authorisation can be granted. 
Almost 20 years later, Council Regulation EEC/2309/93 established the 
'European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products' (EMEA). '^ Together 
with Directive 93/41/EEC'^ the Regulation laid down two new procedures for the 
authorisation of pharmaceutical products, in order to assure safety and quick access 
to pharmaceuticals for the public. The two new procedures are the 'centralised' 
procedure and the 'mutual recognition' procedure (of which the latter draw upon 
the 'multi-state' procedure from 1975), which w i l l be discussed below. 
The EMEA was set up in order to grant Community marketing authorisations, and 
assist the free movement of pharmaceutical products within the Community. Its 
work was based upon cooperation between Member State Medicines Control 
Agencies, the EMEA, and various institutions within the EC, for example the 
Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products^'' and the Pharmaceutical 
Committee,^' as well as the European Commission. In November 2005 the EMEA 
was officially replaced by the new 'European Medicines Agency' (EMEA).^* The 
new Agency broadly carries on the work of the 'o ld ' EMEA, administering 
applications for Community marketing authorisations using the centralised 
procedure, discussed below. 
'*N. 4 above. 
See chapter I , p. 17, n. 34 above; and introduction, p. 7, n. 23 above. 
Council Directive 93/41/EEC repealing Directive 87/22/EEC on the approximation of national 
measures relating to the placing on the national market of high-technology medicinal products, 
particularly those derived from biotechnology [1993] O.J. L214/40. 
" See S. Grubb, 'Development of a trans-national European licensing system for pharmaceutical 
products,' (1992) 3 l . C . C . L . R 77, for a good introduction to the changes brought about by the 1993 
legislation, forming the first attempt at creating a centralised and de-centralised procedure. 
Second Council Directive 75/319/EEC on the approximation of provisions laid down by Law, 
Regulation or Administrative Action relating to proprietary medicinal products [1975] O.J. LI47/13 
established the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products in order to ensure the proper 
implementation of Directive 65/65, n. 3 above. 
-' Council Decision 75/320/EEC establishing a Pharmaceutical Committee [1975] O.J. LI47/23. 
Council Regulation ( E C ) 726/2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and 
supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European 
Medicines Agency [2004] O.J. L136/01, Title V and Art. 90. The acronym E M E A remains. See also 
n. 17 above. 
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However, it is not only the marketing stage of pharmaceutical products that must be 
controlled and regulated. Pharmacovigilance, or the surveillance o f the safety of a 
product during its time on the market, is also regulated by the Community." 
Directive 75/319/EEC^^ and Regulation EEC/2309/93" required Member States to 
set up national pharmacovigilance systems to collect and evaluate information in 
order to assess the possible side-effects and adverse reactions o f products on 
national markets. The 'new' EMEA is responsible for ensuring pharmacovigilance 
in the Community by issuing guidance notes and cooperating with national 
Medicines Control Agencies. Pharmacovigilance is indirectly relevant to the 
validity of marketing authorisations: i f marketed products do not f u l f i l the safety 
requirements they may be revoked. 
Directive 2001/83/EC'^ amended the rules relating to the mutual recognition and 
centralised procedures, and established a third procedure, the 'abridged marketing 
authorisation' procedure for generic and well-established products. A l l three 
procedures must be discussed before the regulations governing the importation of 
products benefiting from marketing authorisations can be analysed. 
2.1 The 'centralisedprocedure' 
This procedure is compulsory for all biotechnology products. Under the 2004 
legislation the procedure is now also compulsory for all medicines to treat AIDS, 
cancer, diabetes, neurodegenerative disorders, orphan diseases and, from 2008, 
auto-immune and viral diseases."^ 
" See C. Hodges, 'European regulation of consumer safety,' (Oxford: OUP, 200) p. 138, 142, and 
Appendix 1, for a good introduction to the concept of pharmacovigilance. 
^'N. 20 above. 
-^N. 4 above. 
^*N. 1 above. 
Regulation 726/2004, n. 22 above, Annex. See also L . Horton J. Mailly and K. Goecke, 'Prognosis 
on pharmaceuticals is progress - new legislation on pharmaceuticals that was published in April 
includes many important changes in the E U legislative framework for regulation of product quality, 
safety and efficacy,' (2004) 101 Law Society Gazette 35, 36. 
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28 Applications for marketing authorisations are submitted directly to the EMEA. 
The Committee of Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) evaluates the 
application and selects a Member State to assess the application. On return, the 
CPMP evaluates the findings of the Member State Medicines Control Agency (the 
'rapporteur') and decides whether or not to grant a marketing authorisation. This 
process should take no more than 210 days.^' The findings of the CPMP are then 
forwarded to the EMEA, which, within 30 days, forwards its decision to the 
Commission which w i l l take the final decision. The decision is binding on all 
Member States. A centrally authorised Community marketing authorisation remains 
valid for 5 years, and the authorised product can be marketed in all Member States. 
Applications for extension must be made to the EMEA three months before the date 
of expiration of the marketing authorisation.^" 
Even though obtaining a marketing authorisation through the centralised procedure 
should be beneficial and time-efficient for pharmaceutical companies, the number 
of medicinal products approved under the centralised procedure has remained low. 
In 1995 the Commission approved three medicinal products, reaching the peak in 
2001 when 44 medicinal products were granted a centralised Community marketing 
authorisation. However, in 2003 the Commission only approved 20 applications, 
rising to 42 in 2004.^' Hopefully the numbers w i l l increase in pace with the ongoing 
harmonisation. However, following the Community enlargement in 2004, existing 
(national) marketing authorisations in the new Member States that were in conflict 
with existing Community marketing authorisations, i.e. for the benefit of the same 
product, have been annexed/transformed to the relevant Community marketing 
authorisation.^' Further, as the new Member States had to apply the acquis by the 
See Commission Notice, n. 6 above; and Commission Communication on the Community 
marketing authorisation procedures for medicinal products [1998] O.J. C229/4, for detailed 
information relating to this sub-heading. 
Regulation 726/2004, n. 22 above, Art. 6(3). 
' °See Commission, 'Pharmaceuticals,' n. 8 above, 11. 
'^ See The Community Register of medicinal products (<http://pharmacos.eudra.org/F2/register/ 
alfregister.htm>). See also The Swedish Association of the Pharmaceutical Industry (LIP), 
'Pharmaceutical market and healthcare,' Fakta (2005), (<http://www.Iif se/Statistik/stat.asp>), p. 18. 
Disputes may arise as to whether the product benefiting from a national marketing authorisation in 
a new Member State is identical to the product benefiting from the Community marketing 
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date of accession. Commission Decisions (including Community marketing 
authorisations) extend automatically to the territory o f the new Member States. 
The effect of this is that national marketing authorisations in the new Member 
States that do not comply with the safety standards in Directive 2001/83/EC became 
illegal on the day o f accession of the new Member States. 
It has been contested whether a product benefiting from a centrally authorised 
Community marketing authorisation must be marketed under the same brand name 
and in the same packaging throughout the Community. In Thomae the ECJ was 
asked to decide whether the notification and upholding of a Community marketing 
authorisation requires a universal brand name and packaging throughout the 
Community.^^ The ECJ found that the relevant Community measures refer to a 
singular name, implying that a Community marketing authorisation should only be 
granted for one brand name.''^ Allowing a marketing authorisation holder to use 
different brand names throughout the Community may lead to segmentation along 
national borders affecting the free movement of pharmaceutical products within the 
Community, and thus amount to a measure having equivalent effect to a 
quantitative restriction under Article 28 EC Treaty, or amount to an abuse of a 
authorisation. The products must be considered to be the 'same medicinal product.' See E M E A , 
' P E R F II Acquis Working Group: Reflection Paper on phasing in issues,' (EMEA-PERF-Acq-1041-
02-Final). 
" See E M E A , ' P E R F II Acquis Working Group: Achieving Compliance of Medicinal Products 
Authorised in C C with the Acquis,' (EMEA-PERF-Acq-1043-02-final), p. 4. 
However, the 2003 Act of Accession [2003] O.J. L236/33 (see introduction, p. 4, n. 15 above for a 
full reference), provides for transition periods during which Directive 2001/83 (n. 1 above) do not 
apply to the following Member States and dates in relation to upgrading of product dossiers; 
Lithuania - 1" January 2007 (Annex IX, para. 2 ); Poland - 31" December 2008 (Annex X I I , para. 
5); Malta - 31'' December 2006 (Annex X I , para. 2); and Slovenia - 31 December 2007 (Annex 
XIII , para. 1). This means that national marketing authorisations for certain pharmaceutical products 
issued under national law granted prior to accession will remain valid until renewed in compliance 
with the acquis. These marketing authorisations will not benefit from the mutual recognition 
procedure (discussed below), and can not be parallel imported unless the exporting and importing 
Member State Medicines Control Agencies certifies that the two products are identical and approves 
of such importation. See M. Struys, 'Practical implications of E U enlargement,' Allen & Overy 
publication (January 2004), (<http://www.allenovery.com/pdf/EUlP.pdf>). See also chapter 5(5) 
below. 
" Case T-123/00 Thomae GmbH v. Commission [2002] E C R 11-5193. See also Case T-179/00 A. 
Menarini Sri v. Commission [2002] E .C .R. 11-2879 (universal packaging); Commission 
Communication on parallel imports of proprietary medicinal products for which marketing 
authorisations have already been granted [2003] COM/839/final., para. 3; and chapter 7(3.1) below. 
Case T-123/00, ibid., para. 63. 
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dominant position under Article 82 EC Treaty.^^ However, the ECJ held that in 
exceptional circumstances relating to the protection of health and human life, 
variations to the package layout may be allowed. National laws precluding the use 
of a particular brand name, which may prevent market access, may be such an 
exception i f necessary for the protection of public health and safety. 
Thomae^^ exemplifies a typical Commimity problem, namely discrepancy in the 
Community harmonisation framework. The effectiveness of the centralised 
procedure is affected by the lack o f complete harmonisation in relation to 
trademarks. The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Associations (EFPIA) considers it important for the pharmaceutical industry to be 
allowed to use different brand names in different Member States for the same 
product, particularly in situations where legal, linguistic or practical complications 
prevent the use of a universal brand name throughout the Community.^^ An 
argument is that the process o f obtaining a trademark available throughout the 
Community is difficult, costly and time consuming, and may delay the marketing of 
pharmaceutical products much in demand."*" 
2.1.1 The Centralised procedure and parallel imports 
Centrally authorised pharmaceuticals distributed in parallel benefit f rom the 
Community marketing authorisation granted to the manufacturer, and do not need 
to apply for a 'parallel import licence' (PIL)."" This may be done even i f the 
marketing authorisation holder has not yet placed the authorised products on the 
market."*" It is therefore only products benefiting from a national marketing 
" See E M E A , 'Post-authorisation guidance on parallel distribution,' (EMEA/Ho/2368/04/Rev 2), 
para. 9. 
'*N. 35 above. 
EFPIA 'The single trademark issue - the importance of trade mark rights for medicines,' Position 
paper (June 2002), (<http://www.efpia.org/4_pos/legal/Trademarks0602.pdf>). See also chapter 
6(3), pp. 184-185 below. 
See International Trademark Association (INTA), 'Single trademark requirement,' Position paper 
(June 2003), (<http://www.inta.org/downloads/tap_singletm2003.pdf>). 
PILs are discussed in section 3.2 below. 
"""See Commission Communication (2003), n. 35 above, for detailed information. 
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authorisation, issued by a national Medicines Control Agency or using the 'mutual 
recognition' procedure, that need to benefit from a PIL."*^ In parallel trade in 
centrally authorised pharmaceutical products, the marketing authorisation holder 
remains the same. The marketing authorisation holder is therefore responsible for 
the pharmaceutical product even when the product is subject to parallel trade. Trade 
in centrally authorised pharmaceutical products is therefore commonly referred to 
as 'parallel distribution.' A trader is free to distribute the product in any Member 
State without applying for a PIL - provided the labelling, package leaflet and blue-
box have been amended so as to comply with national legislation in the Member 
State of importation.''^ However, following Thomae,'^^ the parallel importer is not 
allowed to change the brand name of the product. Similarly, parallel importers are 
not allowed to bundle together products which benefit from different Community 
marketing authorisations so as to create a smaller or larger package."*^ 
However, all parallel distribution of centrally authorised medicinal products within 
the Community must be notified to the EMEA before the products are placed on the 
market. According to Article 57 of Regulation 726/2004, 'checking that the 
conditions laid down in Community legislation... and in the marketing 
authorizations are observed in the case of parallel distribution...'' '^ is one of the 
official tasks of the EMEA. The notification takes the form of a 'Notification of 
parallel distribution of a centrally authorized medicinal product.'"*^ The notification 
form must include details of the parallel distributor; the Member State of 
destination; the repackager; certification that the condition of the product has not 
E M E A , 'Post-authorisation,' n. 37 above, 1. 
See F-J . Braun, 'The Legal Framework for Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals for Human Use in 
the European Economic Area,' Master of Drug Regulatory Affairs Thesis, Friedrich-Willheims-
Universitat Bonn (2004), p. 8. See chapter 7(3.1) below for a further discussion on the blue-box and 
repackaging of centrally authorised pharmaceutical products. 
N. 35 above. 
*^ Case C-433/00 Aventis GmbH v. Kohlpharma GmbH & MTK GmbH [2002] E . C . R . 7761. See also 
E U F (ed.), 'Repackaging of medicines must respect marketing authorisations,' (2002) 109 E . U . F . 
16; and the lengthy discussion of this case in chapter 7(3.1) below. 
N. 22 above, Art. 57. 
E M E A , 'Post-authorisation,' n. 37 above. 
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been affected; and a confirmation that the administrative fee has been paid."^^ Mock-
ups of the package and package leaflet, as well as a copy of the 'wholesale dealer's 
licence' or a copy of the marketing authorisation must be annexed to the 
notification form.^'' The EMEA no longer requires a specimen of the repackaged 
product to be submitted with the Notification.^' A colour copy of the repackaged 
sales presentation must, however, accompany the Notification.^^ According to the 
EMEA, the average time taken to obtain the Notice is around three months.^'' When 
the EMEA has no objections to the parallel distribution and repackaging, it wi l l 
issue a Notice and send it to the parallel distributor, the relevant national authority, 
and the original marketing authorisation holder. 
In essence, notice to the EMEA is a form of PIL. A n official PIL is not needed, but 
it needs to be confirmed that the imported product is identical to the product already 
benefiting from a Community marketing authorisation. It is also important that 
national authorities be notified as to when, where, what, and by whom a 
pharmaceutical product is being imported. In the event of a product recall or a 
withdrawal o f the marketing authorisation for safety reasons, it is vital that national 
authorities know whom to contact, and where and when the products have been 
marketed. 
2.2 The 'mutual recog)iition'procedure 
Directives 75/318/EEC^^ and 75/319/EEC^^ established the 'multi-state' procedure 
which allows Member States to take account of previous marketing authorisations 
E M E A , 'Post-authorisation,' n. 37 above, 12: this fee is currently € 3 480. 
^° ibid., 3. If the products are imported from a new Member State subject to the 'specific mechanism' 
in the 2003 Act of Accession (see n. 34 above), the applicant must prove that adequate notice has 





Council Directive 75/318/EEC on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating to 
analytical, pharmaco-toxicological and clinical standards and protocols in respect of the testing of 
proprietary medicinal products [1975] O.J. LI47/01. 
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in other Member States. Following the entering into force of Directive 
2001/83/EC^^ this became the 'mutual recognition' procedure. The principle of 
mutual recognition of products legally marketed in the exporting Member State by 
the importing Member State was established in Cassis de Dijon.^^ The mutual 
recognition procedure implements this case-law by enabling the mutual recognition 
of marketing authorisations. Since all pharmaceutical products marketed in the 
Community must benefit firom a marketing authorisation, it is not possible to have a 
system of mutual recognition of pharmaceutical products per se, as this could lead 
to a product being marketed in a country where it does not benefit f rom a marketing 
authorisation. Instead it is the mutual recognition of the marketing authorisations, 
not the products, which forms the basis of this procedure. 
Article 8(3)(j) of Directive 2001/83/EC states that 'copies of any authorisation 
obtained in another Member State or in a third country to place the medicinal 
product on the market, together with a list of those Member States in which an 
application for authorisation submitted in accordance with this Directive is under 
examination'^* shall be submitted. Following this, the Member State where the 
marketing authorisation is sought shall 'approve the assessment report, the 
summary of product characteristics and the labelling and package leaflet and shall 
inform the reference Member State accordingly.'^^ This is the basis upon which the 
'mutual recognition' procedure for marketing authorisations is founded. 
An application for a marketing authorisation may be addressed to several Member 
States. The first Member State to start processing the application w i l l become the 
'reference' Member State. The reference Member State then notifies the other 
Member States having received identical applications, which may then stop their 
investigations, and await the result from the reference Member State. When the 
" N . 20 above. 
'*N. 1 above. 
Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG \r. Bundesmonopolvenvaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis) [1979] 
E .C.R. 649. 
58 N. 1 above, Art. 8(3)(i). 
'\bid,An. 28(4). 
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reference Member State authority has reached a decision, it sends its findings to the 
other Member States. The Member States then have 90 days to recognise the 
decision o f the reference Member State and grant the applicant marketing 
authorisation.^*' In this way the applicant w i l l be granted several national marketing 
authorisations by only making one application. It is important to remember that the 
set of marketing authorisations granted does not have the status o f a Community 
marketing authorisation, but remains a bundle of individual national marketing 
authorisations.^' As such it is beneficial to large pharmaceutical companies as it 
allows them to use initially different brand names across the Community, acting as 
a preventative measure against parallel imports, as well as providing more 
flexibility in products roll-out.^' 
2.3 The 'abridgedprocedure' 
This provides a speedier marketing authorisation procedure for generic products. 
Since manufacturers of generics (i.e. 'copies' of pharmaceutical products already in 
well-established use) do not have access to the test results and other information 
concerning the pharmaceutical product, and the 'reference' pharmaceutical product 
already benefits from a marketing authorisation, manufacturers o f generics do not 
have to submit all test results. 
Article 10 of Directive 2001/83/EC," which derogates f rom Article 8(3)(i), is the 
basis of the so-called 'abridged application' procedure. According to Article 10 the 
'applicant shall not be required to provide the results o f pre-clinical tests and of 
clinical trials i f he can demonstrate that the medicinal product is a generic of a 
reference medicinal product, which is or has been authorized under Article 6 for not 
*° In accordance with Directive 2001/83, n. 1 above, Art. 28(4). 
It should also be noted that national marketing authorisations in the new Member States cannot 
benefit from the mutual recognition procedure during the transition period: see n. 34 above. 
" See IMS Insights (ed.), 'New E U Drug regulations positioned to boost new introductions and 
competition,' IMS Insights, 12 June 2003, (<http://www.ims-global.com>); and E F P L ^ , 'Single 
trademark,' n. 39 above. 
" N. 1 above. 
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less than eight years in a Member State or in the Community.'^'' 'Generic medicinal 
product' shall mean a medicinal product that has the same 'qualitative and 
quantitative composition in active substances and the same pharmaceutical form as 
the reference medicinal product, and whose bioequivalence with the reference 
medicinal product has been demonstrated by appropriate bioavailability studies.'^^ 
This definition is often referred to as the 'essentially similar' test. 
In the case o f generic products that are marketed in a Member State other than the 
one intended for importation, Article 10(a) becomes relevant. It states that 'the 
applicant shall not be required to provide the results o f pre-clinical tests or clinical 
trials i f he can demonstrate that the active substances of the medicinal product have 
been in well-established medicinal use within the Community for at least ten years, 
with recognised efficacy and an acceptable level of safety...'^^ This procedure is 
often referred to as the 'informed consent application.'^^ An application using the 
abridged procedure does not result in a marketing authorisation with any specific 
attributes. Rather, the procedure is only a procedure being applied by the national 
Medicines Control Agency, subsequently resulting in the granting of a national 
marketing authorisation. The procedure can also be applied in conjunction with the 
mutual recognition procedure.^^ 
The recent Directive 2004/27/EC^^ changed the procedures concerning regulatory 
data exclusivity. Data submitted by pharmaceutical companies w i l l be protected for 
10 years from the first time of first authorisation. However, it is possible for a 
''ibid.. An. 10. 
65 Directive 2001/83, n. 1 above, Art. 10(2)(b). See also Case C-368/96 R. v. Licensing Authority, ex 
parte Generics [1998] E . C . R . 1-7967. 
66 ibid.. Art. 10(a). 
Commission Notice, n. 6 above, 9. 
Note, however, that nationally authorised generic versions of centrally authorised products cannot 
legally stay on the market in the new Member States after accession. Similarly, due to the transition 
periods during which Directive 2001/83 (n. 1 above) do not apply to the new Member States in 
accordance with the 2003 Act of Accession (see n. 34 above), a generic product cannot be imported 
from a new Member State to an 'old' Member States even if the products are identical unless express 
consent is given by the respective national Medicines Control Agencies in the Member States of 
importation and exportation. See pp. 91-92 above; and P E R F , 'Reflection paper,' n. 33 above, 7. 
Council Directive 2004/27/EC amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to 
medicinal products for human use [2004] O.J. L136/34. 
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generic company to submit an abridged application for a marketing authorisation 
relying on the innovator's data eight years after the issue of first marketing 
authorisation, although the applicant w i l l have to wait a further two years before the 
product may be placed on the market - hence the expression 'the 8+2' formula.^*^ 
The protecfion o f the innovator's data is to allow for a recoup of investments - a 
form of reward for the innovator's investments in research and development. 
3. Imported pharmaceutical products 
A trader wishing to import pharmaceutical products into the U K (or any other 
Member State) must normally possess a 'wholesale dealer's licence' (WDL) issued 
by the MHRA, regardless o f whether the parallel imported product benefits from a 
Community or a national marketing authorisation.^' This means that a W D L must 
normally be obtained before a PIL can be granted. 
However, parallel importers who import pharmaceuticals from another Member 
State do not need to possess a W D L as long as the products are subject to a P I L " 
and the importer is in possession of a 'manufacturer's (assemble) licence' ( M A L ) in 
the Member State of importation, subject to the products not having left the 
premises of the licensed manufacturer or assembler before sold or supplied.'^ This 
is embodied in Article 77(3) of Directive 2001/83/EC, which states that 'possession 
of a manufacturing authorization shall include authorization to distribute by 
wholesale the medicinal products covered by that authorization.'^'' 
™ Horton, Mailly and Goecke, n. 27 above, 36. This rule is only applicable to products patented after 
the entry into force of Directive 2004/27, n. 69 above. 
" E M E A , 'Post-authorisation,' n. 37 above, 14. 
See section 3.2 below. 
" See the Medicines Act 1968, n. 2 above, Art. 8(3)(c); The Medicines (Exemption from Licences) 
(Wholesale Dealing) Order 1990; and MHRA, 'Notes for applicants and holders of a wholesale 
dealer's licence,' (MHRA Guidance Note No. 6), para. 19. MALs are further discussed in chapter 
7(2) below. 
Directive 2001/83, n. 1 above. Art. 77(3). 
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The procedures and laws governing the granting o f WDLs are laid down in 
Directive 2001/83/EC.^^ Article 80(g) of Directive 2001/83/EC requires holders of a 
W D L to comply with the Guidelines on Good Distribution Practice of Medicinal 
Products for Human Use,^^ as prepared in accordance with Article 10 of Directive 
92/25/EEC^^ on the wholesale distribution of pharmaceutical products for human 
use. These Directives have been implemented by UK law.'* 
A W D L can be divided into three parts. The company (and qualified person) must 
be authorised, the products for which wholesale distribution is intended must be 
specified, and finally, the premises where the products intended for wholesale 
distribution wi l l be stored must be authorised. The applicant must have a 'qualified 
person' designated as the responsible person.'^ The M H R A Guidelines state that it 
is not required that the responsible person is a pharmacist, but it is recommended.*" 
The designated person need not be an employee of the licence holder, but must be 
at the licence holder's disposal, as he could be liable to take action in Court on 
behalf of the licence holder. The 'qualified person' must ensure that the products 
supplied under a W D L have been obtained from another company benefiting from a 
W D L , and that the products are only supplied to another W D L licensee.*' Further, 
the storage conditions, including transportation, observing that the right temperature 
is maintained, and protecting the products from contamination and/or mixing with 
82 
other products intended for distribution, must be adequate. 
" ibid. 
Commission Guidelines on Good Distribution Practice of Medicinal Products for Human Use 
(94/C 63/03). 
Council Directive 92/25/EEC on the wholesale distribution of medicinal products for human use 
[1992] O.J. L I 13/1. 
" See The Standard Provisions for Wholesale Dealer's Licences and Wholesale Dealer's Import 
licences laid down in the Medicines (Standard Provisions for Licences and Certificates) Regulations 
1971, as amended. 
" See Hodges, n. 23 above, 157, for a further discussion of the 'qualified person.' 
^°MHRA Guidance Note No. 6, n. 73 above, paras. 6.3-6.4. 
'^ Directive 2001/83, n. 1 above, Art. 80(b) and (c). See also MHRA Guidance Note No. 6, ibid., 
paras. 5.2(d)-5.2(e). 
See Commission, 'Good distribution,' n. 76 above, paras. 9-16; and MHRA Guidance Note No. 6, 
ibid. Appendix 1. 
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A W D L holder must also establish an emergency and recall plan.^^ In order to be 
able to execute an effective recall, the distributor is required to keep records for any 
transaction including pharmaceutical products over the last five years. Under the 
Guidelines on Good Distribution, the wholesaler must also record the batch number 
of the products supplied, so as to ensure an effective recall process in case of an 
emergency. This plan should apply without any difference to deliveries in the 
Member State where the licence was granted and in other Member States where the 
batch was supplied, which entails a certain amount of cooperation between Member 
States. 
Further cooperation between Member States is also needed due to the fact that the 
wholesale dealer's premises (where the products are stored) need not be located in 
the Member State o f importation (where the licence is g r a n t e d ) . I t would amount 
to a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction under Article 28 
EC to require an applicant of a W D L to maintain premises for storage and technical 
equipment in the Member State where the application is made, i f the applicant 
already has access to adequate premises in another Member State.^^ I f the premises 
conform to the laws and regulations in the second Member State, it would be an 
additional cost for the applicant to maintain additional premises in the Member 
State where the application is made, even i f such a requirement applied without 
distinction to all applicants.*^ Safety can still be assured by means of cooperation, 
and additional checks at borders and in pharmacies.*^ The argument that the 
requirement is merely intended to guarantee regular supplies of foreign 
pharmaceutical products to the market is not valid, since this requirement can be 
met without the need for the applicant to maintain premises in the Member State of 
importation.** The Member State which issued the W D L w i l l have to cooperate 
" See Commission, 'Good distribution,' ibid., paras. 25-30, for the rules relating to emergency plans 
and recalls discussed in the paragraph below. 
See Joined Cases 87-88/85 Legia & Gyselinx v. Minister for Health [1986] E . C . R . 1707. See also 
chapter 7(2) below for further discussion of this case. 
ibid., para. 16. 
ibid. 
ibid., paras. 18 and 20. 
ibid., para. 22. 
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with the authorities in the Member State where the wholesale dealer's premises are 
located.*^ I f effective cooperation is not possible, this w i l l affect public health and 
safety. It wi l l also mean added expenses for the Member State granting the WDL, 
which w i l l have to carry out inspections in pharmacies and at borders in order to 
maintain safety. The Member State where the premises are located may not be so 
rigid in its inspections of the premises, as (national) public health and safety is not 
at risk since the products are being supplied in another Member State. Nevertheless, 
a W D L is a normal requirement for importers of pharmaceutical products, and 
despite having to rely on effective cooperation between Member States to maintain 
public health and safety, it provide some safety guarantees. 
3.1 Marketing authorisations and imported pharmaceutical products 
Even i f a parallel importer benefits f rom a WDL, Directive 2001/83/EC^° makes it 
clear that no pharmaceutical product may be placed on the market without a 
marketing authorisation. A problem therefore presents itself for parallel importers 
o f pharmaceutical products not benefiting from a Community marketing 
authorisation: without access to the results of pre-clinical studies and chemical data 
it is almost impossible to obtain a marketing authorisation, especially since many 
pharmaceutical products intended for parallel importation are still patent protected 
and the data protection period has not yet expired. 
In consequence, the requirement of marketing authorisation effectively hinders the 
free movement of pharmaceutical products within the Community. It is also 
debatable whether importers should be required to go through the same application 
process as this would entail unnecessary risks and suffering to test animals and 
humans taking part in the clinical trials required for a successful marketing 
authorisation application.^' 
^' ibid., para. 20. 
'N. 1 above, Art. 6. 
' It should be not( 
Schumacher v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Ost [1989] E . C . R . 617, rules restricting 
" ed that different rules apply to 'personal imports.' Following Case 215/87 
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This was first discussed by the ECJ in Adriaan de Peijper.^^ Adriaan de Peijper was 
the managing director of Centrafarm, a parallel importer distributing 
pharmaceutical products imported from the United Kingdom to Dutch pharmacies. 
The Officier van Justitie considered that de Peijper infringed national public health 
legislation on two grounds. First, the Netherlands authorities had not consented to 
such importation being carried out by Centrafarm. Secondly, certain essential 
documents concerning the preparation of the concerned products, namely the 
'records' and the ' f i l e ' as defined by Dutch legislation, were not available. In this 
context, ' f i l e ' means a document which the importer must keep for 'every 
pharmaceutical packaging of a pharmaceutical preparation which he imports...and 
which must contain detailed particulars concerning the said packaging and 
especially of the quantitative and qualitative composition as well as the method of 
preparation.'^^ These documents and particulars must then be endorsed by the 
person or persons responsible for the manufacture o f the said pharmaceutical 
product abroad. When applying for marketing authorisation, the ' f i l e ' must be 
shown in order to obtain a certification. Only the holder of a ' f i l e ' w i l l be able to 
obtain effective marketing authorisation. 'Record' means a document the importer 
must show when he markets the pharmaceutical products in the Netherlands to 
certify that the products have actually been manufactured and checked in 
accordance with the ' f i le . ' The ' f i l e ' therefore seems to refer to the product and its 
manufacturing process in general, whereas the 'record' refers to specific batches of 
the product. 
De Peijper claimed that the Dutch legislation was in breach o f Article 28 EC Treaty. 
By requesting the delivery of documents identical to documents already in their 
importation by private individuals of non-prescription pharmaceutical products authorised and 
available in the Member State of importation, but purchased in a pharmacy in another Member State, 
is not compatible with the Community's free movement of goods provisions. Neither is a prior 
authorisation procedure to personal imports, not effected by personal transport, of products being 
lawfully prescribed in the Member State of importation compatible with Articles 28 and 30 E C 
Treaty: Case C-212/03 Commission v. French Republic [2005] E . C . R . 4213, para. 49. See also M. 
Makinen, P. Rautava and J. Forsstrom, 'Restrictions on import of drugs for personal use within the 
European single market,' (2002) 12 E.J.P.H. 244. 
" Case 104/75 Officier van Justitie v. de Peijper [1976] E .C .R. 613. 
" ibid., para. 3. 
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possession (previously supplied by the holder of the reference marketing 
authorisation) the legislation created an obstacle 'capable of hindering, directly or 
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade.''"* The Kartongerecht 
made a preliminary reference to the ECJ. 
The ECJ restated the well-established definition of a measure equivalent to a 
quantitative restriction,'^ and held that 'imports being channelled in such a way that 
only certain traders can effect these imports, whereas others are prevented from 
doing so, constitute such an obstacle to imports.''^ Measures such as these can 
however fall within the derogations provided by Article 30 EC Treaty i f adopted for 
'the protection of 
proportionality test. 
f health and the life of humans.''' The ECJ applied a 
Article 30 EC Treaty carmot be relied upon to just ify measures adopted to 'lighten 
the administrative burden' o f national authorities, unless without the measure the 
burden would in essence be unbearable for the national authorities.'* The Court, 
however, found that it is unnecessary for the protection of public health and life of 
humans to require a parallel importer to supply the authorities with documents 
identical to documents already in their possession produced to them by the 
manufacturer, laying down the specifics of a product identical to the one being 
imported by the parallel importer." However, i f the products are not identical, i.e. 
do not possess the same therapeutic effects or manufacturing process, a request for 
a ' f i l e ' may be in conformity with Article 30 EC Treaty."'^ 'Nevertheless, having 
regard to the nature of the market for the pharmaceutical product in question, it is 
necessary to ask whether this objective cannot be equally well achieved i f the 
national administrations, instead o f waiting passively for the desired evidence to be 
produced to them - and in a form calculated to give the manufacturer of the product 
Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville [1974] E . C . R . 837, para. 5. 
Case 104/75, n. 92 above, para. 12. 
ibid., para. 13. 
" ibid., para. 14. 
ibid., pans. 18 and 32. 
" ibid., para. 21. 
'""(•^ jiVf., paras. 35 and 36. 
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and his duly appointed representative an advantage - were to admit, where 
appropriate, similar evidence and, in particular, to adopt a more active policy which 
could enable every trader to obtain the necessary evidence.'"^' According to the 
Court, this objective can be achieved by cooperation between Member States in 
obtaining the documents necessary to make checks on 'largely standardised and 
widely distributed products. ' '°" 
The objective of safeguarding public health and safety pursued by the Community 
legislation can only be justified in relation to products being put on the market for 
the first time. It can therefore be argued that de Peijper,^^^ in essence, established a 
'first marketing principle' similar to the 'exhaustion of rights doctrine' for 
intellectual property rights."''' When the product has obtained a first marketing 
authorisation, national authorities and the original marketing authorisation holder 
have lost their right to prevent future applicants from relying on the information 
already in the possession of national authorities. The ECJ thus established a 
simplified procedure for parallel imported pharmaceuticals products. 
Since the marketing and importation of pharmaceutical products still need to be 
subject to a certain control system, de Peijper^^ led to the implementation o f a 
system for granting PILs by Member State Medicines Control Agencies. The 
system draws upon the ECJ's ruling and allows parallel importers to rely on the 
product dossier already in the possession of the national Medicines Control Agency 
following the marketing authorisation application of the reference product. This 
system prevents marketing authorisation holders from effectively hindering market 
access for parallel imported products by refusing to supply them with the product 
information necessary to obtain a marketing authorisation. Before discussing the 
Case 104/75, n. 92 above, para. 24. 
ibid., para. 27. 
ibid. 
'"^  See chapter 5 below for discussion of the 'exhaustion of rights doctrine. 
N. 92 above. 
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exceptions and limitations to the de Peijper^^ ruling, the effects of this ruling must 
be discussed. 
3.2 Parallel Import Licences (PILs) 
Following the de Peijper^'' ruling, the Commission published a Communication on 
importation of medicines already benefiting f rom a marketing authorisation.'*'^ This 
prompted the MHRA to issue the 'Notes on Application for Product Licences 
(Parallel Importing)' in 1984.'°^ 
The M H R A defines a PIL as a 'United Kingdom marketing authorisation granted 
by the licensing authority under these Regulations in respect of a relevant medicinal 
product which is imported into the United Kingdom from another EEA State in 
accordance with the rules of Community law relating to parallel imports . ' "° The 
U K application form for a PIL is fairly straightforward.'" Information is required 
regarding the product for which the application is made, as well as information 
concerning the marketing authorisation in the exporting Member State and the 
manufacturer of the product. Information regarding the marketing authorisation and 
its holder in the U K must also be submitted, with fu l l details of the 
relabelling/repackaging procedure, and the name, address and manufacturing 
authorisation number of the relabeller/repackager. In an attempt to verify and assess 
the quality of the product, fu l l details o f the specifications and quality control test 
methods applied by the applicant must also be included in the application. Finally, a 
ibid. 
N. 92 above. 
Commission Communication on parallel imports of proprietary medicinal products for which 
marketing authorisations have already been granted [1982] O.J. C I 15/5. See also Commission 
Communication (2003), n. 35 above. 
MHRA, 'Notes on Application for Product Licences (Parallel Importing) (Medicines for Human 
Use),' (MAL2(PI)). This is no longer available from the MHRA. However, a new unofficial version 
is available upon request: MHRA, 'Guidance notes on applications for product licenses for parallel 
imported medicinal products,' (Unofficial) (2005). 
Medicine (Fees) Regulations 2001, n. 2 above. Art. 2(l)(a). 
"' For the following paragraph see: MHRA, 'Application for a Product Licence (Parallel 
Importing),' (Form M L A 201 (PI)). 
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specimen of the product and specimens of all the containers (in all sizes) intended 
for importation from the exporting Member State must be enclosed. 
Directive 2001/83/EC provides for a 90-day time limit within which the Member 
State may decide upon the mutual recognition of a marketing authorisation already 
granted by another Member State authority."" The Commission, in its 2003 
Communication, therefore suggests that '45 days is a reasonable time-limit for 
applying a simplified procedure to decide on a [PIL] application.'"^ In the UK, all 
new PILs w i l l be published in the MHRA's updating journal for medicines, and w i l l 
also be available on the Agency's website. The MHRA notifies the relevant 
marketing authorisation holder of the granting of a PIL.""* 
This is the basis of the 'simplified procedure.' The system may seem 
straightforward and efficient at a first glance. But the definition o f 'parallel 
imported,' discussed in the next chapter, w i l l show that there are still many 
questions left unanswered concerning the intricacies o f the 'simplified procedure.' 
4. Conclusion and analysis 
The Community's marketing authorisation framework aims to integrate Member 
State markets into a single European market for pharmaceutical products. 
Community legislation therefore provides for three different marketing 
authorisation procedures; the centrally authorised Community procedure, the 
mutual recognition procedure, and the abridged application procedure. The 
centralised procedure grants Community marketing authorisations, valid throughout 
the Community. The mutual recognition procedure provides a bundle o f national 
marketing authorisations granted by way of mutual recognition, and the abridged 
' " N . 1 above, Art. 18. 
Commission Communication (2003), n. 35 above, para. 3. 
"'' The current fee for a parallel import licence is £1,483. The E C J has held that such fees, charged 
in order to check whether the products 'subsequently marketed are identical to the registered product 
do not constitute charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties where those fees form part of 
a general system of internal fees:' Case 32/80 Criminal proceedings against Kortmann [1981] 
E . C . R . 251, para. 3. 
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procedure provides a simplified procedure for generic pharmaceutical products. In 
order to facilitate the free movement of pharmaceutical products, the Community 
also demands that Member States provide a 'simplified procedure' for parallel 
imported pharmaceutical products. The Community market for pharmaceutical 
products therefore consists of pharmaceutical products benefiting from a range of 
different marketing authorisations and licences granted using different procedures. 
This complicated system threatens, to an extent, the safety and efficiency of the 
pharmaceutical trade. Safety and efficacy is weakened due to the fact that there is 
no centralisation. This means that Member States must not only cooperate with each 
other, but also with the EMEA, which can have an effect on pharmacovigilance. 
Instead of a Member State only monitoring and maintaining safety of the 
pharmaceutical products benefiting from a marketing authorisation in its own 
territory, it must rely on the EMEA and other Member State Medicines Control 
Agencies, which means nadonal agencies require a lot o f trust in each other, as well 
as in the EMEA. 
The system also threatens free movement. When applying for national marketing 
authorisations, pharmaceutical companies can still use different names in different 
Member States, even when using the mutual recognition procedure. The mutual 
recognition procedure has therefore not made it easier for parallel importers, which 
must still apply for a PIL. Only when products are benefiting from a Community 
marketing authorisation is a PIL unnecessary. However, the requirement of a single 
brand name throughout the Community reduces the popularity of the centrally 
authorised marketing authorisation. In practice, therefore, the situation for parallel 
importers has not changed significantly over the last 20 years. 
This could be solved by gradually making the centrally authorised Community 
marketing authorisation procedure compulsory for more categories of 
pharmaceuticals."^ A Community marketing authorisation should be seen as 
possessing positive attributes. Once the product has obtained a Community 
See section 2.1 above on the centralised Community procedure. 
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marketing authorisation it can be marketed throughout the Community. But also, 
once a product is withdrawn, it is withdrawn from the entire Community market. 
The marketing authorisation holder is therefore able to focus on the new product, 
recouping the R & D costs. The marketing authorisation holder would not have to 
compete with parallel imported versions either, since parallel trade in a product 
benefiting from a Community marketing authorisation is dependant on the 
marketing authorisation being in force. Making the centralised Community 
marketing authorisation procedure compulsory for more pharmaceutical categories 
would also benefit parallel importers, since a PIL is not needed as a result of all the 
relevant information already being submitted to the EMEA by the Community 
marketing authorisation holder. There would only be one marketing authorisation 
for the product, making safety and quality checks more effective and origin controls 
far more time-efficient. Making the Community marketing authorisation 
compulsory for all new medicinal products would therefore benefit society as a 
whole, since it would increase safety and lead to a more cost effective marketing 
authorisation system. 
Regulation 726/2004, stating that, 'after 20 May 2008, the Commission, having 
consulted the Agency, may present any appropriate proposal modifying' the list of 
product groups for which the centralised procedure shall be compulsory,"^ indeed 
suggests that the Community marketing authorisation procedure may gradually 
become compulsory for more product groups. This is supported by the fact that, as 
of 20 May 2008, the procedure w i l l be compulsory for auto-immune diseases, 
immune dysfunctions and viral diseases."' 
Objections to such a reform are likely to come from, first, national Medicines 
Control Agencies, and indirectly Member States, since it would lead to a decrease 
in responsibilities, and possible down-sizing, of such agencies. Since the regulation 
of the national pharmaceutical industry and market falls under the retained national 
competence over the protection of public health and safety in accordance with 
Article 30 EC Treaty, Member State objections w i l l be difficult to overcome. 
' " N . 22 above, Annex. 
'''ibid. 
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Applying the mutual recognition principle to national marketing authorisations (in 
effect making the mutual recognition procedure compulsory for all pharmaceutical 
products) would perhaps be more welcomed by Member States than making the 
centralised procedure compulsory. Even though this would potentially increase 
safety, it would still require certain cooperation and exchange of information 
between IVIember States, while not solving the issue of PILs, as a PIL would still be 
needed in order to guarantee safety in the absence of a centralised procedure only 
allowing for the marketing of one version of the authorised product. Secondly, 
manufacturers may oppose a proposal to make the centralised procedure 
compulsory due to the negative impact it w i l l have on the ability to foreclose 
markets, as w i l l be evident in the following chapter. However, the benefit of only 
having to apply for one marketing authorisation is likely to outweigh this 
disadvantage. Similarly, parallel importers may object to the proposal due to its 
centralisation. I f the Community marketing authorisation is withdrawn, it w i l l be 
withdrawn throughout the Community. However, this argument is likely to be 
outweighed by the benefit of not having to apply for a PIL in the first place. 
Hopefully, the current system is only a temporary solution adopted under a 
transition period until the centralised procedure for Community marketing 
authorisations becomes standard. This w i l l increase efficiency, public health and 
safety, and provide legal certainty. Making the centralised procedure for marketing 
authorisations compulsory would solve many unanswered questions, and would be 
an efficient way of stimulating free movement of pharmaceutical products within 
the Community. This w i l l be even more evident following the complicated 
definition of 'parallel imported' in relation to the 'simplified procedure,' carried out 
in the next chapter. 
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C H A P T E R 4 
THE SCOPE OF THE SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURE 
As established in the preceding chapter, the product for which a 'parallel import 
licence' (PIL) is applied for must be a parallel imported version of a product 
already benefiting from a marketing authorisation in the Member State of 
importation. The key question is therefore how the ECJ and Community measures 
have defined the term 'parallel imported,' as the normal procedure for obtaining a 
marketing authorisation w i l l apply i f the product is not considered to be a 'parallel 
imported' version of such a product. The two main criteria are, first, that the parallel 
imported and the reference product share a 'common origin,' and, secondly, that 
they can be regarded as 'essentially identical.' The ECJ has also had to consider 
whether the automatic revocation of the PIL upon the withdrawal of the reference 
markedng authorisation is compatible with Articles 28 and 30 EC Treaty. This wi l l 
be discussed in secdon 3. The following secdon w i l l focus on the definidon of 
'common origin' and 'essendally identical.' 
A good introduction to these two definitions is the U K 'Medicines and Healthcare 
products Regulatory Agency's' (MHRA) guidelines for PIL applications: 
MAL2(PI) . ' Paragraph 4 of MAL2(PI) provides that; 'all the following condidons 
must be met before an application can be considered under these arrangements i.e. 
the product concerned must: 
' MHRA, (MAL2(PI)); and MHRA, (Unofficial) (2005): see chapter 3, p. 106, n. 109 above, for full 
references. 
I l l 
a) Be a product which is to be imported from a Member State o f the European 
Community; 
b) Be a proprietary medicinal product (as defined in Article 1 of EC Directive 
65/65) for human use...; 
c) Be covered by a currently valid marketing authorisation granted, in 
accordance with Article 3 of EC Directive 65/65, by the regulatory authority 
of an EC Member State; 
d) .. .have no differences, having therapeutic effect, f rom a product covered by 
a U K [marketing authorisation]...; 
e) Be made by, or under licence to; 
i) the manufacturer who made the product covered by the U K 
[marketing authorisation] or; 
(ii) a member of the same group of companies as the manufacturer who 
made the product covered by the U K [marketing authorisation]. 
I f any of these conditions are not met the applicant w i l l be invited to apply for a 
[marketing authorisation] in the normal way under the [established] procedures.'" 
First, it should be remembered that the parallel imported product must already 
benefit from a marketing authorisation in a Member State other than the Member 
State o f application/importation. Secondly, the parallel imported product must use 
an existing marketing authorisation in the Member State of application/importation 
as a reference when applying for a PIL. Community measures at the very least 
require that this reference marketing authorisation be in force at time of the 
application for a PIL.^ This is not only an additional condition, but a sufficient 
- MAL2(P1), n. 1 above, para. 4. See also Case C-94/98 R. ex parte Rhone-Poulenc Rarer v. The 
Licensing Authority [1999] E . C . R . 1-8789, paras. 9-13. 
^ Case C-223/01 AstraZeneca A/S v. Laegemiddelstyrelsen [2003] E . C . R . 1-11809 concerning an 
application for a marketing authorisation for a generic product under the 'abridged' application 
procedure (see chapter 3.2.3. above), but this may be equally important in relation to the simplified 
procedure for parallel imports. 
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condition." The product need not be marketed: it suffices that the marketing 
authorisation is in force, enabling the MHRA to take part o f the data and documents 
from the reference marketing authorisation.^ The applicant must also show that the 
product is a parallel imported version o f the product benefiting f rom the reference 
marketing authorisation. The granting of a PIL by the M H R A is very 
straightforward i f the product is in every aspect identical to a product already 
benefiting from a marketing authorisation. 
1. 'Common origin' 
The easiest way to show that the product for which a PIL is applied for is a true 
parallel import is to show that it shares a 'common origin' with the product 
benefifing f rom the reference marketing authorisation, i.e. was manufactured by the 
same company, at the same factory. In this way the products wi l l be considered to 
conform with paragraph e(ii) of MAL2(PI),^ which requires the parallel importer 
and manufacturer to be members of the same group of companies. 
In Smith & Nephew v. The Medicines Control Agency' the ECJ was asked to define 
'common origin.' In brief, the facts were that Smith & Nephew had been licenced 
by a US firm to market the drug 'Ditropan' in the U K . Primecrown, a parallel 
importer, was granted a PIL from the MHRA^ for products manufactured by a 
Belgian subsidiary of the US company which had granted the licence to Smith & 
Nephew. The products benefited from a Belgian marketing authorisation, and were 
considered 'essentially identical' to those marketed by Smith & Nephew. 
"Case C-223/01, n. 3 above, paras. 49-50; and Commission Communication on parallel imports of 
proprietary medicinal products for which marketing authorisations have already been granted [2003] 
CON4/839/final., para. 6. 
^ See Article 10(1) of Council Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal 
products for human use [2001] O.J. L311/67, in relation to the abridged procedure. It is likely that 
this is equally applicable to PILs. See also section 2.1 below. 
* N. 1 above, para. e(ii); see also MHRA (unofficial), n. 1 above, para. 6(e). 
' Case C-201/94 Smith & Nephew Ltd v. The Medicines Control Agency [1996] E . C . R . 1-5819. 
^ The thesis refers to the MHRA for the sake of clarity, even though this agency was, at the time, 
known as the Medicines Control Agency: see introduction, p. 7, n. 24 above. 
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However, the US company claimed that it did not supervise or control Smith & 
Nephew's manufacture of Ditropan in the UK. Thus, it could not guarantee that the 
product specifications for the products marketed by Smith & Nephew and those 
manufactured by the Belgian subsidiary were in all respects idenfical. When the 
M H R A became aware of the fact that the requisite link between the two products 
was non-existent it withdrew the licence granted to Primecrown. Primecrown 
brought proceedings to quash the MHRA's decision to withdraw the licence. 
The ECJ compared these facts to those in de Peijper^ The products at issue in de 
Peijper^'^ were in all respects identical, and were produced by the same group of 
companies. The products imported by Primecrown and the products produced by 
Smith & Nephew were, according to tests, identical. However, they did not 
originate from the same producer. What nexus is required between the two sets of 
products? 
The ECJ addressed the issue by stating that: 
'That case-law [de PeijperY^ can be applied to a situation such at issue in the main 
proceedings, in which independent companies produce proprietary medicinal 
products, which have a common origin by virtue of the fact that they are 
manufactured pursuant to agreements concluded with the same licensor. Otherwise, 
such agreements could lead to partitioning of the national markets of the various 
Member States.' 
When two 'essentially identical' products benefit from marketing authorisations in 
two different Member States, the competent authority must treat the products as 
benefiting from both marketing authorisations. The two independent companies 
must be joined by agreements concluded with the same licensor in order to benefit 
' Case 104/75 Officier van Justitie v. de Peijper [1976] E . C . R . 613. See chapter 3(3.2) for the facts. 
'° ibid. 
''ibid. 
'-Case C-201/94, n. 7 above, para. 25. 
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from the 'cross-reference,' which national authorides can carry out 'unless there are 
countervailing consideradons relating to the effecdve protection o f the life and 
health of humans.''^ The fact that the licensor is situated outside the European 
Community is not relevant.''' 
Smith & Nephe\v^ clarified as many quesdons as it created. The two products must 
have a common origin; however, they do not have to be manufactured by the same 
group of companies. The requirement of a common origin was therefore not 
relaxed. The ECJ merely defined 'the same group of companies' to include two 
manufacturers bound together by a licensing agreement.'^ 
The PIL system was set up in order to facilitate the free movement of parallel 
imported pharmaceuticals. The crucial factor is therefore how to define such 
products. In Smith & Nephew^'' the ECJ defined parallel imported products as 
including products produced by two separate manufacturers bound by a licensing 
agreement. However, can products that are 'essendally idendcal' but which lack a 
common origin be defined as parallel imports?'* After all, 'parallel imported' 
means that the products are simply traded in parallel with the original 
manufacturer's distribution network." Allowing products, no matter how 
'essendally idendcal' they may be, to benefit f rom a PIL i f they do not share a 
common origin w i l l undermine the intendon of the ECJ's ruling in de Peijper?^ 
Case C-201/94, n. 7 above, para. 32. 
ibid., para. 34. 
" ibid 
" This is now included in MHRA (unofficial), n.l above, defining a 'common origin' as being 
'made under licence to a company (inside or outside the E E A ) which has also licensed the 
manufacture of the U K product:' (para. 6(e)). 
" N . 7 above. 
In Case C-94/98, n. 2 above, the Court held, in line with Smith & Nephew {ibid) that the marketing 
authorisation holders and the manufacturers of the reference products, as well as for the product for 
which a PIL is applied for, must be members of the same group of companies. Thus it seems Smith 
& Nephew did not have an impact on the importance of a 'common origin.' 
" See chapter 1(3) above. 
N. 9 above. 
115 
The ECJ needed to decide which direction to take, either to reserve the simplified 
procedure for parallel imports in the strict sense, or to use the simplified procedure 
as a vehicle for the free movement of pharmaceutical products in general. The ECJ 
was given an opportunity in Kohlpharma^^ The facts were as follows. 
Jumex was a medicinal product authorised in Italy, and Movergan was a medicinal 
product authorised in Germany. The connection between the two products was that 
the same Hungarian producer supplied the active ingredient used in both. 
Kohlpharma, a German parallel importer, applied for a PIL for Jumex, relying on 
Movergan as the reference product. The German authorities refused the PIL, citing 
a lack o f common origin between the two products as the main reason. 
Kohlpharma claimed that the principle in Smith & Nephew^'^ should apply. I f the 
possibility of a common origin is ruled out solely on the ground that the companies 
are joined by a supply agreement, and not a licensing agreement, as in Smith &. 
Nephew^ pharmaceutical undertakings could effectively prevent parallel imports 
by replacing licensing agreements with supply agreements. 
The ECJ agreed, applying a pro-integration view to the facts. The crucial issue in 
Smith & Nephew,^'^ according to the ECJ, was not whether there was a common 
origin. The Court in Smith & Nephew^^ stated that the provisions of Directive 
2001/83/EC^^ concerning the procedure for issue of marketing authorisations cannot 
apply to a case such as de Peijper'' where the two products under examination were 
' in every respect' identical."^ The Court, in Smith & Nephew^'^ later added; 
'moreover, the proprietary medicinal products at issue 'm...[de Peijper] had been 
Case C-112/02 Kohlpharma GmbH v. Germany [2004] E . C . R . 3369 




26 N. 5 above. 
" N. 8 above. 
Case C-201/94, n. 7 above, paras. 21-23. 
''.bid 
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manufactured by the same group of companies and therefore had a common 
origin.'^*' This implies that a 'common origin' is not a decisive factor, but can 
strengthen the finding that the goods are essentially identical, i f all other criteria are 
fulfilled.^' 
This suggests that the primary purpose is to protect public health and safety.^^ The 
Court, in Kohlpharma^^ therefore drew the conclusion that public health and safety 
is protected i f a product complies with the same safety and efficacy standards to a 
product already benefiting from a marketing authorisation. National authorities 
should use all available information, including information available through 
cooperation with authorities in other Member States.^ "* 
I f the primary purpose is to protect public health and safety, and that requirement is 
fulf i l led by way of showing that the products are 'essenrially identical,' the 
requirement of a 'common origin' w i l l not be decisive in determining whether to 
grant a PIL.^^ However, it may constitute an important 'aspect in establishing that 
such is the case.' 
A PIL can therefore not be precluded solely on the ground that there is no 'common 
origin' between the product for which an application is sought and the reference 
medicinal product, where;^' 
a) the application is submitted with reference to a medicinal product which 
already benefits from a marketing authorisation; 
°^ Case C-201/94, n. 7 above, para. 24. 
'^ Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-112/02, n. 21 above, paras. 56-58. 
-^ Supported by Article 2 of the Preamble to Directive 2001/83, n. 5 above: 'The essential aim of any 
rules governing the production, distribution and use of medicinal products must be to safeguard 
public health.' 
" N . 2 1 above. 
ibid., para. 20. 
ibid., para. 15. 
ibid., para. 17. 
" ibid., para. 21. 
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b) the medicinal product for which a licence is sought is imported from a 
Member State in which it already benefits from a marketing authorisation, 
and; 
c) the safety and efficacy assessment carried out for the reference marketing 
authorisation can be used in the application for a PIL for the applicant 
product without any risk to public health and safety.^^ 
Following Kohlpharma^'^ a common origin between the parallel imported 
pharmaceutical product and the reference product cannot be a decisive factor for the 
granfing of a PIL. However, it should be noted that the ECJ has not yet ruled on 
facts where no common origin, however remote, exists. There was a common 
origin, to a certain extent, in de Peijper,^^ Smith & Nephew,and Kohlpharma!^^ 
Even though the Court used different reasoning in Kohlpharma,^^ it did not overturn 
any earlier rulings, but merely expanded the definition of 'common origin.' A PIL 
has not been denied solely on the ground of an absence of 'common origin,' and has 
not been granted in absence of a 'common origin' however remote, either before or 
after Kohlpharmaf'^ A 'common origin' therefore remains highly relevant. I f there 
is a total lack of 'common origin' between the parallel imported product and the 
reference marketing authorisation it w i l l be hard to prove that the products are 
'essentially identical.' It is therefore an advantage for the parallel importer i f he can 
demonstrate a common origin between the two products. 
However, the law is characterised by imcertainty. This disturbing tendency of the 
ECJ to act as lawmaker rather than interpreter, by departing from previous rulings 
without an explanation as in Kohlpharma,^^ should give food for thought."^ In Smith 
Case C-112/02, n. 21 above, para. 21. 
^' ibid 
""N. 9 above. 






& Nephew^^ and de Peijper,^^ the ECJ acknowledged the importance of the 
common origin test, but sought to expand it. By merely considering 'common 
origin' to be an additional condition to 'essentially identical' in Kohlpharma,^'^ the 
ECJ failed to realise the importance o f a 'common origin.' It is precisely because 
parallel imports satisfy the 'common origin' test that the simplified procedure for 
parallel imported medicinal products was implemented. I f 'essentially identical' 
were the only relevant test, a generic product could be imported f rom a Member 
State where the data period has expired into a Member State where the data 
protection period has not yet expired, subject to the two products being 'essentially 
identical.'^° This would undermine the abridged procedure for generic products.^' 
Conversely, it is important not to confuse the 'essentially identical' test under the 
simplified procedure with the 'essentially similar' test under the abridged 
procedure, as this would eradicate the purpose of the simplified procedure for 
parallel imported products.^^ I f products do not need to share an obvious 'common 
origin,' the conditions and requirements that need to be ful f i l led in order for two 
products to be considered 'essentially identical' must be discussed. 
2. 'Essentially identical' 
A PIL w i l l only be granted i f the national Medicines Control Agency already has 
access to the product characteristics and results of clinical trials, having previously 
granted a marketing authorisation for the same pharmaceutical product. Otherwise 
the trade could not be classified as parallel imports. However, this gives the 
See O. Lemaire, 'Regulatory data protection: From essential similarity to not dissimilar?,' 
(2003/2004) 5 B.S .L.R. 197 
" 'N. 7 above. 
N. 9 above. 48 
'"N.21 above. 
See O. Lemaire and M. Meulenbelt, ' Adalat and Kohlpharma - where now for parallel trade in the 
European Union,' (2004) R.A.J. 499, 504. 
'^ See A. Wearing, 1. Kirby, M. Kerckhove and W. Vodra, 'Parallel trade in the E U and US 
pharmaceutical markets,' (2004/05) PLC Global Counsel Life Sciences Handbook 117, 118. See also 
chapter 3(2.3) above, and section 2.1 below, for further discussion of the definition of 'essentially 
similar' and the abridged procedure for generic pharmaceutical products. 
See S. Kon and F. Schaeffer, 'Parallel imports of pharmaceutical products: A new realism, or back 
to basics,' (1997) 18 E . C . L . R . 123, 142 for a further discussion of the need to maintain the 
distinction between the two tests. See also section 2.1 below. 
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reference marketing authorisation holder a potential leeway to differentiate 
pharmaceutical products, i.e. produce slightly different variations of the same 
pharmaceutical product for different Member States. The ECJ has therefore 
clarified that the variations o f a pharmaceutical product are only to be classified as 
different where the documentation concerning the particulars (in the Medicines 
Control Agency's possession) of the variations shows that the differences w i l l result 
in a different therapeutic effect." 
Smith & Nephew clarified the meaning of 'essentially identical,' establishing that 
the products 'need not be identical in all respects,' but should at least be 
manufactured according to the same formulation, using the same active ingredient, 
and have the same therapeutic effects.^'* I f the products are not considered 
'essentially identical,' the parallel imported product must apply for a marketing 
authorisation under the normal procedure. This is reflected in the MHRA's 
guidelines stating that the parallel imported product should 'have no differences, 
having therapeutic effect, from a product covered by a U K [marketing 
authorisation].'^^ 
2.1 'Essentially identical' ox 'essentially similar' 
A common mistake is to confuse the 'essentially similar' criteria under the abridged 
procedure for generic products with the 'essentially identical' criteria under the 
simplified procedure. The two concepts therefore require clarification before a 
detailed definition of 'essentially identical' can be carried out. 
" Case 104/75, n. 9 above. 
N. 7 above, para. 26. See also Commission Communication (2003), n. 4 above, 5. 
" MAL2(P1), n. 1 above, para. 4(e); and MHRA (unofficial), n. 1 above, para 6(d). 
The 'abridged' procedure and the concept of 'essentially similar' are discussed in chapter 3(2.3) 
above. Chapter 3(3.1-3.2) above discussed the origins and workings of the 'simplified procedure' for 
parallel imported products. The abridged procedure allows for a speedier application procedure for 
generic products, resulting in the granting of a valid marketing authorisation. The simplified 
procedure, however, results in a P I L , as the product is not a copy (i.e. generic) but identical to the 
reference product, and thus already benefits from a marketing authorisation. 
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Article 10 of Directive 2001/83/EC (as amended) defines, for the purpose of the 
abridged marketing authorisation procedure that a 'generic medicinal product' 
'shall mean a medicinal product which has the same qualitative and quantitative 
composition in terms of active substances and the same pharmaceutical form as the 
reference medicinal product, and whose bioequivalence with the reference 
medicinal product has been demonstrated by appropriate bioavailability studies.'" 
This concerns generic products applying for a marketing authorisation using the 
abridged procedure. However, the Article serves as a good guideline for 
determining whether a parallel imported product is 'essentially identical' to a 
reference product.^* As the objective of Directive 2001/83^^ and the rules governing 
national Medicines Control Agencies when issuing marketing authorisations is to 
protect public health and safety,^" the conditions to be fulf i l led by parallel imported 
products in order to be considered 'essentially identical' need not be more stringent 
than for generic products to be considered 'essentially similar.' 
The case-law surrounding the abridged procedure's 'essentially similar' test can 
therefore serve as guidance. However, it must be remembered that these two tests 
should not be confused. Only the conditions under the 'essentially identical' test can 
be defined by the case-law surrounding the 'essentially similar' test as the latter test 
does need to be more stringent. The main objective may be to protect public health, 
but the simplified procedure exists to licence a product which already benefits from 
a marketing authorisation for importation,^' whilst the purpose of the abridged 
procedure is to issue a new marketing authorisation for a product similar to an 
existing marketing authorisation 62 
" N . 5 above. Art. 10(2)(b). See also chapter 3(2.3) above. 
It does not, however, mean that the two tests are related or apply to the same products. This 
comparison only serves as an exercise in order to understand and define the 'essentially identical' 
test. 
" N. 5 above. 
'° See n. 32 above; and Case 94/98, n. 2 above, para, 40. 
" See chapter 3(3.1) above. 
" See chapter 3(2.3) above. 
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2.2 The definition of 'essentially identical' 
The two products must have the same therapeutic effect in order to be considered 
'essentially identical.'^^ The therapeutic effect is the effect the drug has on the body 
- i.e. the extent to which it cures a disease. This condition is closely linked to the 
condition concerning 'active ingredients' and the same 'pharmaceutical 
formulation.'^'* In fact, the three criteria are closely interlinked. I f the products have 
the same pharmaceutical formulation it is very likely that they w i l l have the same 
active ingredients, and w i l l most likely have the same therapeutic effect. 
The active ingredient is the part of the product that provides the effect intended by 
the manufacturer - a chemical reaction creating the desired effect within the body. 
It is the primary ingredient in a medicine, all other ingredients only serve to assist 
the active ingredient when creating the therapeutic effect intended. In 
Kohlpharma,^^ the common ground between the two products was the active 
ingredient, produced by the same producer. This suggests that the 'same active 
ingredient' is the core criterion in 'essentially identical.' I f two products are 
considered to contain the same active ingredients, it is likely that the active 
ingredients have to contain the same chemically active compound (quality), and 
possess the same strength (quantitatively). 
In SmithKline Beecham v. Laegemiddelstyrelsen,^^ the ECJ discussed to what extent 
the products require the same composition of 'active ingredients' in order to be 
considered 'essentially similar' under the abridged application procedure.^^ The 
ECJ distinguished between the therapeutically active part of an active substance and 
the active substance itself. The active substance of the drug in question could be 
" Case 104/75, n. 9 above; and Case C-201/94, n. 7 above, para. 26. See Communication (2003), n. 
4 above, 5. 
" Case C-201/94, ibid., para. 26. 
" N . 21 above. 
" Case C-74/03 SmithKline Beecham Pic v. Laegemiddelstyrelsen [2005] E . C . R . 595. See also E U F 
(ed.), 'Products may be essentially similar with same active substance in different salts,' (2005) 159 
E U F 19. 
See chapter 3(2.3) above on the abridged application procedure. 
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divided into two groups - the active moiety and the salt. According to the ECJ, 
neither Article 4(8)(a(iii) of Directive 65/65/EEC^^ nor the Court's judgment in 
Generics,preclude two products from being at least 'essentially similar' despite 
the fact that their active ingredients contain different salts, as long as the active 
moiety of both products is identical.'*^ When considering whether two products are 
'essentially similar,' it is more realistic to base that enquiry on the therapeutic effect 
than on the precise molecular structure of the active ingredients.^' 
In Smith & Nephew, the Court stated that the products should at least have been 
manufactured according to the same formulation, using the same active ingredients, 
in order to be considered 'essentially identical.'^" The most likely meaning of this 
phrase, in light of the above discussion of 'essentially similar,' is that the products 
should have been manufactured according to the same formulation in terms of the 
active ingredient, not the same formulation and the same active ingredients. The 
core definition is therefore that of 'active ingredient,' on the condition that the 
products have the same therapeutic effect. 
The question is therefore whether the active ingredient includes all the substances 
of the chemical compound, or only the active moiety in line with SmithKline 
Beecham^^ I f the definition is to include all parts of the 'active ingredient' this is 
likely to include the 'excipients' as well. 'Excipients' are substances used as 
diluents or a vehicle for a drug. Naturally, it is hard to differentiate between the 
'composition of active ingredients' and 'excipients' as they often complement each 
other to such an extent that they become almost indistinguishable. However, Rhone-
Council Directive 65/65/EEC on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action relating to proprietary medicinal products [1965] O.J. 22/369: Replaced by 
Directive 2001/83, n. 5 above. 
*'Case C-368/96 R. v. Licensing Authority, ex parte Generics [1998] E . C . R . 7967. 
Case C-74/03, n. 66 above, para. 34. See also Directive 2001/83, n. 5 above, Art. 10(2)(b), which 
provides that the different salts, ethers, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes or derivatives of an 
active substance shall be considered to be the same active substance unless they differ significantly 
in properties with regard to safety and efficacy. 
" ibid., paras. 35 and 44. 
" N. 7 above, paras. 25-26; and Case C-94/98, n. 2 above, para. 28. 
" N. 66 above. 
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Poulenc RoreP'^ provided useful guidance on the definition of 'essentially identical' 
in terms of active ingredients and excipients. The basic facts were as follows. 
In 1989 and 1993 the M H R A granted a marketing authorisation to M & B for 
'Zimovane.' M & B appointed Rhone-Poulenc Rorer as their sole agent. After more 
than three years of additional research, Rhone-Poulenc Rorer developed a new, 
improved, version of 'Zimovane.' The new version contained the same active 
ingredients and had the same therapeutic effect, but was manufactured by a 
different manufacturing process and used different excipients which allegedly 
provided a particular benefit to public health compared with the old version. Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer applied to the MHRA for a variation to the marketing authorisation 
for Zimovane. The M H R A allowed the variation and subsequently, at the request of 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, revoked the old marketing authorisation for the original 
Zimovane. The relevant question was whether the new and old version of Zimovane 
could be considered 'essentially identical' for the purpose of the appended PIL. 
The ECJ, referring to Smith & Nephew^^ ruled that in order to ascertain whether 
imports of a pharmaceutical product constitute parallel imports the competent 
authority must verify that the products, i f not identical in all respects, 'have at least 
been manufactured according to the same formulation, using the same active 
ingredient, and have the same therapeutic effect.''^ However, Rhone-Poulenc Rorer 
argued that the condition of 'manufactured according to the same formulation' was 
not met, both in relation to active ingredients and exc ip ien ts .The Court agreed 
that all components of the product - including the excipients - are important to its 
quality, efficacy, and safety, and form part of the reference marketing 
authorisation's product summary as required under Article 4(a) o f Directive 
65/65/EEC.^^ 
' • • N . 2 above. 
' ' N . 7 above. 
X a s e C-94/98, n. 2 above, para. 28. 
' ibid., para. 31. 
' ibid., para. 33. Directive 65/65, n. 68 above. 
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However, according to the Court, it is also true that changes in excipients do not 
normally alter the products therapeutic effect. ' ' Nevertheless, it is still possible for a 
parallel imported product, containing the same active ingredients and having the 
same therapeutic effect, but not using the same excipients as the reference product, 
to show marked differences in terms of safety due to the effect on the product's 
shelf-life and bioavailability, ' for example in relation to the rates at which the 
medicinal product dissolves or is absorbed.'^^ Measuring the bioequivalence of two 
such products generally provides the best method of establishing therapeutic 
equivalence, since the excipients and the manufacturing method may have an 
impact on the bioavailability, i.e. the rate at which the body responds to the 
chemical compound.*' However, the possibility of such effects does not mean that 
national authorities may never issue a PIL in such a scenario, since a change in 
excipients does not normally affect safety.*" 
Consequently, national authorities must grant a PIL, in line with Community 
measures, when the parallel imported product has the same active ingredients (in 
terms of active moiety) and therapeutic effect as the reference medicinal product, 
but does not use the same excipients and is manufactured by a different process, 
where the competent national authority is able to verify that the parallel imported 
product complies with the requirements relating to 'quality, efficacy and safety in 
normal conditions of use and is in a position to ensure normal 
pharmacovigilance.'*^ This effectively took excipients out o f the 'essentially 
identical' test. 
"Case C-94/98, n. 2 above, para. 34. 
80 ibid., para. 43. 
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-368/96, n. 69 above, para. 37. 
'^ Case C-94/98, n. 2 above, para. 44. This is in contrast to the 'abridged application' procedure 
which, according to Directive 2001/83, n. 5 above. Art. 10(2)(b), requires that the bioequivalence 
with the reference medicinal product has been demonstrated by appropriate bioavailability studies. 
" Case C-94/98, n. 2 above, para. 48. This confirmed, or rather extended, the E C J ' s ruling in Case 
C-368/96, n. 69 above - a case which concerned the 'essentially similar' test for generic products - to 
parallel imported products under the simplified procedure. Following (C-368/96) Generics, a generic 
product is considered 'essentially similar' to a reference product despite differences in excipients, as 
long as the quality and efficacy is not compromised, and the products have the same composition in 
terms of active ingredients, the same pharmaceutical form, and are bioequivalents. 
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However, a change in excipients may have an impact on the product's 
characteristics, despite the two products having the same therapeutic effect.*"* In 
such a scenario, when the products only differ in respect of modified excipients, 
leading to e.g. improved temperature stability and thus making storage in the 
refrigerator unnecessary, two products can be considered 'essentially identical' as 
long as the quality and safety is not affected. It is for the national court to decide i f 
public health and safety is put at risk by allowing the two products to be marketed 
side by side simultaneously. 
This leads to the question whether two products can be considered 'essentially 
identical' i f they do not have the same pharmaceutical form. In the words of the 
Council of Europe under the auspices of the European Pharmacopoeia; 'the 
pharmaceutical form is the combinafion of the form in which a pharmaceutical 
product is presented by the manufacturer (form of presentation) and the form in 
which it is administered including the physical form (form of administration).'*^ 
Differences in terms of active substances and excipients are usually not visible to 
the human eye. The consumer would therefore not be able to tell that the products 
are not identical. However, i f two products (containing the same active ingredients 
and having the same therapeutic effects) can be considered 'essenfially idenfical' 
even though they do not have the same pharmaceutical form this would affect the 
consumer's view of the product. 
It should, however, be noted that case-law and Community measures do not 
mention pharmaceutical form in relation to PILs. It is therefore not an established 
condition for the purpose of showing that two products are 'essentially identical.' 
However, the 'same pharmaceutical form' is one of the 'core' conditions o f the 
abridged procedure's 'essentially similar' test,*^ as defined in Directive 
See Case C-172/00 Ferring GmbH v. Eurim-Pliarm GmbH [2002] E . C . R . 6891. 
European Directorate for the Quality of Medicines (EDQM), List of standard terms, 5"" ed., 
( E D Q M : 2004). See also Advocate General Ruiz Jarabo Colomer in Case C-368/96, n. 69 above, 
para. 37. 
See chapter 3(2.3) above on the abridged procedure. 
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2001/83/EC^' and Generics^^ It is possible for two products to contain the same 
active moiety and have the same therapeutic effect even though they have different 
pharmaceutical forms. The 'change in form' is usually due to a change in excipients 
and/or design carried out to facilitate the transportation through the body. The 
question therefore remains whether a product would be considered 'essentially 
identical' to a reference product with a different pharmaceutical form upon the first 
granting o f a PIL.^^ Following Rhone-Poulenc Rorer^^ it seems as i f the answer 
would be positive; even though a different form could entail a different 
pharmaceutical formulation this does not always preclude the finding of 'essentially 
identical.' This presumption is further supported by recent case-law concerning the 
abridged marketing authorisation procedure for generic products, which can serve 
as a guideline for the simplified procedure. In Approved Prescription Services LtcP^ 
the ECJ held that an abridged marketing authorisation can be granted for a product 
C, even though the reference product B is a line extension of product A , 'but has a 
different pharmaceutical form from product A or is otherwise not essentially similar 
to product A within the meaning of Article 10(l)(iii) '^^ o f Directive 2001/83/EC.^^ 
In conclusion, it can be said that two products wi l l be considered 'essentially 
identical' i f they have the same therapeutic effects. In order to have the same 
therapeutic effects, the products must possess the same active ingredients, in 
particular the same active moiety. The excipients need not be identical, i f it can be 
shown that the difference in excipients does not affect quality and safety assurance. 
The implication is that it is not unlikely that two products could be considered 
' ' N . 5 above. 
^*N. 69 above, para. 36. 
^' Incidentally, PlLs have been allowed to remain valid even in circumstances where the reference 
marketing authorisation is withdrawn and replaced by a new marketing authorisation for a product 
with a different pharmaceutical form than the parallel imported version. See Case C-15/01 Paranova 
AB V. Ldkemedelsverket [2003] E . C . R . 1-4175, and Case C - I H / O l Paranova Oy [2003] E.C.R. 
4243. This will be further discussed in section 3 below. 
' ° N . 2 above. 
" Case C-36/03 Approved Prescription Services Ltd v. Licensing Authority [2004] E . C . R . 11583 
^'ibid., para. 16 
" N . 5 above. See chapter 3(2.3) above. 
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'essentially identical' even i f they have different pharmaceutical forms, and possess 
different storage requirements. 
The ECJ has therefore expanded the definition of 'parallel imported' as set out in de 
Peijper?^ The PIL system has moved away from being a system for strictly parallel 
imported products to 'essentially identical' products that do not necessarily need to 
share a common origin with the reference products. Slight differences between the 
imported version and the reference products were allowed in order to preclude 
manufacturers from segmenting the Community market along national lines by 
marketing slightly different pharmaceutical products throughout the Community. 
Unfortunately, it now seems as i f the 'simplified procedure,' by allowing for a lack 
of common origin and differences in the pharmaceutical formulation, has been 
relaxed so as to create an authorisation procedure for imported products in general, 
sharing some similarities with a product already benefiting from a marketing 
authorisation, instead o f a licensing system strictly for the benefit of products 
imported in parallel. The effects this may have on public health and safety w i l l be 
further discussed below. 
However, potential risks to public health and safety may also occur when the two 
'essentially identical' products are sold simultaneously on the market, and in 
particular when the reference marketing authorisation is withdrawn and replaced by 
a marketing authorisation for a new and different, albeit improved, product. 
3. Withdrawal of the reference marketing authorisation 
Withdrawing a marketing authorisation by a pharmaceutical company is a common 
practice. It is often the result of having obtained marketing authorisation for an 
improved version of the product, rendering the marketing authorisation for the old 
version superfluous. It can also be done for reason of profit maximisation as it is 
easier to market a product when the old version is no longer available. A new 
N. 9 above. 
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version o f a drug can recover costs spent on 'research and development' (R&D) by 
income from the period of exclusivity granted by patent protection. I f the old 
version is allowed to coexist on the market the profit derived firom exclusivity w i l l 
not be maximised. Thus, pharmaceutical companies are not interested in continuing 
to market the old version, and do not want parallel importers to market the old 
version alongside the new version. 
Withdrawing a marketing authorisation can also be a response to public health and 
safety concerns. The competent nadonal authority may revoke the marketing 
authorisation i f marketing of the product may pose a risk to public health and 
safety. Likewise, the holder may decide to voluntarily withdraw the marketing 
authorisation i f continuous marketing of the product is likely to harm the public's 
perception of the product and the goodwill of the manufacturer. 
Paragraph 12 of the MHRA's MAL2(PI) established that a PIL continues in force 
only as long as the reference U K marketing authorisation to which it is linked 
remain in force. I f it ceases to be valid for any reason (for example, through 
expiration or revocation) the PIL also ceases to be valid. 
Revoking the PIL as a result of the revocation of the reference marketing 
authorisation by the national Medicines Control Agency on grounds of public health 
and safety can be justified under Article 30 EC Treaty. I f the product under the 
reference marketing authorisation presents a risk to public health and safety, so wi l l 
the product under the PIL. However, revoking the PIL upon the mere withdrawal of 
the reference marketing authorisation (by its holder) w i l l obstruct the free 
movement of goods under Article 28 EC Treaty, and cannot be justified under 
Article 30 EC Treaty, since marketing of the parallel imported product presents no 
risk to public health and safety.^^ Similarly, in Ferring,'^^ the ECJ noted that the 
'^MAL2(PI) , n. 1 above, para. 12. 
" See Case C-94/98, n. 2 above, para. 48. The MHRA (unofficial), n. 1 above, has been amended so 
as to take into account this (and subsequent) case-law by adding that: ' I f a marketing authorisation is 
withdrawn, it may be possible to continue to market the product in the U K , but only if 'the [PIL] 
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withdrawal of the reference marketing authorisation does not mean that the safety 
and quality o f the product has been called into question. In fact, the products 
continue to be marketed in the Member State of exportation.'* Therefore, when the 
reference marketing authorisation is withdrawn for reasons other than the protection 
of public health, the automatic cessation of the linked PIL cannot be just i f ied. ' ' 
The fact that it is not the act of withdrawal by the marketing authorisation holder 
that is questioned, but the act of the State-regulated Medicines Control Agency 
when revoking the PIL, supports the argument that national Medicines Control 
Agencies, when granting PILs, may not restrict duration of the PIL until the expiry 
date of the reference marketing authorisation. The expiry of a PIL, for reasons not 
relating to health and safety, at a time when the reference marketing authorisation 
remains valid, should have the same effect on the free movement o f goods as a 
revocation. 
Conversely, withdrawing the marketing authorisation in the Member State of 
exportation w i l l have the same effect on the free movement of goods. I f the supply 
chain is broken, this wi l l prevent intra-Community trade. However, the difference is 
that it w i l l be difficult to link this restriction to a State measure, as the Member 
State w i l l not be responsible for the revocation o f the PIL. It is however possible 
that the marketing authorisation holder could be liable under competition law, i f 
intending to prevent parallel t r a d e . I t w i l l be interesting to note the ECJ's and the 
Commission's reaction to such a situation. 
satisfies the strict criteria that the [ECJ] have set for the survival of [PILs] in these circumstances. 
Otherwise, the [PIL] will automatically fall:' (para. 13). 
N. 84 above. By way of an Article 234 E C Treaty reference from a German Court, the E C J was 
asked to rule upon the conformity of a law demanding that all PILs have to be automatically revoked 
upon the withdrawal of the reference marketing authorisation with Articles 28 and 30 E C Treaty: see 
p. 132 below. 
ibid., para 36. 
ibid., para 33. 
'°°See Commission Communication (2003), n. 4 above, 17. 
'°' See Commission Decision COMP/A.37.507/F3-AstraZeneca of 15 July 2005 ((not yet reported, 
but a non-confidential version is available on D G Competition's website:<http://ec.europa.eu/comm/ 
competition/index_en.html>); and Commission Press Release IP/05/737. The decision has been 
appealed: Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca AB v. Commission [2005] O.J. C271/47. The Commission 
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However, a voluntarily-withdrawn marketing authorisation is normally replaced by 
a new marketing authorisation for a new, improved product. I f the national 
Medicines Control Agency considers the new and old versions to be 'essentially 
identical,' it w i l l append the PIL to the new marketing authorisation. By doing this, 
the national Medicines Control Agency in effect avoids the 'question of lawfulness 
in the light of free movement of goods of the automatic revocation of PILs as a 
result of the revocation of a parent authorisation at the request of the holder of that 
authorisation.' '°" 
If , however, the PIL is not appended to the new marketing authorisation, but is 
nevertheless allowed to remain in force; the Member State Medicines Control 
Agency is not required to take into consideration that the new version of the product 
may provide a particular public benefit to public health, and that this may not be 
achieved i f the two products are allowed to be sold simultaneously on the market."^'' 
The safety of the old version is not being questioned considering that the old 
version is still marketed in other Member States, not least the exporting Member 
State. Revoking the PIL in such circumstances may only lead to a loss of benefit to 
public health, as opposed to creating a risk to public health. However, there may be 
a risk to public health i f consumers are likely to confuse the two versions. 
In Ferring,^^^ the ECJ ruled that ' i f it is demonstrated that there is in fact a risk to 
public health arising from the coexistence o f two versions of the same 
pharmaceutical product on the market in a Member State such a risk may justify 
fined AstraZeneca €60 million for, inter alia, 'misusing rules and procedures applied by the national 
Medicines Control Agencies which issue market authorisations for medicines by selectively 
deregistering the marketing authorisations for Losec .wi th the intent of blocking or delaying entry 
by generic firms and parallel traders;' (Press release, above). Thus, withdrawing marketing 
authorisations, with the intention of blocking parallel imports, infringes Article 82 E C Treaty if the 
undertaking holds a dominant position. This shows that competition law is a relevant factor. 
However, subsequent changes in the E U legislation have made it impossible to repeat the specific 
conduct. See the below discussion on Cases C-15/01 and C-113/01, n. 89 above. It should be noted 
that the decision concerned the withdrawal of marketing authorisations on the importing market, and 
not on the exporting market as discussed in this paragraph. See chapter 2, pp. 70-72 above, for 
further discussion of this Commission Decision and Article 82 E C Treaty. 
'"-Case C-94/98, n. 2 above, para. 39. 
'"zW£f.,para.48. 
' " " N . 84 above. See n. 97 above for the facts of the case. 
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restrictions on the importation of the old version of the pharmaceutical product in 
consequence of the withdrawal o f the marketing authorisation o f reference by the 
holder thereof in relation to that market. ' '°^ The difference between the new and old 
version (still being parallel imported) in Fem'«g'°^ was that the old version needed 
to be stored in a cool place in order to preserve its therapeutic qualities, whereas the 
improved thermostatibility of the new version means that i t can be stored at room 
temperature. As a result, is it relevant to the ruling that marketing the two products 
simultaneously means that there is a danger of incorrect storage of the 'old ' version, 
which may have consequences to public health and safety? 
I f it can be demonstrated that there is a risk to public health arising from the 
coexistence of the new and old versions, such a risk may just ify restrictions on the 
old version.'*'^ It is for the competent national authorities to determine whether the 
coexistence of the two versions poses a risk to public health and safety. Mere 
reliance on the reference marketing authorisation holder's assertion cannot justify 
such a prohibition.'*^^ In consequence, the national court must apply the principle of 
proportionality. For example, it may be possible to avert this risk by adequate 
labelling, or by providing relevant information to patients and pharmaceutical 
dispensers. 
Shortly after F e m r t g , " ° the ECJ was faced with similar facts in the related cases of 
Paranova Oy ' ' and Paranova AB}^^ Astra held the Swedish and Finnish marketing 
authorisations for Losec ENTERO, notably the best-selling pharmaceutical product 
in the world. Astra improved the product and applied for marketing authorisations 
Case C-172/00, n. 84 above, para 46. 
a '"'ibid, 
'"'ibid, para. 43. 
'"^ ibid., para. 44. 
ibid., para. 45. On the facts, however, the ECJ thought it conceivable that adequate labelling 
would not suffice to avert this risk. 
""N. 84 above. 
'"Case C-113/01, n. 89 above. 
Case C-15/01, n. 89 above. For a thorough discussion of both cases, see F. Wiraeus, 
'Parallellimport och forsaljning av lakemedel - fallet Losec,' Examanesarbete, University of Lund 
(2000). 
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in Sweden and Finland for the new variant, called Losec MUPS. The difference 
between the two variants is that ENTERO comes in the form of capsules with 
omeprazole acid as the active ingredient, whilst MUPS is in the pharmaceutical 
form of tablets with the active ingredient consisting of magnesium salt of 
omeprazole acid. The tablet was made up by thousands of small grains, each having 
a diameter of 0.5 mm, whilst the capsule consists of one hundred small grains with 
a diameter of 0.7 - 1.6 mm. Moreover, the tablets and capsules differ in size and 
colour. As a result o f introducing a new variant, Astra Oy and Hassle withdrew 
the marketing authorisations for Losec ENTERO in Sweden and Finland. In 
response, the relevant national Medicines Control Agencies (the Swedish and 
Finnish Lakemedelsverket) notified the holders of the PILs for Losec ENTERO that 
the PILs would cease to be valid as a result of the withdrawal of the reference 
marketing authorisations. Paranova appealed against the Agencies decisions, 
subsequently resulting in an Article 234 EC Treaty referral to the ECJ by the 
Swedish Supreme Court. 
The ECJ ruled, in line with Femng,"" that Articles 28 and 30 preclude national 
legislation under which the withdrawal of the reference marketing authorisation 
entails the withdrawal of the PIL."^ However, partly as a consequence of the 
differences between the two products, the important parts of these rulings concern 
the issue o f pharmacovigilance, since as a consequence of the withdrawal of the 
marketing authorisation for the old version of the product, the previous marketing 
authorisation holder would not be under an obligafion to submit the information 
necessary to carry out effective pharmacovigilance. Due to the differences between 
the two products it was even more important to monitor their safety; individually as 
well as the potential consequences of allowing the two products to be sold side-by-
side. However, despite these obstacles, the ECJ considered that adequate 
pharmacovigilance can still be effectively carried out, even though certain 
information may have to be requested f rom the parallel importer. 
Wiraeus, n. 112 above, 24. 
' " N . 84 above. 
'' ^  Case C-15/01, n. 89 above, para. 3 3. 
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Pharmacovigilance satisfying Directive 75/319"^ can be guaranteed by requesting 
information and documentation from national authorities in the Member States 
where the products are still marketed and benefiting from a marketing 
authorisation,"' in line wi th the decision in de Peyper"* when establishing the 
simplified procedure. The 'Note for Guidance on Procedure for competent 
Authorities on the Undertaking of Pharmacovigilance Act iv i t i e s ' " ' requires 
information to be submitted to a database using international or mutually 
recognisable codes and languages, so as to ensure effective pharmacovigilance 
accessible for all Member State authorities throughout the C o m m u n i t y . E f f e c t i v e 
pharmacovigilance can therefore be achieved by cooperation with other Member 
States. Information necessary to maintain an effective pharmacovigilance system 
w i l l still be obtainable since the product is still marketed in other Member States. 
However, this does not preclude specific reasons relating to the protection of public 
health and safety which may justify the withdrawal of a PIL, in line with Ferring}^^ 
First, it can be argued that this 'forced cooperation' may have a positive side-effect 
on integration. By leaving the PIL valid following the withdrawal of the reference 
marketing authorisation, the ECJ forces Member State Medicines Control Agencies 
to rely solely on information provided by agencies in other Member States. In 
consequence, it encourages Member States into stronger co-operation, as well as 
indicating that licences based on separate national procedures are no longer 
sufficient to satisfy Community integration and public health. 
Secondly, the Paranova cases may, as discussed in section 2.2 above, have an 
impact on the definition of 'essentially identical.' Losec ENTERO and Losec 
MUPS differ in terms o f active ingredients. It may be argued that the products have 
"^Council Directive 75/319/EEC on the approximation of provisions laid down by Law, Regulation 
or Administrative Action relating to proprietary medicinal products [1975] O.J. LI47/13. 
'"Case C-15/01, n. 89 above, para. 28. 
' " N . 9 above. 
The European Medicines Agency ( E M E A ) , 'Note for Guidance on Procedure for competent 
Authorities on the Undertaking of Pharmacovigilance Activities,' (CPMP/PhVWP/175/95 Rev. 1). 
""Case C-15/01, n. 89 above, para. 29. 
' - 'N . 84 above. 
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the same active ingredient, and the difference lay in the excipients used. 
Nevertheless, the products differ in terms of 'pharmaceutical form.' However, it 
should be noted that the cases were concerned with the revocation of PILs, and so 
may not have an impact on the definition of 'essentially identical' per se. The PILs 
were not appended to the new marketing authorisations, as in Rhone-Poulenc,^^^ but 
were merely allowed to co-exist with the new marketing authorisations. I f the 
products had been appended to the new marketing authorisations, this would de 
facto have confirmed that the two products were 'essentially identical' despite 
having different pharmaceutical forms.'^^ Nevertheless, the practical effect of the 
two rulings mean that a parallel imported version may be sold alongside a reference 
product having a different 'pharmaceutical form,' thus strengthening the theory that 
the ECJ would rule that the 'same pharmaceutical form' is not part of the definition 
of the term 'essentially identical,' should it be asked to rule on this question in the 
future. 
The rules regarding the revocation of PILs as a response to the withdrawal of the 
reference marketing authorisation can therefore be summarised as follows; 
- Articles 28 and 30 EC Treaty preclude national legislation under which the 
withdrawal of the reference product marketing authorisation on application of 
the holder entails the automatic cessation of the PIL for that product;'^^ 
- the fact that a new version of the product has been put on the national market 
and is also found in other Community markets does not alter this outcome;'^ ^ 
- However, those provisions do not apply i f there is a risk to public health and 
safety by allowing the two products to coexist on the market. 127 
N. 2 above. 
See section 2.2 above 
124 See ibid., and in particular Case C-36/03, n. 91 above, para. 16, concerning the 'same 
pharmaceutical form' in the context of the abridged marketing authorisation. 
'"Case C-172/00, n. 84 above, para 46; Case C-15/01, n. 89 above, para. 33; and C-113/01, n. 89 
above, para 34. 
'^*Case C-172/00, ibid., para 46. 
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4. Conclusion and analysis 
Following de Peijper^^^ and the ECJ's subsequent case-law concerning the 
simplified procedure, there are no real obstacles remaining for parallel importers in 
relation to marketing authorisations. The definition of 'parallel imported' is very 
generous, and manufacturers can no longer prevent parallel imports by withdrawing 
reference marketing authorisations. The question is instead whether the ECJ has in 
fact adopted a stronger pro-integration policy than is necessary in order to establish 
a common market, and whether this can be justified despite the ensuing risks to 
public health and safety. 
The de Peijper^^ case was equally important to the development of parallel trade in 
pharmaceutical products as the case-law establishing the 'exhaustion of rights' 
principle in relation to intellectual property rights, which will be discussed in the 
next chapter.'^ "^  By establishing a simplified procedure for parallel imported 
pharmaceutical products in order to allow for the importation of products 
'essentially identical' to products which already benefit from a marketing 
authorisation the ECJ, in essence, created an 'exhaustion of rights' principle for 
marketing authorisations. In order to preclude marketing authorisation holders from 
preventing parallel trade in their products by marketing slightly different variations 
throughout the Community, the ECJ held that it would be sufficient i f the parallel 
imported product and the reference product are 'essentially identical.' In theory, this 
system does not constitute a risk to public health and safety since the information 
relating to the pharmaceutical product is already in the relevant national Medicines 
Control Agency's possession as a result of the reference marketing authorisation 
application. 
Case C-172/00, n. 84 above, para. 46; and Case C-15/01, n. 89 above, paras. 31-32. 
'-^ N. 9 above. See chapter 3(3.1) above. 
''-'ibid. 
™ See chapter 5 below. 
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However, the ECJ's pro-integration policy has lead to a system whereby the two 
products, albeit being 'essentially identical,' need not have a common origin and 
the PIL cannot be revoked even after the withdrawal of the reference marketing 
authorisation. The definition of 'essentially identical' has also expanded to 
encompass a difference in excipients and, possibly, pharmaceutical form. This has 
eradicated the initial purpose of the simplified procedure. It seems as i f the 
procedure has turned into a fifth procedure for marketing authorisations allowing 
for a speedier procedure for imported pharmaceutical products being closely linked 
to the abridged procedure.'^' 
It is likely that this was not the intention of the ECJ when establishing the 
simplified procedure in de Peijper}^'^ The Court's intention was to establish a 
procedure which enables 'parallel importation' in the term's historical and true 
meaning, and not for 'normally imported' products, even though they are 
'essentially identical' to products which already benefit from marketing 
authorisations. Products that fi t this description should use the abridged application 
procedure when applying for marketing authorisation. 
The current system can indirectly risk public health and safety. Member State 
Medicines Control Agencies will find it harder to carry out effective 
pharmacovigilance when all the information is not in their hands and they have to 
cooperate with agencies in other Member States in order to find the information and 
particulars that cover the differences between the reference product and the parallel 
imported product. This may be positive for the integration of the single market, 
forcing Member States to cooperate, but it will also lead to an increasing risk of 
errors by national Medicines Control Agencies when carrying out 
pharmacovigilance due to the extra workload associated with cooperation. 
See chapter 3(2.3) above on the abridged procedure. 
N. 9 above. See chapter 3(3.1) above. 
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A solution would be to go back to the ruling in de Peijper}^^ The particulars and 
conditions could be laid down in Community measures, thus limiting the procedure 
to products imported in parallel. Products not originating from the same 
manufacturer, thus not having an absolutely common origin with the reference 
product, should be restricted to the abridged marketing authorisation procedure.'^'' 
But in order not to affect legal certainty, the best solution is to gradually make the 
Community marketing authorisation compulsory for more categories of 
pharmaceutical product. This would solve many problems for all three involved 
parties; the marketing authorisation holder, the parallel importer, and society at 
large, not to mention the Community which would benefit from the centralisation 
and further integration, which would result from only having one marketing 
authorisation procedure throughout the Community.'^^ Only one marketing 
authorisation would be needed, and a PIL would not be necessary. Once the 
marketing authorisation is withdrawn, parallel importation will not be possible. But 
since most withdrawn marketing authorisations are replaced by new marketing 
authorisations for similar products, parallel importation of the replacing product can 
commence instantly. As discussed in chapter 3 section 4, the wording of Regulation 
726/2004 indeed suggest that the Community marketing authorisation procedure 
may gradually become compulsory for more product groups.'^ ^ Unfortunately, 
however, the objections to such a reform may be difficult to overcome despite its 
many benefits.'^^ 
However, even though the parallel importer is eligible to apply for a parallel import 
licence under the current system, and indeed may be granted such a licence, the 
manufacturer may exercise the intellectual property rights linked to the 
pharmaceutical product to prevent such importation. Intellectual property right 
holders are therefore in theory capable of segmenting the common market along 
N. 9 above. 
See chapter 3(2.3) above. 
See chapter 3(4) above. 
See ibid.; and the Annex to Council Regulation ( E C ) 726/2004 laying down Community 
procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use 
and establishing a European Medicines Agency [2004] O.J. LI36/01. 
See chapter 3(4) above for discussion of the possible objections to such a reform. 
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national boundaries. The relationship between parallel trade and intellectual 
property rights, discussed in the next chapter, is therefore linked to the hurdle of 
marketing authorisations as successful parallel importation requires that the free 




PARALLEL TRADE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTED PRODUCTS AND REPACKAGING OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS 
C H A P T E R 5 
THE E C TREATY AND I N T E L L E C T U A L PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: THE 'EXHAUSTION OF RIGHTS' DOCTRINE 
Intellectual property rights are granted by national legislation conferring exclusive 
and territorial property rights upon the holders thereof. A typical pharmaceutical 
product is likely to benefit from a patent protection for its chemical composition, 
and a trademark affixed on its packaging. The latter will ensure to the holder of the 
trademark the goodwill associated with the product, and guarantee the origin of the 
trademarked product to consumers. Owing to the territorial nature of intellectual 
property rights, patent and trademark holders are capable of segmenting the 
common market along national borders. Some limited measures have been adopted 
by the Community, such as the Trade Mark Directive' providing for the grant of a 
trademark valid throughout the EEA. However, the debate as to whether national 
intellectual property rights are compatible with the EC Treaty was left to be 
resolved by the ECJ, resulting in the distinction between the 'existence' and the 
'exercise' of an intellectual property right. The former is protected by Article 295 
EC Treaty^ whilst the latter is subject to the severity of the free movement of goods 
and competition rules.^  This tension between national and Community law whereby 
the existence of national intellectual property rights is recognised but the 
' Council Directive 89/104 E E C to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade 
marks [1989] O.J. L40/1. 
" See introduction, p. 4, n. 13 above, for a full recital. This Article should be read in conjunction with 
Article 30 E C Treaty (see n. 3 below). Article 295 originates from article 83 E C Treaty establishing 
the Coal and Steel Community, whose function was to detemiine whether an undertaking was 
privately or public owned. The application of Article 295 E C Treaty to intellectual property rights, 
so as to make a distinction between the existence and the exercise of intellectual property rights, is 
therefore a somewhat elaborate exercise. See G. Tritton, 'Articles 30 and 36 and intellectual 
property; Is the jurisprudence of the E C J now at an ideal standard,' (1994) 16 E.l .P.R. 422, 423. 
' The free movement of goods provisions consists of Articles 28-30 E C Treaty: see introduction, p. 
2, n. 3 above, for full recitals. The competition rules comprise Articles 81 and 82 E C Treaty, 
discussed in chapter 2 above. 
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exploitation thereof is subject to Community law, has been further developed by the 
ECJ in the context of interpreting Articles 28 and 30 EC Treaty. The 'exhaustion of 
rights' doctrine defines the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the right by 
Community law. The implications of this doctrine subsequently resulted in a 
'specific mechanism' in the 2003 Act of Accession,'* allowing intellectual property 
rights holders to derogate from the doctrine i f the products imported from the ten 
new Member States possess certain characteristics. 
This chapter will discuss the compatibility of the fi-ee movement of goods 
provisions and parallel trade in pharmaceutical products within the EEA. 
Discussion of the controversial issue of allowing for international exhaustion, as 
opposed to merely Community exhaustion of intellectual property rights, will be 
followed by discussion of the application of these principles in the 'EFTA-EEA' 
Member States. Finally, a thorough analysis of the derogation in the 2003 Act of 
Accession^ wil l be undertaken to provide a complete account of the free movement 
of intellectual property protected pharmaceutical products within the enlarged EEA. 
1. The existence/exercise distinction 
If a European common market is to be achieved goods must be imported and 
exported between Member States without restrictions. However, as Member States 
tend to adopt protectionist measures that directly or indirectly favour national 
interests, the ECJ is frequently asked to rule on the compatibility of national 
legislation with the free movement of goods provisions in the EC Treaty. Article 28 
EC Treaty prohibits all restrictions on the free movement of goods and all measures 
having equivalent effect between Member States.^  National intellectual property 
rights, i f exercised according to national law, may prevent this freedom of 
movement owing to their inherently territorial nature. The EC Treaty provides for 
an express derogation to the free movement of goods provision in Article 30 EC 
Act of Accession [2003] O.J. L236/33: see introduction, p. 4, n. 15 above for a full reference. 
^ See ibid.; and n. 138 below. 
* See n. 3 above. 
141 
Treaty, stating that Article 28 EC Treaty shall not preclude prohibitions or 
restrictions on imports or exports which are justified for, inter alia, the protection of 
industrial and commercial property. 'Such prohibitions and restrictions shall not, 
however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
trade between Member States.'^  Save for the limited protection of property 
ownership afforded under Article 295 EC Treaty,^ the Treaty provides no further 
guidance concerning intellectual property rights. The traditional function of a 
patent, in the context of the pharmaceutical industry, is to grant the inventor of a 
new pharmaceutical product a time-restricted monopoly right over the invention, 
while the risk premium is compensated for and the financial investment made 
during its development recovered.^ Equally, it cannot be disputed that a trademark 
owner who has invested much time and funds in building up goodwill and 
following for a trademark should be able to prevent a third party from illegally 
capitalising on the trademark's reputation. 
Consequently, the ECJ has been forced to strike a balance, when interpreting the EC 
Treaty, between the traditional function of national intellectual property rights and 
the common market objective. In Deutsche Grammophon, a case concerning 
parallel importation of copyright protected music records, the Court stated that; 
'although the Treaty does not affect the existence of industrial property rights 
conferred by the national legislation of a Member State, the exercise of these rights 
may come within the prohibitions of the Treaty.'"' The origin of this 'existence-
exercise' distinction can be traced to two earlier judgments concerning the 
relationship between Article 81 EC Treaty and intellectual property rights." This 
leads to the question of how the concepts of 'existence' and exercise' are defined. 
' Article 30 E C Treaty; see n. 3 above. 
^ See n. 2 above. 
' See D. Bainbridge, Intellectual property, 5* ed., (London: Longman, 2002), chapter 12, for 
discussion of the traditional functions of a patent. 
Case 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro [1971] E . C . R . 487, para. 11. 
" Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten SARL & Grundig-Verkaufs GmbH v. Commission [1966] 
E . C . R . 299 and Case 24/67 Parke Davis & Co. Ltd. v. Probe! & Centrafarm [1968] E . C . R . 55. See 
chapter 2(1) above for a further discussion. 
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2. The 'specific subject matter' of intellectual property rights 
The existence/exercise distinction in relation to intellectual property rights only 
functions i f the different attributes of an intellectual property right can be divided 
into separate categories. Following Deutsche Grammophon^^ a line of cases 
focusing on the definition of the existence and the exercise of an intellectual 
property right emerged. For intellectual property proprietors this is commercially a 
very important issue. Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug^^ defined the 'specific subject 
matter' of a patent. The term 'specific subject matter' is, for the purpose of this 
chapter, interchangeable with 'existence,' and will be used throughout the chapter. 
The facts were as follows: Sterling held the patent for a drug marketed in the UK 
and Germany. Centrafarm, a parallel importer, discovered that the drug was 
considerably more expensive in the Netherlands, and started to import it from the 
UK and Germany. Sterling sought injunctive relief preventing Centrafarm from 
importing it into the Netherlands. After referral to the ECJ by the Dutch Court, the 
ECJ confirmed the 'existence/exercise' principle from Deutsche Gratnmophon^^ 
and then held that the specific subject matter of a patent is 'the exclusive right to 
use an invention with a view to manufacturing industrial products and putting them 
into circulation for the first time, either directly or by the grant of licences to third 
parties, as well as the right to oppose infringements.''^ The specific subject matter 
serves to 'reward the creative effort of the inventor,''^ which is the function of a 
patent. A patent therefore gives its proprietor the inherent right to manufacture and 
put the patented products into circulation for the first time. Al l other actions of the 
patent proprietor fall into the category of 'exercising' the patent. 
The distinction between the specific subject matter and the exercise of trademark 
rights is similar. Trademark rights granted by national legislation are State 
'measures' within the scope of Articles 28 and 30 EC Treaty. The ECJ has 
" N . 10 above. 
Case 15/74 Centra/arm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc. [1974] E .C .R. 1147. 
'"N. 10 above. 
Case 15/74, n. 13 above, para. 1' 
ibid., para. 9. 
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recognised that the exercise of trademark rights may affect intra-Community trade 
and held in Centmfarm v. Winthrop that the specific subject matter 'is the guarantee 
that the owner of the trade mark has the exclusive right to use that trade mark, for 
the purpose of putting products protected by the trademark into circulation for the 
first time.''^ The Court has further held that the 'essential function' of a trademark 
is to guarantee the origin of the trademarked product to the end consumer, thus 
guaranteeing that the product has not been subject to interference by a third party at 
a previous stage of marketing so as to affect the original condition of the product.'^ 
The right to prevent any interference by a third party with the 'essential function' of 
the trademark is also part of the trademark's specific subject matter. Trademark 
proprietors thus have two rights constituting the specific subject matter of the 
trademark. First, to market the trademarked product for the first time, and secondly, 
to prevent any misuse by a third party of the trademark that is likely to impair the 
quality and the guarantee of origin of the trademarked product. 
3. The 'exhaustion of rights' doctrine 
As the specific subject matter of intellectual property rights includes the right to 
market a product for the first time, once the product is first put into circulation 
within the Community, the right-holder will be deemed to have exhausted the right 
to prevent the products from moving freely within the EEA. This rule is commonly 
referred to as the 'exhaustion of rights' doctrine, or simply the exhaustion 
doctrine.'^ 
The exhaustion doctrine essentially opened the door for parallel trade, a practice 
which had earlier been prohibited due to the territorial nature of intellectual 
property rights. But the doctrine also led to a debate on the effect of parallel trade 
" Case 16/74 Centrafarm BV \. Winthrop BK[1974] E .C .R. 1183, para. 8. 
" Case 102/77 Hoffman-La Roche & Co AG v. Centrafarm mbH [1978] E . C . R . 1139, para. 7; and 
Case C-3/78 Centrafarm BVv. American Home Products Corp. [1978] E . C . R . 1823, para. 12. 
" In practice, this means that so long as a patent is valid, only the proprietor has the right to 
manufacture the product. After the product is marketed the right to prevent any subsequent trade will 
have been exhausted. See Case C-316/95 Generics BVy. Smith Kline Ltd. [1997] E . C . R . 3929. 
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on 'research and development' (R&D).^° The specific subject matter of a patent as 
defined by the ECJ failed to take into consideration all the functions of a patent. 
Commentators argue that the Court also failed to consider the underlying policy 
objectives of the patent system: the importance of adequately protecting scientific 
progress; and providing a commercial incentive for carrying out effective R&D."" 
Patent protection bestows a monopoly limited by time on the inventor as a form of 
reward for his efforts, allowing for a recoup of the investments.^ ^ As such, patents 
create a financial incentive for carrying out R&D as well as providing a means for 
publishing the specifics of the patent in the public domain after its expiration. 
Patent proprietors retain the right to first marketing, but the exhaustion doctrine 
prevents them from capitalising on the different price levels throughout the 
Community as parallel importers export the products from low-priced Member 
States to higher-priced markets. Due to national pricing regulations patent 
proprietors cannot counter parallel imports by harmonising the price throughout the 
Community and thus make parallel trade commercially unsound."'' 
Instead of recognising the pharmaceutical industry's concerns regarding the 
exhaustion doctrine the ECJ, in true pro-integration spirit, has held that this doctrine 
applies even though the patent protected-product was first marketed and put into 
circulation in a Member State where patent protection was not available at the time 
of marketing. '^* The function of a patent is to reward the inventor without, however, 
"" See chapter 1(3.1) above; and, inter alia, T. Booer, P. Edmonds, D. Glynn and C. Oglialoro, 
'Economic aspects of the single European market in pharmaceuticals,' (1999) 22 E . C . L . R . 256. 
See e.g. C . Vicien, 'Why parallel imports of pharmaceutical products should be forbidden,' (1996) 
17 E . C . L . R . 219, 222; H. Bale, 'The conflicts between parallel trade and product access and 
innovation: The case of pharmaceuticals,' (1998) J . I . E . L 637, 647; P. Rey and J. Venit, 'Parallel 
trade and pharmaceuticals: A policy in search of itself,' (2004) 29 E.L.Rev. 153, 165-168; and L . 
Hancher, 'The European pharmaceutical market: Problems of partial harmonisation,' (1990) 15 
E.L.Rev. 9, 24. 
"" In Case 15/74, n. 13 above, para. 9, the Court acknowledged that patents serve to reward the 
creative effort of the inventor. But the question is if the specific subject matter is substantial enough 
to compensate for this effort. 
"•' See chapter 1(2.2) above; and chapter 2 above on the application of Articles 81 and 82 E C Treaty 
to parallel import-restrictive pricing measures. 
" Case 187/80 Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV [1981] E . C . R . 2063; and Joined Cases C-267-268/95 
Merck & Co. Inc. v. Primecrown Ltd[\996] E . C . R . 6285. 
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guaranteeing that the inventor will obtain such a reward in all circumstances.^ ^ 
Considering that the proprietor was fully aware that patent protection was not 
available in the Member State in question, and fully aware of the implications of the 
free movement of goods, the proprietor must accept the consequences of his 
decision to market the product in that Member State. Intellectual property 
proprietors are free to choose where in the Community to market their products, but 
once that decision is made, the intellectual property rights are exhausted throughout 
the Community whether or not first marketing took place in a Member State not 
providing for intellectual property protection.'^ ^ This should be contrasted, however, 
to a situation where a patent proprietor is legally bound to market the product in 
another Member State, as in Pharmon v. Hoechst?'' Hoechst, a pharmaceutical 
company, held the patent for a drug in Germany, the UK and the Netherlands. 
Subsequently a UK company obtained a compulsory licence"^ from the UK 
authorities. In breach of the prohibition against exporting the drug, the UK 
company sold the manufactured drugs to a Dutch parallel importer, which led to 
Case 187/80, n. 24 above, para. 10. Merck marketed a pharmaceutical product in the Netherlands, 
for which it was also the patent proprietor. Merck also marketed the product in Italy, where patent 
protection was then unavailable. Stephar, a parallel importer, imported the drug from Italy and 
marketed it in the Netherlands. Merck claimed unsuccessfully that the exhaustion doctrine is not 
applicable when the product is placed on a market where patent protection is not available. 
ibid., para. 11. 'To prevent the importation of the product freely marketed by him in another 
Member State where that product is not patentable would bring about a partitioning of the national 
markets which would be contrary to the aims of the Treaty:'(para. 13). See also S. Kon and F. 
Schaeffer, 'Parallel imports of pharmaceutical products: A new realism, or back to basics,' [1997] 18 
E . C . L . R . 123, 133. This principle has been extended to copyright rights; Joined Cases 55 and 57/80 
Miisik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. GEMA [1981] E .C .R. 147; however, see the distinction made 
between material and non-material copyright rights in Case 262/81 Coditel v. Cine Vog Films SA 
[1982] E . C . R . 3381. The Merck v. Stephar {ibid.) principle has been criticised as being inconsistent 
with subsequent case-law generated by the E C J ; most notably Case 158/86 Warner Bros and 
Metronome Video ApS v. Christiansen [1988] E . C . R . 2605, where the Court recognised that the 
market for selling video cassettes is distinct from hiring out video cassettes, and that both functions 
needed separate consent for the exhaustion principle to apply if the rental right would not completely 
lose its substance. The distinction between Merck v. Stephar and Warner is that the sale of 
pharmaceutical products only involves marketing and not any subsequent rental rights. Thus, even if 
the patent proprietor cannot prevent re-importation, he still has a right to first marketing, whereas if 
consent was not needed for the exhaustion of the rental rights of video cassettes the entire video 
rental business would collapse. 
Case \ Pharmon BV V. Hoechst AG [\9%5] E .C .R. 2281. 
A licence granted by national governments to manufacture products still protected by patent law, 
subject to the payment of royalty fees to the patent proprietor. See Commission Communication on 
the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the compulsory 
licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products for export to countries 
with public health problems [2004] COM/737/final. 
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Hoechst taking action against the Dutch company under its Dutch patent. Hoechst 
argued that its patent rights were not exhausted since it had not consented to such 
marketing in the Netherlands. A compulsory licence is an act of the State which 
leaves no room for negotiations, whilst a contractual licence is the result of 
negotiations between the licensee and the licensor. I f marketing a product in a 
Member State where no patent protection is available is the result of a contractual 
licence, the patent proprietor cannot claim that there was a lack of consent as he 
freely entered into the negotiations, exhausting his exclusive right on the exporting 
market.^ ^ However, when a Member State grants a compulsory licence to a third 
party, so as to be able to manufacture and market the product subject to the licence, 
the patent proprietor cannot be said to have consented to the actions of the third 
party.'"' The case was thus decided on the basis of lack of consent from the patent 
proprietor, and not on technicalities relating to whether or not the product was 
actually put on the market in the first Member State. Pharmon v. Hoechst therefore 
confirmed the ruling in Merck v. Stephar^^ in relation to the consent aspect.^ ^ 
Whether Merck v. StephaP^ was rightly decided was finally to be resolved in yet 
another case involving Merck: Merck v. Primecrown}'^ Again Merck tried to 
prevent parallel imports, this time from Spain and Portugal. First, Merck claimed 
that the exhaustion of rights doctrine should not apply since patent protection was 
not available in those Member States at the time of marketing. The ECJ rejected this 
argument, stating that manufacturers are prohibited from opposing importation 'by 
a third party of that product from another Member State in circumstances where the 
holder first put the product on the market in that State after its accession to the 
European Community but before the product could be protected by a patent in that 
However, in relation to trademarks , this reasoning is negated by the ruling in Case C-9/93 IHT 
Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH [ 1994] E . C . R . 2789; see p. 151 below. 
'° 'Such a measure deprives the patent proprietor of his right to determine freely the conditions under 
which he markets his products:' Case 19/84, n. 27 above, para. 25. 
N. 24 above. 
Case 19/84, n. 27 above, para. 26-27. See D. Guy, 'Pharmon v Hoechst: Compulsory licences 
clarified,'(1986) 8 E .LP.R. 252. 
" N. 24 above 
ibid. 
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State.'^ ^ Secondly, Merck claimed that the prevailingly low prices for 
pharmaceutical products in the two Iberian States is the result of national 
legislation, which has a serious impact on the economic value of the patent and 
affects the ability to carry out future R&D.''^ The ECJ responded by ruling that price 
regulations may indeed, in certain circumstances, distort competition, but 'it is well 
settled that distorfions caused by different price legislation in a Member State must 
be remedied by measures taken by the Community authorities and not by the 
adoption by another Member State of measures incompatible with the rules on free 
movement of goods.'" The second Merck case thus confirmed Merck v. Stephar?^ 
However, Merck also argued that, since pharmaceutical companies have an ethical 
obligation to continue to market products on a Member State market after first 
marketing, the exhaustion doctrine should not apply under these circumstances.^ ^ 
This argument appears rather desperate. It is true that the holder of a marketing 
authorisation is under an obligation to supply pharmaceutical products so that the 
needs of the patients in the Member State in question are satisfied, but this does not 
preclude the marketing authorisation holder from withdrawing the marketing 
authorisation (exiting the market), or indeed, never apply for a marketing 
authorisation in the first place.""^  No pharmaceutical company would ever market a 
Cases C-267-268/95, n. 24 above, para. 54 (emphasis added). The case also concerned the 
derogation in the Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal, and is further discussed in section 5 below 
in relation to the derogation mechanism in the 2003 Act of Accession (n. 4 above). 
ibid., para. 46. See also R. Nazzini, 'Parallel trade in the pharmaceutical market - current trends 
and future solutions,' (2003) 26 World Competition 53, 62; V. Korah, 'The exhaustion of patents by 
sale in a Member State where a monopoly profit could not be earned,' (1997) 18 E . C . L . R . 265; and 
1. Stamatoudi and P. Torremans, 'Merck v Stephar survives the test,' (1997) 22 E.L.Rev 228, for a 
discussion. 
ibid., para. 53. See also Nazzini, ibid., 62. Advocate General Fennelly considered that the effect of 
the ruling in Merck v. Stephar (Case 187/80, n. 24 above), and therefore the effect of upholding that 
view in ibid, is 'to export not merely the product but also the commercial consequences of the 
legislative choice made by the exporting State to the importing State because the patentee has made 
a commercial choice to sell the product even in a less protected environment:' Advocate General 
Fennelly in ibid., para. 108. 
N. 24 above. 
" Cases C-267-268/95, n. 24 above, para. 15. 
See Article 81 of Council Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal 
products for human use [2001] O.J. L311/67: 'The holder of a marketing authorisation for a 
medicinal product and the distributors of the said medicinal product actually placed on the market in 
a Member State shall, within the limits of their responsibilities, ensure appropriate and continued 
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product i f it could not see at least the potential for making a profit,'" and ethical, as 
opposed to legal, obligations are hard to differentiate from commercial 
considerations. It can also be questioned whether a truly ethical obligation would 
take patent protection into consideration - after all it is not a commercial obligation. 
Moreover, despite having full knowledge of the impact of the ruling in the first 
Merck case,"*^  Merck still decided to market the products where patent protection 
was not available, surely anticipating that the products would be subject to parallel 
exportation.'*^ The ECJ acknowledged this, and held that an ethical obligation 
cannot be the 'basis for derogating from the rule on free movement of goods.''*'* If, 
however, a patent proprietor has a legal obligation to market the products on the 
exporting Member State market he cannot be said to have consented to such 
marketing and is therefore free to oppose importation and marketing of the products 
in Member States where the products are benefiting from patent protection.'*^ The 
distinction between ethical and legal obligations is in line with the Court's previous 
supplies of that medicinal product to pharmacies and persons authorised to supply medicinal 
products so that the needs of patients in the Member State in question are covered.' See chapter 3 
above for discussion of marketing authorisations. See also Case C-249/88 Commission v. Belgium 
[1991] E . C . R . 1275, para. 20, where the E C J held that pharmaceutical undertakings are under no 
legal obligation to continue marketing their products in a Member State, i.e. it is only marketing 
authorisation holders that are under an obligation to supply authorised products. However, in 
Commission Decision A.37.507/F3-AstraZeneca (not yet reported, but non-confidential version 
available on DG Competition's website: <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/ competition/index_en.html>); 
the Commission held that AstraZeneca infringed Article 82 E C Treaty by abusing its dominant 
position when withdrawing the marketing authorisation for 'Losec capsules' and replacing it with a 
new marketing authorisation for 'Losec tablets.' The Commission alleges that this was done in order 
to prevent competition from parallel importers and generics companies. See Chapter 2, pp. 70-72 
above. 
For example, when several South American countries demanded that a national trademark must be 
registered in addition to the multinational trademark, a number of international pharmaceutical 
companies withdrew from the countries in question or at least sympathised with that tactic. See 
Stamatoudi and Torremans, n. 36 above, 255; and M. Blakeney, Legal aspects of the transfer of 
technology to developing countries, (Oxford: E S C Publishing, 1989), p. 129. Further, Primecrown, 
the defendants in Case C-267-268/95 (n. 24 above), relied on a report by the National Economic 
Research Associates (NERA) which showed that only 40 of the 50 most commonly prescribed 
medicines in Europe were marketed in all Member States. Thus, the industry did not seem to act as if 
an ethical obligation existed. See 1. Stamatuodi and P. Torremans, 'Merck is back to stay: The Court 
of Justice's judgment in Merck v Primecrown,' (1997) 19E.LP.R. 545, 548. 
'''Case 187/80, n. 24 above. 
Stamatuodi and Torremans, 'Merck is back,' n. 41 above, 548. However, this should be read in 
conjunction with the ECJ's case-law on Articles 81 and 82 E C Treaty, as a refusal to supply can 
potentially amount to an infringement of the Community's competition law provisions. See chapters 
2(1.4) and 2(2.4) above. 
Cases C-267-268/95, n. 24 above, para. 53. 
ibid., para. 50 
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rulings in Merck v. Stephar and Pharmon v. Hoechst, as a compulsory licence is 
a legal obligation and an ethical obligation was not more obvious in Merck v. 
Primecrowii^^ than in Merck v. Stepharf'^ However, except for declaring a 
compulsory licence to come within the notion, the ECJ failed to provide an 
adequate definition of the notion of a 'legal obligation' in relation to the exhaustion 
doctrine. According to the ECJ, the patent proprietor must prove, by way of 
reference to decisions by 'national authorities or courts or of the competent 
Community authorities, that there is a genuine, existing [legal] o b l i g a t i o n . T h e 
legal obligation must, most likely, lead to a 'first marketing' of the protected 
products by the patent proprietor, which, i f done without a 'legal obligation,' would 
have exhausted the proprietary right. For example, a compulsory licence is a 'legal 
obligation' because the patentee agreed to the national law which provides for the 
issuance of a compulsory licence, if/where the innovation is not being applied, 
when applying for patent protection. The patent proprietor therefore never 
consented to the first marketing of the product in this Member State, but was under 
a legal obligation to allow a third party to put the product on the market under a 
compulsory licence. Negative legal obligations, not involving a first marketing, as 
for example continuing to market the products under the patent in order to avoid 
allegations of abuse of a dominant position under Article 82 EC Treaty,^' cannot be 
considered to be 'legal obligations' in relation to the exhaustion doctrine and the 
first marketing principle. It is not an abuse of a dominant position not to put a new 
product on the market for the first time. However, i f the undertaking decides to 
market the product, the undertaking w i l l have exhausted its right to exercise the 
patent rights after first marketing. Continuing to market the products in order to 
avoid allegations o f abuse of a dominant position can therefore not be considered a 
'legal obligation,' but only a consequence of the commercial decision to market the 
products for the first time. 
N. 24 above. 
N. 27 above. 
'"N.24 above 
°^ Cases C-267-268/95, n. 24 above, para. 50 
N. 24 above. 
. 
'^ See chapter 2(2.4.2) above. 
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It should be noted that, at the time of Merck v. Primecrown,^^ those Member States 
that did not offer patent protection were the exceptions/'' Allowing patent 
proprietors to exercise their patent rights so as to prevent parallel exports from these 
Member States would not have had a great impact on Community integration, but 
would in fact have acted as a transition measure until such patent protection was in 
place in the remaining Member States.^ '* This should be compared to Merck v. 
Stephar,^^ which was decided at a time when a number of Member States did not 
provide for patent protection. However, the fact that most Member States provide 
for patent protection 'does not mean that the reasoning underlying the rule in 
[Merck v. Stephar] is superseded.' Legal certainty and consistency outweighed the 
argument that Merck v. Stephar^^ should be overturned because the rule had lost in 
importance and applicability. The Court nevertheless pointed out that Member 
States can adopt transitional measures so as to prevent parallel imports from 
acceding countries to the Community i f such acceding Member States do not yet 
provide for patent protection.^^ 
Merck's campaign to make the ECJ recognise the special nature of the 
pharmaceutical trade, the lack of pricing harmonisation and its reliance on 
investments in R & D , therefore came to an end without significant impact on 
" N. 24 above. 
" ibid., para 34: 'It is true, as Merck and Beecham points out, that it is now the norm for 
pharmaceutical products to be patentable.' 
Pharmaceutical products were for a long time excluded from patent protection in many countries 
on the basis of public health considerations (as for example Italy). However, following Article 27(1) 
of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: Annex 1(c) of the World 
Trade Agreement 1994 (establishing the WTO and including G A T T Uruguay 1994) (TRIPs) all 
Member States are now obliged to provide for patent protection for inventions in all fields of 
technology, including pharmaceutical products. See I. Govaere, 'The quest for a master key to 
control parallel imports,' (2001) 4 Cambridge Yearbook for European Studies 192, 203; and C. 
Tuosto, 'The TRIPS Council decision of August 30, 2003 on the import of pharmaceuticals under 
compulsory licences,' 26 (2004) E.l .P.R. 542. 
" N. 24 above. 
Cases C-267-268/95, n. 24 above, para. 34. 
" N. 24 above. 
See Cases C-267-268/95, n. 24 above, para. 39. This will be discussed below (section 5) in 
relation to the accession to the Community of Spain and Portugal, and the accession of the ten new 
Member States in 2004. 
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parallel trade in pharmaceutical products.^^ The ECJ did not accept Merck's 
argument that parallel importation w i l l not promote price harmonisation within the 
Community in the absence of further integration and harmonisation brought about 
by Community measures. In consequence, not only products, but also national 
pricing policies are still being exported and imported within the Community.^" 
The ECJ has had to consider similar intricacies of the exhaustion doctrine in 
relation to trademarks. As w i l l be evident, the Court has taken a more pragmatic 
approach to the degree of consent needed for the exhaustion of trademarks in 
comparison with their pro-integration policy in relation to patents, established in 
Merck V. Stephar.^^ 
In Hag / " the Court concluded that to prohibit the importation of trademarked 
products simply because the same trademark was registered and protected in the 
Member State of importation by a third party was not compatible with Articles 28 
and 30 EC Treaty.^^ This peculiar situation was brought about by the sequestering 
by the Belgian State of the Belgian section of the German instant coffee company 
Hag during the Second World War, i.e. as a result of expropriation. Due to later 
case-law, notably Pharmon v. Hoechst,^ the Court took the opportunity to overturn 
its decision in, ironically, a case involving the same facts but another issue - Hag 
11^^ Even i f allowing the trademark owner to exercise his national trademark rights 
^' However, see inter alia Advocate General Jacobs's Opinion in Case C-53/03 Synetairismos 
Farmakopoion Aitolias (Syfait) & Others v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE [2005] E .C .R. 4609, proposing 
a special application of Article 82 E C Treaty to pharmaceutical products due to the special 
characteristics of the pharmaceutical sector in order to promote future R&D. The issue is, therefore, 
still very much alive. See chapter 2(2.5) above. 
*° Advocate General Fenneliy in Cases C-267-268/95, n. 24 above, para. 108. 
N. 24 above. 
" Case 192/73 Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag AG (Hag I) [ 1974] E . C . R . 731. 
" This principle is commonly referred to as the 'common origin' doctrine. The doctrine, established 
in ibid., was heavily criticised on grounds that the trademark proprietor had not consented to such 
marketing; see R. Joliet, 'Trade mark law and the free movement of goods: The overruling of Hag I, ' 
(1992) l . I .C. 303, 317; and Case 119/75 Terrapin Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie CA [1976] E . C . R . 
1039. 
^'N. 27 above. 
" Case C-10/89 SA CNL-Sucal NV v Hag GF AG (Hag II) [1990] E . C . R . 3711. Incidentally, the 
Rapporteur in the case was Professor Rene Joliet, author of Joliet, n. 63 above, and one of the 
strongest critics of the 'common origin' doctrine. 
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w i l l partition the Community market along national borders, the trademark owner 
must be allowed to do so as he has not given his consent to such marketing, in line 
with Pharmon v. Hoechst.^^ Further, the 'essential function' of a trademark, which 
is part of the specific subject matter, is to guarantee the origin of the trademarked 
products. With two identical trademarks, divided as a resuh of national legislation 
(expropriation), neither of the trademarks serves to guarantee the origin of the 
products to the end consnmer.^^ Thus, the 'common origin' doctrine lost all its 
importance in respect o f expropriated trademarks when Hag was decided in line 
with Pharmon v. Hoechst.^"^ After all, it is hard to see a difference between the act 
of a government in expropriating a trademark right as part o f enemy property and 
the act of a government in granting a compulsory licence under a patent.^*' 
However, at present, the division of ownership of trademarks has presumably come 
about more often as a result of freely negotiated agreements, rather than 
government expropriation. Whilst expropriation can be compared to the granting of 
a compulsory licence, division of ownership as a result of fi-eely negotiated 
agreements cannot be compared to the facts of Merck v. PrimecrownJ^ where 
Merck was the sole proprietor of the intellectual property right, and could therefore 
be seen as having fu l l control o f its specific subject matter. Following a division of 
ownership the proprietor w i l l no longer be the sole proprietor, and cannot be said to 
be in fu l l control of the specific subject matter o f the intellectual property right. In 
Ideal Standard'^ the Court therefore held that the principle in Hag iP should not 
only apply to trademarks sharing a common origin due to expropriation but also to 
trademarks sharing a common origin as a result of a freely negotiated transfer of 
" N . 27 above. 
Case C-10/89 (Hag II), n. 65 above, para. 16; the Court stated that 'consumers being able to 
identify the origin of the marked good and the proprietor could be held responsible for the poor 
quality of the goods for which he was in no way accountable,' similarly Advocate General Jacobs 
stated in his Opinion to Hag II, para. 26, that 'the consumer is not interested in the genealogy of 
trade marks...he is interested in knowing who made the goods that he purchased.' 
N. 65 above. 
* ' N . 27 above. 
See Guy, n. 32 above, 253. 
" N. 24 above. 
N. 29 above. See Tritton, n. 2 above, for a thorough discussion on this case. 
" N . 6 5 above. 
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ownership. The Court's ruling has been criticised for not taking into consideration 
that, in contrast to expropriated trademarks, the original trademark owner freely 
consented to the marketing of the products when transferring ownership of the 
identical trademark.'"* In response to this argument the Court held that 'that view 
must be rejected. The consent implicit in any assignment is not the consent required 
for application of the doctrine of exhaustion of rights...if, by assignment, control 
over the trade mark is surrendered to a third party having no economic link with the 
assignor.' The argument that the trademark proprietor(s) fi^eely consented to the 
marketing of the products, so as to be sold side-by-side on the same market, fails to 
take into consideration the essential function of trademarks which is part of their 
specific subject matter. Departing from the traditional concept of intellectual 
property rights as primarily a right to protect the intellectual property owner,'^ 
which was argued by the claimant in Merck v. Primecrown^^ the Court stated that a 
trademark 'must offer a guarantee that all goods bearing it have been produced 
under the control of a single undertaking which is accountable for their quality. ' ' ' 
The Court therefore made it clear that its reasoning in Hag if^ equally applies to 
trademarks divided through freely negotiated agreements as long as the two 
trademark owners are not economically linked. Thus, following Hag if^ and Ideal 
Standarc?^ it can now be claimed that it is irrelevant whether a trademark has a 
common origin in considering the application of the exhaustion o f rights doctrine.^' 
In abolishing the common origin doctrine the Court in essence created a potential 
Case C-9/93, n. 29 above, para. 43. See also H. Cohen Jehoram, 'The Ideal-Standard Judgment: 
An unheeded warning,'(1999) I.P.Q. 114, 119 for further discussion. 
" Cohen Jehoram, ibid., 118. 
N. 24 above. 
Case C-9/93, n. 29 above, para. 37. By way of illustration, due to the territoriality of trademark 
rights, the English Court of Appeal held in Colgate Palmolive v. Markwell Finance [1989] R F C 497, 
that an English manufacturer of toothpaste had not given his consent to the importation of toothpaste 
from Brazil bearing the same trademark, but not containing the same ingredients as the English 
version, even though the trademark shared a common origin with the English owned trademark. 
N. 65 above. 
" ibid. 
'° N. 29 above. 
See G. Tritton, Intellectual property in Europe, 2"'' ed., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), p. 518. 
154 
circumvention of the exhaustion o f rights doctrine, in that it effectively allows for 
the trademark to be used for voluntary division of the common market.^^ 
The foregoing has concerned the application of the exhaustion doctrine to products 
first put into circulation, and subsequently traded, within the common market. The 
suggestion that the exhaustion of rights doctrine also applies to non-Member States 
(third countries), creating a doctrine of international exhaustion, has been severely 
criticised by European intellectual property proprietors. As w i l l be evident in the 
next section, introducing international exhaustion would cause severe damage to 
Europe's pharmaceutical industry, which is why the ECJ has had to adopt a 
pragmatic approach to this concept. 
4. International exhaustion 
It is now firmly established that once a product is marketed and put into circulation 
within the common market the intellectual property rights holder w i l l have 
exhausted the right to prevent further trading in the product within the common 
market.^^ In this respect. Article 7(1) of the Trade Mark Directive^'* and subsequent 
case-law only allows for 'Community exhaustion.' The issue of international 
exhaustion, i.e. allowing for exhaustion of rights for goods entering the common 
market f rom a third country, is highly controversial as it would preclude intellectual 
property proprietors fi-om preventing importation of trademark protected 
pharmaceutical products into the Community regardless of geographical origin. 
"^ Case C-9/93, n. 29 above, para. 59. However, as the trademark owners must not be economically 
linked, there is limited freedom to make such arrangements. Article 81 E C Treaty may, however, 
apply in such circumstances. See Case 40/70 Sirena Sri v. Eda Srl[\91\] E . C . R . 3169 where the 
Court held that a contract for assignment could fall within Article 81 E C Treaty if the assignment 
continues to produce restrictive effects to the common market after its fulfilment. See M. Jarvis, 
'The ideal standard in Court of Justice case-law,' (1995) 20 E.L.Rev. 195; and chapter 2(1) above 
for further discussion of the application of Article 81 E C Treaty. 
" Case 15/74, 13 above; and Cases C-267-268/95, n. 24 above. Following Article 24 E C Treaty and 
Case 41/76 Criel v. Procureur de la Republique [1976] E.C.R. 1921 , goods imported from outside 
the common market are to be treated as domestic goods once put into circulation within the common 
market, i.e. in the same manner as goods originating from within the common market. See T. Hays, 
Parallel importation under European Union law, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) p. 48. 
" N . 1 above, Art. 7(1). 
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Hence, parallel traders may locate the lowest-priced country for any given 
pharmaceutical product before exporting the products to the highest-priced Member 
State market in the Community. In EMf^ the ECJ held that 'the exercise of a trade 
mark right in order to prevent the marketing of products coming from a third 
country under an identical mark, even i f this constitutes a measure having an effect 
equivalent to a quantitative restriction, does not affect the free movement of goods 
between Member States and thus does not come under the prohibitions set out in the 
Articles [28 and 30] of the Treaty.'^^ The facts o f the case share many similarities 
with Ideal Standard^^ with the difference that the defendant imported the products 
from a third country. The products in question were similar goods bearing the same 
trademark manufactured by a third party, no longer directly or indirectly, legally or 
economically linked with the national trademark ovraer. The argument that EMf^ 
effectively established that the EC Treaty does not provide for international 
exhaustion, but merely Community exhaustion, is therefore d e b a t a b l e . I n this 
respect, the ruling may only be seen as an early formulation of the principle 
subsequently established by the Court in Ideal Standard^^ As long as the two 
trademark proprietors are not economically linked, the essential function of the 
trademark w i l l be undermined i f the goods are allowed to be sold side-by-side on 
the common market, regardless of the geographical origin of the imported products. 
The question o f whether the EC Treaty provides for international exhaustion or 
merely Community exhaustion was eventually addressed by the Trade Mark 
Directive,^' which of course must be interpreted within the scope of the EC Treaty. 
The Trade Mark Directive seeks to harmonise national trademark laws, in particular 
concerning trademark exhaustion. Article 7(1) of the Directive states that a 
" Case 51/75 EMI Records Ltd v. CBS Ltd [1976] E .C .R. 811. 
ibid., para. 10. See J. Jones, 'Does an opportunity still exist for the development of a doctrine of 
international exhaustion at a Community level under Articles 28 and 30,' (2000) 22 E.l .P.R. 171, for 
a good discussion of this case. 
" N . 29 above. 
N. 85 above. 
" Jones, n. 86 above, 171. 
N. 29 above. 
" N. 1 above. 
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'trademark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods 
which have been put on the market in the Community under that trademark by the 
proprietor or with his consent.'^^ Although the Directive seems reasonably clear on 
the matter o f Community exhaustion, doubts still existed as to whether Community 
exhaustion is only a stipulated minimum, and therefore individual Member States 
were free to implement a principle of international exhaustion.^^ The obvious risk 
entailed with leaving it up to individual Member States to legislate on international 
exhaustion became evident in the French case Pytheron^'^ where the French court 
held that once a product has been legally imported into a Member State providing 
for international exhaustion Member States are prohibited from preventing further 
trade in the trademarked product once the product is put into circulation within the 
common market. In this respect, it would not make a real difference whether the 
Community would provide for international exhaustion in its entirety, or i f only one 
Member State would provide for such exhaustion, as the Member State providing 
for international exhaustion would act as a gateway for all goods entering the 
common market from third countries.^^ 
The ECJ, much to the delight of intellectual property proprietors, adopted a more 
restrictive interpretation of the Trade Mark Directive in Silhouette^^ The facts were 
as follows: Silhouette, an Austrian producer of frames for spectacles, sold the 
previous year's fashion frames to a Bulgarian trader. Even though the Bulgarian 
trader had agreed only to market the frames in Bulgaria and a number of other ex-
Soviet States the frames nevertheless found a way back into Austria. Silhouette 
brought an action to prohibit the importation and marketing of the frames in Austria 
" Directive 89/104, n. 1 above, Art. 7(1). 
" See R. Goldberg and J. Lonbay (ed.), Pharmaceutical medicine, biotechnology and European law, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 37; and A. Carboni, 'Cases past the post on trade 
mark exhaustion: An English perspective,' (1997) 19 E.I.P.R. 198. 
Pytheron International SA v. Jean Bowdon SA [1997] E.T.M.R. 211. 
" However, see pp. 155-157 below in relation to the ' E F T A - E E A ' Member States. 
Case C-355/96 Silhouette International GmbH v. Hartlauer mbH [1998] E . C . R . 4799. See W. 
Alexander, 'Exhaustion of trade mark rights in the European Economic Area,' (1999) 24 E.L.Rev. 
56; W. Cornish, 'Trade Marks: Portcullis for the E E A ? , ' (1998) 20 E.I .P.R. 172; and T. Hays and P. 
Hansen, 'Silhouette is not the proper case upon which to decide the parallel importation question,' 
(1998) 20 E.I .P.R. 277. 
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relying on the fact that the products had never been placed in circulation within the 
common market. The ECJ held that the exhaustion doctrine only applies to goods 
being imported and exported within the common market. Since the goods had not 
been put into circulation within the common market, and Silhouette had not 
consented to the re-importation of the products, the Austrian trademark proprietor 
had the right to prevent importation from third countries.^' This interpretation of 
Article 7 of the Trade Mark Directive provides for Community wide exhaustion, but 
not for international exhaustion. The Court stated that this 'is the only interpretation 
which is ful ly capable of ensuring that the purpose of the Directive is achieved, 
namely to safeguard the functioning of the internal market.'^^ I f some Member 
States were allowed to adopt a principle of international exhaustion, while other 
Member States chose not to, this would create barriers to intra-Community trade by 
segmenting the common market along national boundaries. Thus the 
pharmaceutical industry can take comfort in the fact that the Trade Mark Directive^^ 
does not provide for international exhaustion, restricting the(ir) problem of parallel 
trade to the EEA common market."'" 
However, three EEA Member States; Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway, are in a 
unique position as they are Members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and 
the EEA simultaneously ( 'EFTA-EEA' Member States). Point 4(c) of Annex X V I I 
to the EEA Agreement'"' implements Article 7(1) of the Trade Mark Directive,'"^ 
inserting the words ' in a Contracting Party' in place of the Trade Mark Directive's 
Case C-355/96, n. 96 above, para. 18. 
ibid., para. 27. 
" N . 1 above. 
This is likely to remain the case unless the Trade Mark Directive, ibid., is amended so as to 
provide for international exhaustion. Nothing in the TRIP agreement (n. 54 above) prohibits Member 
States fi-om imposing a narrow intellectual property regime. Further, Article 6 of T R I P states that: 
'for the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of Articles 3 
and 4, nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual 
property rights.' See D. Kallay, 'Levi Strauss v Tesco: At a difficult juncture of competition, IP and 
free trade policies,' (2002) 23 E . C . L . R . 193, 198; and L . Brazell, 'The protection of pharmaceutical 
products and regulatory data: E U enlargement update,' (2002) 24 E.I .P.R. 155, 158-159. 
The Agreement on the European Economic Area [1994] O.J. L344/3. 
N. 1 above. 
158 
' in the Community.''"^ In addition. Article 2 of Protocol 28 to the EEA Agreement 
stipulates that 'this provision shall be interpreted in accordance with the meaning 
established in relevant rulings of the ECJ prior to the signing of the Agreement.' 
Silhouette^'^^ (decided after the signing of the EEA Agreement) is therefore not 
relevant to the interpretation of the exhaustion provisions of the EEA Agreement. 
Although the 'EFTA-EEA' Member States are not a prime source for 
pharmaceutical products destined for parallel exports, this sparked a fear that an 
'EFTA-EEA' Member State might be used as an 'open-gate' into the Community 
for pharmaceutical products never intended for marketing in the Member State, but 
aimed for onward trading into the EC common market. 
To this end the Norwegian Court asked the EFTA Court for an advisory opinion on 
the compatibility of the EEA Agreement and national laws providing for 
international exhaustion in Mag Instrument. "'^ The EFTA Court held that the aim of 
the EEA is to create a free trade area, and not, as is the EC, a customs union. EEA-
wide exhaustion is a minimum and applies to all goods irrespective of origin, whilst 
EEA Member States are free to implement a policy o f international exhaustion as 
the provisions do not stipulate a m a x i m u m . H o w e v e r , according to article 8 of the 
EEA Agreement the free movement of goods provisions in Article 11 and 13 of the 
EEA Agreement'*^^ applies only to goods originating from within the EEA."^ As 
the free movement provisions are not applicable to goods originating from outside 
the EEA the parallel importer must show that the trademark proprietor consented to 
N. 1 above. Art. 7(1). 
N. 101 above, Protocol 28 Art. 2. 
'"^  N. 96 above. 
See e.g. A. Toutoungi, ' E F T A : Fortress Europe's soft underbelly?,' (2006) 28 E . C . L . R . 110. 
Case E-2/97 Mag Instrument Inc. v. California Trading Company [1998] E .T .M.R. 85. The case 
was much the result of the Norwegian Trade Mark Act (Act No. 4 of March 3. 1961), which is silent 
on the issue of exhaustion even though it is well established that Norwegian law in genera! provides 
for international exhaustion of trademark rights. 
'"^ ibid., para. 22. However, the Commission argued that the ' E F T A - E E A ' and the E C Member 
States must adopt the same rule in relation to international exhaustion, as otherwise it may lead to 
'internal disparities:' (paras. 12-13 and 24). See Toutoungi, n. 106 above, 112-114. See also 
Advocate General Jacobs's Opinion in C-355/96, n. 96 above, where a similar argument is 
presented. 
""N. 101 above. 
See Alexander, n. 96 above, 66. 
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such importation into an EC Member State. In conclusion, the 'EFTA-EEA' 
Member States are free to implement a policy of international exhaustion on the 
national market, but, as the free movement of goods provision do not apply to 
goods originating from outside the EEA, the intellecmal property proprietor must 
give his consent to any subsequent exportation or importation of the goods within 
the common market.'' ' 
The definition of 'consent' and the distribution of the 'burden o f proof is therefore 
very important since the trademark proprietor may be deemed to have exhausted his 
rights, and therefore unable to prevent further dealing in the products i f he can be 
considered to have 'consented' to the importation into the EEA from a non-Member 
State or an 'EFTA-EEA' Member State providing for international exhaustion. The 
issue of consent and the 'burden of proof wi l l be discussed in the following 
section. 
4.1 Consent and the 'burden of proof 
It is clear that consent w i l l not be implied merely from the fact that the trademark 
proprietor has sold the same type of products within the common market before 
importation was commenced by the trader. Thus consent is required for every batch 
of products, i.e. the ascertainable products under the control of the importer."" 
In Davidoff^^ the Court held that, under a proper construction of the Trade Mark 
Directive,"'' the trademark proprietor's consent must be expressed positively, or in 
the alternative, 'the factors taken into consideration in finding implied consent must 
"' See Toutoungi, n. 106 above, 112. 
Case C-173/98 Sebago Inc. v. G-B Unic SA [1999] E .C .R. 4103. Sebago had consented to the 
marketing in the E E A of one batch of goods, and the issue was whether or not, in absence of an 
express prohibition, this amounted to implied consent to market other batches of the same goods 
within the E E A . See also Case No. 98/550 Parfums Christian Dior S.A v. Etos 5 .K (The Appeals 
Court of the Hague, 15 February, 2000); and T. Hays, 'The burden of proof in parallel-importation 
cases,' [2000] 22 E.I.P.R. 353. 
Joined Cases C-414-416/99 Zino DavidoffSA v. A&G Imports Ltd & Levi Strauss & Co v. Tesco 
Stores [2001] E . C . R . 8691. 
' " N . 1 above. 
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unequivocally demonstrate that the trade mark proprietor has renounced any 
intention to enforce his exclusive rights.'"^ In view of this, 'consent must be so 
expressed that an intention to renounce those rights is unequivocally 
demonstrated.'"^ Although it can do no harm to include a clause in the contract of 
sale containing restrictions upon where the products might ultimately be sold, 
refraining from doing so w i l l not amount to consent,"^ as consent carmot be 
inferred from mere silence on behalf of the trademark proprietor."* This shows the 
different approach to consent taken by the ECJ in relation to products that have first 
been put on the market outside, as opposed to inside, the EEA. The sale by a 
licensee, a parent company, or a subsidiary implies consent when the marketing 
takes place within the EEA so as to trigger Community exhaustion, but does not 
imply consent when the first marketing is outside the EEA."^ 
The Court has made it clear that the burden o f proof rests with the defendant, 
meaning that it is for the trader 'alleging consent to prove it and not for the trade 
mark proprietor to demonstrate its absence.''^'' However, i f the burden of proof 
rests with the parallel trader, the trader would be faced with the dilemma of either 
winning the case by revealing his source of supply and subsequently losing the 
source as the proprietor wi l l block it, or losing the case despite the fact that the 
goods actually had been marketed within the EEA.'^' The ECJ has recognised that 
'' ^  Cases C-414-416/99, n. 113 above, para. 53. 
116 
117 
ibid., para. 45. 
See the ( U K ) Chancery Division ruling in Quiksilver Pty Ltd v. Charles Robertson 
(Developments) Ltd (t/a Trago Mills) [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 36. The Court followed the approach 
adopted in Davidoff (ibid.) and held that consent cannot be inferred merely fi-om the fact that the 
contract of sale did not contain any restrictions upon where the goods might ultimately be sold. See 
J. Smith and V. Noy, 'Trade marks - parallel imports,' (2004) 26 E.I .P.R. N194, for a comment on 
the case. However, a prohibition on reselling in the E E A does not 'preclude the exhaustion of the 
proprietor's exclusive rights in the event of a resale in the E E A in breach of the prohibition:' Case C-
16/03 Peak Holding ABv. Axolin-Elinor AS [2004] E .C .R. 11313, para. 56. 
'"Cases C-414-416/99,n. 113 above, para. 53. 
See G. Petursson and P. Dyrberg, 'What is consent? A note on Davidoff and Levi Strauss,' (2002) 
27 E.L.Rev. 464, 470. The authors also note that trademark owners may only bring trademark 
infringement claims in Member States where the trademark is registered. As a result, there is nothing 
to prevent a trader from importing trademarked products from a third country into an E E A Member 
State where the trademark is not registered. 
Cases C-414-416/99, n. 113 above, para. 54. 
'"' See P. Dyrberg, 'For E E A exhaustion to apply, who has to prove the marketing of the trade 
marked goods in the E E A - the trade mark owner or the defendant,' (2004) 26 E.I.P.R. 81, 82. 
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such an arrangement may in fact amount to a barrier to intra-Community trade by 
obstructing parallel trade, becoming even more obvious when the trademark owner 
is marketing the products using an exclusive distribution network, as the products 
must have been sourced from a small number of suppliers to which the trademark 
proprietor is closely aligned. The ECJ's soludon to this problem was to shift the 
burden of proof to the trademark proprietor i f the trader could establish that there is 
such a risk i f he himself bears the burden of proving consent. I f the trader manages 
to establish this, the burden w i l l revert back to the trademark proprietor who must 
prove that the goods were initially marketed outside the EEA with his consent, after 
which the burden w i l l shift back to the trader who has to prove that the trademark 
owner indeed had given his consent to the importation and subsequent marketing of 
the products within the EEA.'"^ As a result it w i l l become more burdensome for 
trademark proprietors to prove trademark infringement, in particular when an 
exclusive distribution network is the preferred choice of distribution and marketing. 
A possible precautionary measure that can be adopted by trademark proprietors is to 
market products using different boxes in different regions, thus allowing the 
proprietor to easily identify where and incidentally by whom the goods were first 
put on the market.'^^ Another arrangement would be for trademark proprietors to 
print 'for export only' or 'not for sale in the EEA' on the outer packaging of the 
product, in an attempt to rebut any presumptions of consent on their part.'^ "* This 
would rebut any presumptions at the time of sale without interfering with the sale 
transaction. 
'-- This was established in Case C-244/00 Van Doren + Q GmbH v. Lifestyle Sports mbH [2003] 
E .C.R. 3051. Van Doren brought an action for trademark infringement against the defendant for 
marketing products in Germany under Van Doren's trademark. The products had, according to Van 
Doren, been marketed in the US before being exported so as to be marketed in Germany. As the 
defendant claimed that the products had been purchased from an intermediary who had obtained the 
goods from an authorised distributor in the E E A , the Court was forced to answer the question as to 
which party had to prove the place of marketing of the products. See Dyrberg, ' E E A exhaustion,' n. 
121 above, 83. 
See J. Wessei, 'Germany: Trade marks - exhaustion of rights in the E C - exclusive distribution 
system,' (2004) 26 E.I.P.R. NI52, N153. In December 2003 Glaxo (the pharmaceutical company) 
announced that it was to colour pharmaceutical products that are destined for non-EEA States. This 
was a response to the U K High Court and, subsequently, the U K Court of Appeal's decision in 
Glaxo Group Limited v. Dowelhurst Limited and Richard Taylor [2004] E .W.C.A. (Civ) 290. See 
also C. Davies, 'Glaxo v Dowelhurst: A new twist in the tale,' [2005] 27 E.I.P.R. 127. 
See Hays, 'burden of proof,' n. 112 above, 357. This may however be in breach of Article 81 E C 
Treaty: see chapter 2(1.3) above. 
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5. The new Member States and the exhaustion of rights doctrine 
The absence of international exhaustion in conjunction with the exhaustion of rights 
doctrine for goods first marketed within the common market has given rise to the 
expression 'Fortress Europe.' It cannot be denied that it is a very accurate 
description of the common market in terms of the bottleneck effect it applies to 
imports from third countries - the difficulties in gaining entry into the Community 
is compensated for by the Community's free movement provisions giving rise to 
ample opportunities for traders to capitalise on price differences. However, it is 
hard to identify a direct analogy between transforming regional markets into a 
national market, and integrating national markets into a Community market, which 
can be illustrated by the judgment in Merck v. Primecrown^^^ and not least by the 
common origin doctrine.'^^ I f 'Fortress Europe' is impenetrable by intellectual 
property protected goods from third countries due to the non-applicability of 
international exhaustion, an enlargement of 'Fortress Europe' is the only option left 
in order to allow goods placed on other markets access to the common market. The 
latest enlargement of the Community, in 2004, saw ten new countries gaining 
access to the exclusive club of Member States. The new Member States, mostly 
central and eastern European (CEE), have struggling economies and pharmaceutical 
prices are normally far lower than in the 15 'old ' Member States. As a result, the 
Act o f Accession'^^ provided for a 'specific mechanism' in relation to the 
exhaustion of rights doctrine, the effects of which w i l l be discussed below. 
5.1 The new Member States 
The new Member States are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. This is the first time CEE 
countries have been admitted as Member States. Economic differences between the 
N. 24 above. 
See D. Edward, 'Trade marks, descriptions of origin and the internal market: The Stephen 
Stewart Memorial Lecture 2000,' (2001) I.P.Q. 135, 138, for an extended discussion. 
N. 4 above. 
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ten new and the 15 'old ' Member States are inherent. At the time of the accession 
negotiations the new Member States accounted for roughly 8.5% of the GDP 
generated by the old, with GDP per capita averaging about 55% of the GDP per 
capita in the old Member States.'"* Despite the fact that the Community's expansion 
to a population o f nearly half a billion citizens does present significant market 
opportunities for pharmaceutical manufacturers, the public health expenditure per 
capita was on average 2.5 times lower than in the 15 old Member States pre-
accession.'"^ The New Member States therefore have a strong focus on generics, as 
the low government health expenditure affects the choice and availability of new 
pharmaceutical products entering the markets.''"^ Consequently, the new Member 
States wi l l most likely become a source for low-priced pharmaceutical products 
exported to higher-priced Member States as the UK, Germany and the Scandinavian 
Member States by parallel importers. 
5.2 The 'specific mechanism' 
On the accession date the acquis commiinautaire automatically became part of the 
national laws of the new Member States.'^' Due to the inherent price differentials, 
and the fact that patent protection for pharmaceutical products was only recently 
introduced in the new Member States, the pharmaceutical industry and the new 
Member States (except for Malta and Cyprus) negotiated for derogations and 
transitional provisions in relation to the exhaustion of rights doctrine. As the price 
level o f pharmaceutical products is significantly lower in the new Member States 
than in the rest of the Community, and as a result of the inevitable competing 
''^ The statistics exclude Malta and Cyprus. See Commission Communication - Strategy Paper 
'Towards the Enlarged Union' [2002] COM/700/final. 
N. Wong, 'Accession impact on pharma,' Datamonitor (October 2005), (<http://www.drug 
researcher.com/news/news-ng.asp?id=50138>). Even at purchasing power parity levels, the health 
expenditure is only about one third of the health expenditure per capita in the 15 old Member States 
according to the World Health Organisation (WHO), 'Worid Health Report,' (2002), pp. 210-216. 
See the European Generics Medicine Association's website: <http://www.egagenerics.com>. The 
average market share (value) for generics in the new C E E Member States is almost 37%, whilst only 
12% in the old Member States. Currently Poland has the highest market share, with generics 
accounting for nearly 87% of the total volume. 
Existing patents and marketing authorisations were automatically extended so as to be effective in 
the new Member States. See chapter 3, pp. 91-92 above. 
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interests between the pharmaceutical industry in the old Member States and the 
established generics industry in the new Member States, the negotiations resulted in 
a compromise between competing interests.'''^ The pharmaceutical industry's 
concern was that the effect o f applying the exhaustion o f rights doctrine in the new 
Member States would result in an inflow of pharmaceutical products f rom the new 
Member States destined for Member States with a higher price level.'^^ The concem 
chiefly stems from the ECJ rulings in Merck v. Stephar^^ and Merck v. 
Primecrown,^^^ precluding patent proprietors from exercising their patent rights 
even though patent protection was not available at the time of marketing. Parallel 
importers took the opposing view, claiming that the insertion of any kind of 
derogation from the exhaustion doctrine in the Act of Accession would in effect be 
nothing more than 'an export ban intended to benefit the EU-15 pharmaceutical 
industry.''''^ The negotiations resulted in the insertion o f a derogation mechanism 
(the 'specific mechanism') in the Act of Accession'''^ which reads as follows: 
See S. Bruun-Nielsen, 'Into the great wide open...? Aspects of the accession process of countries 
in eastern and central Europe,' (1998) Int. T . L . R . 198; and R. Kobia, 'Reflections on the effects of 
future enlargements of the E U on industrial property: The case of trade marks,' (1998) E.I .P.R. 183 
for an understanding of the general concerns and debates pre-accession. 
See, e.g. The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) , ' E U 
enlargement and pharmaceuticals: Key issues,' Position paper (October 2000), (<http:// 
www.efpia.org/2_indust/topic_2.PDF.>): 'Therefore, to ensure the flow and availability of 
innovative therapies in the newly acceding E U States...a sound basis for the progressive 
introduction of innovative medicines in these states needs to be provided for.' The Act of Accession 
must ensure that the manufacturers business 'in the existing E U pharmaceutical market [is not] 
compromised by re-exports into the current Member States with their higher economic standards.' 
N. 24 above. 
N. 24 above. 
D. MacArthur, ' E U enlargement and free trade with Medicines,' (2002) R.A.J . 4, 9: 'it is a thinly 
disguised restriction on free trade, one of the fundamental pillars of the E U , and should be deleted.' 
N. 4 above. 
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'With regards to the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, the holder or his beneficiary, of a patent or 
supplementary protection certificate for a pharmaceutical product filed in a 
Member State at a time when such protection could not be obtained in one of 
the abovementioned new Member States for the product, may rely on the rights 
granted by that patent or supplementary protection certificate in order to 
prevent the import and marketing of the product in the Member State or States 
where the product in question enjoys patent protection or supplementary 
protection, even if the product was put on the market in that new Member State 
for the first time by him or with his consent. 
Any person intending to import or market a pharmaceutical product covered by 
the above paragraph in a Member State where the product enjoys patent or 
supplementary protection shall demonstrate to the competent authorities in the 
application regarding that import that one month's prior notification has been 
given to the holder or beneficiary of such protection. ''^^ 
This means that the principle in Merck v. Stephar^'^ is temporarily suspended for all 
products within the scope of the derogation. I f the exhaustion o f rights doctrine 
would have applied products could have been acquired in the new Member States 
and re-imported back to the old Member State markets. By suspending the 
exhaustion of rights doctrine, the pharmaceutical market and pharmaceutical traders 
w i l l be given extra time to adjust pharmaceutical prices, distribution networks and 
patent protection; thus in essence creating a transition period. There is however a 
significant difference between placing a product on a Member State market where 
patent protection is not available, and marketing a product in one of the new 
Member States before it provided for patent protection and before becoming a 
Member o f the Community. A patent proprietor who, ful ly aware o f the 
consequences in terms of the exhaustion of rights doctrine, markets a product in a 
Member State where patent protection is not available can be said to have consented 
to the marketing and the aforementioned consequences. However, a patent 
proprietor who decided to market a product in one of the new Member States before 
patent protection became available cannot be said to have consented to the 
subsequent consequences of the decision to market the product as he could not 
possibly have predicted that the country in question would one day jo in the 
™ 2003 Act of Accession, n. 4 above, Chapter 2 (Company Law) of Annex IV. This section is 
referred to as the 'specific mechanism.' 
'^'N. 24 above. 
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European Community. Allowing parallel imports in a scenario like the one just 
described would therefore be 'inequitable.' In fact, the 'specific mechanism' can be 
justified with reference to Pharmon v. Hoechst}'^^ Just as a patent proprietor cannot 
be said to have consented to the granting of a compulsory hcence, a patent 
proprietor marketing a product in a country which subsequently joined the 
Community cannot be said to have consented to the future consequences o f that 
marketing, in contrast to Merck v. Stephar^^ where the patent proprietor must 
necessarily have been aware of the consequences of marketing the products in a 
Member State not providing for patent protection.'''^ 
In order to analyse the scope and applicability o f the 'specific mechanism' that 
provision can be divided into three main sections; the temporal scope, the 
geographical scope and the notification requirement. Prior derogation mechanisms, 
notably the derogation in the Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal,'''^ w i l l 
provide a useful analytical and comparative background to the applicability of the 
'specific mechanism.' 
N. 27 above. 
N. 24 above. 
'"^  In Merck v. Primecrown, (Cases C-267-268/95, n. 24 above), the products concerned were 
marketed after Spain had acceded to the E C , but before patent protection was made available. Also, 
the derogation period had expired by the time of the E C J ruling. The new (2004) Member States, on 
the other hand, made patent protection available before accession. Merck v. Primecrown therefore 
does not contradict the 'specific mechanism,' regardless of the interpretation of this case in respect 
of the validity of the concerned derogation. 
Art 47 and 209 of the Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and 
the Portuguese Republic to the European Communities and Adjustments to the Treaties [1985] O.J. 
L302/23 provide that 'the holder, or his beneficiary, of a patent for a chemical or pharmaceutical 
product or a product relating to plant health, filed in a Member State at a lime when a product 
patent could not be obtained [in Spain and Portugal]/or that product may rely on the rights granted 
by that patent in order to prevent the import and marketing of that product in the present Member 
State or States where that product enjoys patent protection even if that product was put on the 
market [in Spain or Portugal] for the first time by him or with his consent.' 'This right may be 
invoked for [pharmaceutical products] ... until the end of the third year after [Spain and Portugal] 
has made these products patentable.' 
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5.2.1 Temporal and product scope 
The 'specific mechanism' provides that a patent and 'supplementary protection 
certificate' (SPC) holder may exercise the patent rights for the duration of its 
validity to prevent parallel imports from the new Member States (excluding Malta 
and Cyprus) i f 'such' protection was not available in the new Member State at the 
time of filing the patent in the old Member State. In absence of clear guidance in the 
'specific mechanism,' the definition of 'such' protection is not clear. It is evident 
from the wording of the 'specific mechanism' that 'such' protection includes 'a 
patent or supplementary protection certificate for a pharmaceufical product.'''*'' 
SPCs aim to compensate patent holders for time lost in the commercialisation of 
pharmaceutical products due to the delay in obtaining marketing authorisation.'"*^ 
They last for up to five years and were designed to provide a maximum of 15 years 
of markefing monopoly. The SPC period is calculated by subtracting five years 
f rom the time difference between the patent application date and the date of the first 
granting of a marketing authorisation in the Community. As an SPC must be lodged 
within six months after the date the first marketing authorisafion was granted the 
2003 Act o f Accession allows for derogations to the SPC Regulafion'"*^ for products 
that were authorised in the new Member States before accession.'"^^ Following the 
amendment, an SPC had to be applied for within six months of the date of 
accession, i.e. before November 2004.'"^^ 
'"''N. 138 above, para. 1. 
See Council Regulation ( E E C ) 1768/92 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection 
certificate for medicinal products [1992] O.J. L I 82/01. 
ibid. 
Chapter 4 (Company law) of Annex II of the 2003 Act of Accession (n. 4 above), amends Article 
\9 of ibid. 
ibid. However, special rules apply to the Czech Republic (within six months of the date on which 
the first market authorisation was obtained), Estonia (within six months of the date on which the first 
market authorisation was obtained, or if the patent was granted before 1 January 2000 within a six 
month period), and Slovakia (within six months of the date on which the first market authorisation 
was obtained, or within six months of 1 July 2002 if the market authorisation was obtained before 
that date.). See C. van Nispen, 'The consequences of E U enlargement for the pharmaceutical sector,' 
De Brauw Blackstone & Westbroek publication (November 2003), (<http://allens.com.au/pubs 
/bt/pharma.pdf>), p. 4. 
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However, any guidance to what type of patent the SPC must be linked to - product, 
second medical use, or manufacturing process patent - is not made clear by the 
wording of the 'specific mechanism.' In the derogation included in the Act of 
Accession o f Spain and Portugal the relevant provision is more precise and refers to 
a 'product patent.'''*^ The wording of the 'specific mechanism' can be interpreted as 
meaning that the particular type of patent protection (product, second medical use, 
or manufacturing process) must not have been obtainable in the new Member State 
at the time of filing the patent in the old Member State. This would mean that the 
holder of a manufacturing process patent, filed in an old Member State, wi l l not be 
able to invoke the 'specific mechanism' for products imported fi-om the Czech 
Republic or Slovakia as these countries made manufacturing process patents 
available as early as in 1957.'^° Conversely, the holder of a second medical use 
patent, filed in an old Member State before 2001, w i l l be able to invoke the specific 
mechanism for parallel imports from the Slovak Republic for many years as 'such' 
protection (second medical use patent) was not obtainable until 2001 in this 
country.'^' This simple interpretation, however, would not be in conformity with 
the ECJ ruling in Merck v. Primecrown where the ECJ held that any exceptions to 
the free movement of goods principle should be interpreted strictly, and the specific 
mechanism must be 'interpreted in a way that the transitional [period] expires on 
the date which ensure the earliest application' of the derogation.'^^ Therefore, as all 
new Member States introduced product patents before second medical use 
patents,'^'' the relevant type of patents for the purpose of invoking the specific 
Seen. 143 above. 
Czechoslovakian Law No. 34/1957. 
Slovak Republic Act No. 435/2001. 
Case C-267-268/95, n. 24 above, para. 23 and 25. See also Case C-191/90 Generics Ltd. v. Smith 
Kline Ltd. [1992] E .C .R. 5335, para. 41. 
See O. Lemaire, 'Parallel trade of pharmaceutical products within the enlarged European Union,' 
(2005) 27 E.I .P.R. 43, 45, for a list of dates. Product patents cover a product's active ingredient or 
any other specified chemical composition, and also include so-called 'formulation patents' referring 
to a specific formulation; i.e. tablet, injection, extended release etc. On a strict interpretation of the 
mechanism, transitional legislation enacted in the new Member States before product patents became 
available, such as pipeline protection (allowing for patent protection in a non-Member State to be 
valid upon registration in the Member State in question), cannot be considered 'such protection' 
under the mechanism: (p. 50). 
169 
mechanism must be product patents.'^ "^ In practice this is the only relevant date, as a 
product patent confers (at least) the same territorial rights upon the holder thereof as 
a second medical use patent. Secondly, all old Member States (except Spain and 
Finland) made product patents available before the new Member States.'^^ Product 
patent protecdon could therefore have been obtained in the vast majority of old 
Member State before becoming available in the new Member States. Finally, as 
mentioned above, even i f (theoretically) the holder of a manufacturing process 
patent, filed in an old Member State not providing for product patents at a time 
when manufacturing process patents were not available in the new Member State, 
could invoke the 'specific mechanism,' the temporal scope of the derogation wi l l 
demote this to a purely academic question as a patent filed before 1957 w i l l have 
expired a long time ago. It can therefore be concluded that the relevant type of 
patent protection is product patents with/and SPCs. Finally, in accordance with the 
ECJ ruling in Merck v. Primecrown, the relevant cut-off date for invoking the 
'specific mechanism' is before the (exact) date product patent protection was made 
available in the new Member State, and not the last day o f the relevant calendar 
year or any other elaborate interpretation.'^^ 
A fundamental difference between the 'specific mechanism' and all previous 
derogation mechanisms is that the 'specific mechanism' provides for a dynamic 
transitional period, while all other mechanisms provided for a fixed period.'^^ In 
order to ascertain whether a product w i l l benefit f rom the derogation the parallel 
importer and the patent proprietor must determine when patent protection was filed 
Lemaire's argument that 'the 'specific mechanism' applies whenever there is an objective 
difference in the level of patent or supplementary protection, regardless of the form of the patent or 
SPC (product, second medicinal use, or process)' therefore fails to ftjlly consider the implications of 
Merck v. Primecrown (n. 24 above) by not restricting the product scope to product patents: Lemaire, 
n. 153 above, 50. 
See section 5.2.2, p. 175 below. 
Cases C-267-268/95, n. 24 above, para. 24; and Stamatoudi and Torremans, 'Survives the test,' n. 
36 above, 255. 
'^ ^ For Spain and Portugal, the transitional provision was valid for three years after patent protection 
was extended to pharmaceutical products: n. 145 above. Similarly, Finland and Iceland benefited 
from a two-year transition period, whilst the transitional period for Sweden, Austria and Norway was 
limited to three years: Art. 65(2), and Art. 3(6) of Protocol 28 on Intellectual Property of the E E A 
Agreement, n. 101 above. 
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for in the old Member State and when patent protection was made available in the 
new Member State. Thus, as a relatively small and ever decreasing segment of 
products f i t this description, a fu l l list o f the dates when product patent protection 
was made available in the new Member States must be compiled in order to analyse 
the extent o f products covered by the 'specific mechanism.' 
Table 4'^* 
Date product patents were introduced in the new Member States 
Member State Date of introduction 
The Czech Republic January 1, 1991'^' 
The Slovak Republic January 1, 1991'*° 
Slovenia January 1, 1993'*' 
Latvia March 31, 1993'" 
Poland Apnl 16, 1993'" 
Lithuania February 1, 1994'*' 
Estonia May 23, 1994'" 
Hungary July 1, 1994'** 
Thus, patent protection was made available in all the new Member States between 
1991 and 1994. Pharmaceutical products for which a patent was filed for in an old 
Member State after 1994 wi l l not under any circumstances benefit f rom the 
' ' Gathered from C. Feddersen, 'Parallel trade in pharmaceuticals in a Europe of 25: What the 
"specific mechanism" achieves and what it does not,' (2003) 25 E.I .P.R. 545, 551; Brazell, n. 100 
above, 156; Lemaire, n. 153 above, 45; and the author's own research. 
S. 2 of the Law on Inventions, Industrial Designs and Rationalization Proposals, Law 527 of 
November 27, 1990. Entered into force on January 1, 1991. 
''"ibid. 
The Law on Industrial Property, published in the Official Gazette RS 13/1992 of March 20, 1992. 
The provision providing for the granting of product patents did not enter into for until January 1, 
1993. 
Patent Law of March 2, 1993, Journal of Laws 1993, No. 12. Entered into force on March 31, 
1993. Replaced by the Patent Law of March 30, 1995, Journal of Laws 1995, No. 17. 
'" The Law on Inventive Activity (Journal of Laws No. 26 of April 8, 1993: Text No. 117). Entered 
into force on April 16, 1993. Subsequently replaced by The Industrial Property Law Act of June 30, 
2000 (Journal of Laws No. 49 of May 2001: Text No. 508). 
Patent Law No. L372 of January 18, 1994. Entered into force on February 1, 1994. 
Patent Act (RTl 1994, 25, 406) of March 16, 1994. Entered into force on May 23, 1994. 
'** Law No. VII of February 8, 1994, amendments to Law No. II of 1969 on the Protection of 
Inventions by Patents. Entered into force on July 1, 1994. 
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'specific mechanism,' whilst all products for which a patent was filed for in an old 
Member State before 1991 wi l l automatically benefit from the derogation for the 
duration of the patent term and the SPC. Consequently, products for which a patent 
was filed for between 1991 and 1994 must be examined on a product-by-product 
basis for each new Member State. This is best illustrated by way of an example: 
A patent application for a pharmaceutical product was filed in the U K in 1993. The 
patent was fmally granted in 1997, and marketing authorisation was obtained 
through the centralised procedure in 2001. The 'specific mechanism' w i l l be 
triggered as no patent protection was available in Lithuania in 1993. The UK patent 
w i l l be valid until 2013, and the SPC expires in 2016.'^' The patented product may 
therefore not be exported from Lithuania to the U K before the end of 2016. 
5.2.2 Geographical scope 
The 'specific mechanism' purposely applies to products put on the market in eight 
new Member States. As Malta and Cyprus made patent protection available at 
approximately the same time as the old Member States, the two new Member States 
did not negotiate for the inclusion of a 'specific mechanism' in the Act of 
Accession. Conversely, the 'specific mechanism' purposely applies to products 
imported into one of the old Member States. However, it should be noted that the 
new Member States acceded to the EEA simultaneously with their accession to the 
Community.'^^ As a result of Annex B of the EEA Accession Agreement,'™ the 
Calculating the SPC period: ((2001 - 1993) - 5) + 2013 = 2016: see p. 168 above. 
Pharmaceuticals have been subject to (product but not process) patent protection in Malta since 
the coming into force of the Industrial Property (Protection) Ordinance (Cap. 29) on 1 January 1900. 
A system whereby U K product patents can be registered in Cyprus has been in effect since the 
1950's. Cyprus joined the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent 
Convention) (1973) in 1998. 
Agreement on the participation of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of 
Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of 
Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic in the European 
Economic Area [2004] O.J. L130/1. Pursuant to Article 128 of the E E A Agreement, n. 101 above, 
accession to the European Community must be accompanied by accession to the E E A . 
"° ibid.. Annex B, sets out that the 'specific mechanism' shall apply between the contracting parties. 
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'specific mechanism,' in its own right, applies to products exported fi^om the new 
Member States to Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein. 171 
However, the 'specific mechanism' only refers to 'new Member States' and 
'Member States' making it unclear whether patent proprietors in Malta and Cyprus 
can, in fact, invoke the 'specific mechanism' in order to prevent products imported 
from the eight new CEE Member States. Remembering that any derogations to the 
Community's free movement provisions must be strictly interpreted, it can be 
argued that patent proprietors in the two island States can indeed invoke the 
'specific mechanism' with regard to products imported f rom the (other) new 
Member States, as the 'specific mechanism' refers to the 'abovementioned Member 
States,''''^ o f which Malta and Cyprus are not part, and not to 'new Member States' 
de facto. This interpretation can however be negated by an even stricter 
interpretation of the mechanism. The phrase ' f i led in a Member State at a time 
when such protection could not be obtained in one o f the abovementioned new 
Member States'"'^ can be interpreted so as to imply that the Member State in 
question must indeed have been a Member State at the time of filing the patent 
application. Needless to say, i f the latter interpretation is correct patent proprietors 
in Malta and Cyprus may not under any circumstances invoke the 'specific 
mechanism' as neither Malta nor Cyprus were Members of the Community prior to 
1994. Nevertheless, as the phrasing of the mechanism is ambiguous, and 
considering that the purpose of the 'specific mechanism' is to provide a transition 
period so as to allow for a smooth integration into the Community, the ECJ is not 
Owing to Liechtenstein's patent convention with Switzerland it has been argued that SPCs 
granted by the Swiss Patent Office only takes effect within Liechtenstein owing to the Swiss-
Liechtenstein patent union so as to preclude patent proprietors from relying on the 'specific 
mechanism' for the duration of the SPC term: see Feddersen, n. 158 above, 549. However, this 
argument cannot be sustained following the ECJ ruling in Joined Cases C-207 and 252/03 Novariis 
AG V. Comptroller-General, & Ministre de I'Economie v Millenium Pharmaceuticals Inc. [2005] 
E . C . R . 3209, where the Court held that a marketing authorisation issued by the Swiss Patent Office 
constitutes the 'first authorisation to place the product on the market' within the meaning of 
Regulation 1768/92 (n. 145 above) for the purposes of the E E A Agreement (n. 101 above). As 
Liechtenstein adopted SPC legislation in 1997 the relevance of this legal question will eventually 
diminish. 
'Specific mechanism,' n. 138 above, para. 1. 
ibid. 
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likely to discriminate between the 15 old Member States and Malta and Cyprus, 
especially since Malta and Cyprus enacted patent legislation at a similar time as the 
15 old Member States. 
The same reasoning, albeit with a few modifications, can be applied to the 
interesting legal question of whether the 'specific mechanism' can be invoked by a 
patent proprietor in one of the eight new CEE Member States for products imported 
from another new CEE Member State.''^ "^ From a strict interpretation of the 
derogation,''^ it is clear that the new CEE Member States are explicitly part of the 
'abovementioned new Member States' listed in the 'specific mechanism.'''^ From 
this, it can be argued that the 'abovementioned new Member States'''' are 
simultaneously 'Member States' for the purpose of the 'specific mechanism.'"* But 
again, this may be negated by interpreting the mechanism so as to imply that the 
importing State must have been a Member of the Community at the time of filing 
the patent application. However, the ECJ would be seen as discriminating between 
(new and old) Member States i f not allowing the 'specific mechanism' to be 
invoked in one of the new CEE Member States for products imported fi-om another 
of the 'abovemendoned new [CEE] Member States.'"^ Indeed, in Merck v. 
Primecrown, the ECJ stated that the derogation in the Spanish and Portuguese Act 
of Accession'*° 'should apply in fu l l to trade between Spain and PortuRal, on the 
one hand, and the existing Member States, on the other,' giving support to this 
reasoning.'*' Following this reasoning, the 'specific mechanism' can potendally be 
invoked for products patented in the Czech and Slovak Republics desdned for 
Poland or Hungary i f the patent application was filed between 1991 and 1994. 
'Specific mechanism,' n. 138 above, para. 1. See Feddersen, n. 158 above, 549, for a discussion. 
As required following the ruling in Cases C-267-268/95, n. 24 above, para. 23. 
'Specific mechanism,' n. 138 above, para. 1. 
ibid, 
'''ibid. 
™ Lemaire, n. 153 above, 49. 
N. 143 above. The wording of the derogation, in respect of the geographical scope in relation to 
acceding and old Member States, is similar to that of the 'specific mechanism' (n. 139 above). 
Cases C-267-268/95, n. 24 above, para. 38 (emphasis added). 
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This highlights the fact that the temporal scope affects the de facto geographical 
scope. Member States that made patent protection available after it became 
available in the eight new Member States are technically outside the scope of the 
'specific mechanism.' Patent proprietors in Finland,'^^ Spain,'^^ and the EEA 
Member States Iceland'*'' and Norway'*^ (albeit the latter as well as Spain only in 
relation to products originating from the Czech and Slovak Republics), w i l l not 
under any circumstances be able to invoke the 'specific mechanism' owing to the 
(late) date(s) these Member States made patent protection available. 
Interestingly, the 'specific mechanism' allows patent proprietors to prevent 'the 
import and marketing' of the product.'*^ It can therefore be asked whether parallel 
importers are allowed to circumvent the 'specific mechanism' by using Member 
States where the mechanism cannot be invoked as a gateway before re-exporting 
the goods to a Member State coming within the scope of the mechanism. By way of 
illustration, owing to the temporal scope of the mechanism patent proprietors in 
Spain are unable to invoke the mechanism for products imported from the Czech 
Republic. Germany, however, made patent protection available long before such 
protection became available in the Czech Republic. The question is therefore 
whether a German patent proprietor may invoke the mechanism for products 
imported f rom the Czech Republic through Spain, assiuning that the products were 
never marketed in Spain but merely repackaged, before marketed in Germany. 
The answer must be positive for two reasons. First, following Merck v. Primecrown 
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derogations to the free movement provisions must be interpreted strictly. The 
Forordningen om patent pa lake- eller livsmedel (932/1987). Product patents for pharmaceutical 
products are available if the application was filed on or after January 1, 1995. 
Law No. 11/1986 of March 20, on Patents. Para.l(l) of the Transitional Provisions provide that 
inventions concerning chemical and pharmaceutical products shall not be patentable before October 
7, 1992. 
Icelandic Patent Act No. 17 of 1991 (amended 1996). The Act allows for the granting of product 
patents for pharmaceuticals after June I , 1996, based on applications filed after January I , 1995. 
Norwegian Patent Act of 1991. Product patents for pharmaceuticals became available on January 
1, 1992. Applications must have been filed on or after this date. 
" ' N . 138 above, para. I . 
Cases 267-268/95, n. 24 above, para. 23. 
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above discussed legal issue therefore concerns the interpretation of the 'specific 
mechanism,' and not the ECJ's case-law on consent and the exhaustion doctrine. 
Consent can only be given under the 'specific mechanism' when the parallel 
importer has given adequate notice to the patent proprietor, which wi l l be further 
discussed in the next section. Secondly, i f derogating from the above argument, 
mere importation 'without actually selling [the products]' cannot be regarded as 
'having been put on the market' for the purpose of the exhaustion doctrine.'^^ The 
products cannot therefore be deemed to have been put ' in free circulation within the 
EE A ' until the products are marketed in an EEA Member State falling outside the 
geographical scope of the mechanism, or until the proprietor has exhausted his 
rights under the 'specific mechanism' by consenting to such marketing in a Member 
State falling within the scope of the mechanism. In conclusion, considering that 
allowing parallel importers to circumvent the 'specific mechanism' by routing the 
transport of the goods through Member States where the 'specific mechanism' is 
not applicable would undermine the very purpose o f the mechanism, the ECJ would 
be well advised to simply rule that the 'specific mechanism' can be invoked, at 
least, up until first marketing in a Member State falling outside the scope of the 
mechanism, or until the proprietor has consented to such marketing (having 
received adequate notice from the parallel importer) in a Member State falling 
within the scope of the mechanism. This wi l l prevent the rights under the 
mechanism being exhausted after first importation. 
5.2.3 The notification requirement 
Products benefiting f rom the 'specific mechanism' can legally be imported if, 
following one month's notice, the patent holder has no objections to such 
importation. Even i f adequate notification is given by the 'intending' parallel 
importer, the patent holder 'may' exercise his rights so as to prevent such 
See Case C-16/03, n. 117 above, para. 43. 
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importation, thus conferring a discretionary power on the patent holder.'^^ A patent 
holder is even fi-ee to invoke the 'specific mechanism' in one Member State, but not 
in another. It is foreseeable that patent holders may not object to parallel 
importation between low-price Member States such as the eight new CEE Member 
States,'^ "^ but object to parallel importation f rom the new CEE Member States to 
high-price Member States such as Sweden and the UK. The patent holder may even 
approve of only a certain quantity of products to be imported so as to limit the risk 
o f the products being re-exported post marketing into a high-price Member State. It 
must be remembered that the notification requirement is not an exemption to the 
'specific mechanism,' but exists independently o f the rights conferred on the patent 
proprietor by the 'specific mechanism.''^' The only function of the notification 
requirement is therefore to allow the patent proprietor to consider whether to allow 
parallel importation by waiving the rights conferred on him by the 'specific 
mechanism.' 
As the notification requirement in the 'specific mechanism' clearly draws upon the 
ECJ's case-law on repackaging, it is clear that the parallel importer and not a third 
party must notify the patent proprietor.'^" The 'specific mechanism' does not 
explicitly require that the marketing authorisation holder be notified in addition to 
the patent holder.'^^ This is, however, advisable in order to waive any liability on 
The 'specific mechanism,' n. 138 above, para. 1, states that the patent holder 'may rely on the 
rights granted by that patent' or SPC. 
Subject to the geographical scope of the 'specific mechanism.' See section 5.2.2 above. 
See Feddersen, n. 158 above, 553, for a detailed discussion of the nofification requirement. 
The Court's case-law on repackaging is an extension of the exhaustion of rights doctrine. In order 
not to infringe the intellectual property osvners rights when repackaging trademarked products the 
parallel importer must give the intellectual property owner 15 days' prior notice. See Case C-143/00 
Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd & Dowelhurst Ltd [2002] E . C . R . 3759, para. 64. The 
period of one month (in the 'specific mechanism,' n. 138 above) appears to be an adoption of 
Advocate General Jacobs's suggestion in his Opinion in the abovementioned case, where he 
suggested a notice period of 3-4 weeks for repackaged products (para. 34). The patent holder must 
be notified by the parallel import directly, as notification by the competent authority granting a 
parallel import licence (PIL) will not be sufficient. See chapter 6(8) below for further discussion. 
The Commission Communication on a stronger European-based pharmaceutical industry for the 
benefit of the patient [2003] COM/383/final., p. 22, states that the patent holder as well as the 
marketing authorisation holder shall be notified. As it is difficult to reconcile this statement with a 
strict interpretation of the 'specific mechanism' it is unclear whether the marketing authorisation 
holder must be notified. It is however clear that the marketing authorisation holder will, for other 
reasons, be notified by the competent authority in connection with the granting of a PIL (see chapter 
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behalf of the parallel importer. Presumably the nodficadon must include the name 
of the product, as well as informadon on where, when and by whom the products 
were supplied to the parallel importer. 
That adequate notice is given should be o f utmost concern to the parallel importer, 
as the granting of a 'parallel import licence' (PIL) is dependant on the parallel 
importer demonstrating to the competent authority that one month's notification has 
been given.'^"^ Nodfication in wridng, preferably by registered mail, is therefore 
advisable.'^^ The definition of 'competent authority' is dependant on the patent 
proprietor's form of marketing authorisadon for the product in question. I f the 
product benefits from a Community marketing authorisation the parallel importer 
must prove that adequate notice has been given to the patent proprietor when 
notifying the European Medicines Agency (EMEA) o f its intention to carry out 
parallel importadon.'^^ Similarly, i f the products benefits f rom a nadonal markedng 
authorisation the parallel importer must prove that adequate notice has been given 
to the patent proprietor when obtaining a PIL from the relevant national Medicines 
Control Agency. The competent authority must also verify that the correct patent 
'holder or beneficiary of such protecdon' has been notified. The only guidance is 
that the beneficiary must be able to 'rely on the rights granted by that patent''^' or 
SPC. Thus, the nadonal patent holder as well as a potendal licensee must come 
within the notion 'holder or beneficiary.''^* Failure to demonstrate that adequate 
notice has been given to the patent holder should result in the non-issuance of a PIL 
or, depending on the definidon of 'competent authority,' negadve clearance by the 
EMEA. I f the patent holder responds to the nodficadon by mere silence the 
competent authority may give clearance or issue the PIL and the parallel importer 
3(3.2) above), albeit not given one month's notice. It should also be noted that in the majority of 
cases the patent holder and the marketing authorisation holder is one and the same person. 
PILs are granted by national Medicines Control Agencies. See chapter 3(3.2) above for further 
discussion. 
Lemaire, n. 153 above, 52. 
See chapter 3(2.1.1) above. 
" ' N . 138 above, para. 2. 
Whether a licensee has a right to enforce the patent against a third party is a matter of contract 
law. In most Member States the assignment of licensing of a patent must be recorded with the 
national patent office so as to be enforceable against third parties: Lemaire, n. 153 above, 51. 
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may commence importation. Should, subsequently, the patent holder object to the 
parallel importation, the importer should not be liable for damages, but sanctioned 
by the withdrawal of the PIL/clearance resulting in an end to the parallel 
importation. 
6. Conclusion 
The insertion of the 'specific mechanism' in the 2003 Act of Accession'^^ can be 
seen as evidence of the Member States' disapproval o f the principle of international 
exhaustion. I f intellectual property proprietors are allowed to derogate from the 
exhaustion of rights doctrine in relation to products marketed within the 
Community, albeit only in the new Member States for a dynamic period, it would 
be paradoxical to apply the doctrine to goods imported from outside the 
Community. The 'specific mechanism' should therefore not only be welcomed by 
patent proprietors, but also by supporters of a competitive pharmaceutical industry 
within the Community. Opponents of the 'specific mechanism' can take comfort in 
the fact that the product scope of the derogation is very limited and ever decreasing. 
The Court can expect questions concerning the temporal and geographical scope of 
the 'specific mechanism' in the near future, as the derogation is not satisfactorily 
clear on this matter. As an identically-phrased derogation w i l l be included in the 
Act of Accession o f Romania and Bulgaria,^ *^*^ it is not unlikely that the scope of the 
'specific mechanism' w i l l be subject to a referral to the ECJ even before the 
abovementioned Act comes into force in 2007. In such a situation, it is important 
that the ECJ rules that the rights under the 'specific mechanism' cannot be 
exhausted by mere importation through (but not marketing in) a Member State 
falling outside the scope of the mechanism."^' 
' " N . 138 above. 
See Annex 3(1) of the Treaty of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania (signed by the E U Member 
States and Bulgaria and Romania in Luxembourg on 25 April 2005). 
See pp. 175-176 above. 
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By limiting the exhaustion of rights doctrine to products first put into circulation 
within the common market the ECJ in effect created a 'fortress Europe.'^°^ Even i f 
international exhaustion would have lowered pharmaceutical prices, it is likely that 
the profit f rom parallel imports originating in non-Member States would remain 
with the parallel importer while simultaneously weakening the Community's 
pharmaceutical industry.^"^ The aim of the EC Treaty is to enhance economical 
competitiveness within the Community by establishing a common market, not allow 
parallel imported goods from third countries to destabilise the European 
pharmaceutical industry. Nevertheless, the Court did not completely refute the 
concept of international exhaustion in its entirety, but left a glimmer of hope for 
parallel importers by allowing exhaustion of intellectual property rights i f it can be 
proved that the proprietor consented to re-importation into the Community. The 
definition o f 'consent' is therefore sfill a highly relevant question. The exhaustion 
of rights doctrine has nevertheless had a drastic impact on the trade in 
pharmaceutical products within the EEA. Parallel imports account for an 
increasingly large share of the European pharmaceutical sales market, while 
manufacturers find it increasingly difficult to prevent parallel importers from 
exporting not only their products but, in effect, the exporting Member State's 
pricing policy.'^"* Yet the exhaustion of rights doctrine, as accounted for in this 
chapter, is only the doctrine in its basic form. As w i l l be discussed in the following 
chapter, the ECJ has applied a very pro-integration policy to the trade in intellectual 
property protected products, even allowing for repackaging and rebranding of 
parallel imported pharmaceutical products. 
-°- See Cases C-414-416/99, n. 113 above. 
See chapter 1(3.1) above. 
See chapter 1(2.2) above. 
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C H A P T E R 6 
REPACKAGING OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS I: 
THE I N T E L L E C T U A L PROPERTY ASPECT 
Disparities in the regulatory harmonisation o f pricing control have, together with 
the operation of the principle of exhaustion, produced vast opportunities for parallel 
trade in pharmaceutical products.' However, national marketing regulations 
governing marketing authorisations, commercial practices and customer preferences 
have presented obstacles to parallel importers' ability to ful ly exploit these 
opportunities.^ By way of illustration, goods purchased in bulk originally packaged 
for sales to hospitals may require repackaging to accommodate smaller quantity 
consumer sales;^ packaging with instructions or warnings in one language may need 
to be translated for sale in another Member State, and fragile packaging could be 
covered by a more durable outer layer."* More controversial is the claim that parallel 
importers actively seek to make packaging more attractive to consumers, notably by 
marketing products under an 'own-brand' label and package design, so as to 
increase the products' market share.^ The legal argument arises between parallel 
importers (repackagers) and manufacturers (trademark proprietors). The parallel 
importer argues that the ti-ademark proprietor has lost the right to prevent 
repackaging when the products were fu:st put into circulation within the 
' See chapter 1(3) above. 
" For example, a rule authorising packaging only of a certain size, or sickness insurance rules making 
reimbursement dependant on the size of the packaging, may entail repackaging. See chapter 3(2.1.1) 
above. 
' In the UK for example, medicines usually come in multiples of seven, whereas in other continental 
Member States medicines are usually packaged in multiples of five or ten. See Report fi-om the 
Select Committee on Trade and Industry: Trade marks, fakes and consumers, (1999 HC 380); and P. 
Koutrakos, 'In search of a common vocabulary in free movement of goods: the example of 
repackaging pharmaceuticals,' (2003) 28 E.L.Rev. 53, 54. 
T. Hays, Parallel importation under European Union Law, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) p. 
94. 
^ See section 4.2 below. 
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Community. Not to allow repackaging would amount to a conscious partitioning of 
the single market. The manufacturers/trademark owners take the opposite view, 
claiming that the right to prevent repackaging is part of the specific subject matter 
of the trademark, in itself a guarantee o f origin. 
1. A proprietary right to oppose unauthorised use of trademarks 
It has already been established that a trademark proprietor may only rely upon the 
derogation under Article 30 EC Treaty i f the unauthorised use of the trademark, or 
movement of the trademark goods, falls within the specific subject matter or 
essential function of the trademark.^ That essential function is to guarantee 'the 
identity of the origin of the trademarked product to the consumer or ultimate user, 
including the guarantee that the product has not been subject to interference by a 
third party at a previous stage of marketing such as to affect the original condition 
of the product.'^ The ECJ in Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarm therefore concluded 
that a consumer was entitled to know that the original condition of a trademarked 
product had not been affected by the interference of a third party.^ The Court 
confirmed that the trademark proprietor was justified under Article 30 EC Treaty in 
preventing a parallel importer from re-affixing the trademark after repackaging.' 
Similarly, in Centrafarm v. American Home Products the ECJ held that Centrafarm 
was not justified under Article 30 EC Treaty in affixing the trademark 'Seresta' on 
products marketed in the Netherlands, when the products had originally been 
marketed under the trademark 'Serenid' in the U K prior to repackaging by 
' Case 16/74 Centrafarm BVv. Winthrop 5 K [1974] E . C . R . 1183. See chapter 5(2) for discussion of 
the specific subject matter of intellectual property rights. 
' Case 102/77 Hoffman-La Roche & Co AG v. Centrafarm mbH [1978] E .C .R. 1139, paras. 8-11. 
' ibid. Hoffrnan-La Roche had marketed 'Valium' in Germany for individual patients in packages 
containing 20-50 tablets and for hospitals in batches of five packages containing 100-250 tablets. Its 
British subsidiary marketed the same product in the U K at a considerably lower price, in packages of 
100 or 500 tablets per package. Centrafarm, a parallel importer, imported 'Valium' from the U K into 
Germany, affixing the trademark 'Valium' on the new packages following repackaging by 
Centrafarm in the Netherlands. 
' ibid., para. 8. 
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Centrafarm.'" The Court however recognised that in some cases this may be 
allowed and would go beyond the trademark proprietor's right to oppose such 
activity." When there is no threat to the guarantee o f origin and the quality of 
goods, opposing trademark re-affixation can form a disguised restriction on intra-
Community trade which cannot be justified by Article 30 EC Treaty. The ECJ 
formulated four conditions which would in effect exhaust the trademark 
proprietor's rights.'^ First, it must be showed that allowing the trademark proprietor 
to rely on his rights would amount to a partitioning of the market.'^ Secondly, the 
repackaging must not affect the original condition o f the goods.''' Thirdly, the 
parallel importer must give adequate prior notice to the trademark proprietor 
together with a specimen of the repackaged product,'^ and finally, the repackaging 
must clearly indicate the identity of the repackager.'^ 
A n interesting legal question arose shortly after Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarrn^ 
by the facts referred to the ECJ by the German Landesgericht in Pfizer v. Eurim-
Pharm}^ The difference between these two cases was that the importer in Pfizer v. 
Eurim-Pharm^^ did not reaffix the trademark. The original trademark, 'vibramycin 
Pfizer,' was still in place, and was visible through a 'window' on the new outer 
packaging. The Court, recalling the essential function of a trademark, which is part 
of the specific subject matter of the trademark, held on the facts that Eurim-Pharm's 
repackaging was not liable to impair the guarantee of origin. Repackaging so that 
the inner packaging is not breached or altered and the manufacturer's trademark is 
visible through a window on the outer packaging had not impaired the guarantee of 
Case 3/78 Cenlrafarm BV\. American Home Products Corp. [1978] E . C . R . 1823. See section 3 
below. 
" See section 3 below. 
'- Case 102/77, n. 7 above, para. 10. 
ibid., para. 14. 
ibid. See also Joined Cases C-427, C-429 and C-436/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova A/S 
1996] E . C . R . 3457, para. 60 
' Case 102/77, ibid., para. 14; Cases C-427/93 etc., ibid., para. 78; and Case C-143/00 Boehringer 
Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd & Dowelhurst Ltd [2002] E . C . R . 3759, paras. 66-68. 
" Case 102/77, ibid., para. 14; and Cases C-427/93 etc., ibid., para. 70. 
"Case \02m,ibid. 
' Case 1/81 Pfizer Inc. v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH [198]] E . C . R . 763. 
'a " ibid. 
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origin and therefore not interfered with the essential function of the trademark.^'' 
Further, by clearly stating the identity of the repackager and the manufacturer, the 
packaging cannot be liable to mislead consumers as to the origin of the products.^' 
A trademark proprietor may not therefore rely on his rights to prevent a parallel 
importer from marketing a product repackaged in this way.'^ The fact that the 
original trademark remained visible, allowed the ECJ to prohibit Pfizer from 
opposing Eurim-Pharm's repackaging without overruling Hojfman-La Roche v. 
CentrafarmP 
The ECJ has therefore held that there is no need for a legal distinction between re-
labelling and repackaging?'* The practical difference, however, is that relabelling is 
the least intrusive way of meeting national regulations and gaining market access. 
As a result, the trademark proprietor may find it difficult to show that the 
relabelling risks impairing the guarantee of origin. If , however, the form of 
relabelling risks impairing the guarantee of origin and so has not satisfied all the 
conditions outlined in Hojfman-La Roche v. Centrafarm, 'then by way of 
derogation from the free movement o f goods, the trademark owner's rights 
may...prevail.' '^ In practice, a legal distinction is therefore uimecessary, and 
following Loendersloot v. Ballantine'^ re-labelling should be subject to the same 
conditions outlined in Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarm. 27 
-"Case 1/81,n. 18 above,para. 10. 
•' ibid., para. 11. 
ibid., para. 13. 
" N. 7 above. 
Joined Cases C-71-73/94 Eiirim-Pharm GmbH v. Beirersdorf AG [1996] E . C . R . 3603. However, 
Advocate General Sharpston is of the opinion that the Case 102/77 Hoffman (n. 7 above) and Cases 
C-427/93 etc. (n. 14 above) conditions 'do not apply where a parallel importer markets in one 
Member State a pharmaceutical product imported from another Member State in its original internal 
and external packaging to which the parallel importer has applied an additional external label:' see 
Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-348/04 Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward 
Ltd. (delivered on 6 April 2006, not yet reported), para. 42. The ruling of the E C J in this case is 
therefore eagerly awaited. 
Advocate General Sharpston, ibid., para. 41. 
*^ Case C-349/95 Loendersloot v. George Ballantine & Son Ltd [1997] E .C .R. 6227. 
N. 7 above. 
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The ECJ's decision in Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarn?^ provides the legal 
framework for the unauthorised use of trademarks in the course of repackaging. The 
decision has subsequently been amended, most notably by Bristol-Myers Squibb v. 
Paranova~^ and Boehringer v. Swingward and Dowelhurst?^ These rulings have 
affected the balance struck between the trademark proprietors' right to oppose 
unauthorised use of their intellectual property rights, and the parallel importers' 
rights under the free movement provisions. Before the four conditions as outlined in 
Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarm^^ can be discussed in detail, the effect of the 
Trade Mark Directive^^ on repackaging must be discussed. 
2. The Trade Mark Directive and unauthorised use of trademarks 
The Trade Mark Directive, adopted after the decision in Hoffman-La Roche v. 
Centrafarm}^ effectively enshrines the principle of Community-wide exhaustion of 
trademarks. Article 7(1) state that 'the trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to 
prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the 
Community under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent.''''' Since 
repackaging involves placing the products in a new box with a new trademark, it 
can be argued that the exhaustion principle in Article 7(1) should not apply to 
repackaged goods which have not been put on the 'Community under that 
[particular] trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent.'''^ Naturally, this 
would affect the case-law established by the ECJ before the adoption of the 
Directive. The matter was complicated further by the exception to the exhaustion 
formula introduced in Article 7(2) 'where there exist legitimate reasons for the 
proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where the 
" N. 7 above. 
- ' N . 14 above. 
' ° N . 15 above. 
N. 7 above. 
" Council Directive 89/104 E E C to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade 
marks [1989] O.J. L40/1 
" N. 7 above. 
Directive 89/104, n. 32 above, Art. 7(1). 
ibid, (emphasis added). 
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condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on the 
market.'^^ This Article is perhaps even more important to parallel trade and 
repackaging than Article 7(1). Considering the nature o f pharmaceutical products, it 
is not hard to find legitimate reasons to prevent repackaging, especially in the 
context o f public health and safety, which threatened to restrict the ECJ's previous 
case- law." The ECJ was faced with the compatibihty of Article 7(1) and 7(2) of the 
Trade Mark Directive and repackaging in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova?^ The 
Court found that Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive does not exclude 
repackaged products from the exhaustion of rights principle. To do so would be to 
restrict Articles 28 and 30 EC Treaty and estabhshed case-law. The Court observed 
that 'to accept the argument that the principle of exhaustion under Article 7(1) 
cannot apply i f the importer has repackaged the product and reaffixed the trade 
mark would.. . imply a major alteration to the principles f lowing f rom [the free 
movement provisions] of the Treaty.'^^ Reaffirming its previous case-law, the Court 
held that 'the prohibition on quantitative restrictions and measures having 
equivalent effect applies not only to national measures but also to those emanating 
from Community institutions.''"' In order to circumvent Article 7(2) the ECJ 
interpreted the word 'especially' so as to show that the 'case envisaged is given 
only as an example.'"" Article 30 EC Treaty and Article 7 o f the Trade Mark 
Directive pursue the same result, namely to protect trademark rights, and must 
therefore be given the same interpretation. Article 7 must be read in conjunction 
with the Court's case-law establishing that derogation from the free movement of 
goods principle is only permissible in so far as it aims to protect the specific subject 
matter of intellectual property rights.''^ The ECJ restated that intellectual property 
proprietors may oppose parallel importation of repackaged goods bearing a 
" Directive 89/104, n. 32 above, Art. 7(2). 
See e.g. Koutrakos, n. 3 above, 54. 
N. 14 above. Paranova, a parallel importer, acquired pharmaceutical products manufactured and 
trademarked by Bristol-Myers Squibb in Member States with low-price regimes, repackaged the 
products and re-affixed Bristol-Myers Squibb's trademark on the new packaging before being sold 
by Paranova in higher-priced Member States, primarily Denmark and Sweden. 
^' ibid., para. 35. 
ibid., paras. 35-36. 
ibid., para. 39. 
ibid., paras. 47-48. 
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reaffixed trademark, unless the parallel importer has fulf i l led the conditions set out 
in Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarm.'^^ Before these conditions, applicable to 
repackaged, relabelled, and rebranded products alike, are discussed in detail, a 
comprehensive discussion on rebranding is necessary as a legal and practical 
distinction can be drawn between repackaging/relabelling and rebranding. 
3. Rebranding 
The difference between repackaging/relabelling and rebranding is that the parallel 
importer does not merely re-affix the trademark on the new packaging, but actually 
affixes a different trademark. Rebranding tends to occur when manufacturers 
market products using different brand names throughout the Community. It is 
important to remember that under a centralised Community marketing authorisation 
a single product name must be used throughout the Community.'*'* It is therefore 
essential that only products benefiting from national marketing authorisations and 
marketing authorisations granted under the mutual recognition procedure are 
allowed to use different product names in different Member States. 
Linguistic differences are inevitable due to the existence of 20 official languages in 
the EC, their respective subtleties and the different alphabets and script (Greek). 
AstraZeneca, for example, markets the stomach acid-lowering product "Losec" 
throughout the EU, but uses the brand name "Mopral" in France (because of the 
meaning of "I'leau sec"). Pfizer markets "Norvasc" in most Member States, but 
calls it "Norvas" in Spain because "c" cannot end a word in Spanish."*^ National 
health authorities may also have requested that a certain name may or may not be 
N. 7 above. 
However, the E C J has held that in exceptional circumstances relating to the protection of health 
and human life, variations to the package layout and product name may be allowed. National laws 
precluding the use of a particular brand name, which may prevent market access, may be such an 
exception. See Case T-I23/00 Thomae GmbH v. Commission [2002] E C R 11-5193; and chapter 
3(2.1) above. 
*^  See European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) , 'The single 
trademark issue - the importance of trade mark rights for medicines,' Position paper (June 2002), 
(<http://www.efi3ia. org/4_pos/legal/Trademarks0602.pdf>). 
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used. The name may be similar to the name of another pharmaceutical product (thus 
constituting a risk to public health and safety), or invoke associations that may lead 
to a risk to public health and safety. Trademark rights may also preclude the use of 
a single product name. I f a similar or identical name is already registered in one 
Member State, the pharmaceutical company must decide whether to use a different 
name, available throughout the Community, or to simply use a slightly different 
name in the Member State concerned. Bayer, for example, markets "Ciproxin" 
throughout the Community, but use the brand name "Ciprobay" in Germany due to 
prior trademark rights. Speculative trademark owners are also a growing concern 
for pharmaceutical companies. A choice must be made between paying an 
excessive price for the trademark rights, or to use a different trademark in the 
Member State concerned.''^ 
Preventing parallel importers from marketing products under different brand names 
in the Member States of exportation and importation may obstruct intra-Community 
trade. The ECJ was given a chance to discuss this issue in Centrafarm v. American 
Home Products.'^^ The Court recalled that the right granted to the trademark 
proprietor to prohibit the affixing of a trademark not originally affixed to the 
product is part of the specific subject matter of the trademark, and only the 
proprietor may confer an identity on the product. The proprietor is therefore 
justified, imder Article 30 EC Treaty, in prohibiting such interference with its goods 
and trademark. However, the Court also held that prohibiting a third party from 
unauthorised usage of the frademark would constitute a restriction on Community 
trade under Article 28 EC Treaty, i f the practice o f using different trademarks in 
different Member States had been adopted to prevent parallel imports, and therefore 
to artificially partition the common market. 
E F P I A 'Single trademark,' n. 45 above, 8. 
N. 10 above. Centrafarm, a parallel importer, acquired products manufactured by AHP and 
marketed them using the trademark 'Serenid' in the UK. The products were subsequently 
repackaged, and the trademark 'Seresta' affixed to the new packaging before marketing in the 
Netherlands. 
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The issue o f rebranding was finally resolved by the ECJ in Pharmacia & UpJohn v. 
Paranova.^^ UpJohn, a pharmaceutical manufacturer, claimed that Paranova, a 
parallel importer, was in breach of Danish intellectual property laws by affixing a 
different trademark to the repackaged products. The manufacturer also claimed that 
Community measures cannot justify such actions since there are objective grounds 
justifying the use of different trade names in different Member States where the 
product is to be marketed. Paranova claimed the different trademarks were in reality 
the same, and so the trademark proprietor had exhausted his trademark rights when 
the goods were first marketed. In the alternate - and this is the interesting claim -
Paranova claimed that the system of using different trademarks throughout the 
Community amounts to artificial partitioning of the market, and therefore not 
compatible with Articles 28 and 30 EC Treaty. 
The ECJ established that the national Court was proceeding on the assumption that 
UpJohn had used different trademarks in Denmark, France and Greece to market 
clindamycin. ' I t is thus in the light of Article 36 [30] of the Treaty that the legality 
of the trademark proprietor's opposition to the replacement of the trade mark falls 
to be assessed.''*' It is also established that Article 7 o f the Trade Mark Directive^^ 
and Article 30 EC Treaty must be given the same interpretation in order to protect 
the fundamental interests of the free movement of goods provisions within the 
single market. 
The ECJ confirmed Centrafarm v. American Home Products^^ but stated that it 
cannot be justified i f it amounts to an artificial partitioning of the market. More 
importantly, the ECJ continued by saying that 'that condition cannot be applied 
differently depending on whether the original trade mark is reaffixed after 
repackaging or replaced, unless separate rules are justified by objective differences 
' Case C-379/97 Pharmacia & UpJohn S/A v. Paranova A/S [1999] E .C .R. 6927, 
' ibid., para. 29. 
°^ N. 32 above. 
'^ N. 10 above. 
189 
between the two situations.'" It can however be argued that there is a difference 
between the pracfice of reaffixing and replacing. The practice of using different 
trademarks was not adopted with the intention of partitioning the market. Moreover, 
the right to affix a trademark, and to place a new trademark on a product, thus 
changing its identity, is part of the specific subject matter o f a trademark and is 
therefore a right only granted to the trademark proprietor. The ECJ, however, ruled 
that it does not matter whether the products are merely repackaged and the 
trademark re-affixed, or whether the trademark is replaced with another trademark, 
since in both cases the 'parallel importer is interfering with a trademark that do not 
belong to him.'^^ The practice of using different trademarks throughout the 
Community w i l l lead to a partitioning of the market regardless of the trademark 
proprietor's intention. Rebranding is therefore necessary in order to enable intra-
Community trade. 'The condition of artificial partitioning of the markets between 
Member States, as defined by the Court in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova,^^ thus 
applies where a parallel importer replaces the original trade mark by that used by 
the proprietor in the Member State of import . ' " However, this means that the 
condition of necessity as applied by the Court in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. 
Paranova'^ also applies in circumstances of rebranding. The condition of necessity 
w i l l be satisfied i f objecting to rebranding would effectively hinder access to the 
importing Member State market. This would be the case, for example, i f national 
legislation prohibits the parallel importer from importing and marketing the goods 
in the importing Member State with the trademark used on the exporting Member 
State market. This could be for reasons of consumer safety i f the trademark is liable 
to mislead consumers. It is for the national court to determine, in each specific case, 
whether replacing the trademark with the trademark used in the importing Member 
State is objectively necessary.^^ However, the ECJ made it clear that 'the condition 
" Case C-379/97, n. 48 above, para. 32. 
" ibid., paras. 37-38. The view taken by the Court, that there is no objective difference between 
rebranding and mere trademark re-affixing, has been criticised; I. Forrester, 'The Repackaging of 
Trade Marked Pharmaceuticals in Europe: Recent Developments,' [2000] 22 E.I.P.R. 512, 516. 
Cases C-427/93 etc., n. 14 above. 
" Case C-379/97, n. 48 above, para. 40. 
N. 14 above. Further discussed in section 4 below. 
" Case C-379/97, n. 48 above, paras. 43 and 45. 
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of necessity w i l l not be satisfied i f replacement of the trademark is explicable solely 
58 
by the parallel importer's attempt to secure a commercial advantage.' 
This decision left many questions unanswered. Did it overrule Centrafarm v. 
American Home Products,^'^ or merely expand it? In Centrafarm v. American Home 
Products'^ the Court said that rebranding is not allowed unless it would lead to a 
partitioning of the internal market. In Pharmacia & UpJohn v. Paranovct^ the 
Court ruled that rebranding is only allowed i f it fiilfils a 'necessity' test, i.e. when 
the use o f different trademarks on the importing and exporting market partitions the 
market to such an extent that rebranding is 'necessary.' The ECJ also gave clear 
guidance to the effect that rebranding is not allowed when done in order to secure a 
commercial advantage. The Court did not define 'necessity' any further. However, 
i f the use of different trademarks throughout the Community partitions the market, 
and therefore hinders parallel importation, rebranding should be considered 
'necessary.' 
It is interesting that the ECJ took the view that the requirement of market 
partitioning as set out in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova^' 'has the practical 
advantage that it does not require national courts to assess evidence o f intention, 
which is notoriously difficult to prove.'^^ For some reason the ECJ finds the notion 
of 'intention' harder to define than the concept of 'necessity.' Furthermore, the rule 
that purely commercial reasons are not sufficient as to necessitate rebranding sits 
badly with the ECJ's general case-law on the free movement o f goods. I f a product 
is marketed under trademark X in the exporting Member State and trademark Y in 
the importing Member State, this may require the parallel importer to spend 
considerably more funds on advertising and marketing for strictly commercial 
reasons. That can be considered an 'obstacle to trade' i f the product in question is 
Case C-379/97, n. 48 above, para. 44. 
59 
" ibid. 
N. 10 above. 
it 
" N. 48 above. 
" N . 14 above. 
Case C-379/97, n. 48 above, para. 41. 
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not a pharmaceutical product.^'* Further, i f two identical products appear on the 
market under different trademarks, this may confuse consumers as to the origin and 
quality of the parallel imported product. Rebranding would therefore be necessary 
for commercial reasons. This shows that a much clearer definition of 'necessity' is 
needed. However, in paragraph 39 of its ruling the ECJ states that '...where the 
repackaging with reaffixing or the replacement of the trademark is necessary to 
enable the products to be marketed by the parallel importer in the importing 
Member State, there are obstacles to intra-Community trade...'^^ This seem to 
suggest that where repackaging is necessary, rebranding is allowed. As a result, 
rebranded, as well as repackaged/relabelled products, must f u l f i l the four conditions 
set out in Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarm^^ in order for the unauthorised use of 
the trademark to come within the exhaustive effect of Articles 28 and 30 EC Treaty. 
These conditions are discussed below, beginning with the 'market partitioning' 
(commonly referred to as the 'necessity') condition. 
4. Market partitioning, effective market access and the need to repackage 
Partitioning of the market occurs when the packaging o f pharmaceutical products 
prevents effective access to the market. This could be the result of national laws in 
the importing Member State, the most obvious being laws only authorising 
pharmaceutical products sold in certain package sizes.Sickness insurance rules on 
68 
reimbursement of sickness expenses may depend on the size of the packaging. 
Well-established practice, recommended by professional bodies such as pharmacists 
and doctors, may amount to partitioning of the market i f they recommend 
dispensation in certain package sizes.^' The ECJ used the phrase ' in particular' 
" It could be seen to be a measure equivalent to a quantitative restriction (see Case 8/74 Procureur 
du Roi v. Dassonville [1974] E . C . R . 837). The Cases C-267-268/91 Criminal proceedings against 
Keck and Mithouard [1993] E . C . R . 6097 'selling arrangement' exception seems unlikely to apply 
since the measure is not non-discriminatory - it directly affects importers, and hence obstructs the 
free movement of goods. 
" Case C-379/97, n. 48 above, para. 39. 
N. 7 above. 




when listing measures that would amount to market partitioning, suggesting that it 
is not an exhaustive list.™ As a result of the diversity o f such measures throughout 
the Community, the first condition for repackaging identified by the Court requires 
a parallel importer to establish 'that the use o f the frade mark right by the owner, 
having regard to the marketing system which he has adopted, w i l l contribute to the 
artificial partitioning [of markets] between Member States.'^' This wording 
suggests that 'artificial ' refers to some degree of intention on the part of the 
intellectual property owner.^^ In Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova^^ the Court 
stressed that it is not necessary for the parallel importer to prove that the intellectual 
property owner deliberately sought to partition the market by using various forms of 
packaging. Hence, as discussed above in relation to rebranding, showing intention 
is not required.^'* 'Ar t i f ic ia l ' merely refers to the protection o f the specific subject 
matter. I f the repackaging does not interfere with the specific subject matter of the 
trademark, the resultant partitioning of the market is artificial, in the sense that it 
w i l l not be justifiable under the EC Treaty.^^ 
This 'objective' test restricts the intellectual property owner to the extent that he can 
never lawfully exercise his intellectual property rights. I f market partitioning can be 
showed, the trademark owner w i l l be unable to exercise his trademark rights. 
However, it should also be emphasised that repackaging is not allowed for purely 
commercial reasons; as such reasons alone would not render the market partitioning 
'artificial. ' '^ In consequence, the test is very straightforward, namely ' i f market 
'° Cases 427/93 etc., n. 14 above, para. 53. 
" ibid., para. 49. See also Case 102/77, n. 7 above, para. 14. As noted by Koutrakos (n. 3 above, 66): 
'in rendering effective access to the market the key to the determination of whether repackaging is 
objectively justified, the Court introduces consistency in its overall free movement of goods case-
law.' The definition of the outer limit of measures having equivalent effect to quantitative 
restrictions under Article 28 E C Treaty is increasingly focusing on 'market access.' 
See F. Castillo de la Torre, 'Trademarks and free movement of pharmaceuticals in the European 
Community: To partition or not to partition the market,' (1997) 19 E.I.P.R. 304, 306. 
" N . 14 above. 
In Case C-379/97, n. 48 above, para. 41, the Court stated that intention is 'notoriously difficult' to 
prove. 
" ibid., para. 57. 
This can be inferred from ibid., para. 44. For example, if the parallel importer is seeking to use 
repackaging as a springboard for marketing generic products or to build up a 'customer following' 
for its products. See section 4.2 below. 
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partitioning can be showed.' I f this test is fulf i l led, it can only be rebutted i f proven 
necessary to preserve the guarantee o f origin. However, i f the intellectual property 
owner, due to national laws in the importing Member State, markets a product using 
many different package sizes in the importing Member State, and one of these sizes 
is also available on the exporting market, this does not render repackaging 
unnecessary. Partitioning of the market would still occur even i f the importer has 
access to part of the market.'^ However, repackaging w i l l not be allowed i f other 
measures would be viable. This means that the need to repackage must comply with 
the Community principle of proportionality. Intellectual property owners may 
oppose repackaging in new external packaging i f relabelling would suffice to 
market the product in the importing Member State. Similarly, repackaging in new 
external packaging when a new translated information leaflet inserted into the 
original packaging would have been sufficient under national regulations w i l l not be 
78 
considered proportional. 
The Court has been very pro-integration and has prohibited intellectual property 
owners fi-om opposing repackaging as long as the actions undertaken by the parallel 
importer have been proportionate to the need to repackage or otherwise alter the 
presentation of the product. National courts also take proportionality into 
consideration when applying the ECJ's rulings in national litigation. In Bristol-
Myers Squibb v. Paranova^^ the Danish Supreme Court, having received the 
preliminary ruling from the ECJ, ruled in favour of the claimant intellectual 
property owner. Paranova's claim that 'sealing' of the packages by Boehringer 
Ingelheim made it necessary to repackage, since the boxes could not be sufficiently 
sealed after an information leaflet had been inserted, was rejected.^'' The Supreme 
" Cases C-427/93 etc., n. 14 above, para. 54. However, see the special rules applicable to centrally 
authorised pharmaceutical products: Case C-433/00 Aventis GmbH v. Koiilpharma GmbH & MTK 
GmbH[2002] E . C . R . 7761. See also chapter 7(3.1) below. 
Cases C-427/93 etc., ibid., para. 55. See D. Dryden and S. Midlemiss, 'Parallel importation of 
repackaged goods: Is 'necessity' really necessary,' (2003) J .B.L. 82, for discussion of the limitations 
of the market partitioning condition. 
' ' N . 14 above. 
Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova A/S [2003] (Unreported) (HR(DK)), joined case (reference) 
with Case 272/2001 Paranova A/S v. CH. Boeliringer GmbH & Otiiers [2004] E.T.M.R. 24. See K. 
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Court also rejected Paranova's claim that repackaging was necessary following the 
removal of an article from the original package, which allegedly rendered the box 
too big.*' Paranova had over-labelled certain products, only leaving Boehringer 
Ingelheims' trademark visible through a 'window.' The 'window labelling' was not 
prohibited in itself, in line with Pfizer v. Eurim-Pharm^^ but the extensive over-
labelling was held disproportionate. 
The 'market partitioning' test fails to consider one important factor, that of 
consumer preference. Following Merck v. Paranova,^^ where the ECJ ruled that 
repackaging is objectively necessary i f without such repackaging effective access to 
the market would be hindered, this test, in essence relying on the preferences of a 
'significant proportion of consumers,' has come to be known as the 'consumer 
preference test.' This test is an extension of the Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova^'^ 
'market partitioning' condition. 
4.1 The customer preference test 
The ruling in Merck v. Paranova^^ heralded the Court's new approach to 'market 
access.' The Court failed to define the concept of a 'significant proportion of 
customers,' but nevertheless allowed repackaging when relabelling had been 
sufficient to satisfy national legislation, following recommendations by national 
authorities in the importing Member State to the effect that there was significant 
customer resistance to relabelled products. 
Dyekjaer-Hansen, 'Denmark: Trade Marks -parallel imports - rebranding and repackaging' (2003) 
25 E.I.P.R.N183. 
Dyekjaer-Hansen, n. 80 above. 
' ' N . 18 above. 
" Case C-443/99 Merck. Sharp & Dohme GmbH v. Paranova GmbH [2002] E . C . R . 3703: Paranova 
repackaged products after the Austrian authorities had recommended replacement packaging and not 
mere relabelling. Paranova did not rely on statistics or reports showing that there was resistance to 
relabelled products from a significant proportion of consumers. Even though the size of the packages 
was the same in the exporting Member State and Austria, the E C J held that repackaging is 
objectively necessary if without such repackaging effective access to the market would be hindered. 
The fact that national authorities recommended repackaging was strong evidence in support of 
Paranova's claim that repackaging was necessary. 
**N. 14 above. 
N. 83 above. 
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In Boehringer Ingelheim v. Dowelhurst, the defendant parallel importer claimed 
that repackaging was necessary in order to gain effective access to the market, but 
the claimant manufacturer argued that 'the reluctance of consumers to accept over-
stickered products is not a legitimate reason for repackaging.'^^ The Court repeated 
established case-law, stating that trademark proprietors cannot rely on their national 
trademark rights when repackaging is necessary in order to overcome market 
partitioning, and parallel importers are not allowed to repackage solely on grounds 
of gaining a commercial advantage.*^ 
'However, there may exist on a market, or on a substantial part of it, such strong 
resistance from a significant proportion of consumers to relabelled pharmaceutical 
products that there must be held to be a hindrance to effective market access. In 
those circumstances, repackaging of the pharmaceutical products would not be 
explicable solely by the attempt to secure a commercial advantage. The purpose 
would be to achieve effective market access. 
This takes 'necessity' beyond national regulations and conscious partitioning of the 
market, and in essence creates a 'customer preference' test to be applied by national 
courts. This is a difficult test for national courts to apply because no clear guidelines 
exist as to what is a 'significant proportion' o f customers. The term demands two 
separate definitions; a definition of 'customer' and a definition of a 'significant 
proportion' [of customers]. 
Mr Justice Laddie, in the first Boehringer Ingelheim v. Swingward U K High Court 
judgment, considered that both consumers and pharmacists come within the notion 
of 'customer.'*' However, the pharmaceutical industry, especially the 
pharmaceutical wholesale industry, is very price competitive. The prime factor for 
pharmacists is the price of the pharmaceutical product, not the box. It is more 
Case C-143/00, n. 15 above, para. 40. 
See C. Stothers, 'Are parallel imports bad medicine? Repackaging of trade-marked 
pharmaceuticals within the E U , ' (2002) 23 E . C . L . R . 417, for discussion. 
Case C-143/00, n. 15 above, para. 52. 
Glaxo Group Ltd v. Dowelhurst Ltd [2000] 2 C.M.L.R. 571, para. 165. 
196 
plausible to see patients being concerned with the appearance of the pharmaceutical 
product than pharmacists. Even though it can be argued that pharmacists can 
actively inform patients about the safety o f reboxed and relabelled pharmaceuticals, 
and thus overcome this barrier, 'this is not the real world - poorly people want their 
pills, not explanations.'^'' Similarly, in MPA Pharma v. Rhone Poulenc^^ the ECJ 
made a distinction between pharmaceutical products sold to hospitals and 
pharmaceutical products sold to consumers through pharmacies.The presentation 
of the product is of little importance to hospital patients since professionals 
administer the pharmaceutical products. The presentation of the product is of 
greater importance when they are sold to consumers through pharmacies, even 
though the fact that the pharmaceutical products are subject to a prescription by a 
doctor should give consumers some confidence.Consumers/patients are therefore 
the 'customers' most concerned with the appearance o f the products. However, this 
simple analysis fails to consider that pharmacists, acting in a market economy, are 
in theory representatives of their customers' demands; and it is in their interest to 
satisfy that demand. Pharmacists, as representatives o f their customers, are therefore 
the most competent group to assess 'customer preference.' 
As for the definition of a 'significant proportion' [of customers], the defendants in 
the first Boehringer Ingelheim v. Swingward High Court judgment relied on the 
results of a survey.^ "* There are between 9000 - 9500 independent pharmacies in the 
UK. Questiormaires were sent out to between 3500 - 4000 pharmacies. 1,153 out of 
1200 pharmacists [replies] stated that they preferred re-boxed, whilst 1,116 said that 
their patients preferred repackaged. Only 26 preferred relabelled, and 728 stated 
that they would sell more o f the product i f it were repackaged, whilst 386 stated that 
they would sell the same. The claimant manufacturers answered by relying on a 
similar report aimed at pharmacists: 
Per Lord Justice Jacobs in (the second U K case of) Boehringer Ingelheim v. Swingward and 
Boehringer Ingelheim v. Dowelhurst [2004] 3 C.M.L.R. 3, para. 50. 
" Case C-232/94 MPA GmbH v. Rhone-Poidenc GmbH [1996] E .C .R. 3671 
ibid., para. 48 
" ibid. This paragraph concerned the 'brand reputation' condition (section 6 below) but nevertheless 
is good obiter dicta which can be applied to the 'customer preference' test. 
" N . 89 above, para. 187. 
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'Pharmacies buy based on price but they are very aware o f the varying quaUty of 
product and availability. Many pharmacists spoke of changing suppliers because of 
out-of-stock problems or issues with the quality of the product. In some cases, the 
pharmacist refused to use [parallel importers] who did not repackage into English 
language packs, while in others, although they did not refuse foreign language 
packs, they were less happy about their use.'^ ^ Many pharmacists claimed that they 
could overcome consumer reluctance to relabelled (and parallel imported) products 
by carefully explaining that the products are identical to the original trademark 
owners' products. 
This shows the complexity, and lack of objectivity, of the 'customer preference' 
test. The U K Court of Appeal acknowledged that there is a 'customer preference' 
test, but failed to define the term 'significant proportion' [of customers] as the 
Court decided to refer questions regarding what form of relabelling and reboxing 
considered necessary, which is now pending before the ECJ.^^ 
The Danish Supreme Court faced similar facts when ruling in Bristol-Myers Squibb 
V . Paranova.^^ Before the Supreme Court could apply the ECJ ruling in Bristol-
Myers Squibb v. Paranova,^'^ the ECJ had amended the test so as to include the 
'customer preference test' established in Boehringer Ingelheim v. Dowelhurst.^'^^ 
The defendant relied on an A I M survey; similar to the survey relied on in 
Boehringer Ingelheim v. Dowelhurst}^^ The survey showed that pharmacists 
generally preferred repackaged and rebranded pharmaceutical products to 
relabelled. "^ ^ However, Paranova had successfully marketed repackaged and 
rebranded pharmaceutical products since 1999. The 'customer preference test' 
' ' N . 89 above, para. 179. 
ibid. The report, prepared by Taylor Nelson Ltd., was commissioned by GlaxoWellcome and the 
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI). 
Case C-348/04 Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd [2004] O.J. C273/11. See Opinion of 
Advocate General Sharpston, n. 24 above. See also section 4.2 below. 
Case 272/2001 (Denmark), n. 80 above. See Dyekjaer-Hansen, n. 80 above, N184. 
" N . 14 above. 
'""N. 15 above. 
"" N. 90 above, para. 187. 
Case 272/2001, n. 80 above, para. 13-15. 
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could therefore not be applied, since the resistance to relabelled pharmaceutical 
products was a consequence of Paranova's own action by letting pharmacists 
become accustomed to repackaged and rebranded products. Indeed, i t is likely that 
pharmacists would have grown accustomed to relabelled instead o f repackaged 
pharmaceutical products i f Paranova had decided to market relabelled products as 
early as in 1999."^^ In consequence, repackaging is not necessary where the 
resistance to relabelled products can, over time, be overcome.'*''* A survey should 
therefore be carried out before first marketing, so as to be able to argue that 
repackaging is necessary in order to access the market for a first sale. 
The 'customer preference test' means that repackaging is now allowed not only 
when it is necessary for legal reasons, but also when it is necessary for practical 
reasons. This w i l l most likely lead to new and innovative claims by parallel 
importers, relying on expert advice and specialist reports. It can be claimed that the 
test is important for the establishment of a common market. However, i f the parallel 
importer can lawfully market a product in its original packaging, or by using re-
labelling, repackaging may be disproportionate. In a market economy it should be 
for the parallel importer to overcome consumer tendencies, being able over time to 
influence customer preference. The 'customer preference test' may therefore be an 
important pro-integration policy in the short run, but unnecessary in the long run.'"^ 
4.2 'Necessity' of co-branding 
In order to create a following for their products, parallel importers frequently attach 
their own brand and logo to the repackaged or relabelled products, or simply 
reattach the original manufacturer's brand name in conjunction with the parallel 
importer's distinct 'get-up' (e.g. colours and lines arranged in a distinctive manner). 
This is often referred to as 'co-branding.' For example, the U K based parallel 
importer Dowelhurst has created its own brand called 'Concept Generics.' 
ibid. 
Dyekjaer-Hansen, n. 80 above, N184. 
This argument was raised by Merck in Case C-443/99, n. 83 above, para. 18. 
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Dowelhurst advertises this brand without reference to the manufacturer's 
trademark, and does not attach the trademark to the new packaging even though the 
packages contain the trademark owner's products.'*'^ 
The issue of co-branding can be divided into two parts. First, can co-branding ever 
be considered necessary in order to gain 'market access,' and secondly, does co-
branding affect the specific subject matter of the trademark? It can be argued that 
co-branding is carried out for purely 'commercial reasons' i f mere 
repackaging/relabelling or rebranding would have been sufficient in order to gain 
market access. Considering that repackaging/relabelling or rebranding is not 
allowed for purely 'commercial reasons,' the same rule must apply to co-branding. 
This can, hypothetically, be rebutted by proving that co-branding is 'necessary' in 
order to gain market access due to resistance from a significant proportion of 
customers to products that have not been co-branded. However, the 'customer 
preference test' concerns the right to repackage instead o f relabel products, 
rendering it unlikely that the ECJ would consider it 'necessary' to co-brand i f 
repackaging would have been sufficient, or, indeed, that the 'necessity' of co-
branding would justify repackaging i f relabelling would have been sufficient to gain 
market access.'"'' The relevant question is instead whether co-branding is allowed 
after it has been established that repackaging is objectively necessary. The necessity 
to repackage and co-brand should therefore not be part o f the same 'necessity' test, 
but two separate issues to be assessed individually. 
This reasoning was adopted by the EFTA Court when delivering judgment in 
Paranova v. Merck}'^^ Coloured stripes along the outer packaging, designed so as to 
See N. Gross and L . Harrold, 'Fighting for pharmaceutical profits - the decision in Boehringer 
Ingelheim v Swingward,' (2002) 24 E.I.P.R. 497, 499. 
In Case 272/2001 (Denmark), n. 80 above, para. 23, The Danish Supreme Court held that 
Paranova's 'window-labelhng,' relabelling the entire package in its own distinctive colour and 
design scheme, only leaving Boehringer Ingelheim's trademark visible in order to make it look like a 
repackaged product, was unnecessary in order to market the products. It is not clear whether the 
Court only considered the extensive relabelling to be disproportional, or whether the 'window 
labelling' was considered co-branding, and therefore prohibited. See Dyekjaer-Hansen, n. 80 above, 
Nl 84; and pp. 194-195 above. 
'"^  Case E-3/02 Paranova AS v. Merck & Co Inc. [2003] 40 C.M.L.R. 7 
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resemble the original packaging by the manufacturer, were used by Paranova on 
parallel imported pharmaceutical products in Norway. According to the Court, the 
parallel importer must be considered to be on 'basically equal footing with the 
manufacturer and trade mark proprietor within the limits set by the [Trade Mark] 
Directive,' after the products have been lawfully repackaged and the trademark re-
affixed.'^^ The 'market partitioning/necessity' condition is therefore only relevant 
when determining the parallel importer's right to repackage as such, but not to the 
parallel importer's particular packaging design. It follows from Christian Dior v. 
Evora}^^ that the trademark proprietor's right to oppose use o f the trademark in 
relation to advertising and/or package design is exhausted simultaneously with the 
right to oppose marketing of the products. The trademark proprietor wi l l therefore 
have lost his right to prevent co-branding after it is established that repackaging is 
necessary in order to gain access to the importing market. However, in line with 
Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Parawova,"' the repackaging/co-branding must not be 
done in such a way that it is liable to damage the reputation of the trademark."^ 
Untidy packaging may damage the reputation of the trademark. A further basis of 
damage to the reputation of the trademark may occur i f the repackaging is done in a 
way which may give the impression that there is a commercial connection between 
the repackager and the trademark proprietor, thus jeopardising the guarantee of 
origin."^ This could amount to a 'legitimate' interest for the purpose of Article 7(2) 
of the Trade Mark Directive."'* ' I n assessing whether the use o f coloured stripes 
would in fact give rise to such an impression, the national court must take into 
account the level of knowledge and consciousness of doctors and pharmacists, since 
Case E-3/02, n. 108 above, para. 45. 
"° Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV [1997] E . C . R . 6013 
N. 14 above. 
"" Case E-3/02, n. 108 above, para. 50. This is further discussed in section 6 below. 
See Case C-63/97 BMW AG v. Deenik [1999] E .C .R. 905, para. 55, where the ECJ held that the 
use of the trademark gave rise to the impression that the reseller's business was affiliated with the 
trademark proprietor's distribution network. See also Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in 
Case C-348/04, n. 24 above, para. 66, where the Advocate General suggests that an 'incorrect 
suggestion of a commercial connection [is] capable in principle of damaging the trade mark's 
reputation.' 
""N. 32 above. Art. 7(2). 
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the products at issue are prescription d r u g s . ' I t is 'immaterial,' in this context, 
that the parallel importer takes advantage o f a particular graphic design in order to 
create a 'brand line. '"^ The fact that parallel importers must state the name of the 
manufacturer on the new packaging w i l l in any event prevent parallel importers 
from marketing the products as 'their own. ' ' 
The issue of co-branding therefore falls to be decided in the light o f damage to the 
brand reputation in conjunction with public health and safety considerations, rather 
than a necessity test."^ However, like the 'customer preference test,' a final 
conclusion on the legitimacy of co-branding cannot be made until the ECJ has 
decided in the latest referral made by the U K Court of Appeal in the Boehringer v. 
Swingwarct^^ saga. It is hoped that the Court w i l l follow Advocate General 
Sharpston's Opinion, in which the Advocate General states that 'the requirement 
that repackaging be necessary...appUes merely to the fact of reboxing and does not 
extend to the precise manner and style thereof,''^'' thus approving the EFTA Court's 
judgment in Paranova v. Merck.^^^ Whether the damage caused to the trademark 
owner by co-branding is sufficiently serious to amount to a 'legitimate reason' for 
the trademark owner to oppose further marketing is a question of fact for the 
national court. In consequence, national courts may implement a wide definition of 
'legitimate reason' for the purpose o f prohibiting co-branding, as parallel traders 
w i l l not be able to show that such (particular) co-branding is 'necessary' in order to 
gain market access. 
Case E-3/02, n. 108 above, para. 53. 
"SWrf., para. 54. 
Discussed in section 7 below. 
The Danish Supreme Court, in Orifarm A/S (unreported), interpreted the judgment by the E F T A 
Court to mean that the necessity criterion is not applicable in matters that may involve certain 
elements of co-branding. Orifarm's excessive co-branding was held to infringe the manufacturer's 
trademark rights. See K. Dyekjaer-Hansen, 'Denmark: Trade Marks - Parallel Imports,' (2004) 26 
E.1.P.R.N108 
Case C-348/04, n. 97 above. 
'"° Advocate General Sharpston in ibid, n. 24 above, para. 100. 
Case E-3/02, n. 108 above, para. 45; and ibid., paras. 49-52. 
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5. Not affect the original condition of the product 
The ECJ has repeatedly held that a trademark proprietor may oppose repackaging 
on grounds of it having an adverse effect on the original condition of the 
pharmaceutical product, as this would infringe the specific subject matter of the 
trademark. I f the quality of the product is affected, due to interference by the 
parallel importer or repackager, this w i l l affect the guarantee o f origin.'^^ This was 
one of the original conditions in Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarm,^^^ most recently 
discussed and clarified by the ECJ in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova:^^^ 
'As regards pharmaceutical products, it follows from the same paragraph in 
Hoffman-La Roche that repackaging must be regarded as having been carried out 
in circumstances not capable of affecting the original condition of the product 
where, for example, the trade mark owner has placed the product on the market in 
double packaging and the repackaging affects only the external layer, leaving the 
inner packaging intact, or where the repackaging is carried out under the 
supervision of a public authority in order to ensure that the product remains 
intact 
As long as the product is not removed from its 'inner packaging' and directly 
exposed, the repackaging w i l l not be such as to affect the original condition of the 
product.'^^ Removing the products from their original outer packaging into a new 
container, inserting a new information leaflet and applying self-stick labels, or the 
The Court has ruled that, if the inner packaging is not affected, 'the essential function of a trade 
mark as a guarantee of origin is safeguarded. The consumer or end user is not misled as to the origin 
of the products, and does in fact receive products manufactured under the sole supervision of the 
trade mark owner:' Case C-232/94, n. 91 above, para. 39. 
N. 7 above. 
N. 14 above. The E C J has consistently rejected a number of claims from trademark owners and 
manufacturers concerning the risks involved with repackaging of pharmaceutical products due to 
their toxic and potentially hazardous nature. For a discussion on this topic, see Forrester, n. 53 
above, 514-515. 
ibid., para. 60. 
Case 102/77, n. 7 above, para. 14. In Case C-232/94, n. 91 above, para. 30, the Court made it 
clear that 'the concept of adverse effects on the original condition of the product refers to the 
condition of the product inside the packaging.' 
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inclusion and substitution of an extra article without interfering with the inner 
packaging was not held to affect the original quality o f the products in Bristol-
Myers Squibb v. Paranova}^^ As such, the mere over-labelling of inhalers, flasks, 
phials, or ampoules, by its very nature, is unlikely to affect the original quality of 
the products. Relabelling, leaving the inner packaging intact, only affecting the 
outer packaging, cannot affect the quality of the product since it has not been 
interfered with. 
However, it is not only the risk of direct interference with the actual chemical 
product that may pose a threat to public health and safety. Mixing pharmaceutical 
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products from batches with different use-by dates may have severe consequences. 
A l l pharmaceutical products have use-by dates, and can pose a threat to health i f 
administered past these dates. The storage of the pharmaceutical products may also 
affect quality. Over-lengthy storage or excessive lighting may have detrimental 
effects. The Court does not recognise this: 'those arguments cannot be accepted. It 
is not possible for each hypothetical risk of isolated error to suffice to confer on the 
trade mark owner the right to oppose any repackaging of pharmaceutical products 
in new external packaging.''"' The Court however recognises that omitting certain 
important information relating to the usage instructions, composition, ingredients, 
or information regarding the storage of the product, may have an effect on its 
original condition. An additional article not complying with the user instructions or 
dosage instructions may have the same consequences.'^'' It is for the national court 
to assess whether repackaging has affected the original condition of the repackaged 
product.'^' 
The pharmaceutical industry is characterised by strict regulations, with the majority 
concerning quality control. The low safety threshold set by the ECJ is therefore 
Cases C-427/93 etc., n. 14 above, paras. 61 and 64. 
''^ See chapter 7(3.2.1-2) for a thorough discussion of batch codes and expiry dates within the 
context of public health and safety. 
Cases C-427/93 etc., n. 14 above, para. 63. 
ibid., para. 65. 
ibid., para. 65. 
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surprising. The presumption that repackaging does not alter the original condition 
of the product is a standpoint that contradicts most national regulations governing 
the repackaging process. The ECJ said that the 'hypothetical risk of [an] isolated 
error' is not enough to oppose repackaging.'^^ Quahty flaws in the repackaging of 
'normal' consumer goods may have minor consequences, and can be overlooked i f 
relevant to the integration of the common market. However, quality flaws (isolated 
errors) in repackaging o f pharmaceutical products may have fatal consequences, 
and the common market objective cannot justify taking this risk. It should however 
be remembered that this condition only concerns the conformity o f the trademark 
proprietors' right to exercise their intellectual property rights with the Community's 
free movement of goods provisions. Public health and safety should therefore not be 
affected since the Community's and Member States' quality controls, in 
conjunction with the labelling and package leaflet regulations, discussed in chapter 
7 below, do not consider intellectual property aspects.'^^ 
6. Not affect 'brand reputation' 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova^^'* the ECJ recognised that poor quality or 
defective repackaging can damage the reputation of the trademark. A trademark 
forms part of the identity of a product, and serves to distinguish it from other 
products. As such, the goodwill invested in the trademark serves to give the product 
and brand a reputation and following which may prove a valuable asset both before 
and after patent expiration.'^^ Repackaged products must therefore not be presented 
in such a way as to affect the reputation of the manufacturer's brand.'^^ 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers w i l l have spent much time and funds on creating a 
strong brand reputation. ' I n the case of pharmaceutical products, that is certainly a 
Cases C-427/93 etc., n. 14 above, para. 63. 
The Court had already (in Case 102/77, n. 7 above, para. 10) concluded that in the event the inner 
packaging is not left intact, repackaging would have to be made under the supervision of a public 
authority to satisfy this condition. See Case C-232/94, n. 91 above, para. 32; and chapter 7 below. 
' " N . 14 above. 
See J. Nazerali, S. Hocking and U. Ranasinghe, 'Parallel imports of pharmaceuticals - a 
prescription for success or a free market overdose?,' (1998) 19 E . C . L . R . 332, 334. 
See Hays, n. 4 above, 103, for a general discussion of this condition. 
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sensitive area in which the public is particularly demanding as to the quality and 
integrity of the product, and the presentation of the product may indeed be capable 
of inspiring pubhc confidence in that regard.''^^ 
It can be argued that this condition is especially important in relation to relabelled 
products, since relabelled products can often appear untidy, which contradicts 
manufacturers' response to repackaged products seen in the discussion on whether 
repackaging is necessary in order to gain access to the market.'''^ In fact, 
manufacturers prefer relabelled products to repackaged products even though 
repackaged products often look tidier and as such are less likely to affect the 
reputation of the brand.'^^ The Court, however, states that the 'requirements to be 
met by the presentation of a repackaged pharmaceutical product vary according to 
whether the product is sold to hospitals or, through pharmacies, to consumers. 
The discussion of the definition of 'customer' carried out in the section concerning 
the 'customer preference test' can therefore be applied to this condition. For the 
purpose of the 'customer preference test,' pharmacists were held to come within the 
notion of 'customer' by Mr Justice Laddie.'"*' Pharmacists, acting in a market 
economy, are in theory representatives of their customers' demands; and it is in 
their interest to satisfy that demand."*^ Nevertheless, it is likely that 
consumers/patients are more concerned with the packaging and appearance of the 
product than the brand of the product. Consumers/patients generally prefer 
repackaged to relabelled because such products look tidier, not because they are 
relying on the reputation of that particular brand. Pharmacists and doctors in 
hospitals, on the other hand, are the customers who take brand reputation into 
account when prescribing or buying pharmaceutical products, not least because they 
frequently have many years of experience with different brands. However, it is also 
true that doctors and pharmacists should be experienced enough to know that the 
Cases C-427/93 etc., n. 14 above, para. 76. 
'^ ^ See section 4.1 above. See also section 1 above regarding relabelling, in particular Advocate 
General Sharpston in Case C-348/04, n. 24 above, para. 100. 
See Case C-143/00, n. 15 above, para. 52. 
Case C-232/94, n. 91 above, para. 48 
per Mr Justice Laddie in Glaxo v. Dowelhurst, n. 89 above, para. 165. 
See pp. 196-197 above. 
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particular product in question has been repackaged. Nevertheless, pharmacists are 
the most competent group (of customers) to assess harm to the reputation of the 
brand. Not only as professionals with many years of experience with different 
brands, but also as actors in a market economy eager to satisfy their customers 
demands o f tidily packaged products. 
The condition, however, should not be limited to untidy and poor quality packaging. 
According to Advocate General Sharpston's Opinion in Boehringer v. Swingward 
(currently pending before the ECJ), both inappropriate presentation of the 
trademark and the incorrect suggestion of a conunercial link between the parallel 
importer and the manufacturer may damage the trademark.'''^ There may also be 
other factors affecting the reputation of the brand which are only visible and 
noticeable to pharmacists and doctors. For example, removing the batch codes from 
repackaged products may harm the reputation of the brand.""* Even i f product 
recalls are still possible in the absence of batch codes, they wi l l include a larger 
number o f products being recalled from a wider geographic area. This is hkely to 
harm the manufacturer's brand image due to the extensive information campaign it 
would entail.'"*^ In the event o f a product recall, the parallel trader (who removed 
the batch codes) w i l l not be burdened, whilst the manufacturer w i l l suffer injury to 
his 'brand reputation' as a result of the parallel importer's action. 
The manufacturer should bear the burden of proving interference with his trademark 
rights, as the manufacturer is in the best position to 'assess whether the repackaging 
'"^  Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-348/04, n. 24 above, para. 66. See also section 4.2 above 
re: co-branding; and Case C-63/97, n. 113 above, para. 55. 
Whether or not removing batch codes is compatible with the Community's free movement 
provisions and the Community's labelling and package leaflet regulations will be discussed in 
chapter 7(3.2.2) below; this section will only discuss its impact on 'brand reputation.' 
'"^  For a wider discussion see P. Shepphard, 'Batch codes used in Davidoff The brand owners' 
view,' (2000) 22 E.I.P.R. 147. In a comment on Joined Cases C-4I4-416/99 Zino Davidoff SA v. 
A&G Imports Ltd, & Levi Strauss & Co v. Tesco Stores Ltd [2001] E . C . R . 8691, Jeetun commented 
that 'it may be in the interest of the reputation of the trade mark proprietor if he is able to remove 
defective or sub-standard products through use of batch code numbers. It is for the national court to 
determine whether the removal causes sufficiently serious damage to the reputation of the trade 
mark:' See P. Jeetun, 'Parallel victories,' Ent.L.R. 12 (2001) 210, 215-216. 
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presents no risk, or a possible risk, of damaging the trademark's reputation.''""^ This 
may be more difficult to prove than to prove that the original condition of the 
product has been affected, or indeed to prove that any o f the other conditions have 
not been fulf i l led. Nevertheless, the 'brand reputation' condition, at least, gives the 
trademark proprietor an opportunity to demand that the repackaged product does 
not affect the reputation of the brand; and so may prevent parallel importers from 
abusing their rights by diminishing the goodwill created by the trademark 
proprietor. 
7. Clearly indicate the identity of the repackager 
'Since it is in the trade mark owner's interest that the consumer or end user should 
not be led to believe that the owner is responsible for the repackaging, an indication 
must be given on the packaging of who repackaged the product.'*'*^ This 
requirement was established in Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarm,^'^^ and confirmed 
in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova. It is for the national court to assess whether 
the indication is proper, and 'printed in such a way as to be understood by a person 
with normal eyesight, exercising a normal degree of attentiveness.''^'' The ECJ 
states that ' i t may indeed be in the manufacturer's interest that the consumer or end 
user should not be led to believe that the importer is the owner of the trade mark 
and that the product was manufactured under his supervision.''^' The product 
should therefore clearly state the name of the manufacturer on the outer packaging. 
It is, however, equally important for Uability reasons. I f the repackaged products are 
defective, and it is proved that it is not the result of negligent repackaging, the 
Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-348/04, n. 24 above, para. 98. 
Cases C-427/93 etc., n. 14 above, para. 70. This is 'in the interest of the owner as proprietor of 
the trade mark, and to protect him against any misuse:' (para. 69). The E C J followed the same line 
of reasoning as in Case 102/77, n. 7 above, para. 11, referring to the need to protect the trademark 
owner from 'abuse.' See also chapter 7(3.2) below for a discussion of the requirements under the 
Community's labelling and package leaflet regulations, relating to indicating the name of the 
repackager and parallel importer on the new (so-called) 'blue box.' 
N. 7 above. 
""N. 14 above. 
Cases C-427/93 etc., n. 14 above, para. 71; and Case C-232/94, n. 91 above, para. 44. 
Cases C-427/93 etc., ibid., para. 74, referring to Case 1/81, n. 18 above, para. 11; and Case C -
232/94, ibid., para. 45. 
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manufacturer w i l l be liable for any damage caused. I f the identity of the 
manufacturer is not clearly indicated the products may (hypothetically) be 
considered 'own-brand' products under Council Directive 85/374/EEC'" on 
liability of defective products, transferring any liability from the manufacturer to 
the parallel importer. 
Further, the repackaged product need not indicate whether or not the product was 
repackaged with the consent of the trademark owner. According to the ECJ, stating 
that the parallel imported product is not repackaged with the authorisation of the 
trademark owner may lead consumers to believe that the products are 
illegitimate.'^^ However, stating that repackaging has been authorised by the 
trademark owner could serve as a distinction between parallel imports and 
counterfeit products, since counterfeit pharmaceutical products are often 
repackaged into boxes similar or identical to the original packaging. 
The same requirements w i l l apply i f the trader includes additional articles in the 
new box. The parallel importer must clearly indicate the origin of the additional 
article on the box in order to rebut any liability on behalf o f the trademark owner, 
and avoid applying the manufacturer's trademark to the additional article as this 
would amount to an infringement of the manufacturer's trademark.'^'' The ECJ's 
reasoning in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova has since been applied by national 
courts. In Sony Entertainments v. Tesco,^^^ Tesco was seen as infringing Sony's 
trademark by not clearly indicating that additional adaptors added to Playstation 
boxes manufactured by Sony were not approved and manufactured by Sony. 
Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products [1985] O.J. L210/29. 
Cases C-427/93 etc., n. 14 above, para. 72; and Case C-232/94, n. 91 above, para. 44. 
Cases C-427/93 etc., ibid., paras. 65 and 73: 'he must ensure that the origin of the extra article is 
indicated in such a way as to dispel any impression that the trade mark owner is responsible for it.' 
Such additions of new articles may adversely affect the original condition of the product, depending 
on how the national court views the addition: Hays, n. 4 above, 102. 
Sony Computer Entertainments Inc. v. Tesco Stores Ltd [2000] E.T.M.R 102 (Ch.D). 
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8. The requirement to give prior notice 
When a product has been repackaged the repackager must give notice to the 
trademark owner prior to marketing of the product. This is in order to give the 
manufacturer a chance to examine the product, and check that the repackaging 
process has not affected its original condition.'^^ The accompaniment o f a specimen 
of the repackaged product with the notice w i l l also allow the manufacturer to 
inspect 'that the presentation after repackaging is not likely to damage the 
reputation of the trademark. Similarly, such a requirement affords the trademark 
owner a better possibility of protecting himself against counterfeiting. ' '" 
Mr Justice Laddie, in the first Boehringer Ingelheim v. Swingward High Court 
judgment, thought that the notification given by the U K Medicines and Healthcare 
products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) when granting a parallel import licence 
(PIL), published in the London Gazette, would suffice.'^^ The ECJ did not agree, 
stating that prior notification must be given by the parallel importer himself'^^ I f 
the notification given by a PIL licensing authority had been sufficient, the notice 
requirement as such would have been unnecessary, since licensing authorities 
always notify the original marketing authorisation holder when a PIL is granted. 
Instead, the ECJ ruled that fifteen working days would constitute a reasonable 
notification period for the parallel importer.'^*' It is however possible for the parallel 
importer to allow for a shorter period of notice, and for the trademark proprietor to 
ask for a longer time to react to the notice.'^' The trademark proprietor should be 
given a reasonable period of notice to respond to the repackaging, but consideration 
should also be given to the parallel importer's interest in proceeding to marketing 
the product as soon as possible after obtaining a PIL.'^^ It is for the national court to 
Cases C - 427/93 etc., n. 14 above, para. 78. 
ibid., para. 78. See also Case C-143/00, n. 15 above, para. 67; and Gross and Harrold, n. 106 
above, 503. 
'^ ^ N. 89 above, para. 155. See chapter 3(3.2) above. 
Case C-143/00, n. 15 above, para. 64. 
"^ o ibid., para. 67. 
ibid. 
ibid., para. 66. 
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determine in the light of the facts of the particular case whether the manufacturer 
was given a reasonable fime to react to the intended repackaging.'^^ This is now 
embodied in the 2003 Commission Communication'^'* which also notes that the 
notification requirement imposed by the derogation from the 'exhaustion of rights' 
doctrine in the 2003 Act of Accession'^^ (which should not be confused with the 
notification requirement relating to repackaging) requires parallel importers to give 
manufacturers one month's prior notification.'^^ There is no logical explanafion as 
to why the notification period is longer under the Act of Accession, since the 
inspection procedures carried out by manufacturers are the same for both 
notification systems.'^^ 
The notification requirement allows the trademark proprietor to verify whether 
there is an actual infringement of the specific subject matter.'^^ The contention is 
that a failure to notify would turn a non-infringement of the specific subject matter 
into an infringement.'^' Mr Justice Laddie, in the Boehringer Ingelheim v. 
Swingward U K High Court judgment, rightly observed that such a requirement 
Case C-143/00, n. 15 above, para. 68. It is likely that the definition of 'a reasonable time' will 
vary from Member State to Member State. The difficulty in defining this term is highlighted by the 
fact that Mr Justice Laddie in the U K High Court decision, Advocate-General Jacobs in his Opinion, 
and the E C J could not agree upon the length of a 'reasonable time:' varying from 2 days (Mr Justice 
Laddie, n. 89 above, para. 155); 3-4 weeks (Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-143/00, 
n. 15 above, para. 134); to 15 days ( E C J in Case C- 143/00, n. 15 above, para. 67). In Ystad County 
Court (Sweden) a case is currently being brought by Merck against the parallel trader Parallell 
Pharma for not waiting the required time (which, according to Merck, is three weeks in Sweden) 
after notification before marketing the product. Merck demands that the Court orders Parallell 
Pharma to stop marketing the repackaged and rebranded products, as well as holding Parallell 
Pharma liable for damages amounting to one million S E K if not complying with the Court's 
judgment: see J. Hyden, 'Anklagas for varumarkes intrang,' Skanska Dagbladet, 11 September 2005, 
p. 8. 
Commission Communication on parallel imports of proprietary medicinal products for which 
marketing authorisations have already been granted [2003] Com/839/final. 
Chapter 2 (Company Law) of Annex IV of the Act of Accession [2003] O.J. L236/33; see 
Introduction, p. 4, n. 15 above for a full reference. See chapter 5(5.2) above for discussion of the 
derogation ('specific mechanism'). 
See Commission Communication (2003), n. 164 above, para. 5.5. See also chapter 5(5.2.3) above. 
See ibid, for further discussion of the differences and similarities of the two notification 
requirements. 
See Gross and Harrold, n. 106 above; and Dryden and Middlemiss, n. 78 above for further 
discussion of the notification requirement. 
Case C-143/00, n. 15 above, para. 63. However, the E C J noted that 'adequate functioning of the 
notice system presupposes that the interested parties make sincere efforts to respect each other's 
legitimate interests:' (para. 62). 
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would introduce 'a wide ranging and powerful instrument for preventing or 
dislocating the free movement of goods...under the guise o f protection of 
trademarks which is decoupled from the need to preserve the specific subject matter 
of those rights.''^" It can therefore be an unnecessary obstacle to the free movement 
of goods within the Community. However, it is also arguable that the requirement is 
little more than yet another formality which the parallel importer must comply with, 
and 'satisfying the [notice requirement] scarcely poses any real practical problems 
for parallel importers.''^' Failure to give notice w i l l therefore, in the vast majority 
of cases, be deliberate. It should therefore result in a dissuasive, but proportionate, 
sanction being imposed on the parallel importer.'^^ The appropriate sanction should 
be determined by the national court, regarding every subsequent importation as an 
infringement.'^^ 
From a public health and safety standpoint, the notice requirement w i l l enable 
manufacturers of pharmaceutical products to assess the quality and authenticity''"^ 
of the repackaged product as well as the adequacy of the new box, thus preventing 
repackaging that is likely to affect the quality and safety of pharmaceutical 
products. The notice requirement also, to a certain extent, prevents parallel 
importers from infringing the specific subject matter o f the trademark, as well as 
providing a mechanism to monitor the quality (and quantity) of repackaged 
pharmaceutical products. 
""N. 89 above, para. 119. 
Case C-143/00, n. 15 above, para. 62. 
See Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-348/04, n. 24 above, para. 100. 
ibid., para. 80. 
However, see A. Worsdall and A. Clarke, Anti-counterfeiting: A practical guide, (Bristol: Jordan 
Publishing, 1998), p. 10: where it is argued that product testing is an inefficient way of detecting 
counterfeit products in the market place 'due to the time consuming and expensive procedure of 
testing products, which often render the products unsaleable.' Nevertheless, the notice is only 
accompanied by one product sample, and notice is only required once. It may therefore, in 
comparison with, for example, a system of 'random-product tests' of products already in the market 
place, prove to be an efficient and inexpensive way of detecting counterfeits. 
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9. Conclusion 
In order to prevent the European pharmaceutical market from being partitioned 
along national borders the ECJ has repeatedly ruled that trademark proprietors are 
precluded from 'exercising' their intellectual property rights so as to prevent 
repackaging of pharmaceutical products as long as the parallel importer fulf i ls a set 
o f conditions. I f satisfied, these conditions effectively afford the parallel trader a 
licence for the unauthorised use of the relevant trademark. The conditions, at first 
being concerned only with the 'necessity' of repackaging in order to comply with 
national legislation and the protection of the specific subject matter of the 
trademark, have with the 'customer preference test' and the practice of 'co-
branding' developed into a grey-zone between enabling parallel trade and satisfying 
parallel importers' commercial aspirations. Being beneficial for the integration of 
the Member State markets, the ECJ nevertheless may have taken the pro-integration 
aspect a step to far by allowing parallel importers to adjust to the different Member 
State market conditions, instead of delegating the responsibility o f letting customers 
and commercial forces in the Community grow accustomed to repackaged products 
to the parallel importers themselves.'^^ The latest additions by the ECJ illustrates 
that the doctrine of exhaustion still generates difficult and highly controversial case-
law, often leading to discrepancy in Member States' subsequent employment of the 
guidance in national judgements.'^^ 
It should be remembered that the case-law on repackaging concerns the right to 
exercise intellectual property rights against another private undertaking. The 
integration aspect therefore takes priority over the public health and safety aspect. 
However, even though the trademark proprietor may be precluded from exercising 
his intellectual property rights so as to prevent repackaging, the repackaged product 
See the Danish Court's argument in Case 272/2001 (Denmark), n. 80 above, paras. 13-15. 
For example: Case C-143/00, n. 15 above, together with Case 272/2001 (Denmark), n. 80 above, 
and the U K Court of Appeal in Boehringer v. Swingward, n. 90 above. However, Advocate General 
Sharpston in Case C-348/04, n. 24 above, para. 3, expressed the view that: 'every judge knows that 
ingenious lawyers can always find a reason why a given proposition does or does not apply to their 
client's situation. It should not however in my view be for the Court of Justice to adjudicate on such 
detail for evermore.' 
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may not f u l f i l the Community's labelling and package leaflet regulations. These 
regulations, discussed in the following chapter, do not consider intellectual property 
aspects but are only concerned with public health and safety. Fulfilling the 
conditions established by the ECJ so as to 'exhaust' the trademark proprietor's right 
to exercise his trademark rights may therefore not be sufficient to subsequently 
market the repackaged products. 
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C H A P T E R 7 
REPACKAGING OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS II: 
THE COMMUNITY'S L A B E L L I N G AND 
PACKAGE L E A F L E T REGULATIONS 
Following the establishment of the exhaustion of rights principle parallel traders are 
free to repackage and rebrand pharmaceutical products so as to comply with 
national legislation and customer preference.' However, intellectual property rights 
and the free movement of goods provisions are not the only Community measures 
to take into consideration when repackaging pharmaceutical products. There are 
Community measures governing the packaging of pharmaceutical products, equally 
applicable to manufacturers and parallel importers. The trader w i l l be in breach of 
these Community measures i f the new packaging does not meet the standard 
required by the Community. This chapter w i l l therefore discuss the impact of these 
measures on parallel trade in pharmaceutical products, taking into account public 
health and safety issues as well as Community integration aspects. 
1. Repackaging in practice 
A parallel importer who decides to repackage products intended for importation 
generally has three concerns. First, w i l l the repackaging amount to an infringement 
of the manufacturer's trademark? As discussed in chapter 6, repackaging wi l l 
amount to an infringement, but the trademark proprietor has lost the right as to 
exercise the trademark rights once the product was first put into circulation within 
the Community. Secondly, is the repackager authorised to carry out the repackaging 
process? Finally, does the new packaging satisfy Community measures regulating 
Subject to conditions discussed in chapter 6 above. 
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the packaging of pharmaceutical products? The two latter issues are discussed 
below. 
2. Manufacturer's (assemble) licences (MAL) 
Directive 2001/83/EC states that 'Member States shall take all appropriate measures 
to ensure that the manufacture of the medicinal products within their territory is 
subject to the holding o f an authorization.'^ This applies to manufacturers in 
relation to both the production of the product itself and the subsequent packaging 
thereof. However, Article 40(2) of Directive 2001/83/EC clarifies that authorisation 
'shall be required for both total and partial manufacture and for the various 
processes of dividing up, packaging or presentation.''' Thus, parallel importers 
require a manufacturer's licence before carrying out any form o f repackaging. Since 
parallel importers only intend to tamper with the packaging, not affecting the actual 
pharmaceutical products, they can apply for a 'manufacturer's (assemble) licence' 
(MAL)'* which only gives them the right to 'assemble' pharmaceutical products. 
'Assemble' is defined as 'enclosing the products (with or without other medicinal 
products of the same description) in a container which is labelled before the product 
is sold or supplied, or, where the product is already enclosed in the container in 
which it is to be sold or supplied, labelling the container before the product is sold 
or supplied in it, and 'assemble' has a corresponding meaning.'^ The UK Medicines 
and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) also makes it clear that the 
over-labelling o f medicinal products is an 'assemble' activity and therefore 
licensable.^ 
- Article 40(1) of Council Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal 
products for human use [2001] O.J. L311/67. 
' ibid.. Art. 40(2). 
" Section 132 of the U K Medicines Act 1968. 
' ibid. 
6 See MHRA, 'Notes for applicants and holders of a manufacturer's licence,' Guidance Note No. 5, 
p. 3. 
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A M A L holder in the Member State of importation does not require a 'wholesale 
dealer's licence' ( W D L ) / It is therefore reasonable that the requirements under a 
M A L are similar to, i f not stricter than, those relating to a WDL.^ The licence 
holder must provide and maintain suitable staff, premises and equipment. 
However, in Gyselinx the ECJ held that it would restrict intra-Community trade 
under Article 28 EC Treaty to require a W D L holder, wishing to supply pharmacists 
directly, to maintain suitable premises for the storage of products in the Member 
State where the licence is granted, i f the applicant already has access to such 
premises in the Member State where its headquarters is situated.^ 'Cooperation and 
exchange of information between the authorities of the two Member States w i l l 
make it possible to ensure that the products at issue are in a good condition before 
their importation.'"^ W D L holders are therefore allowed to store their products in 
another Member State. M A L holders, on the other hand, are only allowed to carry 
out the repackaging in the Member State where the licence is granted, which does 
not necessarily have to be the Member State of importation. It should also be 
remembered that traders who have access to adequate premises and equipment for 
storage and repackaging of pharmaceutical products in the Member State of 
importation only require a M A L in this Member State (i.e. do not have to apply for 
a W D L ) . ' ' In contrast, a trader who decides to carry out the repackaging process 
and store the products in the Member State where the trader's headquarters is 
situated, having access to suitable premises and equipment for repackaging and 
storage in that Member State for the purpose of applying for a M A L , must either 
apply for a W D L in the Member State of importation (which is an additional cost) 
or, alternatively; get access to adequate premises and equipment for repackaging in 
' Directive 2001/83, n. 2 above, Art. 77(3); Medicines Act, n. 4 above, s. 8(3)(c). See MHRA, 
'Notes for applicants and holders of a wholesale dealer's licence,' Guidance Note No. 6, Appendix 
2(7). WDLs are discussed in detail in chapter 3(3) above. 
^ Directive 2001/83, ibid.. Title VII ; and Commission Directive 2003/94/EC laying down the 
principles and guidehnes of good manufacturing practice in respect of medicinal products for human 
use and investigational medicinal products for human use [2003] O.J. L262/22. See chapter 3, pp. 
100-101 above, for further discussion of the requirements applying to the granting of WDLs. 
' Joined Cases 87-88/85 Legia & Gyselinx v. Minister for Health [1986] E . C . R . 1707, para. 22. See 
chapter 3, pp. 101-102 above, for further discussion of this case and WDLs. 
ibid., para. 20. 
" See n. 7 above. 
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the Member State of importation in order to apply for a M A L (also an additional 
cost) so as to avoid the extra costs of having to apply for a W D L in this Member 
State. This is illustrated in Table 5 below: 
Table 5. 
Attributes of Pi ' Licence in MS~ of 
importation 
Licences in another 
MS 
Need to obtain 
additional premises 
PI in MS of 
importation - need to 
repackage 
M A L No. No. 
PI in MS of 
importation - no need 
to repackage 
W D L No. No. 
PI in another MS 
- need to repackage 
W D L M A L No. 
PI in another MS 
- need to repackage 
M A L No. (But have access 
to adequate premises 
for the purpose of a 
M A L in this MS) 
Yes. In MS of 
Importation 
PI in another MS 
- no need to repackage 
W D L No. No. 
Parallel importer. 
• Member State. 
As the requirements under a M A L are, at least, as strict as those applying to W D L 
holders, it can be argued that national legislation prohibiting M A L holders in other 
Member States from importing pharmaceutical products in the absence of holding a 
W D L in the Member State of importation is not compatible with Article 28 EC 
Treaty. This is because it penalises against traders that need to repackage the 
products before importation, and already have at their disposal suitable premises for 
this purpose in another Member State, by rendering them liable for the extra costs 
of having to apply for a WDL. M A L holders in the Member State of importation, 
however, do not require WDLs.'^ Similarly; traders who do not need to repackage 
their products only need to be in possession of a W D L in the Member State of 
importation even i f the products are stored in another Member State.'•^ However, in 
the absence of a sufficient degree of harmonisation at Community level, every 
Member State is entitled to adopt appropriate measures in order to protect public 
" See n. 7 above. 
" Cases 87-88/85, n. 9 above. 
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health and safety in accordance with Article 30 EC Treaty. 'Cooperation and 
exchange of information between the authorities in the two Member States' may be 
enough to ensure public health and safety i f the licence holder is merely allowed to 
store the products in another Member State.'"* However, it is likely that national 
legislation requiring traders to, at least, be in possession of one licence ( M A L or 
W D L ) in the Member State of importation can be justified under Article 30 EC 
Treaty, as it w i l l be very difficult for the importing Member State to ensure public 
health and safety i f the trader is neither licensed nor store the products in this 
Member State. 
The alternative, taking into account that the trader must be in possession of a 
licence (WDL or M A L ) in the Member State of importation for public health and 
safety reasons, would be to allow M A L holders in the Member State o f importation 
to carry out the repackaging process in a Member State other than the one issuing 
the licence. The question is therefore whether national legislation prohibiting M A L 
holders from carrying out the repackaging process in another Member State is in 
conformity with Articles 28 and 30 EC Treaty. Such legislation penalise against 
traders who already have at their disposal suitable premises and equipment for 
repackaging in another Member State by rendering them liable for the extra costs of 
either obtaining suitable premises for repackaging in the Member State of 
importation, or, as discussed above, the extra costs of applying for a W D L in this 
Member State. However, allowing M A L holders to carry out the repackaging 
process in another Member State than the one issuing the licence may have a 
negative impact on public health and safety. It is therefore possible that legislation 
to this effect can be justified under Article 30 EC Treaty. It is true that adequate 
safety checks can potentially still be carried out by the authority granting a parallel 
import licence (PIL) for the product in question.'^ The problem, however, is 
whether cooperation between the national Medicines Control Agency granting the 
M A L and the national Medicines Control Agency in the Member State where the 
See Cases 87-88/85, n. 9 above, para. 20. 
See Case C-347/89 Freistaat Bayern v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH [1991] 1747, para 20. Further 
discussed below. See chapters 3(3.2) and 4 above for discussion of the granting of PILs. 
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products are de facto repackaged w i l l be sufficient to protect public health and 
safety. Even i f the individual inspections and control tests carried out by the two 
national Medicines Control Agencies are sufficient, a lack o f adequate cooperation 
may still lead to a larger amount of products being refused a PIL due to inadequate 
packaging. In the 'worst-case scenario,' it could have fatal consequences for public 
health and safety i f the inspections and control tests, carried out by the national 
Medicines Control Agency granting the PIL and M A L , are not sufficient to notice 
inadequacies in the packaging o f the products due to insufficient cooperation with 
the national Medicines Control Agency in the Member State where the products 
were de facto repackaged. 
Consideration o f whether national legislation prohibiting M A L holders from 
carrying out the repackaging in another Member State is compatible with Articles 
28 and 30 EC Treaty should be contrasted with consideration o f national legislation 
prohibiting the importation o f pharmaceutical products because they are not alreadv 
repackaged so as to comply with national legislation in this Member State. These 
were the facts in Freistaat Bayern v. Eurim-Pharm}^ Eurim-Pharm, a parallel 
importer, was refused a PIL because the products were already packaged and 
provided with a leaflet which only complied with the laws of the exporting Member 
State. Eurim-Pharm claimed that it intended to repackage the products so as to 
conform to German law once they were imported into Germany. For this purpose, 
Eurim-Pharm successfully applied for a M A L in Germany.'^ The ECJ held that this 
constitutes a restriction to intra-Community trade, precluded by Articles 28 and 30 
EC Treaty, as it forces parallel traders to move their repackaging process to each of 
the exporting Member States in order to satisfy German legislation prior to 
importation.'^ The measure could not be justified under Article 30 EC Treaty as a 
PIL enables authorities to make sure that the product is 'essentially identical' to a 
product already benefiting f rom a marketing authorisation in Germany, and a M A L 
enables the same authority to make sure that the packaging is safe and in 
" Case C-347/89, n. 15 above, para 20 
" ibid., para. 18. 
r ibid., paras. 22 and 36. 
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conformity with German legislation.'^ Thus, public health and safety can be 
satisfactorily maintained even i f the products are repackaged in Germany. 
First, it should be said that this ruling is difficult to criticise f rom a public health 
and safety perspective. The products are inspected at the border (when applying for 
a PIL) and inspected and controlled following repackaging. In fact, carrying out the 
repackaging in Germany may well minimise the risk to public health and safety as 
the products are subject to two inspection checks, at the border and following 
repackaging, instead o f only at the time of applying for a PIL. Secondly, the 
decision cannot be criticised for being too pro-integration, as the national legislation 
completely barred importation o f products not yet repackaged so as to comply with 
German law, rendering MALs practically useless for importers. 
Despite the legal questions yet to be resolved, and the health and safety issues 
highlighted by the ECJ's rulings, the law can be summarised as follows. A M A L is 
only required in the Member State where the repackaging process is carried out, 
which may also be the Member State of importation."*' Further, a M A L also 
functions as a WDL, and W D L holders are allowed to store products in the Member 
State of exportation prior to being directly supplied in the Member State of 
importation. Taking this into consideration, it can be argued that national legislation 
prohibiting M A L holders in other Member States f rom importing pharmaceutical 
products in the absence of holding a W D L in the Member State of importation is 
not compatible with Article 28 EC Treaty. The same argument can be applied to 
national legislation in the importing Member State prohibiting the issuance of a 
M A L unless the repackaging process is carried out in this Member State. This is 
because it penalises against traders who already have access to suitable premises for 
repackaging in another Member State. However, strong cooperation between the 
national Medicines Control Agency granting the M A L and the national Medicines 
Control Agency in the Member State where the products are de facto repackaged 
" Case C-347/89, n. 15 above, para. 33. 
''ibid. 
221 
w i l l be needed in order to protect public health and safety in the absence of such 
legislation. It is therefore possible that legislation to this effect can be justified on 
the basis o f the protection of public health and safety in accordance with Article 30 
EC Treaty. 
3. The Community packaging regulations 
Title V of Directive 2001/83/EC^' regulates the labellmg and package leaflets of 
pharmaceutical products. A l l products marketed within the Community must 
comply with these regulations. Manufacturers may, in theory, prevent the marketing 
or importation of repackaged products using trademark laws, even though the 
packaging is in conformity with these regulations.^^ Conversely, trademark owners 
may not, in theory, be allowed to exercise their trademark rights in order to prevent 
the products f rom being repackaged, even though the repackaging fails to conform 
to the requirements of Directive 2001/83/EC.^^ It is therefore important not to 
confuse the intellectual property aspect of repackaging with the Community's 
packaging regulations. 
A successful marketing authorisation application is dependant on the conformity of 
the packaging and package leaflet with the labelling and package leaflet section of 
Directive 2001/83/EC.^'' A l l pharmaceutical products suppHed by the original 
marketing authorisation holder are therefore, in theory, correctly labelled. The fact 
that the national Medicines Control Agency does not refuse a marketing 
authorisation even though the labelling and package leaflet is not in conformity 
with Directive 2001/83/EC" does not alter the legal liability o f the marketing 
authorisation holder.^^ The relevance of Directive 2001/83/EC^^ for parallel 
" N. 2 above. 
For example by not fulfilling the conditions established in Joined Cases C-427, C-429 and C-
436/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova A/S [1996] E . C . R . 3457. See chapter 6 above. 
" N. 2 above. 





importers is therefore two-fold. First, the parallel importer must follow the labelling 
and package leaflet regulations in order to be granted a PIL. Secondly, even though 
a parallel importer is not refused a PIL, it w i l l not waive the parallel importer's 
legal liability i f the packaging is subsequently found to be non-compliant with 
Directive 2001/83/EC.^^ However, as the packaging and package leaflet must have, 
in theory, been in conformity with Directive 2001/83/EC^^ when the manufacturer 
was granted marketing authorisation, the parallel importer can be reasonably 
confident that the subsequent repackaging w i l l be in conformity with the Directive 
i f the only changes carried out to the packaging are necessary in order to comply 
with national legislation in the Member State of importation. Nevertheless, a 
distinction must be made between repackaging of products benefiting from a PIL 
and repackaging of products benefiting from a Community marketing 
authorisation,^*' discussed below in section 3.2 and 3.1 respectively. The reason for 
discussing these two classes of imported pharmaceutical products separately is the 
special measures applying to the packaging of pharmaceutical products benefiting 
from a Community marketing authorisation, which measures w i l l first be discussed 
below. 
3.1 Products benefiting from a Community marketing authorisation 
Parallel traded pharmaceutical products benefiting firom a centrally authorised 
Community marketing authorisation are usually referred to as parallel distributed 
products, and the trader as a parallel distributor.^' Since a PIL is not needed for 
products distributed in parallel, the legal liability w i l l remain with the original 
marketing authorisation holder.^^ However, the parallel distributor still has 
responsibilities in situations where defect products are discovered, particularly in 
N. 2 above. 
" ibid. 
See chapter 3(2.1) on Community marketing authorisations. 
" See ibid. See also Commission Notice to Applicants - The Rules governing Medicinal Products in 
the European Community, (Volume 2C: Regulatory Guidelines) (F2 /BL D(2005) Rev 8, for further 
information on the Community packaging regulations of parallel distributed pharmaceutical 
products. 
^' See chapter 3(3.1-3.2) above for discussion of the centralised Community procedure. 
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cases where the packaging and package leaflet have been changed.''^ Parallel 
distributors can only change the packaging and package leaflet i f they hold a M A L 
issued by the relevant authority. As such, they are bound by the principles and 
guidance on 'Good Manufacturing Practice' (GMP).^'' Under these guidelines a 
parallel distributor is required to notify the relevant authority, as well as the relevant 
Community marketing authorisation holder, of any defect it has become aware of. 
Following such a notification, the relevant authority w i l l assist the distributor in the 
recall process. 
The modifications allowed to the packaging o f pharmaceutical products benefiting 
from Community marketing authorisations are strictly regulated. The parallel 
distributor is required to translate the packaging and package leaflet into the 
prevailing language in the Member State of importation. Proposed changes to the 
packaging of the product and changes to the package leaflet must be included in the 
'notification o f parallel distribution of a centrally authorised medicinal product,'^^ 
which the parallel distributor must submit to the European Medicines Agency 
(EMEA).^^ The notification enables the EMEA to verify that the packaging and 
package leaflet complies with the Community marketing authorisation. I f not, the 
notification w i l l be 'refused,' and parallel distribution denied. 
However, in order to comply with the customary practice o f pharmacists in the 
Member State of importation, or simply in order to maximise profits, parallel 
distributors have created larger pack sizes by bundling together smaller product 
packages. This is technically possible, since manufacturers often market a product 
using a variety of different pack sizes. In Aventis v. Kohlpharma^^ this practice was 
criticised by the ECJ. Aventis marketed 'Insuman' in packs o f ten cartridges in 
" See E M E A , 'Post-authorisation guidance on parallel distribution,' (EMEA/Ho/2368/04/Rev 2), s. 
28. 
Directive 2003/94, n. 8 above. 
" See E M E A , 'Post-authorisation,' n. 33 above. A specimen is no longer required to be supplied 
with the notification. Mock-ups of the proposed packaging and package leaflet are, however, still 
required: see chapter 3(2.1.1) above. 
" See chapter 3, pp. 89-90 below for the functions of the E M E A . 
" Case C-AZ2,m Aventis Pharma GmbH v. Kohlpharma GmbH & MTK GmbH [2002] E . C . R . 7761. 
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Germany. In other Member States the drug was marketed in packs of five 
cartridges. Kohlpharma, a parallel distributor, purchased packs of five cartridges in 
other Member States, and repackaged them so as to contain ten cartridges in every 
package before distributing the packs in Germany. Aventis claimed that this was an 
unnecessary practice, and in any event, infringed Aventis's trademark rights.^^ 
Aventis considered that, for the purpose of marketing the products in Germany, 
Kohlpharma could bundle two packs of five cartridges together and relabel them so 
as to become a single pack of ten cartridges instead of repackaging the products 
completely.^^ The ECJ noted that 'Insuman' was subject to two separate 
Community marketing authorisations, one for packs of five cartridges and one for 
packs of ten cartridges.'"' Every Community marketing authorisation relates to the 
specific presentation and packaging of the product, and is given a number which 
must appear on the packaging. These detailed and specific requirements are 
intended to prevent patients from being misled and thereby to protect public health 
and safety. As a result. Regulation 2309/93^*' precludes a product subject to two 
separate Community marketing authorisations, one for packs of five cartridges and 
one for packs of ten cartridges, 'to be marketed in a package consisting of two 
packs of five items which have been joined together and relabelled.''*' 
Bundling and labelling involves far less risk to the quality o f the product than 
repackaging. By precluding the bundling together of two smaller packs into one 
pack, thus avoiding repackaging, the Court did not find in favour o f public health 
and safety. Neither did the Court act upon overriding pro-integration policies. 
Bundling and relabelling would have been as efficient as repackaging in terms of 
market access. Linguistic differences and customary practices by pharmacists could 
Case C-433/00, n. 37 above, para. 11. 
ibid. 
ibid., para. 25. 
Council Regulation ( E E C ) 2309/93 laying down Community procedures for the authorization and 
supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Agency 
for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products [2003] O.J. L214/1, subsequently repealed and replaced by 
Council Regulation ( E C ) 726/2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and 
supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European 
Medicines Agency [2004] O.J. L I 36/1. 
Case C-433/00, n. 37 above, para. 27. 
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be as effectively addressed by bundling together and relabelling as by repackaging. 
The Court's ruling must therefore be seen as a disguised attempt to achieve legal 
certainty in relation to the centralised procedure, instead of focusing on the 
underlying problem of discrepancy in Community harmonisation. The centralised 
procedure allows for a single Community marketing authorisation, for which 
products a PIL is not needed. But without complete harmonisation of national 
legislation concerning dispensation sizes and customary practice by pharmacists, 
repackaging is nevertheless necessary. 
The fact that a PIL is not needed when importing products benefiting from a 
Community marketing authorisation means that any changes to the design, layout 
and name of the product are not in conformity with Community regulations."*^ The 
only amendments allowed to the packaging of parallel distributed products, except 
for linguistic differences and the inclusion of the name of the distributor, repackager 
and manufacturer on the outer and inner labelling, is the inclusion of a 'blue-box. 
The 'blue-box' is a box-shaped frame on the packaging in which the marketing 
authorisation holder is allowed to include Member State-specific information, such 
as the local representative, whether driving is recommended in conjunction with 
taking the product, and so on."*^  As these requirements differ from Member State to 
Member State, parallel distributors must change the information in the 'blue-box' 
so as to comply with the requirements in the Member State of importation. I f the 
original marketing authorisation holder have not akeady completed a 'blue-box' for 
products destined for the Member State o f importation chosen by the parallel 
distributor, a 'blue-box' must be created from scratch by the parallel distributor so 
" See case T-123/00 Thomae GmbH v. Commission [2002] E C R 11-5193; and chapter 3(2.1.1) 
above. 
See E M E A , 'Post-authorisation,' n. 33 above, 15-16. The name of the parallel distributor as well 
as the repackager and manufacturer must appear on the outer packaging of the product, whilst it is 
optional on the inner packaging. This is in line with established E C J case-law in relation to the 
intellectual property aspect of repackaging , most notably Cases C-427/93 etc., n. 22 above. See 
chapter 6(7) above. 
See Commission Notice, n. 31 above. This document describes the functions and limitations of the 
'blue-box.' Included in the guidelines is also a list of different Member States' requirements in 
relation to the 'blue-box.' 
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as to comply with national legislation. The name of the 'local representative,' which 
must be included in the 'blue-box,' has to be a representative of the parallel 
distributor i f the marketing authorisation holder does not already have 
representation in the particular Member State.'*^ This is an issue specific to parallel 
distribution of centrally authorised products, as nationally authorised products 
cannot be parallel imported unless a marketing authorisation for an 'essentially 
identical' product is already in force in the Member State of importation, and thus, 
the original marketing authorisation holder would automatically have a presence in 
the importing Member State."*^  
Lastly, the parallel distributor is obliged to ensure that the product information 
remains in conformity with the current version o f the Community marketing 
authorisation as authorised by the EMEA. Should the product information (labelling 
and/or package leaflet) be amended, the parallel distributor must submit a 
'notification of change' to the EMEA."** This does not only relate to the package 
and package leaflet layout, but also amendments to the package leaflet in respect of 
the discovery o f additional adverse side effects or urgent safety restrictions 
warranting updating. In consequence, the parallel distributor and repackager must 
regularly check the European Public Assessment Reports (EPAR) relating to the 
relevant product in question."^ The content of the EPAR is derived from the various 
The inclusion of the contact details of a local representative is useful as it helps to increase 
consumer protection. It enables consumers to contact that representative and ask for advice in their 
mother tongue. It has been argued that the inclusion of a logotype alongside the name of the local 
representative gives rise to a risk of confusion when consumers distinguish between the marketing 
authorisation holder and the local representative. However, the E C J has held that the inclusion of the 
local representative's logotype in the 'blue-box' helps to increase consumer protection and is useful 
for health education. The local representative can subsequently refer the consumer to the marketing 
authorisation holder if necessary. The E C J has also ruled that it is necessary to distinguish between 
the general information appearing on the packaging of the pharmaceutical products, and the 
information specific to every Member State appearing in the 'blue-box.' The risk of confusion is 
therefore not sufficient to warrant the exclusion of the local representative's logotype in the 'blue-
box:' see Case T-179/00/I. Menarini Sri v. Commission [2002] E . C . R . 11-2879. 
See chapter 3(3.2) above. 
E M E A , 'Notification of a change for parallel distribution of a centrally authorised medicinal 
product,' (Rev. 5). 
See F . Braun, 'The legal framework for parallel trade in pharmaceuticals for human use in the 
European Economic Area,' Master of Drug Regulatory Affairs Thesis, Friedrich-Willhelms-
Universitat Bonn (2004), pp. 10-11, for a good introduction to the relationship between EPAR's and 
parallel distribution. 
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reports produced during the market authorisation evaluation procedure, resulting 
from the review of the documentation submitted by the applicant. The EPAR w i l l 
be updated regularly throughout the marketing authorisation period to reflect 
changes to the terms and conditions of the marketing authorisation.^*' The EPAR 
also provides authorised versions of the labelling and packaging leaflet in all 
official languages. 
Parallel distributors have free access to EPARs as they are published on the 
EMEA's website, and as such are public information. The responsibility of 
regularly updating the packaging and package layout can therefore not be classified 
as a barrier to trade. The parallel distributor is not dependant on the cooperation of 
the marketing authorisation holder to supply him with the information. As a result, 
this requirement cannot be compared to the facts in de Peijper^^ where the ECJ held 
that the dependency of the parallel trader on the marketing authorisation holder 
when obtaining the relevant information necessary to apply for a marketing 
authorisation is not compatible with Articles 28 and 30 EC T r e a t y . T h e EMEA is 
empowered to inform the Member State where the parallel distributed product is 
marketed i f the distributor has not complied with the post-notification 
responsibilities.^^ This may result in a recall process being instigated by national 
Medicines Control Agencies in order to prevent a risk to public health arising from 
the parallel distributor's non-compliance, or a review o f the parallel distributor's 
W D L . 
3.2 Products benefiting from a parallel import licence (PIL) 
Most parallel imported pharmaceutical products benefit from a PIL. The difference 
between repackaging products benefiting from a (national) PIL and repackaging of 
products benefiting from a Community marketing authorisation concerns the lack of 
°^ See E M E A website on EPARs: <http://www.emea.eu.int/htms/human/epar/epar.htm>. 
'^ Case 104/75 Officier van Justitie v. de Peijper. [1976] E .C .R. 613. 
" See chapter 3(3.2) above. 
" See E M E A , 'Post-authorisation,' n. 33 above; and Braun, n. 49 above, 10-11. 
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a uniform packaging throughout the Community. The absence of a requirement not 
to mix products benefiting f rom different marketing authorisations (sarrie products 
but different packaging sizes) and not make any amendments (except for the 
insertion o f a 'blue-box' and necessary translations), gives a parallel importer more 
freedom than a parallel distributor. On the other hand, this only compensates for the 
fact that parallel importation, compared to parallel distribution, frequently demands 
repackaging of the products before marketing. A distinction, however, is not made 
between the two practices in relation to the right to repackage. A n M A L is required 
and the intellectual property rights aspect is equally applicable to repackaging of 
parallel imported and parallel distributed pharmaceutical products.^"* 
The repackaging must be in conformity with Title V of Directive 2001/83/EC." 
The labelling and package leaflet section of the Directive can be divided into three 
main areas; the outer packaging, the inner packaging, and the package leaflet. The 
PIL number and the name and address o f the parallel importer must be stated on the 
outer p a c k a g i n g . I n line with the ECJ's case-law on repackaging, the outer 
packaging should also bear the name and address of the manufacturer." I f the 
parallel importer has not repackaged the product, i.e. the actual repackaging process 
is carried out by a contractor; it is advisable that this name also be printed on the 
outer packaging.^^ Similarly, the name of the PIL holder, in addition to the name of 
the product, should be printed on the irmer packaging.^^ Furthermore, 'the original 
condition o f the product inside the packaging might be indirectly affected' i f the 
*^ See chapter 6 on the intellectual property aspect of repackaging. 
" N. 2 above. 
Directive 2001/83, n. 2 above. Arts. 54(k) and 54(1); and Cases C-427/93 etc., n. 22 above, paras. 
70-71. 
" It may be in the manufacturer's interest that the consumer or end user should not be led to believe 
that the importer is the owner of the trademark, and that the product was manufactured under his 
supervision. See Cases C-71-73/94 Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Beirersdorf AG [1996] E . C . R . 3603, 
para. 64. See also chapter 6(7) above. 
Cases C-427/93 etc., n. 22 above, para. 70. 
" Directive 2001/83, n. 2 above. Art. 55(2). However, following advice from the European 
Commission, the MHRA no longer requires the name of the parallel importer to be printed on blister 
strips, as long as it appears on the outer packaging and the package leaflet. The MHRA will 
therefore not refuse the granting of a PIL solely on the basis of a failure to include the parallel 
importer's name on the blister strip: per Keith Jones (Director and Chief Executive of the MHRA's 
predecessor; 'the Medicines Control Agency') in K. Jones, 'Parallel imports: LabelHng of blister 
strips,' (2000) 264 P.J. 293. 
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requirements under Directive 2001/83/EC relating to the outer and inner packaging 
are not adhered to.^ ^ If this is shown, the trademark proprietor (in addition to the 
national Medicines Control Agency) will have a legitimate reason to prevent the 
products from being marketed. 
Directive 2001/83/EC also state that all pharmaceutical products must carry a batch 
code and an expiry-date as well as a package leaflet in the language of the Member 
State of importation. These issues must be discussed in the context of Directive 
2001/83/EC's aim of protecting public health and safety as well as intellectual 
property rights. Even though the intellectual property aspect was discussed in 
chapter 6, the specific and detailed nature of these three issues warrant separate 
discussions in this chapter. 
3.2.1 Re-attaching the expiry-date 
According to Directive 2001/83/EC all inner and outer packaging must state the 
expiry-date of the pharmaceutical products.^' The expiry-date is there to inform the 
consumer when and for how long it is advisable to consume/use the pharmaceutical 
product. 
The inclusion of an expiry-date is particularly important in relation to parallel 
imports. Direct-imported pharmaceutical products (i.e. by the manufacturer) are 
usually transferred straight from the factory to the pharmacist. However, parallel 
imported products are often repackaged, which may mean that the period between 
reaching the pharmacist and the expiry-date is shorter than when supplied by the 
original manufacturer. Secondly, repackaging pharmaceutical products from 
*° In particular, where for example the outer or inner packaging of the repackaged product 'omits 
certain important or gives inaccurate information concerning the nature, composition, effect, use or 
storage of the product:' Cases C-71-73/94, n. 57 above, para. 56. Since these requirements are part 
of Articles 54 and 55 of Directive 2001/83 (n. 2 above) it is likely that the E C J would consider that a 
failure to conform to these articles would affect the original condition of the product. See chapter 
6(5) above. 
" N. 2 above, Arts. 54(h) and 55(3). 
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different batches may lead to products with different expiry-dates being packaged 
into one box. 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb the plaintiffs claimed that 'blister packs coming originally 
from different packs and grouped together in single external packaging might have 
come from different production batches with different use-by-dates,'^^ and as such 
entail the risk of adversely affecting the original condition of the product. The E C J 
stated that those arguments cannot be accepted.^ ^ According to case-law concerning 
the intellectual property aspect of repackaging, this practice is therefore accepted. It 
is not mentioned in other Community measures, nor in U K guidelines. However, 
one solution to this problem is to only allow repackaging of one batch at a time, and 
only allow one particular batch into the repackaging room at any given time.^ This 
would prevent products with different expiry-dates and batch codes, further 
discussed below, from being grouped together into a new pack. 
3.2.2 Failure to re-affix the batch code 
Directive 2001/83/EC states that the 'manufacturer's batch number' must appear on 
the outer packaging of the pharmaceutical product.^ ^ The iimer packaging, 
including blister packs as well as immediate smaller packaging, must also bear a 
'batch number.'^^ Whether a distinction can be made between 'manufacturer's 
batch number' and 'batch number' is not clear. For now, it suffice to note that the 
" N. 22 above, para. 62. 
" ibid. 
This has been the practice of the leading Swedish parallel importer Cross-Pharma since 1998: see 
Lakemedelsvarlden (ed.), 'Klagomal avsevart vanligare for parallellimporterade lakemedel,' 
Lakemedelsvarlden, 1 October 1998, (<http://www.lakemedelsvarlden.nu/article.asp?articleID=1379 
&articleCategoryID=2&issueID=50>). Also recommended by the European Association of Euro-
Pharmaceutical Companies ( E A E P C ) in, 'Good parallel distribution practice guidelines for 
medicinal products,' (September 2005), (<http://www.eaepc.org/admin/files/eaepc_good_parallel_ 
distribution_practice_guidelines.pdf>), p. 4. 
" N. 2 above. Art. 54(m). 
ibid.. Art. 55(2) and 55(3). 
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'manufacturer's batch number' (also known as 'batch code') must appear on the 
outer packaging according to Directive 2001/83/EC. 
Batch codes^ ^ serve two important purposes - allowing the manufacturer to trace the 
goods in the event of a recall of defective products, and to detect counterfeit 
products. When relabelling or repackaging a product it is important that the batch 
code is left intact or re-affixed to the new packaging. In relation to the intellectual 
property aspect of repackaging, the E C J has recognised that new external or internal 
packaging which omits certain important information regarding the nature or 
storage of the product may affect the original condition of the product.^ ^ However, 
it is not clear whether batch codes are considered 'important information.' 
Loendersloot v. Ballantine'^ concerned the removal of batch codes from whisky 
bottles. Loendersloot, a parallel importer, relabelled the whisky bottles omitting to 
re-affix the batch codes. Ballantine claimed that this was an infringement of its 
trademark rights, since it was not objectively necessary to remove the batch codes 
in order to obtain market access. Loendersloot, on the other hand, claimed that the 
batch codes enabled Ballantine to trace the goods back to Loendersloot's supplier, 
effectively putting Ballantine in a position to prevent Loendersloot from obtaining 
products in the future. Removing the batch codes is therefore an effective way of 
hiding the parallel importer's source of supply. 
The E C J agreed with Ballantine's argument but observed that batch codes 
nevertheless enable manufacturers to trace their products back to the parallel 
importer's supplier. '^ I f batch codes have been applied for purposes of complying 
with a legal requirement, or for a legitimate purpose such as recalling defective 
N. 2 above, Art. 54(m). It is possible that a distinction can be made between the two terms, and 
that this was done deliberately in order to allow for a 're-pack batch code' on the inner packaging. 
This is further discussed in pp. 235-236 below. 
The term 'batch code' is, for the purpose of this chapter, interchangeable with the terms 'batch 
number' and 'product identification code.' 
Cases C-427/93 etc., n. 22 above. See chapter 6(5) above. 
Case C-349/95 Loendersloot v. George Ballantine & Son Ltd[\991] E .C .R. 6227. 
" ibid., para. 27. 
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products, manufacturers do not contribute to market partitioning by asserting their 
trademark rights to oppose marketing of products with removed batch codes7^ 
However, where it is estabhshed that the batch codes have also been applied to 
'combat parallel trade in [the manufacturer's] products, it is under the Treaty 
provisions on competition that those engaged in parallel trade should seek 
protection against action of the latter type.'^ ^ The Court did not clarify how the 
manufacturer will be able to prove that the batch codes were not applied to combat 
parallel trade/'* However, following Van Doreri'^ it is likely that the burden of 
proof will be transferred to the trademark owner in situations where the parallel 
importer fears that his source of supply will be penalised by the manufacturer upon 
discovery. If such proof is given, the burden of proof will revert back to the parallel 
importer 7^  
Batch codes were also at issue in the landmark case of Davidoff v. A & G Imports'^ 
concerning international exhaustion. The facts were as follows. The defendant 
parallel importer removed the batch codes from Davidoff s cosmetic products 
before marketing. Davidoff unsuccessfully claimed trademark infringement under 
Article 7(2) of the Trade Mark Directive.^^ The Cosmetic Directive,''^ which had 
been implemented in the UK, required that all cosmetic products carry a batch code. 
However, the goods had not been affected by the removal of the batch codes. Mr 
Justice Laddie, in the U K High Court decision, did not accept product safety 
arguments since product recalls would still be possible, albeit in a wider scale, 
Case C-349/95, n. 70 above, paras. 41-42. 
ibid., para. 43. 
See Clark A, 'Trade marks and the relabelling of goods in the single market: Anti-counterfeiting 
implications of Loendersloot v. Ballantine,' (1998) 20 E.I .P.R. 328, for a wider discussion of this 
case and batch codes in general. 
" Case C-244/00 Van Doren + Q GmbH v. Lifestyle Sports mbH [2003] E . C . R . 3051. 
ibid., para. 41. See T. Hays, Parallel Importation under European Union Law, (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2004) pp. 91-92; and T. Hays, 'The burden of proof in parallel-importation cases,' [2000] 
22 E.I.P.R. 353, for a wider discussion. The 'burden of proof is discussed in chapter 5(4.1) above. 
" Joined Cases C-414-416/99 Zino Davidoff SA v. A&G Imports Ltd, & Levi Strauss & Co v. Tesco 
Stores Ltd [2001] E . C . R . 8691. See chapter 5(4) above for further discussion of this case. 
Council Directive 89/104/EEC to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade 
marks [1989] O.J. L40/1. 
" Council Directive 76/768/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
cosmetic products [1976] O.J. L262/69. 
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without the batch codes.^° An Article 234 E C Treaty reference was made to the E C J 
by the High Court, but unfortunately the issue was not discussed in the E C J ruling. 
However, the Advocate General's Opinion provides some guidance. The Advocate 
General noted that the case concerned the interpretation of the Trade Mark 
Directive,^' and that, following Loendersloot.^^ complying with a legal requirement 
would not amount to market partitioning. However, the Advocate General was of 
the opinion that 'the removal or obliteration of batch code numbers affixed in 
compliance with a statutory obligation may be of relevance for purposes of trade 
mark rights only if it would have a disproportionately adverse effect on the specific 
subject-matter of the trade mark right.'*^ 
The E C J has not yet been asked to rule in a case concerning the removal of batch 
codes from pharmaceutical products. The E C J has only briefly discussed the 
conformity of re-attaching batch codes with the Trademark Directive^'* and Article 
28 E C Treaty.^^ The Loendersloot^^ ruling and Advocate General Stix-Hackl's 
Opinion in Davidoff^ are therefore still relevant to parallel importers and 
repackagers. Just as in the U K High Court judgment in Davidoff}^ batch codes must 
be affixed to pharmaceutical products in order to comply with a legal requirement 
(Directive 2001/83/EC).^^ However, the parallel trader may not be liable under 
Directive 2001/83/EC,^° and the trademark owner may not have a legitimate reason 
to prevent marketing under the Trade Mark Directive,^' if it can be shown that the 
batch codes were attached for the purpose of combating parallel trade. In order for 
the parallel trader not to reveal his source of supply, the burden of proof rests with 
Zino DavidoffS.A. v. A. & G. Imports Limited [1999] C .M.L.R. 1056, para. 58. See P. Shepphard, 
'Batch codes used in Davidoff: The brand owners' view,' [2000] 22 E.I .P.R. 147, for a wider 
discussion. 
" N. 78 above. 
" N. 70 above. 
" Advocate General Stix-Hack! in Cases C-414-416/99, n. 77 above, para. 120. 
Directive 89/104, n. 78 above. 
See Cases C-71-73/94, n. 57 above. 
N. 70 above. 
" N. 83 above. 
N. 80 above. 
" N. 2 above. 
"ibid. 
" N. 78 above. 
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the trademark owner. FoWov/ing Loendersloot'^^ and Advocate General Stix-Hackl's 
Opinion in DavidqffP it is likely that the trademark proprietor must show, first, that 
the batch codes were not attached in order to combat parallel trade, and, secondly, 
that the subsequent removal of the codes affects the specific-subject matter of the 
trademark. This is for national courts to decide. Looking at national court decisions, 
where for example removing batch codes from Reebok footwear has been held to 
affect the specific subject matter since the batch codes had several important 
functions (such as monitoring production efficiency, distribution routes, and 
preventing the circulation of counterfeit products), it is likely that national courts 
would interpret the ECJ's case-law in favour of the manufacturer.^'' Especially since 
pharmaceutical products are susceptible to counterfeiting, and defective 
pharmaceutical products can have fatal effects. 
Nevertheless, the absence of legal certainty surrounding the removal of batch codes 
has lead to the advancement of several theories on how to prevent this practice.^ ^ 
Perhaps the most plausible solution to the problems associated with this practice is 
to establish an alternative system of batch codes. By substituting the original codes 
by new codes that can be translated into the original code by the parallel importer, 
N. 70 above. 
" N. 83 above. 
Reebok Mernational Ltd v. S.A. Cora, S.A. & Others (Court of Appeal, Brussels) [1999] 
E.T.M.R. 649. 
95 
A theory advanced in T. Hays, 'The Copyright Directive, rights management and the end of 
parallel trade,' [2002] 1 IP & IT Law 2, concerns the relationship between copyright and batch 
codes. By relying on Art. 7(2) of Council Directive 2001/29/EEC on the harmonisation of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] O.J. LI67/10, the 
manufacturer could prevent the removal of the batch codes by claiming that the codes are copyright 
protected. The manufacturer would have to overcome the hurdle of proving that the batch codes 
come within the notion of 'electronic rights-management information.' 'Rights-management 
information' is defined as 'any information provided by right holders which identifies the 
work...and any numbers or codes that represents such information' (Hays, 6). These codes, and 
information about the products bearing them, could be stored electronically on a computer. This 
would prevent parallel importers fi-om removing the codes under Article 4(1) of the Copyright 
Directive. It is an interesting theory, but has not yet been tested in practice (although the Court did 
consider copyright rights in the context of batch codes in the Belgian Court of Appeal case of 
Lancome Parfums v. Kruidvat Retail B.V. [2005] E.T.M.R. 26). Considering how the E C J has 
interpreted the Trade Mark Directive (n. 78 above), it seems unlikely that the E C J would be more 
generous to manufacturers when interpreting the Copyright Directive given the ECJ' s pro-
integration policy: see chapter 6(2) above. In any event, the theory fails to reconcile the need to 
prevent the removal of batch codes with the need to protect the parallel importer's source of supply. 
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the manufacturer will be able to trace the goods in the event of a product recall from 
the information given by the parallel importer, thus only revealing the source of 
supply under such circumstances. This would allow the E C J to maintain its pro-
integration policy without affecting public health and safety. In a sense, this method 
is already applied in practice, since all WDL holders must keep a record of all 
products sold.^ ^ However, it is imperative that the new 're-pack batch code' be 
attached not only to the outer packaging, but also to the inner packaging, as there is 
a risk that one package might contain products originating from different batches.^' 
The E M E A , in a recent Reflection Paper, states that parallel distributors of products 
benefiting from a Community marketing authorisation shall not replace the original 
batch code.^ ^ However, the mentioning of a 're-pack batch code' or the addition of 
a prefix or suffix to the original batch code is allowed, though the original batch 
code must always be retained.^ ^ As parallel distributed products benefit from the 
manufacturer's Community marketing authorisation it is understandable that the 
original batch code must be retained. However, substituting the original batch code 
for a 're-pack batch code' on products marketed under a PIL could be in line with 
the ruling in Loendersloot.^'^'^ Parallel importers would not have to reveal their 
source of supply unless an emergency situation calls for a recall process, in which 
case the parallel importer would be able to translate the 're-pack batch code' into 
the 'original' batch code. 
Whether introducing such a system would benefit public health and safety is 
debatable. Retaining the original batch code is most likely the best solution from a 
Directive 2001/83, n. 2 above, Art. 80(e). This must include at least: the date, name of the 
medicinal product, quantity received or supplied, name and address of the supplier. See also chapter 
3, pp. 100-101 above. 
" This is a concern voiced by manufacturers. See Report from the Select Committee on Trade and 
Industry: Trade marks, fakes and consumers, (1999 HC 380), questions 307-308, where evidence is 
given of a lipid lowering agent by Dr. Brickwood (Managing Director of Janssen Cilag Ltd). Out of 
7 parts (containing 2 tablets each) only two parts had a batch code, which rendered a product recall 
impossible for the remaining 5 parts, as they clearly did not originate from the same original large 
block of tablets (otherwise it would have been unnecessary to cut it into pieces). 
See E M E A , ' P E R F II Acquis Working Group: Reflection paper on parallel imports,' ( E M E A -
PERF-Acq-1367-02-Final). 
" E M E A , 'Post-authorisation,' n. 33 above, s. 25. 
N. 70 above. 
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public health and safety perspective, as the lack of traceability of parallel imported 
products is (even) addressed by the Commission in a paper on Rapid Alerts and 
product recal ls .However, an organised system for 're-pack batch codes' could be 
equally effective if embedded in legal certainty. The E M E A guidelines and 
reflection papers are not legally binding and the ECJ's case-law is not sufficiently 
clear on the matter. The issue of batch codes and parallel imports must therefore be 
included in a future amendment to Directive 2001/83/EC'°^ if the E C J is not 
presented with these facts in the interim. 
Finally, recording of batch codes could be centralised and standardised throughout 
the Community. This system could be established in addition to a system of 're-
pack batch codes.' Manufacturers would be required to submit all batch codes to the 
E M E A before the products are supplied to the wholesalers. When a parallel 
importer subsequently acquires the products the batch codes would have to be 
compared to the batch codes already supplied to the E M E A by the manufacturer, so 
as to confirm authent ic i ty .The new 're-pack batch codes' could also be 
submitted to the E M E A in order to facilitate an effective product recall process. 
This would be possible, although unnecessary for product recall purposes, in the 
case of centrally authorised pharmaceutical products as the batch codes must be 
retained on such products. However, it would be impractical in respect of nationally 
authorised products as the recall process should be carried out by the national 
Medicines Control Agency responsible for the granting of the PIL, for reasons of 
E M E A (published on behalf of the Commission), 'Compilation of Community Procedures on 
Inspection and Exchange of Information - Revised Procedure for Handling Rapid Alerts and Recalls 
arising from Quality Defects' (EMEA/INS/GMP/ 3351/03/revl/corr), p. 18: 'In case of parallel 
imports, where there is difficulty in establishing the traceability of batches, consideration should be 
given to notifying all Member States by the Rapid Alert System.' See Braun, n. 49 above, 24 for a 
wider discussion. On the issue of traceability, it should be mentioned that some manufacturers, 
notably Pfizer, are experimenting with 'radio frequency identification technology.' With this 
technology manufacturers can ascertain 'how much, where it is, how it is being stored and whether 
it is in the correct place at the right time:' per Julian Mount (Senior European Director of Pfizer) in 
S. Shallar, 'Spaghetti junction,' European Pharmaceutical Executive, 1 March 2005, p. 12, 14. 
Parallel importers are likely to protests against the use of such technology, due to its potential 
parallel import-restrictive effect. 
N. 2 above. 
See B. Irvine (ed.), P. Kanavos and P. Holmes, 'Pharmaceutical parallel trade in the U K , ' Report, 
The Institute for the Study of Civil Society (2005), (<http://www.civitas.org.uk/pdCParalIelTradeUK 
.pdf^), p. 74. 
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geographical efficiency. Secondly, Member States may object to such centralisation 
as the supervision of the pharmaceutical market falls under the retained national 
competence over the protection of public health and safety in accordance with 
Article 30 E C Treaty. 
3.2.3 The insertion of a translated package leaflet 
Article 58 of Directive 2001/83/EC states that 'the inclusion in the packaging of all 
medicinal products of a package leaflet shall be obHgatory.. 
The new leaflet must, just like the outer packaging, include the name and address of 
the parallel importer and the name and address of the manufacturer.'*'^ Furthermore, 
the instruction leaflet must be translated into the language of the importing Member 
State.'^^ This requires a good translator, as any mistakes may indirectly have fatal 
consequences.Translating a package leaflet does not usually form the subject of 
an independent infringement action by the intellectual property holder, but is 
generally included in the infringement action by the trademark proprietor for 
repackaging or rebranding. However, it can be argued that package leaflets are 
copyright protected. As a direct consequence the translation of the leaflet will 
constitute an infringement of the copyright rights. Indeed, it is likely that copyright 
will be granted for leaflets under common law. However, most civil law 
jurisdictions would not afford copyright to works of low creativity, which is likely 
to include leaflets. Nevertheless, a company would be able to claim copyright in the 
leaflets when the products are being imported or exported to and from a common 
law jurisdiction.Other factors must also be taken into consideration. A package 
N. 2 above, Art. 58. 
ibid., An. 59(l)(a). 
ibid.. Art. 63(2). The leaflet may be printed in several languages, provided that the same 
information is given in all the languages. 
For example, a parallel importer when translating the Spanish word for prostate cancer into 
English wrote 'pre-menstrual pains:' Select Committee, n. 97 above, question 306. 
'"^  In 1986 Glaxo successfully prevented the importation of Salbutamol by Europharm on the basis 
of copyright infringement in the patient leaflet. Copyright was granted to the leaflets by virtue of the 
Copyright Act 1956. Glaxo was granted an injunction against Europharm to prevent importation of 
products accompanied with patient leaflets: see Glaxo v. Europharm, (unreported) (1986) 1078 Scrip 
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leaflet is not the main 'work' in itself, its only function is to accompany the 
pharmaceutical products to which the leaflet r e f e r s . I f the copyright had been the 
main work, for example the copyright of a book, the proprietor would most likely 
be able to prevent the translation as this would have infringed the specific subject 
matter of the copyright, just as the manufacturing of patent protected 
pharmaceutical products would have infringed the specific subject matter of the 
patent."° Exercising the copyright rights, when the reproduction and/or translation 
of the leaflet is necessary to enable the parallel importer to import the product into 
another Member State, would most likely infringe Article 28 E C Treaty. Preventing 
translation, whenever translation is as necessary as repackaging, would not be done 
to protect the specific subject matter of the copyright in the package leaflet, but to 
prevent parallel trade in the pharmaceutical product itself Regardless of the 
'exhaustion principle' such prevention is not compatible with Articles 28 and 30 E C 
Treaty.'" 
10. It should be noted that this is an old case, and it was not referred to the E C J . See L . Hancher, 
'The European pharmaceutical market: Problems of partial harmonisation,' (1990) 15 E.L.Rev. 9, 
25. 
See I. Stamatoudi, 'From drugs to spirits and fi-om boxes to publicity (decided and undecided 
issues in relation to trade marks and copyright exhaustion),' [1999] I.P.Q. 95, 106-113, for an 
extended discussion of this topic (and the following paragraph). 
"° A copyright right can be divided into two functions; the production and sale right, and the 
performance right. The performance right cannot be exhausted, as this would mean that the 
performance right would lose all its substance. The question is therefore whether the translation can 
be classified as 'performance' or 'reproduction.' Regardless of this, there is the third possibility, that 
translation is necessary in order to enable intra-Community trade. If so, the translation of the leaflet 
may not infringe the specific subject matter of the copyright right, as the package leaflet is only there 
to support the sale of the pharmaceutical product, and can therefore not be 'performed.' The only 
right that would be exhausted in such a scenario would be the sale right which is not part of the 
specific subject matter of the copyright right: see Case 158/86 Warner Bros and Metronome Video 
ApS V . Christiansen [1988] E . C . R . 2605; and Case 262/81 Coditel v. Cine Vog Films SA [1982] 
E . C . R . 3381. See I. Stamatoudi and P. Torremans, 'Merck is back to stay: The Court of Justice's 
judgment in Merck v Primecrown,' (1997) 19 E.I .P.R. 545, 548, for further discussion. 
" ' I n Case E-I /98 Norwegian Government v. Antra Norge A/S [1999] 36 C.M.L.R. 860, the E F T A 
Court had to consider whether copyright protection could be extended to 'summaries of product 
characteristics,' which include the specific information on the labels of packaging for 
pharmaceutical products as required by Articles 13 and 14 of Directive 65/65/EEC (replaced by 
Directive 2001/83, n. 2 above). The Court held that the exercise of the (potential) copyright so as to 
prevent parallel imports would be the equivalent of a prohibited quantitative restriction on imports. 
Further, the E F T A Court found the case to be concerned with the trade in the actual pharmaceutical 
products, and not the 'summary of product characteristics.' This could not be justified by Article 13 
of the E E A Treaty (equivalent to Article 30 E C Treaty), and was a disguised restriction on trade 
between the parallel importer and the owner of the 'summary of product characteristics;' (paras. 24-
26). See Hays, 'Parallel Importation,' n. 76 above, 67-68, for discussion. 
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Following the amendment of Directive 2001/83/EC"^ by Directive 2004/21 fEC all 
package leaflets must 'reflect the results of consultations with target patient groups 
to ensure that it is legible, clear and easy to use.'"^ This applies to both 
manufacturers and parallel importers. A group of 20 participants must undertake a 
45-minute interview comprising 12 to 15 questions designed to determine whether 
the participants understand the leaflet."'* Evaluating all package leaflets will lead to 
manufacturers working even harder to meet consumer needs, which is the main aim 
of this final quality checkpoint for leaflets before marketing to the public. It will 
also insure that leaflets accompanying parallel imported products are correctly 
translated and contain all the information necessary to satisfy consumer needs. 
Considering that a PIL cannot be granted in the absence of a reference marketing 
authorisation, the national Medicines Control Agency must already have carried out 
a 'user test' on the product leaflet at time of first marketing. The results of this test, 
which is estimated to cost £12,000 to £15,000, must therefore already be in the 
agency's possession at time of applying for a PIL. Applying the 'first marketing 
principle' from de Peijper^^^ (establishing the simplified procedure for parallel 
imported products in relation to marketing authorisations), this test may not be 
necessary for parallel imported products, as it would obstruct trade under Article 28 
E C and cannot be justified on grounds of public health and safety. The leaflet has 
already been tested once, and the national Medicines Control Agency already has 
the results. The MHRA states that 'as knowledge and experience grows, it is likely 
that not all [patient informarion leaflets] will need to be user tested. Products may 
be exempt if the leaflet for a similar product has already been successfully 
" - N . 2 above. 
ibid., Art. 59(3), as amended by Council Directive 2004/27/EC amending Directive 2001/83/EC 
on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use [2004] O.J. LI36/34. 'The 
introduction of mandatory readability testing of leaflets' was embodied in recommendation 11 of the 
Commission Communication on a Stronger European-based Pharmaceutical Industry for the Benefit 
of the Patient - A Call for Action [2003] COM/383/final., p. 38. 
""See D. Connelly, 'User testing of PILs now mandatory,' (2005) 275 P.J. 12, for a discussion and 
explanation of'patient-testing' of leaflets. 
N. 51 above. See also chapter 3(3.2) above. 
240 
tested.'"^ This supports the argument that the 'first marketing principle' in de 
Peijper^^^ should be applied to the testing of patient information leaflets, something 
which the E C J will have to rule on when presented with these facts in the future. 
4. Is public health and safety adequately observed? 
The debate over the safety of repackaging of pharmaceutical products seems to be 
never-ending. Pharmaceutical manufacturers claim that repackaging poses a 
significant risk to public health and safety, whilst parallel importers claim that 
repackaging is monitored by national authorities and does not jeopardise patient 
safety. Repackaging may present a risk to public health and safety in two different 
ways. First, the pharmaceutical products in question may have been affected during 
the repackaging process so as to have a non-existent, or in the 'worst-case scenario,' 
a negative therapeutic effect. Secondly, the packaging or package leaflet may be out 
of date or give inaccurate information which may indirectly have a negative effect 
on public health and safety. Before discussing the seriousness of these claims, and 
the various proposals to make repackaging safer, a summary of actual complaints 
made and defects discovered within a 12 month period will provide a good 
introduction. 
Table 6"^ 
24 [March 2003 - 24 March 2004 
Total number of complaints to the MHRA re: packaging of parallel imports 84 
- concerning (actual) defective labelling/packaging 18 
- concerning updating of patient leaflets 47 
- concerning other aspect of the labelling/packaging or leaflet 19 
" MHRA, 'Guidance on the user testing of patient information leaflets,' (MHRA/usertesting/ 
June/05) 
' " N . 51 above. 
Figures given by the Secretary of State for Health in Hansard, HC, Vol 419, Column 930-93IW, 
24 March 2004. 
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18 reports received by the MHRA Defective Medicines Report Centre' '^  concerned 
actual quality defects in the labelling or leaflets of repackaged parallel imports. 
These reports represent 6% of quality defects reported on all products, which is a 
relatively low number considering that parallel imports accounted for more than 
17% of the UK pharmaceutical market in 2003.'^° The remaining complaints and 
reports were not grave enough to warrant a referral to the Defective Medicines 
Report Centre. The vast majority of complaints received by the MHRA were made 
by marketing authorisation holders.'^' 
The statistics do not support the claims made by manufacturers. Naturally, the 
objectivity of the Government can be questioned, but so can the views of 
manufacturers and parallel importers. Pfizer, a large manufacturer of 
pharmaceutical products, conducted an audit of parallel traded pharmaceutical 
products in 2004.'^^ Pfizer claims that, of 300 pharmaceutical products surveyed, 
80% failed for legal and trademark reasons, 50% failed because of poor quahty and 
25% failed for safety reasons. Boots Pharmacy, the pharmacy chain with the largest 
NHS dispensing business in the UK, takes the opposite view.'^^ Although supplying 
approximately 600 000 packs of parallel imported pharmaceutical products per 
month. Boots can only report five instances since the start of 2004 where there have 
been difficulties. According to Boots, 'these were all relatively minor issues 
involving either labelling errors or wrong pack sizes and none of them posed a 
significant risk to patient safety.''"'^  There is also a growing body of opinion and 
reports suggesting a link between parallel trade and the penetration of counterfeit 
pharmaceutical products into the Community. Again, there are no statistics to 
The Centre receives and assesses reports of actual or suspected defective medicines and 
coordinates the necessary actions. 
See chapter 1, p. 26, n. 83 above. 
'"' Hansard, n, 118 above. 14 out of the total of 66 complaints not concerning actual defective 
labelling/packaging were from patients, patient groups and health professionals. The remaining 52 
were from marketing authorisation holders. 
'"Shallar,n. 101 above, 13. 
See David Loudon (Manager, Dispensing Buyer for Boots The Chemist) in Irvine (ed.) et al., n. 
103 above, 60. 
ibid. 
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demonstrate this, even though the debate has been fuelled by the discovery of 
counterfeit Cialis on the U K market in 2004.'^ ^ 
The above section highlights the absence of objectivity surrounding evidence to 
suggest that repackaging is a risk to public health and safety. A different approach 
is therefore necessary. Evidence from patient organisations, and examination of the 
potential risks from a practical perspective, will provide a better and more objective 
overview of the impact of repackaging on public health and safety. 
A survey carried out by Epilepsy Action, a non-profit organisation, showed most of 
its members were not pleased with repackaged/relabelled pharmaceutical 
products.'^^ Patients claimed that they experienced different side-effects, and in 
some cases no therapeutic effect at all when taking the substituted parallel imported 
product instead of the regular product. This opens up the interesting question of the 
occurrence of a 'reverse' placebo effect. Since parallel imported products must have 
the same therapeutic effect as the reference product, patients should not notice a 
difference between the two products. However, the absence of uniform packaging, 
and a different country of manufacture printed on the box, creates a reverse placebo 
effect. So, even if the product and packaging in itself do not constitute a risk to 
public health and safety the psychological impact must be considered. 'The placebo 
effect is well known and very powerful, and some have asked whether a similar 
'reverse' placebo effect could be the cause of problems being blamed on parallel 
imports. Epilepsy Action acknowledges that this could play some part for some 
people. However, if the end result is a seizure, the underlying cause still needs to be 
addressed.''" The effect is strengthened by the fact that the packaging is different. 
See The Pharmaceutical Journal (ed.), 'Advice on counterfeit medicines,' (2004) 273 P.J. 361. 
The tablets had been supplied in the Netherlands, entering the U K through parallel imports. An 
extended discussion on the link between parallel imports and counterfeit pharmaceutical products 
does not belong in a chapter dealing with the direct safety risks associated with repackaging of 
genuine pharmaceutical products. 
Epilepsy Action, 'Epilepsy Action Survey,' (2004), (<http://vmw.epilepsy.org.uk/research/ 
reports/packaging.html>). 
See Irvine (ed.) et al., n. 103 above, 59. When parallel imports started many of the complaints 
forwarded to national Medicines Control Agencies were a result of patient scepticism. A typical 
scenario would be when a patient has for a long time been using a certain medicine. When the 
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The absence of tamper-proof packaging gives rise to suspicion, adding more fuel to 
the 'reverse' placebo effect. Considering that most consumer products, from CD 
discs to soft drinks, are packaged in tamper-proof packaging, it is remarkable that 
pharmaceufical products on which people's lives depend are not. Allowing mixing 
of products from different batches and even cutting of blister packs may be 
statistically safe, but it nevertheless undermines patients' trust in parallel imported 
pharmaceutical products. The same principle applies to pafient leaflets. The 
inclusion of a leaflet with correct and updated instructions is vital to public health 
and safety, and yet there are reports of more than 18% of epilepsy patients not 
receiving a package leaflet with their substituted parallel imported medicine.'^^ 
Analysis of the various statistics in this section suggests that repackaging does not 
per se present a risk to public health and safety. However, repackaging is still an 
irrational pracfice if put into context. The pharmaceutical industry is one of the 
most regulated and supervised industries, and yet importers are allowed to open the 
original box, even cut blister packs into smaller pieces, subsequently putting the 
products in a new box. This practice in itself may be safe under optimal conditions 
when great care and attention is given to the process. Yet if packaging of 
pharmaceutical products is highly regulated and supervised so as to ensure safety by 
eliminating the chances of any mistakes in the packaging process, logical reasoning 
holds that repackaging must exponentially increase the chances of any mistakes in 
the repackaging process as it involves products being packaged for a second time.'"^ 
In conclusion, it can be said that the current case-law and Community measures 
pharmacy subsequently started to supply the parallel imported equivalent, the patient complained to 
the Medicines Control Agency and the parallel importer, claiming that the parallel imported version 
has not had any effect on the patient. Following testing by the Medicines Control Agency, 
comparing the two products, they are almost always found to be identical. In Sweden, for example, 
Astra always printed the name of the country of distribution on the packaging. When, post-1998, 
Astra wrote the name of the manufacturing country (Sweden) instead, complaints by Swedish 
patients concerning the parallel imported version decreased. This is an example of a reverse placebo 
effect: see Lakemedelsvarlden, n. 64 above. 
Epilepsy Action, n. 126 above (referred to in Irvine (ed.) et al., n. 103 above, 58): as much as 
53% of patients receiving their medicine in plain white boxes (packaged by the pharmacists) 
complained of not receiving a package leaflet. 
Not unexpectedly, parallel importers claim that the repackaging process actually contributes to 
public health and safety by acting as a second safety check before marketing: see R. Freudenberg, 
'An excuse to smear parallel trade, with no evidence,' (2004) 276 P.J. 560. 
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governing repackaging of pharmaceutical products adequately ensure public health 
and safety from a strictly theoretical perspective. However, the complexity of these 
measures and rulings, as well as the nature of the parallel system for directly and 
parallel imported pharmaceutical products, demands an effective enforcement and 
supervision of the established laws and regulations governing repackaging.'^" Being 
effective in theory, it is debatable whether cooperation between authorities in 
different Member States is sufficient to guarantee effective control of WDL and 
M A L holders and the eventual safety of repackaged products offered to patients. 
The simplest proposal to remedy these concerns and risks would be to introduce a 
single Community pack and name for all pharmaceutical products by making the 
centralised procedure for the granting of Community marketing authorisations 
gradually compulsory. Although attractive from a public health and safety 
perspective, such reform would, most likely, not be welcomed by manufacturers 
and unacceptable to many governments.'^' Instead, a proposal which satisfies 
public health and safety needs - as well as the demands of manufacturers and 
parallel importers - is 'over-packaging.''^^ This would involve the original package 
being inserted into a new box together with a new package leaflet, and if required, 
blister labelling for patients to stick on over-packaged blister packs. The system has 
the advantage of avoiding opening of tamper-proof packaging, thus not subjecting 
the actual products to the risk of being adversely affected, making cutting of blister 
This could mean shorter intervals between inspections of M A L and W D L holders' premises. 
Currently, premises are only inspected once an application is made, and thereafter only sporadic -
the maximum interval being 4 years (for overseas premises). See the M H R A website: <http://www. 
mhra.gov.uk/ home/ idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&nodeId=613>. 
As proposed in chapter 3(4) above, making the centralised procedure compulsory for all 
pharmaceutical products would enhance safety and stimulate cross-border trade. However, it will be 
difficult to introduce a single Community pack and name until national regulations and trademark 
laws have been further harmonised. Meanwhile, repackaging of centrally authorised products must, 
to an extent, be allowed: see section 3.1 and chapter 3(2.1.1) above for discussion of brand names 
and package sizes in relation to the Community marketing authorisation. Member States may object 
to such centralisation as the national pharmaceutical market falls under the retained national 
competence in accordance with Article 30 E C Treaty, and manufacturers may oppose such a reform 
as it would prevent them fi-om using separate trademarks and names throughout the Community. See 
chapter 3(4) for further discussion of the possible objections to such centrahsation. 
'^ ^ See Shallar, n. 101 above, 14; and Irvine (ed.) et al., n. 103 above, 73. 
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packs a practice of the past.'" The disadvantage is that patients, or the pharmacists, 
will have to stick the blister labels on the blister packs themselves. 
The statistics concerning the risks to patient health and safety brought about by 
repackaging are not conclusive as it is hard to find scientifically objective statistics. 
This is particularly true considering that a normal patient - 'the man on the 
Clapham omnibus' - may not know that the trade exists let alone how to complain 
about it. The laws and regulations governing repackaging seem to be adequate and 
effective, but safety is largely dependent on the enforcement of these regulations. 
Making the centrally authorised marketing authorisation procedure compulsory for 
more pharmaceutical categories would make the system more manageable and 
safer, as parallel distribution does not involve a name change, pack size change, or a 
change in package layout.'^ "^ Until such centralisation has been achieved, over-
boxing coupled with tamper-proof packaging would be a step in the right direction. 
5. Conclusion 
The case-law concerning repackaging of pharmaceutical products can in many 
aspects be viewed as the pinnacle of pro-integration. Manufacturers, the intellectual 
property owners, are not only prohibited fi-om exercising their trademark and patent 
rights so as to prevent trade in intellectual property protected products, but are also 
precluded from preventing the re-attachment of trademarks as a consequence of 
repackaging where this is necessary to comply with national legislation and in some 
cases consumer preference.'^^ This has resulted in a fierce debate between parallel 
importers and manufacturers over the trade's legitimacy. However, perhaps more 
important than the intellectual property aspect of repackaging are the Community's 
labelling and package leaflet regulations, and ultimately public health and safety. 
'^ ^ Pfizer, being in favour of over-packaging, is introducing tamper-evident packaging which will 
make it evident if the package has been opened by using colour-shifting ink. The ink enables 
pharmacists and patients to determine the authenticity of products by using a special filter, similar to 
the system used for banknotes: see Shallar, n. 101 above, 15. 
Seen. 131 above. 
See chapter 6 above. 
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The first step for a parallel importer wanting to engage in repackaging is to obtain a 
MAL, which also works as a WDL. Following Gyselinx,^^^ it can be argued that 
national legislation prohibiting MAL holders in other Member States from 
importing pharmaceutical products in the absence of holding a WDL in the Member 
State of importation is not compatible with Article 28 EC Treaty. Nevertheless, it is 
likely that such legislation can be justified under Article 30 EC Treaty, as it will be 
very difficult for the importing Member State to ensure public health and safety if 
the trader is neither licensed nor store the products in this Member State. Similarly, 
as discussed in section 2 above, national legislation prohibiting the issuance of a 
MAL unless the repackaging process is carried out in this Member State may not be 
compatible with Article 28 EC Treaty. Such legislation penalises against traders 
who already have access to suitable premises for the purpose of a MAL in a 
Member State other than the importing Member State. However, it is likely that 
legislation to this effect can be justified with reference to Article 30 EC Treaty, as 
the abolishment of such legislation would require strong cooperation between the 
two national Medicines Control Agencies in order to protect public health and 
safety. 
The requirement of a MAL is equally applicable to repackaging of parallel 
distributed and parallel imported products. However, as opposed to parallel 
distributed pharmaceutical products, parallel imported products can be repackaged 
into a larger or smaller pack size. As a result, the batch code and expiry-date may 
not be re-attached on the new blister pack after having been cut into smaller pieces. 
Due to the traceability which a batch code affords the manufacturer, this practice 
may be compatible with Articles 28 and 30 EC Treaty. Although the re-attachment 
of the original batch code is preferred in order to protect public health and safety in 
the event a product recall is necessary, a translatable 're-pack batch code' may be 
equally effective without allowing the manufacturer to trace the products in order to 
prevent parallel imports. Concerns have also been raised over the implications for 
public health and safety of the absence of expiry-dates on repackaged parallel 
N. 9 above. 
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imports. Following Directive 2001/83/EC'^^ the expiry-date must be printed on at 
least the outer and inner packaging, but i f the blister packs have been cut and 
mixed, there is a real risk that packages may contain products with different expiry-
dates. This is a real concern. The insertion of a translated package leaflet, on the 
other hand, should be straightforward. Manufacturers will find it hard to claim 
138 
copyright infringement by the parallel importer's translation, and the de Peijper 
'first marketing principle' will most likely prevent national authorities from 
demanding that package leaflets - having akeady been 'patient tested' once - be 
tested again following the granting of a PIL. 
Overall, the case-law and Directive 2001/83/EC'^^ adequately ensure pubUc health 
and safety, although legal certainty is needed in the area of batch codes. Statistics 
do not point towards repackaging constituting a risk to public health and safety, but 
in such a disputed practice as repackaging it is difficult to verify the objectivity of 
statistics. Nevertheless, the ultimate effectiveness of these measures is dependent on 
their enforcement, which demands strong and close cooperation between Member 
State authorities and the EMEA. The Community should draw up clear guidelines 
and/or (preferably) include these in a future amendment to Directive 2001/83/EC''*° 
in order to clarify the responsibility of national Medicines Control Agencies, setting 
up clear channels of cooperation, and providing legal certainty in the areas of batch 
codes and expiry-dates. This will hopefully lead to an effective enforcement of the 
Community's labelling and package leaflet regulations. Finally, it is obvious that 
parallel importers have much to gain from complying with these measures, not least 
to build up patients' confidence in the safety of the trade. 
N. 2 above. 
'^^N. 51 above. 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The elimination of cross-border barriers to trade can generally be expected to 
encourage intra-brand competition and widen customer choice. This will lead to 
increased production efficiency and harmonisation of product prices throughout the 
Community. Given these benefits, it is natural that the Commission actively 
encourages the facilitation of parallel trade. 
These benefits, however, do not apply to parallel trade in the pharmaceutical sector. 
National laws still regulate the pharmaceutical industry on the basis of the retained 
national competence over the protection of public health and safety in accordance 
with Article 30 EC Treaty. National regulations decide when/if and at what price a 
pharmaceutical product can be marketed on the national market. The resultant 
disparity in pharmaceutical prices throughout the Community has resulted in large 
scale parallel trade in pharmaceutical products (see recommendation I below). 
Some Member States value the importance of future R&D by allowing the 
imposition of high pharmaceutical prices; whilst other Member States have adopted 
a pricing policy aimed at generating savings for the national health budget. 
Parallel trade in pharmaceutical products will not lead to price convergence, but 
merely result in the importation of the exporting Member State's pricing policy. 
The legal framework governing parallel trade therefore only facilitates parallel trade 
without having any long-term effect on the EC Treaty objective of establishing a 
common market. It reduces the funds available for future R&D and is therefore 'a 
key factor in Europe's declining attractiveness for pharmaceutical R&D.' ' In 
addition, logic cannot deny that the extra transportation, repackaging, and 
' Humer F, 'A tainted trade - parallel trade medicines are a clear symptom of the failure of Europe's 
pharmaceutical policy,' European Pharmaceutical Executive, 1 November 2005, p. 44. 
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simplified fast-track marketing authorisation application procedure entailed by 
parallel trade carries a potential risk to public health and safety. Parallel trade 
exponentially increases the chance of errors in the distribution chain. 
The main beneficiaries of parallel trade are the parallel importers, and in the short 
term. Member States.^  Parallel traders make a handsome profit, although having to 
rely on larger volumes due to increased sector competition. Parallel trade also 
generates savings for national health budgets. This, however, can be a 
misconception as Member States could simply amend their pricing regulations so as 
to lower prices instead of indirectly encouraging parallel trade.^  
This thesis has discussed the need to balance the common market objective with 
various pubHc health and safety concerns. The Commission and the Community 
courts have not yet fully considered these aspects of the trade when interpreting 
and/or applying the EC Treaty. However, the recent Bayer* judgment heralded a 
change in the Court's approach to parallel imports. Mere unilateral decisions are not 
prohibited by Article 81 EC Treaty, and such prohibitions cannot be justified by the 
Treaty objective of market integration, as restricting parallel imports is not a per se 
violation of Article 81 EC Treaty. Manufacturers should, however, apply the Bayer^ 
judgment with care. In particular: 
Manufacturers should be aware that the principle in Bayer^ may not apply to 
a relationship between a manufacturer and a selective distributor. The ECJ 
did not rely on Ford^ and AEG v. Commission^ since these cases concerned 
selective distribution agreements.^  
" Most price differences remain with the parallel importer, with only a small fraction accruing to the 
national health budget; see chapter 1(3.1) above. 
' See chapter 1(3.1) above. 
" Joined Cases C-2-3/01 P Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure & Commission v. Bayer AG 
[2004] E . C . R . 23. 
' ibid. 
* ibid. 
' See Cases 25-26/84 Ford Inc. v. Commission [1985] E . C . R . 2725. 
* Case 107/82 AEG-Telefunken AG v. Commission [1983] E . C . R . 3151 
' Cases C-2-3/01, n. 4 above, paras. 143-144. 
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• The manufacturer must not make its intentions, as to the refusal to supply, 
known to the distributor or any other party. 
• Manufacturers must refrain from monitoring and tracing parallel exported 
goods back through the distribution chain, as this can be seen as enforcing 
the 'export ban' from which an agreement can be inferred i f the distributors 
adhere to the manufacturer's policy.'° 
• Finally, a manufacturer may potentially benefit from a dishonest 
relationship with its distributors. I f the distributor 'agrees' to the unilateral 
policy the Commission may regard this as an agreement. 
The ^ayer" judgment may prompt the Commission to more actively consider the 
application of Article 82 EC Treaty to parallel import-restrictive measures. 
However, as chapter 2 showed, the Commission will have difficulties in 
establishing the manufacturer's dominance, as the relevant market must be defined 
using the 'arbitrage approach' method giving rise to a very wide market definition. 
This will be further complicated considering the market position of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers versus national health authorities; a monopolist facing a 
monopsonist.'^ Should the Commission be able to establish a dominant position on 
the part of the undertaking. Advocate General Jacobs argued, in Syfait,^^ that the 
special characteristics of the European pharmaceutical market coupled with the 
need to promote pubhc health and safety provides an objective justification for 
parallel import-restrictive measures by dominant undertakings (see recommendation 
2 below). Indeed, it is likely that the CFI was influenced by Advocate General 
Jacobs's Opinion in Syfait^^ when giving judgment in GlaxoWellcome,^^ where the 
Commission Decision 80/1283/EEC yo/i/i5on & Johnson [1980] O.J. L377/16, recitals 15-17. 
" N. 4 above. 
'- See chapter 2(2.3) above. 
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-53/03 Syfait & Others v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE 
2005] E . C . R . 4609. 
" ibid. 
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Court held that certain dual-pricing agreements may be capable of benefiting from 
an Article 81(3) EC Treaty exemption despite having a parallel import-restrictive 
effect (see recommendation 2 below). The Commission may therefore find it 
increasingly difficult to apply Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty to parallel import-
restrictive agreements following GlaxoWellcome^^ and Advocate General Jacobs's 
Opinion in Syfait. Coincidentally, the European Association of Euro-
Pharmaceutical Companies (EAEPC) has filed a complaint with the Commission 
alleging that Pfizer's recently implemented dual-pricing system in Spain is 
incompatible with Articles 81 and/or 82 EC Treaty. The outcome of the 
Commission's re-examination of GlaxoWellcome's request for an exemption, or, i f 
appealed, the ECJ's judgment, is therefore eagerly waited for by commentators. 
Similarly, the Commission and the Community courts have failed to fully consider 
the need to protect public health and safety when interpreting the conformity of the 
legal framework governing the granting of marketing authorisations with the EC 
Treaty. Following de Peijper^ and the ECJ's subsequent case-law concerning the 
'simplified procedure' there are no real obstacles remaining for parallel importers in 
relation to marketing authorisations. The question is instead whether the ECJ has in 
fact adopted a stronger pro-integration policy than is necessary in order to protect 
the concept of a common market, and whether this can be justified despite the 
ensuing risks to public health and safety. 
National Medicines Control Agencies will grant a parallel import licence (PIL) i f 
the parallel imported product can be considered 'essentially identical' and share a 
'common origin' with the reference product already benefiting from a marketing 
authorisation. The ECJ's interpretation of the conformity of these conditions with 
Case T-168/01 GlaxofVellcome pic v. Commission [2006] E . C . R . (unreported: delivered on 
September 27 2006). See also Commission Decision 2001/791/EC Glaxo fVellcome [2001] O.J. 
L302/1. 
ibid. 
" N . 13 above. 
E A E P C , 'Pfizer breaking E U competition rules,' (October 2005), (<http://www.eaepc.org/news 
_and_press/current_articles.php?n=3&id=274>). See also chapter 2, p. 42, n. 53 above. 
" Case 104/75 Officier van Justitie v. de Peijper. [1976] E . C . R . 613. 
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the EC Treaty has led to a very wide definition of 'a common origin' and 
'essentially identical.' 
Following Kohlpharma, a PIL cannot be precluded solely on the ground that there 
is no 'common origin' between the product for which an application is sought and 
the reference medicinal product, where 
a) the application is submitted with reference to a medicinal product which 
already benefits from a marketing authorisation in this Member State; 
b) the medicinal product for which a licence is sought is imported fi-om a 
Member State in which it benefits from a marketing authorisation, and; 
c) the safety and efficacy assessment carried out for the reference marketing 
authorisation can be used in the application for a PIL without any risk to 
public health and safety.^' 
The requirement of a 'common origin' is secondary to 'essentially identical' and 
cannot play a decisive role in deciding whether or not to grant a PIL.^^ However, it 
should be noted that the ECJ has not yet ruled on facts where no common origin, 
however remote, exists. 
The ECJ has applied a similarly wide interpretation of the 'essentially identical' 
condition. The parallel imported and the reference product will be considered 
'essentially identical' i f they possess the same therapeutic effects. In order to have 
the same therapeutic effects, the products must possess the same active ingredients, 
and in particular the same active moiety. The excipients and the 'pharmaceutical 
form' need not be identical i f it can be showed that the difference in excipients does 
not affect quality and safety assurance. 
°^ Case C-112/02 Kohlpharma GmbH v. Germany [2004] E . C . R . 3369, 
ibid., para. 21. 
ibid., para. 15. 
para. 21. 
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Furthermore, the automatic revocation of the PIL upon the voluntarily withdrawal 
of the reference marketing authorisation is not compatible with Articles 28 and 30 
EC Treaty. As a result, when the reference marketing authorisation is withdrawn for 
reasons other than the protection of public health, the automatic cessation and/or 
revocation of the linked PIL cannot be justified.^^ This may have a positive side-
effect on integration. By leaving the PIL valid following the withdrawal of the 
reference marketing authorisation, the ECJ forces national Medicines Control 
Agencies to rely solely on information provided by other Member State Medicines 
Control Agencies. In consequence, this encourages Member States into stronger co-
operation, as well as indicating that licences based on separate national procedures 
are no longer sufficient to satisfy Community integration and public health. 
Nevertheless, the previous marketing authorisation holder would not be under an 
obligation to submit the information necessary to carry out effective 
pharmacovigilance. Maintaining public health and safety is further complicated by 
the fact that most withdrawn marketing authorisations are replaced by a new 
marketing authorisation for a similar, albeit, improved version of the original 
product. Due to the potential differences between the new and 'old' (still parallel 
imported) version of the product, it becomes even more important to monitor the 
safety of the products; individually, as well as the consequences which may result 
from allowing the two products to be sold side-by-side. 
To summarise, it now seems as i f differences in the pharmaceutical formulation and 
a lack of a common origin are not only allowed in order to protect the common 
market, but have been relaxed so as to become an authorisation procedure for 
imported products in general, sharing some similarities with a product already 
benefiting from a marketing authorisation, instead of being a licence system strictlv 
for the benefit of products imported in parallel. In addition, leaving the PIL valid 
following the withdrawal of the reference marketing authorisation may have serious 
consequences to public health and safety as it requires strong cooperation between 
" Case C-172/00 Ferring GmbH v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH [2002] E . C . R . 6891, para 33; and Case C -
15/01 Paranova AB v. Lakemedelsverket [2003] E . C . R . 1-4175, and Case C-113/01 Paranova Oy 
[2003] E . C . R . 4243. See chapter 4(3) above. 
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Member States, and thus increases the risk of mistakes or omissions of information. 
A solufion to this problem would be to go back to the ruling in de Peijper.^'^ 
However, in order not to affect legal certainty, the best solution is to gradually 
make the centralised Community marketing authorisation procedure compulsory for 
more categories of pharmaceutical products (see recommendation 3 below). 
Part 2 of the thesis focused on the intellectual property and repackaging aspect of 
parallel trade. The absence of international exhaustion in conjunction with the 
exhaustion of rights doctrine for goods first marketed within the EEA has given rise 
to the expression 'Fortress Europe.' This is a very accurate description of the 
common market in terms of the bottleneck effect it applies to imports from third 
countries - the difficulties in gaining entry into the Community are compensated for 
by the Community's free movement provisions giving rise to ample opportunities 
for traders to capitalise on price differences. 
The 'exhaustion of rights' doctrine in its basic form, allowing for Community 
exhaustion, cannot be criticised from a pro-integration nor a public health and 
safety perspective. The doctrine's significance to the fulfilment of the common 
market objective outweighs any risks it may pose to the promotion of public health 
and safety. Even though the doctrine may have an effect on the funds made 
available for future R&D, and thus the need to promote public health and safety, 
this can be compensated for by a less stringent application of Articles 81 and 82 EC 
Treaty to parallel import-restrictive measures (see recommendation 2 below). 
The derogation in the 2003 Act of Accession, " commonly referred to as the 
'specific mechanism,' provides for the suspension of the 'exhaustion of rights 
doctrine' for a dynamic transition period in terms of pharmaceutical products 
imported from the new Member States (except Cyprus and Malta) .This means 
" N . 19 above. 
" Chapter 2 (Company Law) of Annex IV of the Act of Accession [2003] O.J. L236/33 (see 
introduction, p. 4, n. 15 above for a full reference). 
See chapter 5(5.2) above. 
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that the principle in Merck v. Stephar^^ is temporarily suspended for all products 
within the scope of the derogation. By suspending the exhaustion of rights doctrine, 
the pharmaceutical market and pharmaceutical traders will be given extra time to 
adjust pharmaceutical prices, distribution networks and patent protection. A patent 
proprietor which, fully aware of the consequences in terms of the exhaustion of 
rights doctrine, markets a product in a Member State where patent protection is not 
available can be said to have consented to the marketing and the aforementioned 
consequences. However, a patent proprietor which decided to market a product in 
one of the new Member States before patent protection became available cannot be 
said to have consented to the subsequent consequences of that decision, being 
unable to predict that the country in question would one day join the European 
Community. In fact, the 'specific mechanism' can be justified with reference to the 
judgment in Pharmon v. Hoechst?^ Just as a patent proprietor cannot be said to 
have consented to the granting of a compulsory licence, a patent proprietor 
marketing a product in one of the new Member States before it joined the 
Community cannot be said to have consented to the future consequences of having 
marketed the products, compared to Merck v. Stephar^^ where the patent proprietor 
must necessarily have been aware of the consequences of such marketing. 
The product, temporal and geographical scope of the mechanism is insufficiently 
clear (see recommendation 4 below). However, it is most likely that the relevant 
form of patent protection in relation to the 'specific mechanism' is product or 
second medical use patents, whichever was introduced earliest. ^ ° As all Member 
States introduced product patents before second medical use patents, the relevant 
date must be the date product patents were introduced in the new Member States. 
As the mechanism expressly includes supplementary protection certificates (SPCs), 
the derogation refers to product patents with additional SPCs. 
" Case \ ?>im Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV E . C . R . 2063. 
'*Case \9m Pharmon BVy.Hoechst AG [\9%5] E . C . R . 2281. 
N. 27 above. See also chapter 5(5.2); and Joined Cases C-267-268/95 Merck & Co. Inc. v. 
Primecrown Ltd [1996] E . C . R . 6285. 
See O. Lemaire, 'Parallel trade of pharmaceutical products within the enlarged European Union,' 
(2005) 27 E.I .P.R. 43, 45 and 50. See also chapter 5(5.2.1) above. 
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Patent protection was made available in all the new Member States between 1991 
and 1994. '^ Pharmaceutical products for which a patent was filed for after 1994 will 
not under any circumstances benefit from the 'specific mechanism,' whilst all 
products for which a patent was filed for before 1991 will automatically benefit 
from the derogation for the duration of the patent term and the SPC. Consequently, 
opponents to the 'specific mechanism' can take comfort in the fact that the product 
scope of the derogation is very limited and ever decreasing. The geographical scope 
of the mechanism should extend not only to parallel imports from the new CEE 
Member States to the 15 old Member States. As the phrasing of the mechanism is 
ambiguous, and considering that the purpose of the 'specific mechanism' is to 
provide a transition period so as to allow for a smooth integration into the 
Community, the ECJ is not likely to discriminate between the 15 old Member States 
and Malta and Cyprus, especially not since Malta and Cyprus enacted patent 
legislation at a similar time as the 15 old Member States.^ ^ Patent proprietors in 
these two island States should therefore be able to invoke the mechanism. 
The same reasoning, albeit with a few modifications, can be applied to the 
interesting legal question of whether the 'specific mechanism' can be invoked by a 
patent proprietor in one of the eight new CEE Member States for products imported 
from another CEE Member State. Admittedly, the derogation explicitly refers to the 
(listed) 'abovementioned [new] Member States' and 'Member States,' as well as 
implying that the importing State must have been a Member State at the time of 
filing the patent application.^^ However, in Merck v. Primecrown the ECJ stated 
that the derogation in the Spanish and Portuguese Act of Accession"''* 'should apply 
in full to trade between Spain and Portugal, on the one hand, and the existing 
Member States, on the other.'^ ^ It is therefore likely that the 'specific mechanism' 
" See chapter 5(5.2.1) above. 
" See chapter 5(5.2.2) above. 
" 'Specific mechanism,' n. 25 above, para. 1. See also chapter 5(5.2.2) above. 
" Art 47 and 209 of the Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and 
the Portuguese Republic to the European Communities and Adjustments to the Treaties [1985] O.J. 
L302/23. The wording of the derogation, in respect of the geographical scope in relation to acceding 
and old Member States, is similar to that of the 'specific mechanism' {ibid). 
" Cases C-267-268/95, n. 29 above, para. 38 (emphasis added). 
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can be invoked in one of the new CEE Member States for products imported from 
another of the new CEE Member States,^ ^ as otherwise the ECJ would be seen as 
discriminating between (new and old) Member States. 
An interesting observation is that the 'specific mechanism' allows patent 
proprietors to prevent 'the import and marketing'^^ of the product. It can therefore 
be debated whether parallel importers are allowed to circumvent the 'specific 
mechanism' by using Member States where the mechanism carmot be invoked (due 
to the temporal scope) as a gateway before re-exporting the goods to a Member 
State coming within the scope of the mechanism (see recommendation 4 below). 
The scope of the mechanism will likely be the subject of many rulings by the ECJ 
and subsequent comments by academic scholars. This, of course, is dependent on 
the effectiveness and enforcement of the derogation. Further research is therefore 
needed when enough time have lapsed so as to be able to assess the impact of the 
'specific mechanism' in hindsight. 
In contrast to the 'specific mechanism' and Community exhaustion of patents, it is 
clear that the ECJ considers the right to exercise trademark rights to be subordinate 
to the common market objective. Repackaging, rebranding and relabelling of 
parallel imported products are practices particular to pharmaceutical products. The 
linguistic, regulatory and customary barriers to intra-Community trade have 
prompted the ECJ to extend the boundaries of the 'exhaustion of rights' doctrine to 
allow unauthorised re-affixation of trademarks and alteration to the packaging 
where this is considered necessary to gain market access (see recommendation 5 
below). The ECJ case-law interpreting the Trade Mark Directive^^ and the EC 
Treaty in relation to repackaging is complex and substantial. The Bristol-Myers 
Lemaire, n. 30 above, 49. 
" N. 25 above, para. 2. 
Council Directive 89/104 E E C to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade 
marks [1989] O.J. L40/1. 
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Squibb v. Paranova^^ and Boehringer v. Swingward and Dowelhurst'^'^ conditions, 
at first only concerned with the 'necessity' to repackage in order to comply with 
national legislation and the protection of the specific subject matter of the 
trademark, have been extended to include a 'customer preference test' in order to 
asses whether repackaging is considered necessary. Perhaps the most controversial 
issue, however, is the practice of 'co-branding,' involving not only the re-affixation 
of the manufacturer's trademark, but the affixation of a parallel trader-specific 
brand mark to the new packaging (see recommendation 5 below). Like the 
'customer preference test,' a final conclusion on the legitimacy of 'co-branding' 
cannot be made until the ECJ has decided upon the latest referral made by the UK 
Court of Appeal in the Boehringer v. Swingward saga. 
However, the intellectual property aspect of repackaging is secondary and 
unconnected to the Community's labelling and package leaflet regulations. 
Contrary to the purpose of the 'exhaustion of rights' doctrine, which mainly 
concerns the common market objective, the objective of these regulations is to 
protect public health and safety. This can potentially have a negative effect on the 
common market objective. For example, following Gyselinx*^ it can be argued that 
national legislation prohibiting 'manufacturer's (assemble) licence' (MAL) holders 
in other Member States from importing pharmaceutical products in the absence of 
holding a 'wholesale dealer's licence' (WDL) in the Member State of importation is 
not compatible with Article 28 EC Treaty. Similarly, it is reasonable to question the 
validity of national legislation requiring MAL holders to repackage the products in 
the Member State where the licence is granted. This is so because a MAL holder 
does not need to be in possession of a WDL, but not vice versa. Such legislation 
penalise nationals from other Member States who have access to suitable premises 
^'Joined Cases C-427, C-429 and C-436/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova A/S [1996] E .C .R. 
3457. 
""Case C-143/00 Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd & Dowelhurst Ltd [2002] E .C .R. 
3759. 
'^ Case C-348/04 Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd [2004] O.J. C273/11 (currently 
pending before the ECJ) . 
^-Joined Cases 87-88/85 Legia & Gyselinx v. Minister for Health [1986] E . C . R . 1707. See also 
chapters 3(3) and 7(2) above. 
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and technology for repackaging in the Member State where the trader's 
headquarters are located, and may not be compatible with Article 28 EC Treaty as it 
renders the trader liable to the additional costs of either obtaining suitable premises 
or a WDL in the Member State of importation. However, as discussed in chapter 
7(2) above, it is possible that legislation to this effect can be justified under Article 
30 EC Treaty as the protection of public health and safety would demand strong 
cooperation in the absence of such legislation (see recommendation 6 below). 
Similarly, demanding the re-attachment of batch codes on repackaged products may 
not be compatible with Article 28 EC Treaty due to the traceability batch codes 
affords manufacturers'*^ (see recommendation 6 below). Concerns have also been 
raised over the potential implications for public health and safety of the possible 
mixing of products with different expiry-dates.Following Directive 2001/83/ECr*^ 
the expiry-date must be printed on the outer and inner packaging, but i f the blister 
packs have been cut and mixed, there is a real risk that packages may contain 
products with different expiry-dates. The insertion of a translated package leaflet, 
on the other hand, should be straightforward. Manufacturers will find it hard to 
claim copyright infringement by the parallel importer's translation, and the de 
Peijper'^^ principle will most likely prevent national authorities from demanding 
that package leaflets - having already been 'patient tested' once - be tested again 
following the granting of a PIL.'*^ 
Statistics do not point towards repackaging constituting a risk to public health and 
safety, but in such a disputed practice as repackaging it is difficult to verify the 
objectivity of statistics."*^ It must be stressed, however, that unlike other product 
groups, one quality flaw in the chemical product or a wrongly or inadequately 
labelled pharmaceutical product can have fatal consequences. In this respect, the 
See chapter 7(3.2.2) above. 
"^See chapter 7(3.2.1) above. 
•'^Articles 54(h) and 55(3) of Council Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to 
medicinal products for human use [2001] O.J. L311/67. 
'^N. 19 above. 
" See chapter 7(3.2.3) above. 
See chapter 7(4) above. 
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common market objective must be secondary to the need to protect public health 
and safety. 
The focus on primary and secondary resources has allowed for a thorough analysis 
of the Commission's and the Community courts' interpretation of the conformity of 
parallel import-restrictive measures with the EC Treaty. This doctrinal study has 
therefore clarified the legal framework governing parallel trade in pharmaceutical 
products, bringing to light the Community courts' and institutions' approach to the 
concept o f balancing the common market objective with the need to promote and 
protect public health and safety. The originality of the contribution of this thesis to 
the academic and professional knowledge-base is two-fold. First, the laws and 
regulations governing the 'simplified procedure' for parallel imported products,"*^ 
and the Community's labelling and package leaflet regulations are largely neglected 
by academic scholars.^^ In addition, recent events involving the interpretation of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty^' and the inclusion of a 'specific mechanism' in the 
2003 Act of Accession" demand novel and original research. Secondly, the thesis 
provides a novel exploration of the interrelationship between the different laws and 
regulations governing the various separate stages in the distribution chain o f parallel 
imported pharmaceutical products. These laws and regulations must complement 
each other in order to facilitate the establishment of a common market without 
compromising public health and safety. To this end, the following 
recommendations seek to strengthen the balance between the common market 
objective and the need to protect and promote public health and safety. 
See chapter 4 above. 
°^ See chapter 7 above. 
See Cases C-2-3/01, n. 4 above; Case C-53/03, n. 13 above; and Case T-168/01, n. 15 above. 
"^ N. 25 above. See chapter 5(5) above. 
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2. Recommendations 
2.1. Harmonising national pricing regulations 
The xmderlying reason for the existence of parallel trade in pharmaceutical products 
is the disparity in pricing regulations as a consequence of the retained national 
competence over the protection of public health and safety in accordance with 
Article 30 EC Treaty. In this context, parallel importation of pharmaceutical 
products does not lead to price convergence, but merely results in the importation of 
the exporting Member State's pricing policy. A solution to this problem would be to 
harmonise national pharmaceutical pricing regulations throughout the Community 
so as to make parallel trade commercially unviable. This would be the best option 
for the European pharmaceutical industry as well as society as a whole. The current 
legal framework governing parallel trade is disparate and complex. Even i f the need 
to promote future R & D could be achieved by allowing manufacturers more freedom 
under the EC Treaty, and the protection of public health and safety can be 
maintained by implementing recommendation 3 below, this could jeopardise legal 
certainty and add to the complexity of the law. Indeed, parallel trade may only 
prove to be a temporary practice in a transition period between partial- and fu l l 
integration of Member State markets i f pharmaceutical pricing regulations were 
harmonised throughout the Community. Further research is needed in this area, but 
as a preliminary remark it can be said that, albeit theoretically ideal, this 
recommendation is not likely to be implemented by the Member States for several 
reasons. First, pharmaceutical pricing is, as mentioned, part of the retained national 
competence over the protection of public health and safety. Secondly, currency 
fluctuations and variations in Member States purchasing power parity (PPP) wi l l 
make such harmonisation difficult. Even i f the harmonised regulations would allow 
for PPP and currency adjustments, this would lead to a disparity in prices which is 
the very reason for harmonising the pricing regulations in the first place. Finally, 
there is the possibility, however insignificant, that such harmonisation w i l l be 
considered 'price-fixing,' and thus not in conformity with Article 81 EC Treaty, i f it 
262 
is the result of a mere agreement between Member States as opposed to being the 
result of a Council or Commission measure. 
2.2 Providing an objective justification or exemption for certain parallel 
import-restrictive abuses/agreements 
I f failing to implement recommendation 1 above, manufacturers must be given a 
certain amount of freedom to restrict parallel trade. As argued by Advocate General 
Jacobs in Syfait," competition on the pharmaceutical market is already distorted 
due to Member State pricing regulations. To allow parallel trade, despite the fact 
that competition is already distorted, can have severe consequences for the 
promotion of public health and safety by reducing the funds made available for 
future R&D.^ ' ' The special characteristics of the pharmaceutical market should 
therefore provide an objective justification for certain parallel import-restrictive 
measures by dominant undertakings. Alternatively, it is hoped that the proposed 
'meeting competition defence' in the recent Commission discussion paper on the 
application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses w i l l provide such a 
justification for parallel import-restrictive measures.^^ The measure must be non-
discriminatory and proportionate, for example, reftising to supply only in instances 
when the orders are out of proportion to the prevalent demand in the relevant 
Member State, or setting the price according to the reimbursement level in the 
relevant Member State. Similarly, the Commission must take into consideration, 
when applying Article 81(3) EC Treaty, the fact that certain dual-pricing 
agreements may remedy a loss in efficiency, and provide a gain in efficiency by 
allowing for an increase in funds made available by the pharmaceutical company 
for future R«&D." 
" N . 13 above. 
See chapter 1(3.1) above. This is a controversial issue, but the pharmaceutical industry definitely 
tends to favour the US to Europe as a location for carrying out R&D and introducing new products. 
According to the pharmaceutical industry, this is partly a result of the industry's inability to restrict 
the practice of parallel trade; see chapter 1(2) above. 
" DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary 
abuses - public consultation, D G Competition (December 2005), (<http://ec.europa.eu/comm/ 
competition/antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf>), para. 81. See also chapter 2(2.5) above. 
" See Case T-168/0l,n. 15 above. 
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By providing an objective justification or declaring such measures to be exempt 
under Article 81(3) EC Treaty, the common market objective would be proportional 
to the need to promote public health and safety. Advocate General Jacobs's Opinion 
in Syfait^^ and the CFI's G/oxoffeZ/cowe^* judgment should therefore be endorsed. 
This would compensate for the effects of the 'exhaustion of rights' doctrine on the 
need to promote R&D. 
2.3 Gradually making the Community marketing authorisation procedure 
compulsory 
The Community market for pharmaceutical products consists o f pharmaceutical 
products benefiting from a range of different marketing authorisations and licences 
granted using different procedures. This complicated system threatens the free 
movement of pharmaceutical products and, to an extent, the safety and efficacy of 
the pharmaceutical trade. The safety and efficacy is weakened due to the fact that 
there is no centralisation. Member States have to rely on the European Medicines 
Agency (EMEA) and other Member State Medicines Control Agencies. 
This can be remedied without affecting legal certainty by gradually making the 
centralised Community marketing authorisation procedure compulsory for more 
categories of pharmaceutical products.^' This would solve many problems for all 
the three involved parties; the marketing authorisation holder, the parallel importer, 
and society at large, not to mention further Community integration. Since parallel 
imported products which benefit from a Community marketing authorisation do not 
need to apply for a PIL, the 'simplified procedure' would be abolished altogether. 
Further, once the marketing authorisation is withdrawn, parallel importation w i l l 
not be possible. However, since most withdrawn marketing authorisations are 
replaced by new marketing authorisations for similar products, parallel importation 
of the replacing product can commence instantly. Repackaging of pharmaceutical 
" N. 13 above. 
Case T-168/0l ,n. 15 above 
59 See chapter 3(2.1 -2.2) on the centralised procedure. 
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products would not be necessary, at least not to the same extent as it is with 
products which benefit from PILs. This would increase public health and safety, not 
least since bundling together of different packs with different expiration dates and 
the removal of batch codes from centrally authorised products is not allowed. 
As discussed in chapter 3(4), the wording of Regulation 726/2004 indeed suggests 
that the Community marketing authorisation procedure may gradually become 
compulsory for more product groups.^ *^ This is supported by the fact that, as o f 20 
May 2008, the procedure w i l l be made compulsory for products to treat auto-
immune diseases, immune dysfunctions and viral diseases.^' However, objections to 
such reform are likely to come from national Medicines Control Agencies, and 
indirectly Member States, since it would lead to a decrease in responsibilities and 
possible down-sizing of such agencies, and the regulation of the national 
pharmaceutical industry and market falls under the retained national competence 
over the protection of public health and safety in accordance with Article 30 EC 
Treaty. Manufacturers may also oppose this recommendation as it potentially 
affects the ability to foreclose national markets even though that ability should be 
non-existent following the Paranova cases and the AstraZeneca Decision. 
However, the benefit of only having to apply for one marketing authorisation is 
likely to outweigh this disadvantage. Similarly, parallel importers may object to the 
proposal due to its centralisation. I f the Community marketing authorisation is 
withdrawn, it w i l l be withdrawn throughout the Commimity. However, this 
argument should be outweighed by the benefit of not having to apply for a PIL in 
the first place. 
*° See Annex to Council Regulation ( E C ) 726/2004 laying down Community procedures for the 
authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and estabhshing a 
European Medicines Agency [2004] O.J. LI36/01. 
ibid. 
" Case C-15/01, n. 23 above; and Case C-113/01, n. 23 above. 
" In Commission Decision COMP/A.37.507/F3-AstraZeneca of 15 July 2005 (not yet reported, but 
non-confidential version available on DG Competition's website:<http://ec.europa.eu/comm/ 
competition/index_en.html>), the Commission held that the practice of withdrawing marketing 
authorisations, with the intention of blocking parallel imports, is an infringement of Article 82 E C 
Treaty if the undertaking holds a dominant position. See chapter 2(2.4.2) above. 
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Applying the mutual recognition principle to national marketing authorisations^'' (in 
effect making the 'mutual recognition' procedure compulsory for all pharmaceutical 
products)^' would perhaps be more welcomed by Member States than eventually 
making the centralised procedure compulsory. It would potentially increase safety, 
but would still require certain cooperation and exchange of information between 
Member States, while not solving the issue of PILs: a PIL would still be needed in 
order to guarantee safety in the absence of a centralised procedure only allowing for 
the marketing o f a single version in terms of origin, pack size, and brand name of 
the authorised product.^^ 
2.4 Applying a strict interpretation of the 2003 'specific mechanism' 
Allowing parallel importers to circumvent the 'specific mechanism' by routing the 
transport o f the goods through, and carrying out the repackaging process, in 
Member States where the 'specific mechanism' is not applicable would undermine 
the very purpose of the mechanism, and have an effect on the need to promote 
future R&D, thus indirectly affecting public health and safety. As the 'specific 
mechanism' allows patent proprietors to prevent the 'import and marketing'*^ of 
the product, the ECJ would be well advised to simply rule that the 'specific 
mechanism' can be invoked, at least, up until the proprietor has consented to such 
marketing in a Member State within the scope of the mechanism, or until fu-st 
marketing in a Member State outside the scope of the mechanism. This w i l l prevent 
the rights under the mechanism being exhausted after first importation.^^ 
See Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis de 
Dijon) [1979] E . C . R . 649. 
See chapter 3(2.2) above on the mutual recognition procedure. 
^ See chapter 3(2.1.1) above. 
" N. 25 above, para 2. 
See chapter 5(5.2.2) above. 
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2.5 Limiting the exhaustion of rights doctrine to strictly necessary repackaging 
and rebranding 
The exhaustion o f rights doctrine cannot be criticised from a public health and 
safety perspective, as this falls upon the Community's labelling and package leaflet 
regulations to safeguard. Since the doctrine is an important aspect o f the common 
market objective, it must be equally applicable to all product groups in order to 
preserve legal certainty. 
However, the doctrine should be limited to strictly 'necessary' repackaging and 
rebranding. The ECJ may have taken the pro-integration aspect a step too far by 
introducing the 'customer preference test,' allowing parallel importers to adjust to 
the different Member State market conditions, instead of delegating the 
responsibility of letting customers and commercial forces in the Community grow 
accustomed to repackaged products to the parallel importers themselves. The 
'exhaustion o f rights' doctrine, in relation to parallel imported pharmaceutical 
products, has with the introduction of the 'customer preference test' and the practice 
of 'co-branding'^° developed into a grey-zone between enabling parallel trade and 
satisfying parallel importers' commercial aspirations. 
It is therefore hoped that the Court w i l l follow Advocate General Sharpston's 
Opinion in Case C-348/04, in which the Advocate General states that 'the 
requirement that repackaging be necessary...applies merely to the fact of reboxing 
and does not extend to the precise manner and style thereof.'^' This w i l l allow 
national courts to implement a wide definition of 'legitimate reason' for the purpose 
of prohibiting co-branding, as parallel traders w i l l not be able to show that such 
(particular) co-branding is 'necessary' in order to gain market access. Allowing co-
branding i f deemed 'necessary' in order to f u l f i l the common market objective, as a 
separate and additional 'necessity/market partitioning' test, would have an 
See chapter 6(4.2) above. 
See Case chapter 6(4.2) above. 
" Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-348/04, n. 41 above, para. 100 (delivered on 6 April 2006, 
not yet reported). 
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unnecessarily negative impact on the trademark ovraer's rights to the benefit o f the 
parallel importers' commercial aspirations. The ECJ must limit the doctrine to 
strictly 'necessary' repackaging and rebranding, sending a clear signal to national 
courts that further rulings should not be necessary within this area of the law. 
2.6 Drawing up clear guidelines for the repackaging ofparallel imported 
pharmaceutical products 
Failing to implement recommendation 3,^ ^ the Community should draw up clear 
guidelines and/or (preferably) include these in a future amendment to Directive 
2001/83/EC.^^ This should; 
• Clarify the responsibility of national Medicines Control Agencies, setting up 
clear channels of cooperation. Particularly concerning the granting and 
enforcement of MALs and WDLs, as the current requirement that M A L 
holders must carry out the repackaging process in the Member State issuing 
the licence may not be compatible with Article 28 EC Treaty.^"* The same 
argument can be applied to national legislation prohibiting M A L holders in 
other Member States from importing pharmaceutical products in the absence 
of holding a W D L in the Member State of importation.^^ Strong and 
structured cooperation w i l l be needed in order to guarantee public health and 
safety should the ECJ consider such legislation to be incompatible with 
Articles 28 and 30 EC Treaty in a future ruling. 
• Introduce clear guidelines on the re-attachment of batch codes.^^ Perhaps the 
most plausible solution to the problems associated with this practice is to 
establish an alternative system of 're-pack batch codes.' By substituting the 
original codes by new codes that can be translated into the original code by 
Gradually making the Community marketing authorisation procedure compulsory: see pp. 264-
266 above. 
" N. 45 above. 
See chapter 7(2) above. 
" ibid. 
See chapter 7(3.2.2) above. 
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the parallel importer, the manufacturer w i l l be able to trace the goods in the 
event of a product recall f rom the information given by the parallel importer, 
thus only revealing the source of supply under such circumstances. This 
would allow the ECJ to maintain its pro-integration policy without affecting 
public health and safety. 
Even though statistics do not suggest that repackaging constitutes a risk to public 
health and safety,^^ the implementation of this recommendation w i l l strengthen the 
Community regulatory framework so as to minimise the potential risk to public 
health and safety. Parallel importers have much to gain from the implementation of, 
and their subsequent compliance, with this recommendation - not least to increase 
patients' confidence in the safety of the trade. 
" See chapter 7(4) above. 
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